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FOREWORD 
The Parliaments and Legislatures Series provides for the publication 
of studies of parliamentary or legislative institutions in democratic so­
cieties. The names parliament and legislature are commonly used to label 
the representative assemblies of nations, states, provinces, or regions. 
Sometimes the term parliament is reserved for assemblies that mostly 
deliberate, ventilate, debate, or provide catharsis, while legislature is 
used to refer to assemblies that have strong lawmaking powers. In prac­
tice, this distinction can be misleading: some parliaments wield im­
pressive legislative power, and some legislatures are "rubber stamps." 
The label parliament may be used to denote the representative assembly 
in a parliamentary system of government, where the working executive 
is chosen or confirmed by the assembly, while the name legislature may 
more readily be identified with nonparliamentary, separated systems. 
But this distinction is not universal. Accordingly, we consider both 
names for representative assemblies to be generic, using them inter­
changeably. And this series of books carries the title "Parliaments and 
Legislatures" to signify that all such assemblies, however named, may 
fall within the series' purview. 
We are living in an age in which democratic constitutions and pol­
itics are being established, or are emerging, in parts of the world pre­
viously under authoritarian domination. Democracy is one of those 
rather uncertain political concepts susceptible to varying meanings. In 
contemporary writing about democratization, democracy often means 
the existence of a culture of civic participation in which free expression 
and free elections may thrive. Democratization, or democratic consol­
idation, is too frequently analyzed only in these terms, without giving 
attention to political institutions, and especially to legislative or parlia­
mentary institutions. Yet it seems axiomatic that representative assem­
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blies are essential institutions for democracy in large-scale societies. 
This series of books is founded on the assumption that parliaments 
and legislatures are at the heart of democracy. The study of democratic 
politics must entail anatomizing the selection, structure, performance, 
and impact of parliamentary or legislative institutions. 
Heretofore, parliaments and legislatures have been studied mainly 
at the national level. Most of our knowledge about these institutions 
comes from research on assemblies like the United States Congress 
and the British and to some extent the Commonwealth parliaments, 
and there are a few scattered studies of parliaments elsewhere. The 
main exception to this national focus in legislative studies is provided 
by state legislatures in the United States, where 50 semisovereign sub-
national units have their own important lawmaking bodies. 
Today, subnational legislative assemblies, apart from the American 
state legislatures, have emerged as vitally important entities for obser­
vation and analysis. Changes occurring across the democratic world 
stir demands for significant political participation in local communi­
ties, local control of crucial governing activities, political decision mak­
ing by community institutions, and reduced centralization, devolving 
political power from national to regional, provincial, or local govern­
ments. William M. Downs's Coalition Government, Subnational Style grows 
out of his recognition of the new or enhanced importance of sub-
national, regional parliaments in major European countries. 
As his inquiry evolved, Downs's curiosity about parliamentary in­
stitutions branched in two directions. First, he sought to investigate 
more fully the recurrent patterns of coalition politics in western Eu­
ropean political systems. Second, he became curious about political 
party behavior in the French regional assemblies and thus decided to 
investigate subnational coalition politics in France and, comparatively, 
in Belgium and Germany. As he investigated coalitions within each of 
the subnational parliaments he analyzed, he sought to unravel the link­
ages between leaders, parties, and parliaments at the regional and na­
tional levels. He came to ask, "Is the politics of coalition formation 
observed at the national level similar to or different from coalition for­
mation in subnational assemblies?" 
The three country settings provide Downs with fruitful variations 
in the contexts for subnational assembly behavior. In France—a uni­
tary political system often described as highly centralized—22 regional 
parliaments were operating by the 1980s, creating a fascinating new 
subnational environment for coalition politics. In Belgium, a formerly 
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unitary system with 9 provincial councils was transformed in the mid­
1990s into a federal state with directly elected regional assemblies in 
Flanders, Wallonia, and Brussels. Germany is a highly federalized sys­
tem with 16 autonomous states, each with its own state legislature. 
In these three countries, the composition of political party coalitions 
varies across regions and between regional and national levels; pat­
terns of electoral competition differ in interesting ways; and the ver­
tical linkages between the subnational and national governmental units 
are diverse. Downs's cogent analysis of these divergent subnational 
parliamentary institutions and parties makes an important contribu­
tion to knowledge about parliaments and legislatures. The journey is 
an informative and delightful one—from Luxembourg to Picardie, 
from Baden-Wiirttemberg to Brabant, from Languedoc-Roussillon 
and Pays de la Loire to Lower Saxony and Liege. Their regional par­
liaments are lively and illuminating, with vigorous party leaders and 
party groups immersed in the politics of coalition building. 
This is a theoretically and empirically rich analysis. It deftly draws 
upon historical and documentary evidence and upon survey data gath­
ered from individual representatives in the subnational assemblies. 
Downs makes a particularly unusual contribution to comparative pol­
itics in the analysis across both regions and nations. There are also 
numerous fascinating nuggets of discovery in this book that can stim­
ulate the imagination and lead to further inquiry. As regional parlia­
ments become more common and more important, this study will come 
to serve as a landmark, a baseline for research on subnational repre­
sentative assemblies. But for now, the reader will find in these pages 
the basis for a richer understanding of the role of parliamentary co­
alition politics in the process of democratization. 
SAMUEL C. PATTERSON 

PREFACE 
Coalition government is a natural obsession for the American observer 
of European politics. At home in the United States, we sit comfortably 
election night after election night and watch as network news anchors 
tell us with ever-increasing rapidity who has won and who has lost. We 
retire to bed safe in the knowledge of who will govern and who will 
not. However, in much of western Europe, and in all multiparty sys­
tems characterized by even a modicum of proportional representation, 
election night usually marks the beginning—not the end—of the gov­
ernment formation process. When no single party secures an outright 
legislative majority, the postelection period is one of vast and varied 
possibilities marked by formal negotiations and backroom deals, by 
promises made and promises broken, and by optimistic public displays 
of unity from new partners all too aware of the fragility of any alliance 
among political competitors. The politics of coalition, especially for the 
American political scientist, is truly great theater. 
The study of coalition politics in regional and local-level represen­
tative assemblies in continental European systems is, initially, rather a 
more difficult sell. I must admit that it did not immediately hold much 
allure for me after having long been captivated by the high drama of 
political machinations in national parliaments. After all, subnational 
politics was not supposed to get much more exciting than waste man­
agement, hospital administration, and land use planning—right? I 
came to the subject in the spring of 1989 rather by chance when, while 
on holiday in Normandy, France, I read in Le Monde about thefits Jean-
Marie Le Pen's far-right Front National was giving the mainstream 
French conservative parties in many of the country's 22 regional as­
semblies. Three years earlier, while all party leaders had publicly 
refused to consider cooperating with the FN at the parliamentary 
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level, newly elected center-right regional councilors from Aquitaine to 
Languedoc-Roussillon to Haute Normandie quietly collaborated with 
the FN to secure executive power. Now it seemed that the strategy had 
exacted high public relations costs, had pushed moderate and liberal 
voters to the left, and had superimposed national debate over immi­
gration control, unemployment, AIDS, and crime onto the regional 
agenda. Even far from the National Assembly, coalition building—the 
politics of strange bedfellows—could be riveting stuff. 
Three years and another French regional election later, my interest 
in coalition strategy in the periphery developed into a Ph.D. disser­
tation prospectus. Trained to think comparatively, like many in my 
generation of political scientists at Emory University, I recognized that 
embedded in subnational coalition government are some substantively 
interesting and theoretically challenging puzzles that could be tested 
in numerous countries: How and why do patterns of party alliances in 
the periphery differ in systematic ways from those witnessed in the 
capital? How closely do the outcomes of coalition negotiations con­
ducted away from the glare of national politics appear to match elec­
toral verdicts and patterns of electoral competition? Do coalitions 
produce consensual decision-making regimes within subnational as­
semblies or, alternatively, paralyze legislative processes with the ideo­
logical intransigence that often marks national parliamentary govern­
ment? How much coalitional learning and diffusion of models is there 
between national and subnational assemblies? 
Early forays into journalistic accounts of individual cases produced 
the kind of findings that beg for more sophisticated scrutiny. There 
were tales of internal party betrayal and of undisciplined secret votes, 
accounts of successful and enduring partnerships never attempted at 
the national level, and, most frequently, evidence that national figures 
(members of parliament and party leaders) were involved—by invi­
tation or by imposition—in the process of negotiating the division of 
government spoils in the periphery. Armed with the political scientist's 
methodological tools, I set out to impose some order and understand­
ing on a complex and fascinating reality. 
My original fascination with the possibilities of coalition govern­
ment and my subsequent but ultimately deep appreciation for sub-
national politics drove me to write a dissertation and now this book. 
During the course of these projects, I have accumulated a large num­
ber of acquaintances and debts, too numerous for me to mention all 
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by name. It is indeed a pleasure, however, to acknowledge some of 
them here. I am especially grateful to Professor Thomas Lancaster, 
who inspired my approach to comparative political research and who 
gave me both the guidance and the intellectual space to produce an 
ambitious doctoral dissertation. My debt to Tom Lancaster goes be­
yond that first project: in helping me return to Europe so soon and to 
obtain a postdoctoral research/teaching position there, he pointed me 
toward the perfect opportunity to transform the dissertation into its 
present book form. 
I have benefited from the advice, support, and time of numerous 
persons in different phases of researching and writing this book. For 
assistance in translating into French and German the survey question­
naire that provides much of the original data for this study, I thank 
Caroline Guichard, Bob King, Jeanne Fourneyron, Marianne Lancas­
ter, Andreas Sobisch, and Geoffrey Roberts. I should also like to thank 
the Political Science Department at Emory University and the Grad­
uate School of Arts and Sciences for their generous financial support 
of the survey questionnaire. Maggie Nicholson, Executive Director of 
the Fulbright Commission in Brussels, and Emile Boulpaep, President 
of the Belgian American Educational Foundation, deserve special rec­
ognition for supporting my first year (1992—93) of field work in Eu­
rope. Equally deserving are the countless politicians, party executives, 
and bureaucrats whose willingness to meet and speak with me gen­
erated much of the original data for this study. Others assisted by pro­
viding valuable documents and source material. Several persons who 
contributed especially useful information do deserve recognition. 
In Belgium, these were Paul Maertens at the Brussels Centrum Voor 
Politieke, Economische en Sociale Studies; Xavier Mabille at the 
Centre de Recherche et d'Information Socio-Politiques; Liewen de 
Winter at the Universite Catholique de Lou vain; Jan Peumans of the 
Limburg Volksunie; Freddy Clauwaerts of the Socialist Party Feder­
ation in Mons; Christiane Lemaire of the Namur Provincial adminis­
tration; Charles Simon, Hainaut Provincial Council greffier; William 
Blondeel, communications officer of the East Flanders Provincial 
Council; Ghislaine Stevens-Maes at the Association des Provinces 
Beiges; and Philippe Lamair of the Radio-Television Beige de la Com­
munaute Frangaise (RTBF). 
In France, these individuals were Dominique Theo at the Picardie 
Conseil Regional in Amiens; Patrick Dos at the Auvergne Conseil Re­
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gional in Chamalieres; Jean Callewaert, Director General of the Basse-
Normandie Conseil Regional; and Monique Rousselin at the He de 
France Conseil Regional in Paris. 
In Germany, these individuals were Heinrich Augustin at the Lower 
Saxony Landtag in Hannover; Michael Tolksdorf at the Berlin Abge­
ordnetenhaus; Reinhard GroB, Chief of Protocol at the Hesse Land-
tag in Wiesbaden; Ingeborg Ruopp at the Green Party secretariat in 
Stuttgart; Hendrik de Boer, press spokesman at the Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern Landtag; Hinnerk Fock, press spokesman at the Ham­
burg Biirgerschaft; Gerald Wood, press spokesman at the Branden­
burg Landtag; Dr. GruB at the Sachsen-Anhalt Landtag; and Dr. 
Mittelsdorf at the Thiiringer Landtag in Erfurt. 
My thanks go also to Paul Pierson, Abby Collins, and their col­
leagues at the Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies at 
Harvard University. My visiting fellowship at Harvard provided a 
unique opportunity to produce the first version of this manuscript. 
The present book is a better one for my having had the experience. 
Invaluable, too, was the support of colleagues and friends during my 
final preparation of this book while I was at Odense University and 
Aarhus University in Denmark: Poul Erik Mouritzen, Mogens N. Ped­
ersen, and J0rgen Gr0nnegard Christiansen. The chance to apply my 
ideas to the Scandinavian systems proved tremendously instructive— 
mange tak! 
Of course, none of this would have been possible without the con­
stant and overwhelming support of my family. This I have enjoyed 
from the very beginning. To my parents, thanks for your inspiration 
and pride. To "my girls"—Kimberly, wife and best friend, and Rachel, 
our beautiful daughter—this book is deservedly dedicated. 
Part One 
Introduction


Chapter One 
Who Will Govern! Dilemmas 
of Coalition Government 
and Parliamentary Democracy 
This book addresses a theme of central importance to the theory and practice of parliamentary democracy in western Europe: 
multiparty coalition government. Coalition government is the subject 
of a voluminous literature within the political science discipline; how­
ever, the present study is unique in its systematic and comparative fo­
cus on coalition government in the richly diverse yet underresearched 
institutional setting of subnational (i.e., regional, provincial, local) rep­
resentative assemblies. Across western Europe in the increasingly pow­
erful institutions of subcentral governance, the politics of coalition has 
become a high-stakes affair with consequences exceeding the limited 
confines of individual localities. In the state parliaments of federal Ger­
many, for example, Green parties have since the mid-1980s upset the 
country's once predictable balance of power. In countries as varied as 
France, Belgium, Italy, and Austria, nationalist forces of the extreme 
far Right have gained toeholds in their respective political systems by 
venturing into power-sharing coalitions with mainstream parties at re­
gional, provincial, and municipal levels. Even in Britain, where the La­
bour and Conservative parties monopolize power at Westminster and 
Downing Street, Liberal Democrats have taken advantage of majority-
less "hung" county and city councils to gain a share of governing re­
sponsibility. With the politicization and nationalization of subnational 
government in recent decades, alignments on the geographical chess­
board of political power in most European democracies have become 
increasingly volatile and complex. 
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"Winner-take-air majoritarian electoral systems at both national 
and subnational levels, such as those in the United States, tend to take 
much of the mystery out of the question "Who will govern?" Con­
versely, the proportional representation systems common throughout 
the continental European democracies normally produce election re­
sults in which no single party holds a majority of council seats. Thus, 
as in national parliamentary institutions in these countries, elections 
to federal state legislatures, regional parliaments, provincial assem­
blies, county boards, and municipal councils tend to produce strong 
incentives for political parties to build alliances in order to form a gov­
erning majority. This book is premised on the observation that in the 
formation of coalition governments we find the crystallization of many 
of the political processes fundamental to representative and parlia­
mentary democracy: interpretation of electoral verdicts, postelection 
compromising of campaign pledges, trade-offs between policy and 
power, indirect selection of executive authority, temporary coopera­
tion between long-term adversaries, collective decision making, and, 
with collective responsibility, a blurring of lines of accountability. 
The prima facie importance of coalition formation is widely ac­
cepted in the context of national parliamentary institutions, but the 
subject is much less analyzed, much less compared, and therefore 
much less understood in the context of subnational assemblies. Seek­
ing to remedy this deficiency, this book has three guiding objectives: 
1. To depict the building of power-sharing coalitions in subnational 
parliaments as outward and well-defined manifestations of po­
litical motivation, governing intent, and democratic responsive­
ness 
2. To assemble and analyze observations and statements of moti­
vations and beliefs made by middle-level legislators—elected 
representatives whose obligations, experiences, and ambitions 
are for the most part overlooked by students of parliamentary 
government 
3. To build upon existing theories of coalition politics to identify 
cross-national behavioral similarities and to highlight within-
nation differences as they are revealed in actual high-stakes po­
litical situations 
Who Will Govern? • 5 
Elections, Coalitions, and Representation 
Two centuries ago, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, in The Social Contract, in­
sisted that "the instant a people gives itself to representatives, it is no 
longer free" (103). For some, Rousseau's radical critique of democratic 
representation may be a bit overstated. In today's world, few would 
contend that perfect direct democracy is really possible on any useful 
scale; still, Rousseau effectively reminds us that the relationship be­
tween representatives and the represented is at best imperfect. One 
particular concern voiced by some observers of political systems char­
acterized by coalition government is whether the quality of democratic 
representation and of the electoral mechanism itself is diminished 
when legislative parties—not voters—ultimately answer the question 
"Who will govern?" 
Two decades ago, Abram De Swaan (1973) also wrote of represen­
tative democracy's imperfections: "If different governments, varying 
in party membership and policy, may result from a given election out­
come, either there is no 'verdict of the electorate' or . .  . the verdict is 
not necessarily, or even usually realized in multi-party systems" (1—2). 
De Swaan at that moment put his finger on one of the supposed weak­
nesses of coalition systems, namely that they remove any direct linkage 
between votes and the formation of a government. According to basic 
tenets of liberal democratic theory, voters—not party leaders locked in 
secretive backroom negotiations—should determine the political com­
plexion of a governing executive body. In political systems that en­
courage government by coalition, however, popular will is instrumental 
only in that it decides which political parties will sit in parliament. Once 
this initial matter is determined, deputies and party leaders are ulti­
mately free to choose from among a potentially huge number of cross-
party combinations and permutations in search of a winning majority. 
This process may produce "strange bedfellows," governments that fail 
to resemble the messages sent by voters some days, weeks, or even 
months earlier. "Coalitions of minorities," groups of small parties 
whose policy preferences may be starkly incompatible, can unite for 
the sole purpose of evicting a larger party from its hegemonic place 
in government. Similarly, "coalitions of losers," parties and adversaries 
whose electoral scores have just dropped precipitously, can join forces 
to cling to power and forestall their mutual demise. The failure to come 
to any cross-party agreement may also produce "coalition avoidance" 
and thus minority governments, often weak and beholden throughout 
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their terms to transient legislative voting majorities or to the threat of 
blackmail from some external party. Indeed, it would seem that almost 
anything is possible in postelection coalition formation. 
A growing number of rigorous studies of government formation 
now suggest that, in reality, the realm of possible cross-party coalitions 
is systematically and significantly constricted by the rules, structures, 
and norms of the parliamentary institutions to which parties gain ac­
cess (Bergman 1995; Laver and Schofield 1990; Strom 1994; Strom, 
Budge, and Laver 1994). These attempts at reconciling a neoinstitu­
tionalist approach with that of formal rational choice theory have 
clearly enhanced the already rich literature on cabinet coalitions in 
European national governments (see Bogdanor 1983; Browne and 
Dreijmanis 1982; Dodd 1976; Luebbert 1986; Pridham 1986). Still, 
efforts to understand coalition behavior in a "constrained real world" 
(Laver and Schofield 1990, 195) remain deficient in at least two re­
spects, the first of which is their general failure to consider broader 
issues of democratic representation. Indeed, inseparable from our de­
sire to better explain and anticipate the political composition of coa­
lition governments should be the goal of evaluating the dynamics of 
coalition formation within the larger democratic process. Political sci­
ence can, for example, evaluate popular claims that political parties 
purposefully manipulate the coalition process in order to circumvent 
electoral verdicts. We can look further to determine if, as is often 
charged, the secretive postelection bargaining and deal making char­
acteristic of government formation undercut the electoral process, thus 
weakening a supposedly fundamental link between citizens and their 
representatives. These concerns help stimulate thought on coalition 
formation not only as a curious behavioral puzzle but also as an am­
biguous mechanism in the machinery of parliamentary democracy. 
Existing efforts also remain deficient by failing to exploit alternative 
data sources outside the national parliamentary arena. Scrutiny of coa­
lition politics in subnational institutions of representative governance 
is especially overdue; the topic has been described as "an almost en­
tirely unworked field in political science" (Mellors 1989, 8) and a 
"largely forgotten area" (Pridham 1987, 374). At subnational levels, 
processes of institutional and political decentralization during the past 
two decades have created new political expectations and new political 
opportunities. In some countries (e.g., France, Belgium, Italy, Spain), 
decentralization has created entirely new institutions of representative 
government, directly elected councils and parliaments located at an 
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intermediate, or "meso," position between national and local govern­
ments. In other countries (e.g., Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Norway), 
decentralization has empowered existing institutions with new fiscal 
and deliberative responsibilities. In all countries, a common justifica­
tion for breathing new life into subnational institutions has been that 
they bring government closer to the people, increase the opportunities 
for citizen participation, decentralize economic decision making, and, 
in short, increase the state's "democraticness" (Putnam 1993; Schmidt 
1990; Sharpe 1993). Thus we have one of our first puzzles to solve: 
How does the "decentralization as democratization" ideal square with 
observations indicating that in many instances local electoral compe­
tition, local public opinion, and local policy issues are not the driving 
forces behind party strategy and key decisions, such as government 
formation, at subnational levels? As an artificial act, and as the im­
mediate act following an election, the process of manufacturing a gov­
erning majority is one area in which parties' choices can be evaluated 
in light of their professed intentions to enhance transparency, account­
ability, and responsiveness in decision making. 
Designed to contribute to serious thinking along these lines, this 
book raises three essential sets of questions: 
1. If different local and regional governments, varying in party 
membership and policy, may result from a given election out­
come, then is the process that yields such "strange bedfellows" 
genuinely responsive to the preferences of the electorate? In 
other words, do electoral competition and electoral verdicts really matter 
in coalition systems? 
2. Do politicians elected to subnational parliaments follow the stra­
tegic instructions of central party leaders, or do regional and lo­
cal parties have a free hand in their coalition decisions? In short, 
when national/subnational divisions over strategy arise, are local 
and regional politicians loyal to their national leaders or their local con­
stituents? 
3. In demonstrating the (in)compatibility of parties, their (in)effi-
cacy in governing, and the electoral (un) popularity of a part­
nership, do coalitions in regional and local parliaments supply 
part of the "perfect information" that national party leaders 
need when they sit down at the bargaining table to negotiate a 
new national government? In what sense are subnational parlia­
ments "proving grounds" for future national coalition governments? 
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Answers to these questions can help explain one of the most important 
recurrent events in parliamentary democracy. Moreover, they allow 
deeper understandings of the meanings of representation, power, and co­
operation outside the more familiar institutional arena of national par­
liamentary politics. 
Coalition Politics in the Real World of 
Subnational Assemblies 
To get a flavor for the politics of coalition as it plays out in subnational 
institutions, we can point to a mix of examples. When, for instance, a 
party holding just 8 seats in a parliament of 113 members in France's 
third-largest region emerges from postelection coalition bargaining in 
sole possession of the regional presidency, in control of the regional 
cabinet, and in command of a Fr 3.9-million regional budget, the pro­
cess by which relative electoral weakness transforms itself into sub­
stantial governmental power becomes central to the concerns of polit­
ical science.l When a party gains the plurality of votes and seats in five 
consecutive elections in Belgium's largest province and is on five con­
secutive occasions excluded and denied any share of provincial power, 
then the process by which relative electoral strength transforms itself 
into complete governmental weakness is again clearly important.2 And 
when a radical right-wing party led by an unrepentant veteran of the 
Waffen SS for the first time enters the parliament of one of Germany's 
wealthiest Lander with 11% of the vote, forces the election's two big 
losers—the Christian Democrats (CDU) and the Social Democrats 
(SPD)—into a rare "Grand Coalition," and thus leaves the Landtag 
with virtually no democratic opposition, then the ability of represen­
tative government to function effectively under such circumstances 
must certainly be examined.3 In short, many substantively important 
political outcomes stand to influence large numbers of people but are 
generally overlooked in the literatures on coalition government and 
parliamentary democracy. 
Journalistic treatment of these outcomes is extensive. There is, 
moreover, a small but growing body of literature that addresses indi­
vidual cases and single countries. Good work has been done, for ex­
ample, on the Dutch municipal councils (Denters 1985, 1993; Kuiper 
and Tops 1989; Steunenberg 1992), on the Danish municipal councils 
(Pedersen and Elklit 1995; Thomas 1989), on the Belgian municipal 
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and provincial councils (Mabille 1982, 1986; Pijnenburg 1987, 1988, 
1989), on the Italian municipal and regional councils (Pridham 1984, 
1986; Zariski 1984), on Germany's Land legislatures (Gunlicks 1977; 
Roberts 1989), on the so-called hung county and regional councils in 
Britain (Laver, Railings, and Thrasher 1987; Mellors 1983, 1984, 
1989; Temple 1991), on the regional assemblies in post-Franco Spain 
(Botella 1989; Robinson 1989), and on France's new regional councils 
(Hainsworth and Loughlin 1989; Mazey 1986; Perrineau 1987; Schmidt 
1990). What these works lack, unfortunately, is genuine comparison. 
Little effort has been made to understand varying political responses 
to power-sharing opportunities at subnational levels across these var­
ious countries. Comparison, then, is one area to which the present 
study seeks to contribute. 
What existing works do tell us very clearly is that coalition outcomes 
are valued by political parties and by voters. This, they conclude, is 
axiomatic. Government status is critical in subnational assemblies, and 
competition for government status is a struggle for resources—both 
political and economic. Provincial and regional governments oversee 
budgets that in past decades have generally grown at rates faster than 
those in local or national government. The overloaded, overburdened 
modern welfare state has "off-loaded" many of its traditional tasks to 
the subcentral units (Batley and Stoker 1991; Jones and Keating 1995; 
Sharpe 1993). Provincial and regional executives not only are charged 
with managing grants and fiscal transfers from the state and from the 
European Union but also have authority and responsibility in such 
areas as investment, regional development, transportation, infrastruc­
ture, education, professional training, social services, environmental 
management, supervision over local governments, and, of course, 
taxation. 
Beyond service delivery, part of "responsible" democratic gover­
nance is responsive and representative institutions of subnational gov­
ernance. Subnational institutions can fulfill purposeful obligations. If 
subnational governance "matters," as a survey of its functional impor­
tance would indicate, then the partisan composition of the governing 
executives themselves should also matter in a practical sense. Research 
indicates that subnational assemblies are increasingly the domain of 
disciplined political party groups and not simply of individuals only 
titularly attached to national party organizations (Dunleavy 1980; Mel­
lors and Pijnenburg 1989; Selle and Svasand 1983). Despite morose 
academic predictions of the "end of ideology" and the "decline of 
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party," we may still assume that the policies of a single-party Socialist 
regional government will differ predictably from those of a single-
party Christian Democratic or Liberal regional government. Indeed, 
there is evidence to support the general proposition that, all else being 
equal, Left-controlled regions have tended to tax, spend, and borrow 
more heavily than Right-controlled regional authorities (Denters 1993; 
Mazey 1993; Page and Goldsmith 1987). To cite just one example, in 
the so-called red Hainaut province in Belgium—"red" because it is the 
bastion of the Socialist Party—taxes and spending per capita are three 
times those of neighboring East Flanders, which has had a conservative 
provincial majority for two uninterrupted decades (Bernard 1992; 
Huge 1989, 1991). 
We must wonder, however, how well a multiparty coalition govern­
ment will perform, especially if it is the product of untried alliances, 
such as those between Socialists and Liberals, traditional parties and 
ecologists, or centrist parties and extremists. What are the effects of 
coalition on subnational budgets, taxes, services, or the distribution of 
central government outlays? Does coalition encourage perpetual leg­
islative "gridlock," or can multiparty power sharing in subnational as­
semblies cultivate pragmatism and cooperation? Clearly, each coalition 
outcome in a local or provincial parliament is a story in itself. Each 
coalition has policy implications, both in terms of substance and in 
terms of intergovernmental coherence. Each coalition says something 
about the degree to which competitors and even avowed adversaries 
can cooperate in democratic systems. Each coalition provides impor­
tant indications as to the locus of power and influence in political par­
ties and in representative assemblies. These are nontrivial concerns; a 
nonsuperficial understanding of modern parliamentary governance, 
therefore, requires that they be addressed. 
Theoretical Justification 
The study of subnational coalition formation provides the opportunity 
to collect empirical observations concerning behavioral outcomes and 
to test alternative causal hypotheses against them. For example, one 
set of outcomes that raises a host of theoretical questions concerns 
those multiparty governing arrangements that deviate from the more 
familiar patterns established in national parliamentary politics. In fact, 
our study could begin by making a single observation: in most multi­
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party systems with directly elected territorial assemblies, power-sharing 
alliances at national and subnational levels of government rarely match. 
Despite the numerical possibility of faithfully mirroring the national 
government-versus-opposition pattern, regional and provincial coali­
tions are frequently "incongruent," with party allies at one level of gov­
ernment facing off as opponents at the next. 
The phenomenon prevails throughout the European democracies. 
The Free Democrats in Germany, for example, participate in regional-
level governments with Social Democrats while playing partner to the 
Christian Union parties in Bonn. The conservative parties in France 
collude with the extremist Front National in the regions while boasting 
a clear and safe distance from the "lepenistes" in Paris. Socialists and 
Liberals in Belgium defy traditional ideological divisions to form joint 
regional, provincial, and municipal governments while refusing co­
operation at the national level. Italian Socialists and Social Democrats 
have shared power with the Communists in regional administrations 
without any similar arrangements evolving in Rome. Even county 
branches of the Conservative and Labour parties in Britain have es­
tablished de facto governing coalitions, although this has been un­
thinkable in national government. 
The puzzle of two levels of the same political party belonging to 
different coalition camps raises an array of questions: Are the incen­
tives and constraints that compel political parties to ally with one an­
other in territorial parliaments the same as those that guide parlia­
mentary parties at the national level? For any given party, where are 
the fundamental decisions about participation in subnational coali­
tions made—at the subnational or the national level? On what bases 
are these decisions made? How much influence is brought to bear on 
subnational party groups by the national party leadership, and vice 
versa? Are governing coalitions at subnational levels more or less re­
sponsive to the will of the electorate than those at the national level? 
Finally, to what extent do political parties use subnational assemblies 
either as experimental laboratories for future national coalitions or as 
outlets for diffusing internal party dissent? 
Turning to what is a rich theoretical literature on coalitions and gov­
ernment formation for answers to these questions proves somewhat 
less than satisfactory. Many extant theories are "policy blind." Most 
insist that researchers consider political parties to be a priori "unitary 
actors" or "single-minded bargaining entities." All but a few view gov­
ernment formation as anything but a single-shot "game"—a static, dis­
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crete contest that neither is influenced by nor is itself influencing 
coalitions being formed at a different time or at different locations in 
the political system. No theories address the linkages between party 
alliances in national government and those developing in subnational 
government. None address the direction of coalition change within the 
system. There is little theoretical provision, moreover, for the pro­
vincial or regional party group whose coalition preference comes into 
conflict with that of its national leadership, for the pressures of main­
taining national-subnational congruence, or for the possibility of local 
experimentation in alternative alliances for possible future use in na­
tional government. Previous efforts have all generally focused on mo­
tivation or ideological compatibility as the causal agents. Few, if any, 
have suggested that situation or context may systematically condition 
what rational actors may be expected to do in coalition situations. In 
short, the existing literature is rather ill equipped to deal with the ques­
tions that emerge once the analysis of coalition government expands 
to include regional and local representative institutions. 
Any theoretical approach that intends to have broad, comparative 
applicability must start, if not from scratch, then at least at the level 
of eclectically borrowing the least objectionable tenets from the exist­
ing literature on coalitions, parties, and democratic representation. 
The fundamental task, taken up in subsequent chapters, is not to con­
coct a model purporting an exact "fit" but to construct some mean­
ingful alternative hypotheses and to test for linkages among significant 
variables. We need, in short, to develop a lens through which to view 
and compare coalition behavior across subnational assemblies. Such a 
lens should allow us to arrive at useful comparative generalizations and 
at the same time allow us to be sensitive to some of the peculiar qualities 
of individual regions, provinces, and parties. 
Structure of the Book 
This introduction has argued the merits of investigating dilemmas of 
coalition politics in subnational parliamentary assemblies, in particular 
the well-defined and regularly repeated political act of government 
formation. The analysis endeavors to compare the process, its out­
comes, and its broader implications for democratic representation. 
Our comparison focuses on western Europe and specifically on 
three countries: France, Belgium, and Germany. There are compelling 
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reasons for considering these three countries as worthy arenas for 
intrasystem and cross-national comparison. The countries are differ­
ent as are the electoral cleavages that separate their parties. Yet in each 
country, recent and major alterations in basic territorial and institu­
tional structures have called new attention to fundamental political 
processes and performance at regional and local levels. Subnational 
governance in each of the three countries runs the full range of pos­
sibilities: single-party majorities, single-party minorities, multiparty 
coalition majorities, multiparty coalition minorities. Power-sharing co­
alitions also demonstrate a variety of characteristics: oversized coali­
tions, ideologically "unconnected" coalitions, coalitions of "losers," and 
coalitions excluding the party with the plurality of seats. In each coun­
try, moreover, parties frequently appear to reject the national coalition 
of the day in favor of some alternative regional or provincial arrange­
ment, even when election results would allow for a duplication. Simi­
larly positioned parties in different regions, when faced with similar 
coalition opportunities, are known to choose different strategies. Vari­
ation, of both the within-nation and the cross-national kind, begs for 
explanation. 
In search of explanation, ensuing chapters explore evidence from 
a mix of sources. Evidence comes first from historical events data: more 
than 260 government formations in the Belgian conseils provinciaux 
and conseils regionaux/gewestraad, the French conseils regionaux, 
and the German Landerparlamenten since the early 1960s. To these 
historical data are added cross-sectional survey data, collected from 
608 elected representatives in the three countries in 1992. These 
sources are then supplemented by material from 107 interviews con­
ducted with deputies, councilors, and party officials during the Sep­
tember 1992—September 1993 period. Such evidence should not only 
add depth to our existing knowledge of coalition politics in Belgium, 
France, and Germany but also demonstrate how coalition arrange­
ments in subnational assemblies can sustain or complicate the coalition 
environment within any multiparty democratic system. 
The book has four parts with nine chapters. In part 1, following 
this introduction, chapter 2 provides a formal discussion of the rele­
vant literature and its application to our particular research questions. 
In doing so, it summarizes the conventional wisdom on coalitions, out­
lines the many and varied criticisms of formal theory, and surveys re­
cent attempts to use subnational coalitions as alternative data sources. 
In this way, we can assess the utility of importing concepts and as­
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sumptions from the existing literature for purposes of describing and 
explaining the payoffs of government status in Europe's subnational 
assemblies. Identifying the stakes for politicians also allows us to iden­
tify the key issues for comparative analysis and to evaluate the status 
of our current theoretical understanding of those issues. 
Part 2 presents theory and methods. Chapter 3 takes a fresh and 
ambitious look at coalition theory from the perspective of subnational 
institutions. In developing a general theory of coalition formation for 
the subnational governmental arena, the chapter constructs testable 
hypotheses regarding system-level, group-level, and individual-level 
influences on strategic choice. Chapter 4 provides an explanation of 
the techniques used to collect and analyze the various kinds of data 
assembled for the book. This chapter delineates a three-pronged re­
search methodology and defends the logic of the selection of cases for 
analysis. The tools of investigation, including events data analysis, at­
titudinal survey administration, and elite interviewing, are elaborated 
and justified. 
Part 3 commences the empirical analysis in earnest, with chapter 5 
narrowing the discussion by focusing on coalition politics in three 
particular (and in some ways peculiar) European nation-states. The 
German (federal), French (unitary/regionalizing), and Belgian (re-
gionalized/federalizing) systems are detailed, including comparisons of 
key parties, institutional "rules of the game," and historical patterns 
of coalition behavior. Comparisons reveal that, unlike the behavior 
posited by existing theory and anticipated by our understanding of 
national-level politics, coalition behavior in peripheral legislatures 
does not necessarily reflect electoral verdicts, obligatory duplications 
of national arrangements, or strict adherence to zero-sum competition. 
Chapter 6 asks, "Do electoral competition and electoral verdicts 
matter in strategic approaches to power sharing at subnational levels?" 
Ideally, the act of majority formation in territorial parliaments should 
serve to determine and legitimize the direction of public policy in the 
province, region, or state. But when election results are not the most 
important influence in the choice of government, the veracity of this 
legitimizing function becomes suspect. In such cases, a fundamental 
principle of representative democracy—that the government, at what­
ever level of the polity, should enjoy the support of the electorate— 
seems lost. Combining aggregate-level and individual-level data, the 
analysis compares the relative influences of electoral competition, elec­
toral accountability, and electoral change on coalition outcomes. 
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Chapter 7 suggests that in a perfect democratic world where party 
competition and cooperation in regional institutions reflected and re­
acted to the opinions and wishes of regional electorates, we would ex­
pect regional party groups to enjoy decision-making autonomy in their 
own parliamentary affairs. In the imperfect democratic systems of the 
real world, however, political decisions that hold weighty consequences 
for local voters may become "nested" in the larger, national coalition 
game and thus subject to the direction of central party leaders and 
other organizational actors external to the region or province. The ef­
fort to identify the personal motivations and internal party pressures 
that influence coalition behavior in the subnational arena is taken up 
in this chapter. Attitudinal data are tested for disparities between sub-
national councilors and national party leadership. These data suggest 
the conditions under which councilors at subnational levels submit to 
national party leadership and those under which there is more likely 
to be attitude-related conflict over strategic choices. 
Part 4 provides applications of the theoretical points made in pre­
ceding chapters and presents the principal conclusions drawn from the 
study. Chapter 8 broaches the important and timely subject of bottom-
up coalition influence and change. Here the task is to demonstrate link­
age between coalition systems at the national and subnational levels of 
government. Can coalitions formed in territorial assemblies restrict or 
enlarge the universe of coalitions available to the same set of parties 
in a national parliament? Which subnational coalitions are consciously 
deemed "proving grounds" for future national governments? Com­
parison of individual cases from Belgium, Germany, and France, re­
porting firsthand accounts of postelection coalition formations, allows 
some substantively interesting political stories to be told that otherwise 
would be left out of accounts of multiparty government in the three 
countries. 
In chapter 9 the discussion returns to the purposes, practices, and 
potential of the subnational parliamentary institutions introduced in 
chapter 1. In turning away from the particular German, French, and 
Belgian cases, this final chapter synthesizes the results garnered from 
the empirical investigation and suggests the primary conclusions and 
contributions of the analysis. Thus, the book concludes with an agenda 
for future research in the fields of subnational parliamentary insti­
tutions, political parties, and coalition government. 
Chapter Two

Negotiating Power in Europe's 
Subnational Parliaments: 
Issues for Analysis 
There is no more important event in the life of our council than 
the act of forming a working majority. It means almost nothing 
to be in the opposition. And so in the hours, days, and some­
times weeks after an election we must carefully negotiate until 
we achieve a workable solution. We ask ourselves: What have 
the voters just told ust What does our party wantl How well 
can individuals work together: What policies are most impor­
tant! And we normally arrive at a successful arrangement that 
benefits us all. 
—Provincial Assembly Member, 
West Flanders, Belgium 
Distributing the important posts between the parties is usu­
ally a Joke. There is no consultation with the voters or with the 
party. There is little discussion of policies or programs. It is a 
simple exercise in political self-preservation. I usually end up 
angry and depressed. 
—Provincial Assembly Member, 
Namur, Belgium 
I egotiating the formation of a new government is a fundamental and regularly repeated political act in subnational assemblies. 
Politicians elected to representative bodies at municipal, county, can­
tonal, provincial, regional, and state levels frequently face dilemmas 
analogous to those of national parliamentarians who must bargain 
across party lines to form a governing majority. Presented above are 
the starkly contrasting observations of 2 of Belgium's 726 provincial 
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council deputies, projecting entirely different images of postelection 
coalition bargaining.1 On the one hand, there is a suggestion that the 
government formation process is a serious occasion for deliberation 
and cooperation to the mutual benefit of politicians, parties, and the 
public. In this vision, coalition building is a process that legitimizes 
political leadership and establishes a clear direction for future public 
policy. On the other hand, there is a suggestion that the government 
formation process is simply politics at its worst—cynical, self-serving, 
and unaccountable. While it is up to subsequent chapters to demon­
strate how reality varies systematically along a continuum between 
these polar extremes, the two descriptions at the very least call upon 
us to look closely at the government formation process, to identify the 
key players and their motivations, to recognize the stakes and payoffs 
of coalition bargaining, and to search out and interpret the internal 
party battles that occur over local strategy. 
The politics of forming governments in assemblies where no party 
has an overall majority thrives in a large institutional universe. As table 
2.1 shows, across western, southern, and northern Europe there are 
approximately 92,000 directly elected local authority councils, more 
than 800 county and provincial councils, and over 100 regional assem­
blies. While some of these will either occasionally or consistently enjoy 
single-party majorities, such is in fact rarely the case. Indeed, in coun­
tries with directly elected regional parliaments, an overwhelming pro­
portion of the legislative bodies at the beginning of 1996 contained no 
party with 50% 4- 1 of the available seats. Clearly, coalitions are part 
of political life in subnational parliaments. 
The absence of a natural majority increases alternatives and thus 
choices. There are always 2n — 1 possible coalition alternatives in any 
n-party parliament (Hinckley 1981; Laver, Railings, and Thrasher 
1995; Shubik 1967). For example, the entry of 10 parties into the 42­
seat legislature of the Italian regional assembly in Calabria following 
its April 1995 election produced a universe of 1,023 possible coalition 
outcomes (table 2.2). A portion of these alternatives would fail to se­
cure a legislative majority and thus yield only minority administration; 
an institutional rule requiring passage of a 50% + 1 threshold is there­
fore important and is present in varying forms cross-nationally (Budge 
and Laver 1986; Laver 1986; Laver and Schofield 1990; Strom 1990b). 
The outcome that Calabria's politicians chose from the 1,023 possible 
was a four-party center-right coalition supporting regional president 
Giuseppe Domenico Nisticd (Forza Italia) with the barest of majorities 
Table 2.1 
Directly Elected Local, Provincial, and Regional Assemblies in Europe 
%Single-Party 
Local Authority Councils N County, Provincial Assemblies N Regional Assemblies N Majority, 1996 
Austria Gemeindenrat, Stadtrat 2,475 Bezirksvertretung 23 Landtag 9 33.3 
Belgium Conseil Communal 589 Conseil Provincial/ 10 Conseil Regional/ 3 
Provincieraad Gewestraad 
Gemeinschaftrat 1 0.00 
A tinf"cr*d/i 14 Denmark Byrad 275 /JLIIILOI d l  i 1 X 
Finland Kunnanvaltuusto 461 Landsting 1 
France Conseil Municipal 36,551 Conseil General 100 Conseil Regional 22 0.00 
Germany Gemeindenrat, Stadtrat 16,160 Kreistag 426 Landtag 16 37.5 
Greece Demotico Symvoulio 6,036 
Iceland Baejar/Sveitarstjorn 196 
Ireland Urban, Town Council 75 County Council 34 
Italy Consiglio Communale 8,085 Consiglio Provinciale 94 Consiglio Regionale 20 0.00 
Luxembourg Conseil Communal 126 
Netherlands Gemeenteraad 636 Provinciale Staten 12 
Norway Bystyre 435 Fylkestinget 19 
Portugal Assembleia Municipal 305 Assembleia Regional 2 100.0 
Spain Ayuntamiento 8,077 Asamblea Regional 17 35.3 
Sweden Kommunfullmaktige 288 Landsting 23 
Switzerland Gemeinderat 3,000 
— Kantonsparlement 21 19.0 
United Kingdom Local Council 8,500 County Council 76 
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Table 2.2 
Distribution of Seats in Calabria Consiglio Regionale, 
April 1995 
Party Seats 
National Alliance 9 
Party of Democratic Socialism 7 
Democratic Union 6 
Forza Italia 6 
Christian Democratic Center 4 
Popular Party 3 
Refounded Communists 3 
Democracy Yes 2 
Independents 1 
Social Democratic Federation 
Total 42 
Coalition possibilities (2M — 1) 1,023 
Winning coalition Forza Italia + Christian 
Democratic Center + National 
Alliance + Popular Party 
(22 of 42 seats). How scholars have attempted to conceptualize, de­
scribe, and explain the process of choosing and successfully negoti­
ating one option out of an often vast pool of alternatives is the subject 
of this chapter. 
Defining Coalitions 
The term coalition may encompass a wide range of activities. There are 
"electoral coalitions," in which cooperating political parties agree to 
systematically transfer votes among themselves to their mutual advan­
tage, as in the French double-ballot system. There are "legislative" or 
"voting coalitions," in which members of political parties agree to join 
forces in support of specific policy or legislation, as in the United States 
Congress. More familiar and more relevant to the present study is the 
notion of "power-sharing" or "governing coalitions," in which political 
parties agree to share executive offices—that is, ministerial portfolios.2 
Outside the Anglo-American democracies, from Italy to Israel and 
Belgium to Germany, such governing coalitions are the norm. For pur­
1 
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poses of clarity, the definitions articulated by Kelley (1968) serve as the 
standard references: coalitions exist when two or more groups or par­
ties "agree to pursue a common goal or a common set of goals, pool 
their resources in pursuit of this goal, and communicate and form 
binding commitments concerning the goal." Specifically, a governing 
coalition entails "the agreement of two or more parties to serve in the 
same government" (62—63). 
Understanding coalitions helps to answer one of the immutable 
questions of politics: Why do avowed adversaries cooperate? If politics 
is largely about bargaining and compromise, then the transformation 
of political competitors into allies is of the utmost importance, what­
ever the situation, setting, or scope. Scholars have asked three classes 
of questions about governing coalitions: those concerning coalition for­
mation, those concerning coalition maintenance, and those concerning 
coalition termination. Observers of coalition formation attempt to ex­
plain, and purport to "predict," the outcomes and payoffs to political 
parties engaged in bargaining over the composition of a cabinet gov­
ernment (see Budge and Herman 1978; De Swaan 1973; Franklin and 
Mackie 1983; Laver 1974; Lijphart 1981; Strom, Budge, and Laver 
1994; Taylor 1972). Much less studied but no less important is coalition 
maintenance. The concerns of coalition maintenance shift analysis 
from outcomes to processes, asking questions about communication 
among partners, joint decision making, policy output, and the efficacy 
of an alliance (see Blondel and Muller-Rommel 1993; Robertson 1983; 
Rudd 1986; Schmidt 1983). A more recent concern with coalition ter­
mination seeks to identify the sources of coalition breakup, such as a 
constitutional crisis, a no-confidence vote, elections, a policy disagree­
ment, or the replacement or death of a government minister (see 
Budge and Keman 1990; Frendreis, Gleiber, and Browne 1986; Gun-
licks 1977; King, Alt, Laver, and Burns 1990; Lupia and Str0m 1995). 
Our concern here is ultimately with all three of these aspects of coa­
lition behavior, although with much greater and more immediate 
emphasis on coalition formation. Maintenance and termination are 
secondary concerns, but both are logically connected to the prospect 
that the mix of coalitions existing in subnational parliaments can in­
fluence the rise and fall of those at the national level. 
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Explaining Coalition Formation 
Much of the theoretical literature on coalition governments embraces 
the assumptions of rational political behavior. Faced with decisions, 
rational political actors possess sets of alternative strategies, ordered 
preferentially, from which options connected with more preferred out­
comes are consistently chosen over those associated with less preferred 
outcomes (Strom 1990a, 30). The game-theoretic tradition, which has 
dominated coalition research, emerged from this general presumption 
of rational decision making (Axelrod 1970; Gamson 1961; Tsebelis 
1990). Game theorists view the process of government formation as "a 
particular type of social interaction, one forcing the actors to bargain 
with each other before they can 'win' and one that can, therefore, be 
modelled by constructing deductive theories on the basis of sets of a 
priori assumptions about the bargaining objectives of the actors" (Laver 
1989, 16). In particular, four a priori assumptions have guided the 
game-theoretic approach, or what is generally labeled "formal coali­
tion theory" (Laver 1986; Riker 1962; Strom 1990a): 
1. Relevant players in the coalition game are unified parties, each 
of which can be considered a single bargaining entity with in­
divisible motives. 
2. The coalition game is zero sum; what is gained by one party in 
pursuit of government office (i.e., cabinet portfolios) is lost by 
another party. 
3. The universe of possible coalition governments is formed by all 
"winning" combinations of parties. 
4. Each game of government formation is an isolated event, in­
dependent of any previous or future bargaining between the 
parties. 
From these basic assumptions, formal theory has generated two 
types of research: size-criterion studies (the "office-seeking" tradition) 
and ideological/policy distance studies (the "policy-seeking" tradition). 
"Office-Seeking" Tradition 
Pioneering the office-seeking tradition, William Riker in his seminal 
contribution, The Theory of Political Coalitions (1962), deduced a "size 
principle" by which in n-person, constant-sum "games" coalitions of 
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minimum size could be expected to form. Seeking to create a "mini­
mum winning coalition*' large enough to win but no larger, rational 
players in Riker's model would, for example, systematically decide to 
form coalitions of no more than 101 members in a 200-seat parliament. 
The clear assumption is that the exclusive motivation of rational party 
actors is the zero-sum maximization of seats in government so as to 
best exploit a fixed prize, namely the spoils of office. Subsequent mod­
ifications to the minimum-size rationality maintained that a minimum 
winning coalition not only should have no unnecessary individual 
members but should include as few parties as possible (Leiserson 
1968). In the hypothetical 200-member parliament, a coalition of two 
equally powerful parties combining for 60% of the seats would be pre­
ferred to a coalition of four equally powerful parties with 60% of the 
seats. 
The frequency of nonminimal-size coalitions in European national 
parliaments casts doubt on the size criterion as a fundamental deter­
minant of multiparty government formation. "Oversized" and "under­
sized" coalitions are the most common deviations from the minimal 
winning solution. The oversized coalition "develops when a cabinet has 
obtained majority status, but at the expense of bringing more political 
parties into the government than are necessary to ensure a majority 
of votes in parliament" (Robertson 1983, 935). Conversely, an under­
sized coalition "may simply be a single minority party holding all the 
ministerial portfolios, yet entirely dependent upon a voting alliance 
within parliament to sustain votes of confidence" (Robertson 1983, 
936). Formal office-seeking theory would have difficulty, then, in ex­
plaining coalition avoidance3 and minority governments in Norway, 
Denmark, and Finland or oversized, "surplus majority" governments 
in Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands. Undersized and oversized co­
alitions are more than "outliers" among European coalition cabinets: 
37% of European governments in nonmajority legislatures from 1945 
to 1987 were minority administrations, while 25% of all European gov­
ernments during the same period contained surplus majorities (Laver 
and Schofield 1990, 70). 
"Policy-Seeking" Tradition 
Countering the generally disappointing results of empirical tests us­
ing the size principle, students in the policy-seeking tradition of gov­
ernment formation contend that parties seek to build coalitions with 
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those parties closest to them ideologically (Axelrod 1970; De Swaan 
1973; Leiserson 1970). According to this vision, the rational collective 
choice of political actors is to minimize the range of policy disagree­
ment and ideological heterogeneity among members of a potential co­
alition. Members of winning coalitions, it follows, would all be adjacent 
or "connected" if placed on an ordinal, single-dimension, Left-Right 
ideological scale. "This implies that considerations of policy are fore­
most in the minds of the actors and that the parliamentary game is, in 
fact, about the determination of major government policy. . . . From 
the interaction of the actors on the basis of these preferences, certain 
coalitions are more likely to emerge than others. Such coalitions are 
not necessarily minimal in the sense of any of the theories presented 
before: they may well include unnecessary members" (De Swaan 1973, 
88). Still, tests of the pioneering policy-distance models revealed more 
than a few cabinet coalitions to be ideologically unconnected (Browne 
and Franklin, 1986). Of 31 postwar Italian national government coa­
litions, for example, only 18 are predictable given the assumptions of 
policy distance (von Beyme 1983). Such predictions thus score only 
slightly better than chance. 
New Directions 
Recent theoretical and empirical works on national government for­
mation have sought to reach beyond the traditional office-seeking ver­
sus policy-seeking dichotomy. Responding to the "poor fit between 
one-dimensional predictions and the empirical consequences of coa­
lition behavior" (Schofield 1993, 3), some scholars now borrow from 
spatial theories of party competition to model coalition bargaining in 
legislatures on the basis of two or more policy dimensions. Schofield's 
(1993) model of "core parties" that can "typically guarantee themselves 
membership of every government coalition" (5) purports to explain 
"the occurrence of minority (non-majority) governments in countries 
such as Sweden as contrasted with the frequent occurrence of surplus 
(supra-majority) governments in Italy" (5). Austen-Smith and Banks 
(1990) and Laver and Shepsle (1990) contribute a "portfolio allocation 
model," suggesting that the credibility of alternative allocations of cab­
inet portfolios proposed during coalition bargaining is crucial: the 
"equilibrium solution" to coalition bargaining comes from identifying 
a discrete alternative in which the coalition awards each key portfolio 
to the party controlling the median legislator on the policy dimension 
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associated with the portfolio in question (Laver, Railings, and Thrasher 
1995). Others, such as Baron (1991, 1993), add to the debate by con­
tending that the very definition of "winning" has to be relaxed so as 
not to be strictly confined to those parties who become formal members 
of the cabinet; minority coalitions can, accordingly, be "winning" if 
they systematically secure support from outside the coalition. 
These new directions in coalition research constitute fertile ground 
for future thought and study in the field of coalition government. They 
do not, however, resolve some of the standing indictments leveled 
against previous research. Models of unconstrained minimalist ratio­
nality operating within the context of laboratory-pure "games" fail to 
adequately explain the two aforementioned types of coalitions that 
commonly deviate from the minimum winning solution: oversized co­
alitions and undersized coalitions. More important, the "pure" rational 
choice approach is "inadequate because it does not allow one to account 
empirically for the environmental phenomena, or context, within which co­
alitions take shape and later collapse" (Robertson 1983, 935, emphasis 
added). T 'e are learning that behavior and choices are systematically 
structured. Politicians and parliamentary parties in minority legisla­
tures should accordingly be seen as constrained actors within partic­
ular, and variable, political and social environments. In studying en­
vironments, we should, for example, assess the impact of electoral 
competition (e.g., interelection volatility and stability) on coalition ne­
gotiations. Likewise, party goals and party systems deserve greater atten­
tion. Lessons from the "new institutionalism" further suggest that it is 
"possible to develop intriguing and powerful models that are driven 
by assumptions about the structuralfeatures constraining coalition bar­
gaining" (Laver and Schofield 1990,198, emphasis added). If a "reality 
gap" exists in our understanding of the theory and practice of coalition 
government, then the way forward may be through systematic inves­
tigation of the roles played by contextual influences such as electoral 
competition, party goals, and institutional rules. 
More damning than any reality gap is the stinging methodological 
critique that in coalition studies "the relationship between theory and 
data has become extremely incestuous" (Laver 1989,16). New theories, 
innovations built upon the early works of Riker, De Swaan, and others, 
continue to be tested with the same set of data—namely, the universe 
of national governments in postwar Europe—from which the early 
theories themselves were originally derived. This poses a predictable 
problem: "It is simply no longer possible, for example, to construct a 
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general theory from a priori assumptions and then to run off to 'test' 
it against the data, since the general properties of this data set are by 
now very well known. . .  . In short, there are not enough national gov­
ernment coalitions to be very useful as a test bed for new theories" 
(Laver 1989, 16—17). There is, then, a "data gap" in coalition studies 
that hinders efforts to increase our understanding of this most basic 
political process. 
To summarize the most basic and contentious shortcomings of con­
ventional approaches to the study of coalitions, it is possible to make 
the following initial claims: 
1. Theories that predict coalition behavior solely on the basis of 
universal, game-theoretic assumptions of minimal size or mini­
mal policy range are insufficient for an accurate account of ac­
tual patterns of government formation. 
2. Extant theory largely underdevelops party goals and electoral 
systems. The methodological choice between laboratory-pure 
theory (based upon deductive assumptions about rational be­
havior) and simple description (detailing case and systemic char­
acteristics) is a false one. Contextual constraints—when they can 
be measured in meaningful fashion—cannot be ignored and 
should be included in deductive models. 
3. Further development in our theoretical understanding of gov­
ernment formation and coalition bargaining is restricted by a 
paucity of fresh data. 
Recognizing these shortcomings, we need to rectify the "accumulated dis­
satisfactions" (Browne and Franklin 1986,469) and the "apparent gulf 
between theory and practice" (Mellors 1989, 5) in coalition studies. 
Importing Coalition Theory t  o Explain Multiparty 
Subnational Government 
Do the shortcomings of previous efforts designed to explain national 
government formation preclude the possibility of importing coalition 
theory to understand government formation in subnational institu­
tions? The difficulties of doing so are certainly exposed when we try 
to make sense of individual instances of coalition bargaining. Consider, 
for example, the case of Belgium's Limburg Province in 1991. The 
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Belgian general election of 24 November marked the beginning of a 
108-day odyssey that ultimately gave the country a new national gov­
ernment. Voters sacked a five-party coalition that had ruled since 
1988. The Flemish Christian People's Party (CVP), whose uninter­
rupted presence in Belgian government dated from 1958, lost 4 of its 
43 previous seats in the 212-member Chamber of Representatives. 
The CVFs partner in the Christian Democracy family, the franco­
phone Christian Social Party (PSC), relinquished 1 of its 19 seats. The 
Flemish (SP) and Walloon (PS) Socialist parties lost 4 and 5 seats, re­
spectively. The Flemish People's Union (Volksunie), a regional nation­
alist party, could salvage but 10 of its original 16 seats. In the wake, a 
total of 13 parties with parliamentary representation stood ready to 
either build or block the formation of a new cabinet. 
The protracted crisis in Brussels coincided with smaller crises 
throughout the country. No single party secured a majority in any of 
Belgium's oldest institutions, the nine provincial assemblies. Nor could 
a single party claim outright victory in any of Belgium's newest insti­
tutions, the regional councils. Indeed, the game being played in the 
capital was duplicated in microcosm across all institutional levels of 
representative government. 
In Limburg province, where linguistic conflict has twice felled na­
tional governments,4 the game was quick, decisive, and seemingly full 
of broader implications. There the Catholic CVP had literally always 
been in the majority, often with an outright monopoly of provincial 
power but at times in coalition with the Flemish Socialists and on one 
occasion with the Flemish Liberals (PVV). This time, voters had re­
duced the CVFs representation in the provincial council (Provincie­
raad) by 1 seat, leaving it with 24 on a council of 70, as shown in table 
2.3. Needing just 12 more seats to secure a majority, the Christian 
Democrats could choose immediately from the Socialists or the Lib­
erals or even from some combination of the regionalist Volksunie, the 
ecologist Agalev, or perhaps the right-wing extremist Vlaams Blok. 
Most theoretical expectations would have led us to predict the winning 
coalition to be one that minimized the number of parties, council seats, 
and ideological distance: for example, a center-right CVP-PVV pro­
vincial government. 
In reality, the outcome bore little resemblance to theoretical expec­
tations. Unbeknownst to the CVP leadership, however, an anti-CVP 
coalition had already taken shape months before the election when SP, 
PVV, and Volksunie militants drew up a secret pact promising a tri­
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Table 2.3 
Distribution of Seats in Limburg Provincieraad, 
21 November 1991 
Party Seats 
Christian People's Party 24 
Socialists 18 
Liberals 12 
Flemish People's Union 10 
Ecologists (Agalev) 3 
Vlaams Blok 3 
Total 70 
partite division of provincial power if voting results allowed.5 The die 
had long before been cast. Following public announcement of the "pal­
ace revolution,"6 the CVP found itself evicted from power in a Flemish 
province for the first time in 161 years! The Limburg government thus 
contained an excess number of parties and an excess number of coun­
cil seats and was ideologically "unconnected" with left-wing and right-
wing parties governing together without the centrist CVP. 
Not only would coalition-theoretic expectations have led us to a 
faulty prediction, but they would also have masked the most interesting 
dimensions as well as the wider importance of coalition bargaining. 
Specifically, conventional theoretical approaches would have missed 
the significance of subnational-national linkages in coalition bargain­
ing. In local terms, the Limburg coalition was rather astounding, a 
small but impressive victory for those campaigning on an an ti—status 
quo theme. Origins and implications of the provincial coup, however, 
exceeded Limburg's own boundaries. The written coalition agree­
ment, signed in the provincial capital, Hasselt, the night after the elec­
tion, itself suggests a much wider importance attached to the outcome. 
Nine persons signed the 21-point document, pledging accord for eight 
years. Among the signatories, not one was an elected member of the 
provincial parliament itself; all were from each party's national lead­
ership. For the Socialists, Willy Claes, the vice prime minister, signed. 
For the Volksunie, the party president, Jaak Gabriels, signed. For the 
Liberals, the party's highest-ranking member in the Flemish executive, 
Patrick Dewael, signed.7 The provincial coalition appeared to have 
gained the attention of each party's top leaders. 
The coalition thrusting the CVP into opposition in Limburg would 
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be attempted again by party leaders at the national level. Fifteen days 
after the announcement of the SP-PVV-VU Limburg alliance, King 
Baudouin designated Guy Verhofstadt, president of the PVV, as for­
mateur of the next Belgian government. For eight furious days, Ver­
hofstadt attempted what no formateur had attempted since 1958—to 
put together a government coalition without the Catholic parties. The 
effort ultimately stalled on 18 December amid bitter disagreements 
over the inclusion of the ecologist parties, Ecolo and Agalev, and the 
old center-Left government—a "losers coalition"8—was revived. Ver-
hofstadt's mission proved historic but short-lived. Socialists and Lib­
erals could not duplicate their Limburg coup; nor could they build 
upon their long-standing alliances in the provinces of Liege, Luxem­
bourg, or Namur. Although the venture had failed, "It was psycho­
logically important, a premonition of what could happen in the future 
in the whole country."9 
The kind of deal making that transpired in Limburg province il­
lustrates many aspects of the process in which we are interested. In 
the Flemish Christian Democrats we see a party whose long-standing 
hegemony in provincial coalition politics suddenly disappears despite an 
apparent advantage in bargaining power, only to be followed quickly 
by a direct challenge to the party's parallel status as hegemon in na­
tional coalition politics. We see, in the Flemish Socialists, a party choos­
ing to "betray" its long-time coalition partner and determined to trade 
in its status as junior member in one coalition for a stronger position 
in another, albeit ideologically "unconnected," coalition arrangement. 
In Guy Vehofstadt we see the political entrepreneur attempting to 
translate provincial coalition innovation into national coalition change. 
We have linkages between coalitions at the provincial and national lev­
els that cause us to question: When do national party leaders become 
directly involved in questions of government participation at subna­
tional levels? Do members of subnational assemblies, those persons 
who must live with the consequences of coalition decisions, share the 
same preferences for coalition partners as their colleagues in national 
parliament? How, moreover, do coalitions at subnational levels influ­
ence the making and breaking of coalitions at the national level? An­
swers to these questions can inform our understanding of strategic 
political behavior not only in Belgium but in all multiparty coalition 
systems. 
The Limburg case does not stand alone. Examining 45 coalitions 
formed in Italy's regional parliaments between 1970 and 1980, Zariski 
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(1984) finds that only 6 cases (13.3%) conform to Riker's prediction of 
minimal winning coalitions and that in only 10 cases (22.2%) do the 
winning coalitions contain no numerically redundant parties. Testing 
the expectations of formal coalition theory against 44 Flemish munic­
ipal council coalitions in Belgium, Pijnenburg (1987) finds that "the 
majority coalition that has actually been formed does not conform at 
all to the minimalist rationality put forward by the formal theories 
[compared to the alternative possibilities, it is actually the worst off] " 
(61—62). In a more ambitious test of the predictive power of size-
oriented, policy-oriented, and actor-oriented models using data from 
483 cases of Dutch municipal council coalitions formed between 1978 
and 1986, Steunenberg (1992) concludes with the less-than-promising 
finding that "although the predictions of most coalition models proved 
to be statistically significant, their performance is still rather poor" 
(245-71). Steunenberg's efforts, together with those of Pijnenburg 
and Zariski, raise doubts about the possibility of making precise pre­
dictions about the formation of "minimal" coalitions. The questions 
most relevant to subnational coalitional behavior cannot be adequately 
addressed by drawing inferences exclusively from data on votes, seats, 
and office payoffs. These outward signs of coalition bargaining do pro­
vide a necessary and useful basis for analysis, but more creative mea­
sures are also required. 
In particular, two nontraditional dimensions of coalition behavior 
deserve closer consideration: the vertical dimension and the internal 
party dimension. Recognition of these two arenas addresses the central 
theme of new thinking concerning coalitions: namely, that "context 
matters." Strom, Budge, and Laver (1994) perhaps put it best in their 
admission that "the real world of coalition politics is one of constraints, 
in which it is quite definitely not the case that everything is possible" 
(307). By looking "inward" and "downward" at government coalitions, 
for example, it may be possible to relax the conventional axioms of 
parties as unitary actors and government formations as isolated events. 
The Vertical Dimension 
The vertical dimension reveals a two-way problem: "How do na­
tional leaders or party strategists control through the state structure 
sub-national coalitional behaviour (vertical-downwards), and what ef­
fect have developments at the sub-national levels on the pursuit of 
party strategies (vertical-upwards)?" (Pridham 1988,6). Do we assume 
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that national parties allied in coalition will want to impose the same 
coalition at all levels where election results allow? Or do we explore the 
possibility that national politicians use certain subnational institutions 
as test markets for future national coalitions? Are subnational coalition 
agreements "nationalized," or are they based purely on local concerns? 
Granted, coalitions in provincial, regional, and state governments have 
less visibility than those at the national level; nevertheless, it must be 
investigated whether they tend to "enter the strategic considerations 
of national party leaders," to what degree they "complicate the coali­
tion environment across the country," and in what fashion they may 
also "act as some determinant of actual coalition behavior" in the cap­
ital (Pridham 1984, 240). In pursuing answers to these questions, the 
vertical dimension allows us to see linkages and perhaps even inter­
dependence between national and subnational coalition systems. 
The Internal Party Dimension 
The internal party dimension likewise forces us to address the con­
sequences of internal party struggles for the bargaining process. Party 
leaders, whether at the national level or in regional parliaments, are 
not free from real or potential internal constraints. These constraints 
may condition a party leader's behavior toward other parties in coa­
lition situations, and they may be seized upon and exploited by com­
petitors at the bargaining table. Peering inside the internal party 
"black box" leads us to ask: Do national elites communicate demands 
to subnational actors that compel the latter to alter their preferred 
course of action or to tolerate actions of their national colleagues that 
the local or regional politicians would not have accepted in the absence 
of intervention from above? Does the national party have the capacity 
to remove courses of action from the subnational party's set of feasible 
choices without engaging in an explicit controversy and without impos­
ing national preferences? Inversely, do authoritative decisions about 
coalition strategyflow upward as well as downward? Along the internal 
party dimension, then, party structures, levels of party centralization, 
elite control over followers, and party factions are all relevant variables 
indicating the interaction between interparty and intraparty relation­
ships (Heidar 1984; Panebianco 1982; Sjoblom 1968). By shifting at­
tention to coalitions at multiple levels of government and by recogniz­
ing the interdependence of parties and coalitions at different levels of 
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the polity, a successful departure can be made from the usual assump­
tions, units of analysis, and arenas that limit conventional analyses. 
Issues for Analysis: Actors, Motivations, 
Outcomes, Time, and Data 
Variation in party coalition behavior across national and subnational 
levels of representative government forces us to rethink the extent to 
which political parties really can be considered "unitary actors," each 
with a "single set of preferences concerning the range of potential co­
alitions" (Laver and Schofield 1990, 21). The possibility that coalition 
outcomes in regional government may influence future coalition out­
comes in national government suggests as well that government for­
mation need no longer be considered the "discrete event'* assumed by 
many theoretical models. A further assumption that the universe of 
possible coalition governments is determined by all "winning" com­
binations of parties, although partially redeemed by the greater pro­
pensity of parties to "experiment" at the subnational level, may also 
deserve some refinement. We look more closely at each of these pos­
sibilities in succession. 
Parties as Unitary Actors 
Coalition theory depends in large part on the supposition that par­
ties ultimately behave as unitary actors. Theoretical parsimony has 
seemingly obliged this oversimplification of the reality of "party" in 
macrocomparative studies of government formation at the national 
level. The unitary actor assumption envisions an organizational oli­
garchy that permits party leaders, backed by their respective national 
executive bureaus and obliging party congresses, to speak to potential 
coalition partners at the bargaining table with one voice. 
Existing knowledge of political parties does, however, indicate that 
all parties have regional factions or strongholds that may or may not 
approve of strategic decisions made by national party leaders. If re­
gional party groups distinguish themselves from the national parlia­
mentary party and the extraparliamentary party leadership in either 
basic goals or policy positions, the predictable result may be conflicting 
coalition preferences. When coalitions so induce conflict between party 
layers, dissenting members can exercise their options either to voice 
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egy in accord with their own ideal points" (Laver and Shepsle 1990, 
496), by introducing a levels-of-analysis dynamic to the study of coa­
lition behavior we must acknowledge at least two sets of leaders with 
two sets of putatively incompatible bargaining strategies, ideological 
proclivities, and policy goals within the same party. Moreover, "It may 
be misleading to assume a priori that officials associated with national 
political institutions are automatically more powerful than officials as­
sociated with local political institutions: that is a key question for em­
pirical research" (Kesselman and Rosenthal 1974, 22). 
The unity of parties is questioned further if we envision that "strat­
archy" is a possible alternative to oligarchy. Parties are, in this alter­
native conception, stratified by different territorial levels and party 
organs, each of which has autonomy over its internal policies and af­
fairs (Kitschelt and Hellemans 1990): "The desperate need in all par­
ties for votes, which are scarcely mobilized at the apex of the hierarchy, 
results in at least some, if not pronounced, deference to the local struc­
tural strata where votes are won or lost. Thus a kind of 'balkanization' 
of power relations occurs, with variations in the extent of autonomy in 
middle and lower hierarchical strata from one habitat to the next" (Eld­
ersveld 1964, 9). Locating the patterns of such variation is, of course, 
an empirical matter. 
In sum, coalition politics in subnational assemblies provides con­
venient laboratories for challenging the unitary actor assumption and 
for testing the depth of partisanship, ideology, and organizational dis­
cipline across vertical party layers. To the extent that there are dis­
cernible and systematic differences, these factors must be considered 
as influencing the process of government formation. 
If Not Single-Headed, Then Singularly Motivated? 
By adding both vertical and internal party perspectives to the anal­
ysis of coalitions, it is possible to give fresh consideration to the tra­
ditional assumption that coalition players all pursue identical goals. If 
parties are indeed not making uniform coalition choices across insti­
tutional levels of power, as suggested above, then the question must be 
whether the basic goals of parties in regional, provincial, and local as­
semblies differ in some real way from those of parties in the national 
bargaining arena. 
The basic division in the theoretical literatures on coalitions and 
competitive parties pits pure "office seekers" against pure "policy seek­
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ers." Ideal-typical office seekers are motivated by office as an end in 
itself, while ideal-typical policy seekers are motivated by office as a 
means to influence policy. Office-seeking party politicians who are mo­
tivated, ceteris paribus, by the fixed-sum pursuit of seats and by the 
overwhelming desire to capture the spoils of national cabinet portfolios 
(e.g., status, salary, staff) tend to see the virtues of policy compromises 
if these increase the party's chances of getting into government. Con­
versely, policy-seeking party politicians who are concerned, ceteris 
paribus, with ideology pursue office with equal vigor but tend to avoid 
the policy compromises necessary to enter certain coalitions. Neither 
classification is new, and most experts find it realistic to consider real-
life politicians and parties as being somewhere in between the two ideal 
types. Still, most research assumes that political parties are motivated 
by either one or both of two ambitions: to get into government and to 
realize their policy goals. 
Evaluating the motivations of political actors involved in coalition 
bargaining at subnational levels cannot by itself resolve the office-
seeking versus policy-seeking controversy. Almost all politicians and 
political parties offering themselves for election are seeking office with 
an eye towards its benefits, and most politicians and political parties 
must pay some deference to policy concerns both before and after an 
election. Problems arise, first, when the stakes of coalition bargaining 
are presumed to be zero sum and, second, when these stakes are pre­
sumed to be identical for all actors and parties involved. 
Formal theory is severely constrained by assuming that coalition ac­
tors pursue identical goals. The pursuit of goals may be identical only 
to the extent that all actors wish to maximize their expected utility. All 
parties and politicians must be considered rational decision makers, 
with their motivations for cross-party alliances based upon rational cal­
culations. But are not the motivations of coalition actors influenced 
systematically by situation? It is possible that the "characteristics of the 
setting within which the coalition forms crucially influence what a ra­
tional actor should do. . .  . A model created to explain coalitions in one 
type of setting may be inappropriate for another" (Reisinger 1986, 
552). If the assumed payoffs of coalition membership are systemati­
cally and independently influenced by some measurable aspect of the 
context of the bargaining arena, then the basic motivations for entering 
into alliances may indeed vary. 
What are the implications, for example, of one set of national party 
elites crafting coalition strategy to suit its basic appetite for the zero­
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sum capture of seats and power, while regional militants in the same 
party find themselves constrained by electoral or organizational pres­
sures and thus are less willing to trade fundamental policy objectives 
for a share of the rewards of office? Will the regional group submit 
to the national strategy or perhaps choose the option of remaining 
outside government to maintain the purity of its message or to keep 
certain campaign promises? Motivations and rewards are important 
because they largely determine the nature of patronage, the nature of 
bargaining compromise, and the ability to ally with supposed ene-
mies—all elements critical to coalitions at any level. The national/ 
subnational divide affords the opportunity to examine the balance be­
tween motivations within parties, and it also allows for some test of the 
constraints that may alter the basic motivations of coalition actors. If 
individuals at various levels of polity and party are subject to the effects 
of multiple roles and cross-pressures, then coalition setting may indeed 
influence what a rational actor can be expected to do. Such influence 
is neglected by a theoretical axiom that stipulates that the coalition 
game is zero sum, with parties motivated solely by the desire to gain 
executive office at virtually any cost. 
Allgemeine Koalitionsfdhigkeit? 
One additional theoretical supposition is that all coalition actors ra­
tionally calculate the benefits of any and all potential coalitions, and 
thus that the universe of all mathematically possible combinations of 
political parties constitutes the universe of coalition possibilities. In 
addition, the probability of all coalitions forming is often presumed to 
be equal. This, like most other such a priori assumptions, is debatable. 
One outspoken critic of this "American assumption" is von Beyme 
(1983): "The polarization of the major components of some party sys­
tems in Western Europe makes most of the theoretically possible co-
alitions—which according to coalition theory increase with the number 
of parties—politically impossible. Even coalitions that are considered 
as politically possible by the elites are resisted from the grass roots'* 
(342). By expanding the analysis of government coalitions to subna­
tional parliaments, it should be possible to test with new data the open­
ness of parties to the entire range of coalition possibilities. If parties 
appear to experiment with alternative coalitions to a greater extent in 
subnational institutions than in national government, it may very well 
prove that this supposition of "allgemeine Koalitionsfahigkeit" actually 
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makes more sense in the subnational arena than in the national arena. 
We would then have to question whether ideological compatibility is 
less important at regional and local levels; alternatively, it might mean 
that electoral exigencies or the desire to experiment with new coalition 
arrangements can loosen the usual constraints that confine parties in 
national parliament. If the universe of coalitions is wider or narrower 
depending upon level of the polity, then it should open up the possi­
bility that coalitions at one level effectively eliminate or enlarge the set 
of feasible coalitions at another level. 
Discrete Event or Continuous Process? 
Should acts of government formation be modeled as one-shot con­
tests, discrete events determined by the legislative weights of the re­
spective parties and not by any past experiences or anticipation of 
future consequences? The possibility that subnational coalitions offer 
both experience and information to parties in the national bargaining 
arena, and thus serve as critical links in a dynamic process, has rarely 
been considered or systematically examined. 
Is it really useful, we must ask, to assume a priori that parties and 
their leaders are both amnesiac and myopic? More likely, "Their strat­
egies in elections and coalitional bargaining are typically conditioned 
by past events, as well as by the anticipation of future benefits" (Strom 
1990b, 569). Clearly, one of the sources of this conditioning may be 
the success or failure of party relations in regional coalitions. The com­
patibility of parties as partners, their loyalty to one another, their ef­
ficacy in governing, and the electoral popularity of a coalition are all 
crucial criteria that provide part of the presumed "perfect informa­
tion" that allows parties to make rational coalition choices during gov­
ernment formation at the national level. 
Given that one of the principal criticisms of formal theory is that its 
laboratory-pure assumptions—like that of coalitions as discrete events 
—mask significant influences on coalition decisions, it would seem de­
sirable that some attention be given to coalition behavior as a contin­
uous process. "Government formation is typically a recurrent event. 
And the behavior of actors in a sequence of games (a so-called super-
game) can differ radically from that of players in a single game. In a 
sequence of games, rational actors will adopt strategies maximizing 
their pay-offs in the supergame, rather than in each consecutive game 
separately" (Denters 1985, 297). Granted, there is no real scientific 
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benefit in documenting every development in party relations or every 
threat to an alliance that occurs between the formation and termina­
tion of a national coalition. However, the periodic formation of coali­
tions in subnational institutions is the most outward manifestation of 
coalition behavior outside the national bargaining game. These are 
events that may be "pregnant with national connotations" (Hainsworth 
and Loughlin 1989, 169). They should be included in a more dynamic 
explanation of governing coalitions, one that improves upon existing 
static models by focusing on political learning processes and memory 
effects. 
Both Gold Mine and Minefield: Methodology 
Put simply, the evidence provided by coalition behavior in subna­
tional assemblies can serve to ameliorate the so-called data gap in co­
alition studies. An enormous supply of untapped data exists at the 
subnational level of analysis. This is tantamount to a "gold mine" for 
observers of coalition behavior who have exhausted the same set of 
post-1945 national cabinet formations in Europe. At the same time, 
the very fact that this huge reservoir of data is both unrefined and 
largely uncollected scares away all but the most determined would-be 
pioneers in the field. This is to say nothing, of course, of the perceived 
minefield of problems in comparing coalition data from territorial 
units across different systems. The argument here, however, is that the 
benefits of gaining a fresh perspective on multiparty coalition govern­
ment through the use of subnational data far outstrip the difficulties 
of collecting and organizing the data itself. 
If the accretion of coalition governments in Europe cannot keep 
pace (despite the best efforts of the Italians!) with the development of 
theory and the demands of hypothesis testing, then we can and should 
turn to subnational coalitions. Doing so produces a new universe of 
coalition cases, the total number of which is "virtually incalculable" 
(Pridham 1987,374). The study of subnational coalitions makes it pos­
sible to analyze a large number of coalitions simultaneously within a 
single country, allowing variables such as political culture and party 
system to be controlled, as well as to analyze an even larger number of 
coalitions longitudinally across countries. 
Investigating coalition behavior in subnational assemblies, espe­
cially with regard to the conditions under which such behavior varies 
systematically from coalition behavior in national parliaments, can 
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therefore help refine our understanding of parties as unitary actors. 
It can, simultaneously, help determine the goals and constraints that 
motivate party politicians to choose certain coalitions from a universe 
of alternatives. Further, it is possible through the study of subnational 
coalition behavior to gain a clearer understanding of coalition building 
as a continuous process instead of accepting the more traditional as­
sumption of government formations as discrete events. Table 2.4 sum­
marizes many of the principal issues at stake, the varied criticisms of 
existing theoretical approaches, some of the solutions offered by anal­
ysis of subnational parliaments, and some of the pressing questions 
that should be pursued in comparative fashion. 
Summary 
Although government formation provides one of the most heavily 
theorized and empirically tested fields in political science, there exists 
too much dissatisfaction over the current state of research to ignore 
the benefits of incorporating subnational legislatures and vertical intra-
party politics. Critics will no doubt suggest that the explanatory and 
predictive powers of the field's most fashionable models would be sac­
rificed by including subnational institutions. The easiest retort to this 
charge is that any such assumed "powers" are themselves dubious. A 
more meaningful rejoinder, however, is that expanding the study of 
coalitions to a new level of analysis does more to advance our insight 
into an important political process than do the logical but often cryptic 
models whose coalition "solutions" depend on laboratory conditions. 
Charting new territory, with all its risks, seems preferable. 
Progress on a new research frontier has to this point been slow, often 
imprecise, and at times simplistic. Moreover, previous research into 
regional and local coalition politics has not ventured beyond single case 
studies and within-nation comparisons. Now is the time to push re­
search to a new level, moving beyond descriptive case studies to theory-
driven, cross-national comparative analysis. Chapter 3 tackles this task 
by formulating a theoretical framework that will allow for rigorous 
thinking and systematic cross-national analysis of coalition formation 
in subnational parliaments. While challenging many of the common 
assumptions in the study of coalitions, the explanation detailed in this 
next chapter maintains the general presumption of rationality. A new 
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Table 2.4 
Analytical Issues in Study of Coalition Government 
Importance of studying
coalition government
formation
•
 •
 •
 •
•
•
 Illustrates capacity of competitors to cooperate 
 Indicates relative openness of political system to rule by diversity of parties 
 Demonstrates relative responsiveness of parties to electoral verdicts 
 Provides first evidence of future direction of public policy 
 Reveals basic motivations of politicians and parties 
 Exposes process of collective decision making in mixed-motive situations 
Approaches to the study of 
coalition government 
formation 
•
•
•
•
•
 Deductive/game-theoretic 
 Inductive/empirical 
 Size principle models 
 Policy distance, ideological range models 
 Actor-oriented models (core party) 
Criticisms of approaches to the 
study of coalition government 
formation 
•
•
•
•
•
•
 Neglect power-sharing coalitions outside national parliamentary arena 
 Neglect internal party influences on strategic choice 
 Fail to account for "oversized" and "undersized" governments 
 Fail to account for contextual constraints (electoral and organizational) 
 Consider government formation static and discrete; ahistorical 
 Data poor 
Solutions offered by studying 
coalition formation in 
subnational government 
•
•
•
 Supplies new and fast growing set of outcomes for within-nation and 
cross-national comparison 
 Focuses attention on parties' internal politics of strategic choice and forces a 
reassessment of the "unitary actor" assumption 
 Raises possibility that government formation is a continuous process, 
interdependent on developments across government tiers 
• Does coalition behavior in subnational arena mimic that in national arena? 
• What are the determinants of coalition choice at subnational levels: 
Key questions 
•
•
•
motivations, compatibility, situation? 
 How responsive are parties to electoral competition and electoral change? 
 How influential are national politicians in forming subnational governments? 
 Do coalitions in subnational parliaments serve as "experiments" for future 
national use? 
set of testable propositions is deduced from this unifying criterion of 
rationality, permitting the collection and analysis of cross-national data 
and thus the pursuit of solutions to the puzzles offered by subnational 
coalition politics. 

Part Two 
Theory and Methods


Chapter Three 
Theory: Constraints on Rationality 
in Government Formation 
What determines coalition choice in subnational legislatures? Re­viewing the "state of the art" in chapter 2 demonstrated that the­
oretical approaches to the study of government formation commonly 
identify actor motivations and policy distance as the exclusive agents 
of causality. Power aggrandizement and ideological proximity clearly 
do play important roles in government formation in subnational in­
stitutions, as they do in national parliaments, and for this reason they 
deserve classification and analysis. However, blankly crediting politi­
cians and parties with zero-sum mentalities and with uniform power-
or policy-seeking motivations does little to explain the immense variety 
of political responses to coalition opportunities found in regional and 
provincial assemblies. Assuming constant and consistent motivations 
fails to explain, for example, why separate subnational branches of the 
same political party choose different coalition strategies when con­
fronted with similar alternatives. This raises the logical question: Does 
context matter? 
Context, situation, and environment are normally "red flag" vari­
ables in comparative political analysis—how can we generalize about 
structures, processes, or outcomes if all are dependent upon the 
unique setting in which they occur? The purpose of this chapter is not 
to seek explanation in the peculiar qualities of regions such as Cata­
lonia, Flanders, Lombardy, or Schleswig-Holstein. Instead, the argu­
ment put forth below is that important and measurable characteristics 
of political environment systematically condition the courses of action 
that rational actors will pursue in the high-stakes affair of government 
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formation. The argument will be advanced, not that "contextual vari­
ables" are themselves the only causal agents in coalition formation, but 
that they can add considerably to our understanding of the power 
game in subnational institutions. 
Figure 3.1 locates the question of contextual influence within a gen­
eral model of coalition formation. Suggested originally by Groennings 
(1970), the model includes "situational" variables among the factors 
influencing coalition bargaining. Situational variables include stability 
of situation, numerical strength of parties, positions of parties, con­
stitutional variables (e.g., election laws), conventions or informal rules, 
external pressures (e.g., public opinion, threat), and the values and 
norms of the political culture (449). Of these, we will focus on stability 
(e.g., the impact of electoral change) and external pressures (e.g., na­
tional party intervention). These factors address key linkages between 
voters and their representatives as well as those between representa­
tives and their parties—two sets of relationships whose qualities are at 
the heart of contemporary concerns over subnational governance. 
A related problematic involves national-subnational coalition linkages. 
Are power-sharing arrangements across levels of government inter­
dependent? In figure 3.1's depiction of the coalition formation pro­
cess, "compatibility perceptions" play an important role in developing 
a party's strategic orientation. Included among compatibility variables 
are "prior party relationships: precedent, tradition, mutual reliability." 
Focusing on top-down and bottom-up directions of coalition change 
and experimentation tests whether the strategies and interactions lead­
ing to government participation at one institutional level are signifi­
cantly influenced by the coalition "game" as it is played out at other 
levels or in other settings (figure 3.2). If parties are interested in pre­
cedent, tradition, and mutual reliability, then it should follow that "ver­
tical political learning" occurs. Empirical support for this assumption 
would contribute temporal and spatial dimensions to the theoretical 
understanding of coalitions and government formation. 
We now have the seeds of our own theoretical approach. Our de­
pendent variable has five dimensions. At root, we are interested in stra­
tegic choices and coalition outcomes, namely, the characteristics of 
actual multiparty governments formed as a result of postelection bar­
gaining. But we recognize that these outcomes have individual-level, 
party-level, and system-level components. At the individual level, we 
want to know, first, if and to what extent politicians perceive constraints 
I 
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Figure 3.1 General Model of Coalition Formation. Source: Adapted from 
Groennings (1970). 
on their behavior emanating from electoral and organizational envi­
ronments, and second, how politicians react to these pressures (i.e., 
the extent to which they are responsive to, or conditioned by, their 
environments). At the party level, we want to measure and explain the 
strategic importance assigned to the congruence of party alliances in 
territorial parliaments with those in the national parliament. Finally, 
at the system level, our concern is with assessing the diffusion (both 
vertically and horizontally) of alternative coalition arrangements ex­
perimented with in the periphery. 
Accepting the basic premise of rational political behavior, this study 
recognizes that underlying motives and preferences are key factors 
contributing to strategic choice and coalition outcomes. Our postulate, 
however, is that this relationship is conditional. Electoral context and 
organizational context condition the translation of political prefer­
ences into decisions and behavior. Electoral context and organizational 
context alter politicians' perceptions of bargaining environments, as­
sign variable weight to such factors as electoral verdicts and party dis­
cipline, and ultimately define the stakes and broader implications of 
any experimental governing alliance. Motives, electoral environment, 
and organizational environment are thus the key explanatory variables 
in this study. The remainder of this chapter details the causal logic 
linking these explanatory variables with the politics of coalition in sub-
national parliaments. 
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National Government 
Local Government 
Figure 3.2 Coalition Linkages across Governmental Tiers 
Propositions 
The choice of coalition strategy by parties forming governments in 
subnational assemblies depends in part on the presence or absence of 
two key sets of constraints, one electoral and one organizational. Each 
constraint is a function of the competitiveness and uncertainty of elec­
toral environments. When politicians in the subnational arena believe 
that their own behavior has a direct impact on electoral outcomes, their 
strategic choices are duly constrained by the necessity of appearing 
credible to the local electorate. Likewise, when politicians under con­
ditions of electoral uncertainty perceive that their coalition behavior 
has a direct impact on internal party relations, then their strategic 
Theory • 47 
choices are constrained by the necessity of reconciling local imperatives 
with national party preferences. Strategies of deferring to national 
wishes or deviating from them are in turn influenced by the balance 
of "organizational radicalism" within the subnational party group. 
Thus, both a logic of electoral competition and a logic of party orga­
nization will guide the theoretical explanation and subsequent empir­
ical investigation. 
The initial basis for this theoretical understanding derives from pre­
vious work by Denters (1985), Strom (1990b), and Kitschelt (1989a). 
The "conditional model of coalition behavior" developed by Denters 
suggests that coalition behavior varies with the competitiveness and 
instability of the subnational political "market" or arena. Competitive­
ness and instability, in turn, determine the degree to which national 
party leaders—"entrepreneurs" in Strom's conceptualization—attempt 
to influence coalition outcomes in the periphery. In conjunction, the 
notion of "organizational radicalism" refined by Kitschelt proposes 
that coalition decisions, and the influence of national leaders on them, 
ultimately vary by the relative weights of internal party factions and 
the efficiency of the strategies to which each subscribes. 
Electoral Constraints on Coalition Bargaining: 
The "Conditional" Model 
According to Denters (1985) and following Downs (1957), politi­
cians in competitive electoral markets are constrained by the need to 
"compete for the electorate's favours in order to attain or retain office" 
(Denters 1985, 296). Conversely, politicians in uncompetitive electoral 
markets "can, without seriously damaging their election result, behave 
in a way that is directly conducive to their ultimate goals" (Denters 
1985, 296). Competitiveness, in short, restricts coalition choice. 
Given these possibilities, two factors may lead regional and local pol­
iticians to consider whether they are operating under the pressure of 
an electoral constraint. First, the political volatility of the subnational 
electoral system itself can determine the presence of such a constraint 
on behavior. The more vote and seat shares for parties fluctuate across 
consecutive elections, the more politicians are likely to believe—both 
individually and collectively—that their electoral fortunes are directly 
tied to their own behavior. Thus, an electoral constraint can be said to 
be operative. However, the less results for parties vary across successive 
elections, the more politicians are likely to detach election outcomes 
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from behavior, including coalition behavior. In this latter case, politi­
cians would be less constrained by electoral imperatives in their stra­
tegic choices, given the marginal utility of votes. 
Second, the extent of nationalization in subnational markets may also 
influence the role an electoral constraint plays in coalition behavior. 
When fluctuations in election results in the subnational arena are tied 
to those in the national arena, choices of coalition strategy by subna­
tional party groups are again likely to be unrestricted. The opposite 
may be true in more "localized" systems in which changes in party vote 
and seat shares are not related to those at the national level. In such 
situations politicians and party groups have incentives to appear "con­
sistent and reliable" to the local electorate and are more inclined to 
pursue a restricted set of coalition possibilities. 
By dichotomizing the electoral volatility and nationalization vari­
ables, we may envision a classification scheme of subnational electoral 
environments (figure 3.3). Electoral markets have either low or high 
rates of political volatility and are deemed either "nationalized" or "lo­
calized." Cross-classifying territorial units by these criteria yields four 
distinct categories of subnational electoral markets: low-volatility/na-
tionalized, low-volatility/localized, high-volatility/nationalized, and high-
volatility/localized . 
The principal hypothesis emerging from this scheme is that vola­
tility tends to "increase the inclination of parties to pursue short-term 
strategies" (Denters 1985, 298). Especially in localized, high-volatility 
systems, parties have the greatest electoral constraint and thus should 
have the strongest incentives to pursue conservative coalitions that 
minimize ideological distance, even if such coalitions are larger than 
the normally optimal minimum winning combination. In nationalized, 
high-volatility systems, parties do have a partial electoral constraint, 
but volatility is largely a function of national political considerations 
and trends. In this latter context, parties are more likely to concentrate 
on the maximization of seats in government: in other words, they will 
prefer a minimum winning coalition that maximizes their share of the 
rewards of political office. The conditions and constraints posited by 
the model are summarized in table 3.1. 
The theoretical model constructed thus far suffers from the sins of 
omission rather than those of commission. The approach as formu­
lated does not fully explore the nationalized/localized distinction, nor 
does it introduce the possibility that national party leaders enter the 
subnational coalition game when the game itself is nationalized or 
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HIGH Nationalized Nationalized low-volatility high-volatility 
elections elections 
Extent of 
Nationalization 
LOW Localized Localized low-volatility high-volatility 
elections elections 
LOW HIGH 
Political Volatility 
Figure 3.3 Typology of Subnational Electoral Environments. Source: Den-
ters(1985, p. 297). 
Table 3.1 
Constraints on Coalition Actors in Different Electoral Environments 
Electoral Electoral Level Scope of Range of Strategic 
Condition Constraint of Risk Strategy Alternatives Orientation 
High-volatility, Full High Short-term Narrow Competitive 
localized 
High-volatility, Partial 
nationalized 
Low-volatility, Partial 
localized 
Low-volatility, None Low Long-term Broad Cooperative 
nationalized 
when the stakes are high. Nor do we yet have evidence to support the 
proposition that "in electoral systems lacking competition, political 
parties are more likely to opt for co-operative strategies, than in sys­
tems where politicians are forced to compete" (Denters 1985, 305). 
Also unexplored is the question of whether individual parties respond 
differently to electoral constraints when volatility manifests as success 
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(i.e., electoral gains) as opposed to failure (i.e., electoral losses). These 
are crucial gaps that must be addressed and are addressed below. 
It suffices to note at this point that the model of conditional coalition 
behavior does provide a useful foundation for the study of subnational 
assemblies. The model's appeal lies in its apparent success at "concil­
iating elements of the formal theories and the alternative real-life anal­
ysis of coalition dynamics" (Pijnenburg 1987, 73). The approach 
"standardizes the dimension of party competition and electoral vola­
tility in such a way that (a) it can easily be operationalized, (b) will lend 
itself perfectly to the formulation of both precise and readily verifiable 
hypotheses, and (c) could prove a relevant and interesting concept for 
cross-national comparisons" (Pijnenburg 1987, 73). This is no small 
feat, given the widely presumed impossibility of conducting rigorous 
cross-national comparisons of subnational coalition politics (see Laver 
1989; Mellors and Pijnenburg 1989). Still, the model is neither com­
plete nor without its problems. 
Specifically, the model must address the role of national-subnational 
linkages in the coalition game. When discussing government forma­
tion in regional or provincial parliaments, it is rather unrealistic not 
to provide for the possibility that the process of subnational coalition 
choice is "nested" within a larger process of coalition formation at the 
national level.1 Allowing for this potentiality brings into focus some 
important questions: In which cases are national party interest and 
involvement in subnational coalitions likely to be greatest? In which 
scenarios is national control over subnational coalition decisions likely 
to be most effective? And when, finally, does a party's electoral con­
straint come into conflict with its internal organizational constraints? 
Clearly, a theoretical explanation that looks "downward" at subna­
tional coalitions must also look "inward" at party relations and orga­
nizational constraints on bargaining. 
Organizational Constraints on Coalition Bargaining: 
Entrepreneurs, Radicals, and Loyalists 
A model of government formation, especially one that purports to 
explain behavior across different levels of the polity, cannot avoid the 
presence of an organizational dynamic. To do so would be to accept 
the purity of the unitary actor assumption dispelled in the preceding 
chapter. The games of coalition bargaining and formation in regions 
or provinces may not occur in complete isolation from the "super­
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game" between parties at the national level. These games, whether at 
the national or the subnational level, are in part constrained by the 
organizational properties of the players. The trouble is how to work 
this particular concern, or what may be called "parties' internal micro-
politics of strategic choice" (Kitschelt 1989a, 401), into the relatively 
parsimonious framework of the conditional model of coalition behavior. 
One logic of this combination can be summarized as follows: Ratio­
nal party leaders value certain political goods, namely, party power and 
status. They seek to maximize these goods in the various institutions 
to which the party gains access. Further, pursuit of these goods is most 
important to party leaders when their attainment is most in doubt. In 
other words, the interest of party leaders is likely to be greatest when 
the goods they intrinsically desire are either in jeopardy or newly 
within their grasp. Under conditions of uncertainty, as in coalition for­
mation, and under conditions of political volatility, as in highly com­
petitive electoral environments, party leaders are forced to focus 
attention on the protection and aggrandizement of these valued goods. 
Just as volatility increases the inclination of subnational party 
groups to react with short-term strategies, so too should high volatility 
increase the inclination of national party leaders to react with their 
own short-term strategies. Herein lies the potential for conflict. In­
deed, if we accept that "parties, regardless of their organizational 
characteristics, face different incentives in different institutional set­
tings" (Strom 1990b, 579), then we must also accept that national par­
ties and their constituent subnational groups may approach the same 
highly volatile situation with dissimilar, though individually rational, 
short-term motivations and strategies. 
Since Downs (1957), the rational motivations of party politicians 
have been the subject of protracted debate. Borrowing from recent 
contributions to the debate by Strom (1990b) and Kitschelt (1989a), it 
is possible to construct a set of assumptions concerning the utility cal­
culations of national party leaders and subnational-level party politi­
cians as they approach coalition strategy. This is best accomplished by 
conceptualizing party leaders, on the one hand, as entrepreneurs and 
elected councilors, and on the other, as a mix of organizational loyalists 
and radicals. 
NATIONAL PARTY LEADERS. National party leaders may be thought 
of as entrepreneurs, primarily motivated by the anticipated benefits of 
converting government status into private goods. "Office benefits must 
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figure prominently in the utility calculations of the individuals who 
become party leaders. Left to their own devices, then, party leaders 
should pursue office benefits rather than votes or policy" (Strom 
1990b, 574). The rational short-term priority of entrepreneurial party 
leaders, all other things being equal, is to maximize the prize of gov­
ernment office. The behavioral manifestation of this priority is an at­
tempt to get the party into government office wherever election results 
allow and to do so in a manner that maximizes the rewards of office, 
such as portfolios, power, and prestige. As entrepreneurs, however, 
party leaders must, when able, also be concerned with longer-term 
strategies that can help them compete electorally in the future. When 
given the luxury, entrepreneurial party leaders may, for example, ex­
periment with alternative coalition formulas in subnational assemblies 
and thus boost their leverage with national coalition partners by in­
creasing the threat of coalition breakup. To meet the concerns of 
short- and long-term strategies as well as the requirements of a ratio­
nal, self-interested leadership intent on protecting its status and power, 
national party leaders accordingly create a hierarchical, top-down party 
decision-making apparatus (Kitschelt 1988; Michels 1962; Schlesinger 
1984). 
These twists on the Downsian notion of parties and party leaders 
relate directly to coalition behavior as classified in the conditional 
model. Under conditions of uncertainty and competitiveness, the 
short-term strategy of rational, unconstrained national party leaders 
is a zero-sum survivalist strategy: that of maximizing the power of the 
party vis-a-vis that of its opponents. In practical terms this means min­
imum winning coalitions and/or the imposition of the national coali­
tion arrangement in all cases permitted by election results. Alterna­
tively, under more stable conditions, rational, unconstrained party 
leaders can pursue ideologically "unconnected" alliances or even ex­
periment with anti-incumbent coalitions of minorities. In all cases, the 
entrepreneurial party leader assumes the deference and adherence of 
party groups at lower echelons. The alternatives for national leaders 
determining party strategy in both low- and high-volatility subnational 
electoral markets are summarized in figure 3.4. 
The deference of regional deputies and provincial parliamentarians 
to the strategic preferences of superior party levels is a rational ex­
pectation under certain conditions. National party leaders should have 
the greatest concern for coalition outcomes in highly volatile subna­
tional electoral markets. The stakes will, it follows, be highest in high­
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Party Leaders 
Maximize power of party and rewards of office in all 
institutions to which party gains entry 
Low Volatility Arenas High Volatility Arenas 
Full Range of Strategies Limited Range of Strategies 
Short-term: Short-term: 
Zero-sum competitive approach Zero-sum competition 
Office maximization Office and power maximization 
Minimum winning coalitions Survival 
Long-term: 
Shore up support for national 
coalition by imposing same 
arrangement everywhere possible 
Experiment with alternative 
coalition arrangements 
(incongruent coalitions, 
anti-incumbent coalitions 
of minorities, grand coalitions, 
"unconnected" coalitions) 
Figure 3.4 Conditional Strategies of National Party Leaders 
volatility, nationalized arenas. With the outcome being of greatest im­
portance to the national party and at the same time appearing to be 
minimally tied to the behavior of the subnational party group itself, 
deference to national strategy is to be expected. Conversely, the stakes 
and interest will be lowest for the national party leadership in low-
volatility, localized electoral arenas. While deference to national pref­
erences is still an expectation—in this case prudent—entrepreneurial 
party leaders have both the luxury and the incentive to grant a degree 
of strategic autonomy, a "carrot" of sorts, to the subnational group. In 
uncompetitive, localized electoral arenas, party leaders have little to 
lose but perhaps something to gain by granting partial or total control 
over coalition decisions to subnational groups. 
In between such poles are those electoral markets that can be classi­
fied as "low volatility/nationalized" or "high-volatility/localized." Where 
electoral competition is nationalized and stable, the motivation for pol­
iticians at either the subnational or the national level to pursue short-
term strategies is not fulfilled. Provincial or regional politicians are not 
restricted by a pressing need to appear reliable and consistent to the 
54 • Chapter Three 
local electorate, and national party leaders are themselves free to direct 
their immediate attention to more contentious arenas. Thus, with nei­
ther an electoral constraint nor an organizational constraint operative, 
parties in low-volatility nationalized cases are free either to pursue co­
alitions that maximize primary goals (e.g., office benefits) or to ex­
periment with alternative coalition formulas. Each option is equally 
rational for both national party leaders and subnational party groups. 
It is the final case, that of the high-volatility localized electoral 
markets, in which the strategies of entrepreneurial party leaders may 
meet resistance. Here both the power and standing of the party are 
clearly at stake, thus making the party's participation in government 
a matter of some concern for the national leadership. If, under con­
ditions of competition and uncertainty, party leaders pursue short-
term strategies, they are likely to view the subnational coalition game 
as a struggle in which only the fittest survive. The consequence is that 
competition easily becomes zero sum and coalitions take on the char­
acter of power-maximizing, minimum winning arrangements. This 
logic, while efficient and optimal from the vantage point of national 
party leaders, may stand in contrast to the preferences of subnational 
party groups. 
For a regional party calculating the consequences of its ultimate co­
alition decision, the rational choice under conditions of a full electoral 
constraint is to pursue a conservative coalition of minimal policy range 
in order to "minimize the damage post-election compromising is 
bound to inflict upon the credibility of coalition parties" (Denters 
1985, 298). Here powerful incentives exist for parties to adjust their 
strategies to local electoral preferences and vote maximization. Such, 
however, may not be in keeping with the national leadership's own 
preferences. Thus, there is the potential for internal party disagree­
ment, even conflict, and hence the presence of organizational risks and 
constraints. 
National party leaders may indeed condone and concur with such 
a cooperative, policy-sensitive local strategy, but only after calculating 
it in terms of costs and benefits to the national coalition strategy. They 
may, however, choose instead to impose alternative coalition formulas 
on their colleagues in the periphery. This could require party groups 
in subnational assemblies to share power with nontraditional partners, 
to break preelection promises, or to concede large portions of their elec­
toral platforms simply to increase acceptability as a coalition partner. Sub-
national party leaders and assembly members must then calculate the 
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costs and benefits of alternative coalitions not only with respect to the 
local electorate but also with respect to the national party leadership. 
Coalition choice under electoral and organizational constraints is 
largely a choice between deference and dissention, between toeing the 
party line and exercising the options of "voice" and "exit" (Hirschman 
1970). Under these conditions, the game is no longer a discrete event 
between unified parties but is instead a kind of "two-table" bargaining 
process in which subnational parties negotiate simultaneously with 
their local rivals and with their own central party leaders. It may be 
rational in the short term, for example, for the regional party group 
to conform to national policy and exclude one or more major parties 
from a coalition. This avoids intraparty conflicts, ensures policy con­
sistency, and engenders harmony between the national coalition part­
ners. The strategy, however, may be counterproductive and suboptimal 
if it dilutes public support—perhaps by excluding the party with the 
plurality of votes—and if the other regional party or parties retaliate 
by excluding the first party from all future coalitions. 
For their part, national party leaders must themselves assess the 
trade-offs between dictating their will and diffusing internal dissen­
tion. So-called strong leaders can neutralize internal conflicts by im­
posing their preferences on subordinate colleagues. As conventional 
wisdom suggests, such centralized, oligarchic leadership produces the 
strongest and most credible actors in coalition bargaining (Groennings 
1970; Maor 1992; Panebianco 1988). We might expect this in, for ex­
ample, the German Free Democrats (FDP). Other, "weaker" leaders 
may see in subnational coalitions the opportunity to retain the support 
and membership of party factions or groups by granting them a free 
hand in their own coalition decisions. Leaders of parties racked by fac­
tion, such as the Belgian Social Christian Party (PSC), may be expected 
to adopt such a posture. 
The key here is simply that the opportunities offered by govern­
ment formation and coalition bargaining can, under certain condi­
tions, appeal to the disparate motives of subnational and national party 
leaders. When this occurs, the interparty coalition game itself can be­
come an intraparty contest as well. The possible conditional dynamics 
of organizational constraints are summarized in table 3.2. 
ELECTED COUNCILORS. Outcomes of internal struggles over coa­
lition strategy depend as much on the goal-related tendencies of in­
ternal party groups as on static organizational rules and structures. By 
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Table 3.2 
Organizational Constraints on Coalition Actors in 
Different Electoral Environments 
Potential for 
Electoral Electoral Organizational Intraparty 
Condition Risks Constraint Conflict 
High-volatility, High Full High 
localized 
High-volatility, Partial Low, favors 
nationalized deference 
Low-volatility, None Low, favors 
localized autonomy 
Low-volatility, Low Partial Low, favors 
nationalized either deference 
or autonomy 
invoking the concept of "organizational radicalism," it is possible to 
anticipate in which parties or in which regions subnational leaders 
and elected party representatives will give in to external prodding 
and where instead they will choose to dissent. By allowing for multiple 
goals across party layers, we should be better able to explain some 
apparently nonrational actions taken by party groups in bargaining 
situations. 
The central assumption of rationality employed so far holds that all 
party politicians, regardless of their position in the polity, have a pri­
mary goal, whether office maximization or policy maximization, ide­
ology advocacy or constituency representation. Politicians, whether in 
subnational parliaments or in positions of national party leadership, 
make deliberate and conscious choices to pursue their respective pri­
mary goals within the constraints offered by the electoral and orga­
nizational environments in which they operate. 
If the Weberian notion of parties as bureaucratic organizations were 
always true, there would be little need in the study of strategic choice 
to proceed past an investigation of national party leaders' primary 
goals. When primary goals within voluntary associations (e.g., political 
parties) are mutually conflicting, party representatives at lower tiers 
of the organizational and governmental pyramids should consistently 
accede to the primary goals of the top leadership under the threat of 
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discipline. In reality, however, national party leaders are themselves 
rarely unconstrained or omnipotent. Their leverage is constrained by 
the balance of power within the party. 
All political parties, regardless of their organizational properties, 
have antagonisms between leaders and followers, between pragmatists 
and ideologues, even between conservatives and progressives. Sub­
groups of parties, such as those brought together in territorial parlia­
ments, contain similar mixes of antagonisms. Borrowing from the 
notion of organizational radicalism, it is possible to identify one such 
antagonism that may influence parties to commit to a particular coa­
lition strategy under both electoral and organizational constraints. 
All political parties contain a mixture of persons either satisfied or 
discontented with the distribution of power within their respective or­
ganizations (Pierre 1986). Following Harmel and Janda (1992), it may 
be assumed that along with vote-, office-, and policy-maximization 
goals, some party politicians may also include intraparty democracy max­
imization among their aims. The antagonism between organizational 
"loyalists," those satisfied or unwilling to challenge decision-making 
norms, and organizational "radicals," those discontented and critical 
of power relations within the party, should help explain outcomes in 
parties' micropolitics of strategic choice. 
Ideal-typical loyalists subscribe to strategic moderation in matters of 
internal party politics and are inclined to pursue strategies that max­
imize party unity as well as their personal careers within the party. For 
organizational loyalists, the objects are efficiency and discipline, even 
if a particular party group has to sacrifice its autonomy and immediate 
interests. They are, in a slight twist on Edmund Burke, "trustees" of 
party policy. Organizational radicals, conversely, call for strategies that 
maximize local identity, local priorities, and decentralized decision 
making rather than the imperatives of party unity. For radicals, the 
object is party democracy, even if the party's ability to speak with one 
voice at the bargaining table has to be compromised. Completing the 
Burkean analogy, organizational radicals are the "delegates" making 
decisions based on their own best judgment. This characterization of 
dichotomies and antagonisms within subnational party groups is sum­
marized in figure 3.5. 
The theoretical connection with the conditional model of coalition 
behavior and its associated electoral and organizational constraints is 
apparent. When the choice of coalition strategy in a competitive 
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Figure 3.5 Micropolitics of Subnational Coalition Choice 
environment—that is, high-volatility, localized electoral markets—in-
duces national-subnational disagreement, politicians may respond (both 
individually and collectively) to organizational demands in different ways 
depending in part upon their organizational radicalism. In the absence 
of both electoral constraints and pressure from national elites, debate 
over the power of party layers is moot. Politicians can pursue unrestricted 
the coalitions that maximize their primary goals. Under the weight of 
both electoral constraints and organizational constraints, however, rad­
icals are more likely than loyalists to pursue their own strategy and risk 
sanction rather than to defer to that of their putative superiors. 
Actors within the same voluntary association can disagree over stra­
tegic choice, and the manner in which one level of party members re­
sponds to the organizational demands made by another level is a 
function of the value placed on intraparty democracy as opposed to 
party unity and deference. Higher degrees of organizational discontent 
and greater concentrations of organizational radicalism can therefore 
condition the behavior of competitive parties in coalition situations. 
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While clashes over internal party democracy are well documented 
within the so-called new politics parties (e.g., Greens), it is unrealistic 
to ignore those that occur within traditional parties, such as the Ger­
man Christian Democratic Union (CDU) after its 1973 restructuring, 
the French Socialist Party (PS) ever since the Epinay Congress of 1971, 
and the Belgian PSC following its decision to abolish organized ten­
dencies in the early 1980s. Though outside the context of coalition 
systems, the U.S. Democratic Party in the late 1960s and early 1970s 
is an additional example of the effect that debates over party democ­
racy can have on strategic orientations. 
Bottom-Up "Feedback"? 
The theoretical exposition has thus far concentrated on the elec­
toral, organizational, and individual constraints that restrain political 
motivations and condition the behavior of actors in subnational coa­
lition situations. A matter of final theoretical importance is the rela­
tionship between coalition building in peripheral parliaments and that 
which occurs in national government. 
In his benchmark contribution, Coalitions in Parliamentary Govern­
ment, Dodd (1976) proposes that "provincial or state parliaments could 
provide an experimental setting in which party coalitions could be at­
tempted between long-term adversaries, with the intermediate provin­
cial experience making national-level coalitions more possible than 
they would be without the provincial experience" (217). Related is 
Hinckley's (1981) more formal contention that "coalition behavior in 
one situation both affects and is affected by behavior in other situa­
tions" (81). Little theoretical effort has, however, been devoted to 
exploring the possibility of bottom-up coalition influence, experimen­
tation, or "feedback." We know little of whether subnational coalitions 
borne of certain electoral conditions produce better experimental 
gauges for future national-level cooperation. Little is known, either, 
about the extent to which decision makers at the regional or provincial 
level are motivated by the expectation that their strategic choices can 
influence those taken at the national level. 
Extrapolating from the logic posited in preceding sections, it follows 
that those coalitions formed in "low-volatility, nationalized" subna­
tional electoral markets should hold the greatest value as test beds for 
future coalition arrangements. Here purposive coalition experimen­
tation is most feasible, given the absence of immediate electoral con­
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straints. Moreover, since election results consistently follow national 
patterns, subnational politics can more easily be seen as national pol­
itics on a reduced scale. Coalitions obliged by electoral mathematics or 
by unique local concerns would not be true "proving grounds" for na­
tional collaboration. For example, it might be expected that a "red­
green" (i.e., red = Social Democrats, green = Greens) experiment in 
Germany's Lower Saxony, where voting in Landtag elections has been 
comparatively stable and where existing voting shifts tend to follow 
national patterns, could better serve as a proving ground for future 
national-level collaboration than one of the so-called traffic light co­
alitions (i.e., red = Social Democrats, yellow = Liberals, green = 
Greens) in Bremen, where voting shares fluctuate wildly and where 
elections are usually won or lost on "local" issues. 
We should anticipate that the value of a subnational coalition in 
terms of its "vertical-upward" ability to influence national coalitions is 
directly related to the nationalization of the electoral environment but 
inversely related to the volatility of the electoral environment. Estab­
lishing causality between subnational coalitions and national coalition 
change is a demanding task. To a certain extent, the definitive estab­
lishment of such causality is beyond the immediate scope of this in­
vestigation. The real goal is to establish that both association and 
influence exist and that under certain measurable conditions the link­
ages between subnational and national coalition systems are stronger. 
Summary 
The preceding discursive exposition has placed this study's theo­
retical basis within the context of current thinking on coalitions and 
competitive party behavior. The overarching premise has been that 
coalition behavior is conditional; it is not necessarily a one-shot contest 
among unified parties. The strategic behavior of parties in the sub-
national bargaining arena can be conditioned by the local electoral en­
vironment as well as by the internal organizational environment. 
Further, the context in which an alternative regional power-sharing 
arrangement emerges determines its worth as an agent of national 
change. Together, these propositions revise our existing understand­
ing of the motivations, outcomes, and consequences of government 
formation. 
The following sections transform the expository discussion into a 
more limited, formal set of statements that enable subsequent empir­
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ical analysis. Underlying assumptions and testable hypotheses are pre­
sented and are followed by a formal depiction of the process of 
subnational government formation. 
Explaining Coalition Bargaining and Government 
Formation in Subnational Assemblies 
Assumptions 
Our theoretical approach to understanding coalition politics in sub-
national parliaments rests upon the following assumptions: 
Al. Politicians are goal oriented; each is motivated by and pursues 
some intrinsically desirable political good or goods. 
A2. Politicians have incentives to pursue utility-maximizing courses 
of action. Politicians are rational agents. 
A3. Outcomes of government formation are valued by politicians, 
parties, and voters. 
A4. In government formation, rational politicians make conscious 
and deliberate decisions concerning participation in govern­
ment. 
A5. In political parties, conscious and deliberate decisions con­
cerning government participation are collective decisions, in­
fluenced by the balance of goals and power within the party. 
A6. For a constraint on individual or collective behavior to be op­
erative, critical actors must perceive its presence. " 'Perception' 
is the intermediate variable that has to be placed between ob­
jective facts and the reactions of the parties" (Deschouwer 
1992, 17). 
These six assumptions allow us to "break free" from the "shackles 
of conventional coalition theory" (Laver and Shepsle 1990, 495). To­
gether, they lay the foundation for an informed, reasonably parsimon­
ious interpretation of a complex process. They simply allow us to 
recognize coalition formation as a rational endeavor with a collective 
outcome, produced from individual preferences aggregated within an 
electoral and organizational framework. They make no predetermi­
nation that parties are unitary actors or that coalitions are discrete 
outcomes. These matters are left open for testing. 
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Hypotheses 
Hypotheses are arranged in three sections, addressing system-level, 
party-level, and individual-level influences on subnational strategic 
choice. Premised on acceptance of the assumptions set forth above, a 
group of hypotheses concerning electoral constraints on strategic 
choice and coalition behavior in subnational assemblies is presented 
first. The dependent phenomena to be explained include strategic 
preferences (i.e., attitudes and perceptions) and the actual outcomes 
of government formation in subnational assemblies (i.e., behavior). 
The basic question is whether different political responses to coalition 
opportunities emerge from different electoral contexts. The essential 
view of the world anticipated by these hypotheses is that, all else being 
equal, electoral volatility and localization should increase the risks of 
coalition decisions, restrict coalition choices, and reinforce adversarial 
strategies. 
HI. Volatility increases the perception among politicians that co­
alition choices affect election outcomes. 
Volatility heightens risk and accountability 
H2. Localization increases the perception among politicians that 
coalition choices affect election outcomes. 
Localization heightens risk and accountability 
H3. Electoral traditions of high volatility and localized voting pat­
terns increase incentives to restrict coalition choices on the ba­
sis of local electoral concerns and thus increase the likelihood 
that parties will adopt vote-maximizing strategies vis-a-vis gov­
ernment participation. 
Corollary. Electoral stability and nationalized voting tra­
ditions eliminate incentives to restrict coalition choices 
on the basis of local electoral concerns. 
H4. Electoral success reinforces noncooperative strategies. 
Corollary. Electoral failure reinforces cooperative strat­
egies. 
Testing these hypotheses should allow us to dispel the null hypoth­
esis that context does not influence what rational actors may be ex­
pected to do in coalition situations. It should, therefore, demonstrate 
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that level and change of electoral support do affect perceptions of stra­
tegic situations. It should, moreover, shed important light on the 
strength of linkages between electoral verdicts and government for­
mations at regional and provincial levels of governance. Alternatively, 
if testing these hypotheses produces little or no real evidence of a re­
lationship between electoral context and strategic choice, then the in­
fluence of the electoral mechanism on government composition— 
presumed to be robust by the democratic ideal—will be proven weak. 
If, finally, no connection can be found between electoral context and 
perceptions of strategic situations, then the indifference of elected rep­
resentatives to popular opinion will be exposed. 
Next, a set of hypotheses regarding organizational influences and 
constraints on coalition choice is presented. These hypotheses suggest 
those conditions under which the involvement and influence of na­
tional party leaders in the coalition affairs of their subnational col­
leagues is likely to be greatest. In conjunction, a hypothesis suggesting 
the conditions under which national involvement in subnational coa­
lition choice is likely to provoke internal disputes is advanced. Here 
again, the competitiveness of subnational electoral environments in­
fluences the degree to which organizational constraints (i.e., national­
subnational intraparty relations) condition coalition outcomes: 
H5. Volatility and nationalization increase the incentives for na­
tional party leaders to participate in decisions of subnational 
government formation. 
H6. Stability and localization increase the incentives for party lead­
ers to grant subnational colleagues strategic autonomy. 
H7. Volatility and localization increase the potential for national­
subnational conflict over coalition strategy. 
If strategic orientations and questions over government participation 
at the provincial or regional level are indeed sources of organizational 
conflict, then it is important that some effort be made to understand 
the likelihood that subnational politicians will behave independently of 
pressure from their national leadership. 
H8. Organizational radicalism reinforces vertical strategic fac­
tionalism. 
H9. Informal party organization reinforces local autonomy in co­
alition decision making. 
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H10. Participation in the organs of party decision making outside 
the region or province is inversely related to vertical strategic 
factionalism. 
A final set of hypotheses concerns the extent to which coalitions in 
subnational parliaments serve as precursors for future coalitions in 
national government. There may, of course, be numerous factors and 
circumstances that connect the choice of strategy in one arena with 
that in another. For the purpose of testing a "conditional" understand­
ing of strategic choice, however, it is useful to focus again on the key 
variables of volatility and localization: 
H11. The risks of coalition experimentation decrease with electoral 
stability and nationalized voting patterns. 
HI2. Traditions of electoral stability and nationalized voting re­
sults increase the utility of subnational coalition "experi­
ments" for future use in national government. 
HI3. Strategic "openness" facilitates coalitional learning. 
These possibilities hold weighty theoretical and practical implications 
for party system change. With empirical evidence to support these 
propositions, it will be possible to contend that coalition outcomes are 
interdependent, not discrete. 
Synthesis 
The theoretical explanation outlined above does not endorse an 
understanding of subnational governance as the exclusive domain of 
unconstrained, self-interested office seekers. Instead, it contends that 
in the government formation process, political self-interest is condi­
tioned in systematic ways by the characteristics of the electoral envi­
ronment in which parties compete. Subnational branches of national 
political parties entering coalition bargaining situations are condi­
tioned in their behavior by the competitiveness of the electoral envi­
ronment, which in turn conditions the involvement and influence of 
national party leaders. Context and situation can condition collective 
outcomes. Moreover, when the best rational strategy of a subnational 
party group conflicts with the preferences of its national party lead­
ership, the decision to conform or to deviate is influenced by organi­
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zational structures and levels of discontent and radicalism within the 
party group. This vision by necessity simplifies a complex reality. It 
does, however, possess a greater sensitivity to the determinants of party 
behavior in coalition situations than do existing explanations that use 
size and ideological orientation as exclusive independent variables and 
that consider parties as homogenous groups of decision makers. 
The essential tenets of this vision of strategic choice are depicted in 
figure 3.6.2 Here coalition choices are driven by the rational pursuit 
of certain preferred goods (primary goals such as office benefits) but 
are constrained by pressures external to a pure utility calculation. 
These constraints include the necessity of adapting to the immediacy 
of the electoral environment and to the preferences of party superiors. 
What needs to be reinforced in this representation is the dynamism 
inherent in the process leading to new coalition governments. It is 
therefore appropriate to depict the same variables within a broader 
systemic context, as in figure 3.7. Visualizing the determinants of co­
alition choice in this manner adds both vertical and temporal aspects 
to the explanation. The vertical dimension shows that coalition bar­
gaining in subnational assemblies may take place within the larger con­
text of national coalitions. Hence, the subnational process is not a 
priori a discrete event but is instead "nested" within national coalition 
systems. Moreover, the possibility that coalitions at one level of gov­
ernment can influence coalitions at another level is denoted by the two­
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way arrows connecting subnational and national coalition processes. 
Adding a temporal dimension also discounts the extent to which coa­
litions may be considered unique events, suggesting instead that a 
"feedback loop" connects past, current, and future iterations of the 
government formation process. 
Of course, figures such as these are but attempts to capture patterns 
in behavior across a variety of cases. Given some basic assumptions of 
rationality and of microeconomic behavior, the explanation posited 
above permits the systematic collection and analysis of comparative 
data and facilitates pursuit of a solution to the puzzle of subnational 
coalitions. The proposed explanation should give us a clearer picture 
of how politicians and parties adapt to their institutional, organiza­
tional, and representational duties. With this explanation, we should 
be better able to determine if pressures from voters make party poli­
ticians more accountable in their strategic choices. Similarly, we should 
be better able to gauge whether the nationalization of subnational pol­
itics allows politicians to place party discipline in strategic decision 
making above personal popularity in their home districts. The exact 
methods employed in this pursuit are detailed in chapter 4. 
Chapter Four 
Methods of Investigation 
We have established the need to know more about what goes on in that murky period between election day and the actual for­
mation of a government. We have recognized that this period is one 
during which party leaders and elected councilors consider the con­
sequences of alternative alliances—consequences based in part on the 
legislative weights of potential partners, the prospect of policy conces­
sions, and the ideological as well as individual compatibility of possible 
allies. We have more narrowly defined as our particular concerns the 
electoral and organizational constraints that may influence strategic 
choice. Finally, we have identified the universe of cases and the evi­
dence available from subnational parliaments as both a gold mine and 
a minefield. Because some of the central advantages offered by the 
study of coalition politics in regional and local assemblies are meth­
odological, it is essential that the techniques and data sources used in 
this study be discussed before presentation of the empirical evidence. 
This is all the more true if, as is hoped, this book is to spawn future 
research into a broader array of comparative cases. 
To investigate the influence of electoral and organizational con­
straints on government formation, the ideal research design would rely 
on nonparticipant observation of postelection negotiations among 
party leaders in the proverbial "smoke-filled backrooms" of council 
chambers and among newly elected councilors gathered at regional, 
provincial, or local party headquarters. While perhaps feasible in 
single-locality or single-party studies, the "fly-on-the-wall" approach is 
difficult, if not impossible, to achieve in comparative multilocality, multi­
party contexts. The best alternative is to document actual decisions and 
to pose questions directly and systematically to those individuals most 
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involved in—and most affected by—the process of forming coalition 
governments. In this spirit a three-pronged research strategy was de­
signed and applied to the intermediate-level subnational assemblies of 
three West European countries: Germany, France, and Belgium. 
The Countries 
Why study and compare coalition politics in the subnational parlia­
ments of Germany, France, and Belgium? Although chapter 5 will de­
tail the historical and institutional factors that make comparison of 
these particular countries appealing, it is useful here to lay out briefly 
the principal reasons for their selection. Political relevance, variation 
along a range of key variables, and subnational-national linkages are 
among the most important criteria. 
Political Relevance 
The three countries are of considerable interest, first, because in 
each case territorial assemblies occupy prominent roles in contempo­
rary political affairs. Belgium, a country that in recent decades has 
been obsessed with state reform and territorial restructuring, contains 
nine provinces (ten since a 1993 constitutional revision) dating from 
the country's 1831 founding that continue to be minibattlegrounds for 
political parties seeking to expand their respective power bases through­
out the country (see map 4.1). Through coalition building at the pro­
vincial level, federalist parties first gained a share of governmental 
power in the 1970s, the country's three party "families" first experi­
mented in bilingual tripartite governance, and mainstream parties 
now try to fight off challenges from upstart ecologists and far-right 
extremists. Since 1995, direct election of the new federal state's three 
regional parliaments in Flanders, Wallonia, and Brussels-Capital (see 
map 4.2) has created an even more prominent institutional arena for 
coalition politics and has greatly increased the stakes of subnational 
government formation (Downs 1995, 1996). 
In Germany 16 autonomous states (see map 4.3) enjoy wide exec­
utive, legislative, and budgetary competences. Politically, the chess­
board of Germany party competition finds the Christian Democrat 
(CDU/CSU)-Free Democrat (FDP) governing coalition in the Bun­
destag coexisting with an increasingly varied set of arrangements in 
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the Lander: CDU-SPD, SPD-FDP, SPD-Grune, SPD-FDP-Grune, even 
SPD—Statt Partei ("Instead Party," a breakaway faction of the Hamburg 
CDU). State-level coalitions are repeatedly held up as models for fu­
ture federal governments. For example, CDU-SPD Grope Koalitionen 
formed in Berlin and Baden-Wiirttemberg in the early 1990s were 
pointed to during the 1994 national parliamentary election campaign 
as models for a possible Christian Democratic—Social Democratic co­
alition in Bonn. Similarly, Rolf Scharping, one-time leader of Ger-
many's opposition Social Democrats, predicted that a "red-green" 
SPD-Griine coalition government established in May 1995 in the coun-
try's most populous state of North Rhine—Westphalia would prove to 
be a model for changing federal government after the 1998 election. 
For parties in opposition nationally, hope springs eternal from the pe­
riphery. Bleaker are the unpopular economic consequences of East-
West unification, which continue to fuel the fortunes of far-right par­
ties (e.g., Deutsche Volksunion and Die Republikaner) in state politics 
and so introduce elements of uncertainty into coalition formation. The 
addition of five Lander from the former German Democratic Republic 
also adds a new wrinkle to coalition politics in Germany, with former 
Communists, reconstituted as the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), 
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now seeking legitimacy as worthy players in the power game. In terms 
of political relevance, regional politics and coalition government in 
Germany clearly score high marks. 
In France the construction of 22 regional parliaments following 
Frangois Mitterrand's assumption of the presidency in 1981 has cre­
ated new arenas for party competition and new necessities for coalition 
building (map 4.4). Since the first direct elections of these parliaments 
in 1986, French politicians have been faced with realigning themselves 
to conform to new regional strategies, strategies that may link them 
with parties they have opposed for years at the local, departmental, or 
national levels. Conservative parties find themselves sharing regional 
power with the far Right, and embattled socialists struggle to build 
alliances with communists and ecologists. The extent to which the 
French Greens and the far-right Front National will be able to trans­
form their regional power-sharing experiments into greater payoffs 
(e.g., legitimacy, acceptability as coalition partners, stepping-stones to 
national power) is a timely and real concern. Part of the allure of in­
cluding France in our analysis is, therefore, that regional-level coalition 
politics is now in its formative stage and as such is the subject of con­
siderable academic and popular curiosity. 
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Map 4.3 German Lander 
Variation 
Provincial and regional-level parliamentary government in all three 
countries exhibits the phenomena identified by previous chapters as 
meriting explanation. Subcentral governments in Belgium, France, 
and Germany run the full range of possibilities: single-party majori­
ties, single-party minorities, multiparty coalition majorities, and multi­
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party coalition minorities. Power-sharing coalitions also demonstrate 
a variety of characteristics: oversized coalitions, ideologically "uncon­
nected" coalitions, coalitions of "losers," and coalitions excluding the 
party with the plurality of seats. In each country, moreover, parties 
frequently appear to reject the national coalition of the day in favor of 
some alternative regional or provincial arrangement, even when elec­
tion results would allow for a duplication. Indeed, similarly positioned 
parties in different regions, when faced with similar coalition oppor­
tunities, are known to choose different strategies. There are, in short, 
numerous instances of the kinds of coalition politics that we have pre­
viously deemed worthy of study. 
There is, moreover, variation along a number of potential explan­
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atory variables. If we are to ask, "Does context matter?" then it is clearly 
important that context itself vary. As will be demonstrated thoroughly 
in chapter 6, patterns of electoral competition in the territorial sub­
units of Belgium, France, and Germany vary substantially and system­
atically. Certain regions, provinces, and states are demonstrably more 
competitive (i.e., electorally volatile) than others. Size, history, and tim­
ing of elections make certain regions or provinces more or less im­
portant in national terms, thus making electoral competition more 
"nationalized" or more "localized" across regions. This variance makes 
it possible to examine whether different political solutions to coalition 
problems emerge out of different electoral contexts. The party systems 
of each country also present useful variation in organizational style, 
from the supposed "basis democracy" of the German, Belgian, and 
French green parties to the outwardly more authoritarian regimes of 
the German FDP, the French Communists (PCF), and Belgium's fran­
cophone Liberals (PRL). Along the organizational axis, then, there is 
also relevant variation. 
Subnational-National Linkages 
A final reason for focusing on these three particular countries is the 
important consequences of subnational coalition outcomes for national 
politics in each. In Belgium, Germany, and France, direct as well as 
indirect linkages connect subnational and national politics and policy. 
The clearest example of this is Germany, where the majority in the 
federal council, or Bundesrat, is always a direct reflection of the gov­
ernments in the 16 constituent Lander. Any change in the partisan 
composition of government at the state level can alter the balance of 
power in the Bundesrat and thus influence the fate of most federal 
legislation. Similarly, in Belgium, a portion of the national senate has 
traditionally been determined not by the voters but by the majorities 
in the provinces. More recently, the massive devolution of legislative 
and executive powers to regional authorities and the federal senate's 
transformation into an arbiter of regional disputes has led to a highly 
complex network of linkages between the executives of the three re­
gions and the national government. In France national-regional link­
ages are also strong, since the ability to accumulate multiple elected 
offices has meant that national deputies, senators, government min­
isters, and even party presidents are often simultaneously regional 
councilors and executives. Of the 577 deputies elected to France's Na­
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tional Assembly in 1993, 523 held at least one other mandate at the 
local or regional levels. Vertical linkages such as these make evident 
the broader system-level importance of government formation and co­
alition politics at subnational levels. 
The Behavior 
Having selected these three country cases, the task of constructing an 
accurate image of coalition behavior begins with accumulation of rel­
evant historical data. For Belgium the analysis includes a 33-year span, 
namely, the period 1961—94, covering 12 national/provincial elections 
and 109 provincial government formations. Additional data derive 
from regional-level coalition building in Flanders (1995), Wallonia 
(1995), and the Brussels-Capital Region (1989, 1995). For Germany, 
the historical reference frame commences with 1961, the year in which 
the liberal Free Democrats began playing their role as indispensable 
federal coalition partners, and it ends with 1992, a year that saw crucial 
state elections in Baden-Wurttemberg and Schleswig-Holstein. In the 
interest of comparability, the formal analysis is limited to governments 
formed in the 11 states of West Germany, and only briefly do we ex­
amine the data from recent coalition governments in the five new east­
ern Lander. During this period the Germans have held more than 90 
elections to the 11 western Landtage. Since direct elections to regional 
councils in France date only from 1986, the historical context of coa­
lition politics at the institutional level of representative government is 
by necessity much narrower than in the Belgian and German cases. 
The 1986 and 1992 elections yield 44 cases of regional government 
formation. 
The historical data derive from two main sources: election results 
and primary documents. Electoral statistics for Belgium, France, and 
Germany provide a vivid historical picture of context and coalition be­
havior at the subnational and national levels in each country. The Bel­
gian Ministry of the Interior provided the data on vote and seat 
distribution for national parliamentary and provincial elections for the 
three-decade period. Additional electoral information for Belgium, in­
cluding the outcomes of government formations, comes from a series 
of postelection analyses published in Res Publica since 1972 (Brans 
1992; Costard 1972,1974; Mabille 1982; Toelen 1986,1987) and from 
the weekly publications of the Centre de Recherche et d'Information 
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Socio-Politiques (CRISP) in Brussels. German electoral data have been 
collected from the annual editions of Statistisches Jahrbuch fur die Bundes­
republik Deutschland (Wiesbaden: Statisches Bundesamt, 1961-1995), 
from Wahlen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Ritter and Niehuss 
1987), and from the Handbuch der deutschen Bundesldnder (Esche and 
Hartmann, 1990). Detailed statistics published in select editions of Le 
Monde provide the electoral database for the French case. These data, 
including percentage of votes won by party, seats obtained, and coa­
litions formed, help construct a statistical compendium of coalition 
cases at both the subnational and national levels. 
Primary documents provide the second source of information re­
garding the historical evolution of subnational coalition politics in Bel­
gium, Germany, and France. Documentary sources include published 
material such as newspapers and journals, official government publi­
cations, accounts of party conferences, records of parliamentary de­
bates, party statutes and election manifestos, and texts of actual 
coalition agreements. Press accounts proved especially useful in high­
lighting those government formations that were especially racked with 
conflict of both the interparty and the intraparty variety. Employed in 
this regard were the principal Belgian dailies {Le Soir, La Libre Belgique, 
Het Volk, De Standaard), two key German papers (Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, Suddeutsche Zeitung), and the leading French journals (Le 
Monde, Le Figaro, UExpress, Le Point). Without saturating the analysis 
with specifics, which rigorous cross-national analysis must avoid, these 
source materials do allow for a fuller, historically sensitive interpre­
tation of the patterns observed in subsequent cross-sectional survey 
analysis. 
The Survey 
The second principal source of evidence comes from a cross-national 
survey questionnaire. Survey research, if properly designed, can pro­
duce generous quantities of comparable data that can then be used to 
test and refine research hypotheses. The survey instrument used in 
this analysis, a mail questionnaire, provides a "snapshot" or cross-
sectional image of perceptions, attitudes, and behavior across a se­
lected range of parties, regions, and countries. The use of surveys in 
single-country subnational coalition studies is not in itself new. Note­
worthy attempts include Bueno de Mesquita's (1975) analysis of "stra­
76 • Chapter Four 
tegic predispositions*' in Indian state parliaments; investigations into 
Britain's "hung" local and county councils by Railings and Thrasher 
(1986) and Temple (1991); and Brearey's (1989) survey of German 
municipal councilors and local government coalitions in North Rhine-
Westphalia. Absent, however, are any true cross-national surveys of 
regional assembly members of the type attempted here. 
To uncover relevant attitudinal patterns, motivational discrepan­
cies, and behavioral observations, an extensive closed-ended mail ques­
tionnaire was deployed. Containing more than 80 items, the question­
naire covers a variety of topics relating to government formation, 
coalition building, electoral competition, legislative affairs, and inter­
nal party relations. Respondents were asked, for example, to charac­
terize their personal involvement in coalition negotiations, to rank the 
concerns that motivated them and their parties in pursuit of govern­
ment office, and to describe the influence of national party leaders in 
local coalition bargaining. Especially critical to our theory are a set of 
questions dealing with the local electoral environment: Had elections 
grown or diminished in intensity during the respondent's tenure? Had 
the determining themes and personalities of the most recent election 
been local or national in nature? To what extent had electoral account­
ability motivated the respondent to support or to oppose certain co­
alition options? In addition, other questions attempted to locate a 
respondent's discontent with internal party relations, as well as his or 
her ideological proclivities and future political ambitions. Still other 
questions sought to tap respondents' awareness of concessions won and 
lost during coalition bargaining, as well as the occurrence of less overt 
forms of coalition building. A list of the questions included in the ques­
tionnaire is provided in Appendix I.1 
In the recognized technique of area sampling, each element of a 
survey population is associated with a particular geographical area. In 
this way, ua sample of elements is drawn, and either all elements in the 
selected areas are included in the survey or a sample of these elements 
is included" (Kalton 1983, 8). Following this basic methodological 
premise, territorial parliaments were selected in each of the three 
countries on the basis of multiple theoretical and substantive criteria. 
Once selected, all elected members of the respective provincial coun­
cils, regional councils, or Landtage were then included in the survey 
population. Lists of the members, their party affiliations, their posi­
tions within the subnational legislatures and governments, and their 
political as well as professional backgrounds were in most cases ob­
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tained directly from the information bureaus of the provincial, re­
gional, and state authorities. Each Belgian greffier provincial!provincie-
griffier supplied detailed information regarding the membership of its 
respective council.2 Each German Landtag publishes some form of a 
Volkshandbuch, which generally includes relevant political and bio­
graphical data. Comparable information was obtained through the Di­
rection General of each French regional council and was supplemented 
by Le Guide: Uannuaire du monde de la politique et des pouvoirs (Profession 
Politique, 1992), a compendium of local, regional, and national polit­
ical figures. 
Occurrence of substantively interesting and politically meaningful 
coalition outcomes topped the list of selection criteria. Effort was made 
to include within the sample those provinces, regions, or Lander in 
which the formation of the sitting government had been unusual— 
those in which there had been an unprecedented party alliance or a 
major coalition shift. This is because it is important to be able to tap 
into the observations, perceptions, and attitudes of representatives 
who take part in or who observe such major events. And for theo­
retical purposes it is important to include within the sample cases 
representing subnational-national coalition "incongruence" as well as 
those representing subnational-national coalition "congruence."3 If 
national-subnational coalition incongruence is an indicator of differ­
ential motives or of internal party disagreement, then it is instructive 
to compare responses across such coalition types. Moreover, since elec­
toral volatility and localization are crucial variables, it is also necessary 
to have cases whose traditions of electoral behavior clearly represent 
different levels of each. These selection criteria were easily met in each 
of the three country cases. Coalition types and national-subnational 
congruence are summarized below, and chapter 6 addresses more di­
rectly the dominant characteristics of the electoral environments of each. 
Belgian Provinces and the Brussels Regional Council 
For Belgium, five of the country's nine provinces elected in Novem­
ber 1991 produced a manageable and representative set of cases. In 
the Li&ge, Luxembourg, and Namur provinces, Socialist (PS)-Liberal 
(PRL) coalitions stood in apparent contradiction to the Socialist (PS/ 
SP)-Christian Social (PSC/CVP) alliance in national government, as 
did the "grand" Socialist (PS/SP)-Christian Social (PSC/CVP>-Liberal 
(PRL/PVV) coalition in Brabant province. In contrast, the Socialist— 
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Christian Social coalition in Hainaut's provincial council mirrored the 
national formula of the day. At the time of the survey, Belgium's only 
directly elected regional parliament was in the Brussels-Capital Re­
gion. Elected in 1989, the Brussels regional assembly chose a govern­
ing coalition that included the center parties (CVP/PSC), the Left (SP/ 
PS), and two linguistic community parties, the Francophone Demo­
cratic Front (FDF) and the Flemish People's Union (Volksunie). These 
governing alignments are summarized in table 4.1. 
In the provincial assemblies of Liege, Luxembourg, and Namur, 
possibilities existed following the 1991 elections to duplicate the na­
tional center-Left coalition, but these were in each case rejected in fa­
vor of ideologically "unconnected" (i.e., skipping the center party) 
socialist-liberal power-sharing arrangements. Given its relevance to 
our research questions, this deliberate rejection of the national for­
mula warranted inclusion of these provinces in the sample. Alterna­
tively, Hainaut's provincial assembly members chose to mimic national 
party alignments. This "congruence" is important and warrants Hai-
naut's inclusion in the sample, as does the fact that for the Hainaut 
Socialists the 1991 coalition was their first with any partner since 1978. 
Marked by its electoral stability and clear "national" character due to 
its location in the province containing the capital city of Brussels, the 
Brabant provincial legislature during the period 1991-94 was of sub­
stantive interest because it represented the first time in any of Bel-
gium's legislative assemblies that one linguistic party wing entered a 
governing coalition without its companion party wing. This occurred 
when the Flemish C VP joined the Brabant provincial government with­
out its "sister" party in the Christian Social family, the francophone 
PSC.4 
German Land Parliaments 
The Land parliaments of Baden-Wiirttemberg, Bremen, Hesse, 
and Lower Saxony provide the area samples for the German case. The 
Christian Democrat-Social Democrat "grand" coalition in the south­
western Landtag of Baden-Wiirttemberg, reminiscent of the same rare 
alliance in the Bundestag from 1966 to 1969, was pointed to at the 
time of the survey as a precursor of some form of "solidarity govern­
ment" to be constructed after the 1994 federal elections. Baden-Wurt-
temberg's importance derives also from the fact that it was the scene 
in 1992 of the first state-level attempt at uniting Christian Democrats 
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Table 4.1 
Belgium: Provincial and Regional Assemblies Included in 
Survey Population, 1992 
Congruence with 
National 
Parliamentary 
Provincial Councils Partisan Composition of Government Alliances 
Brabant Socialists + Christian Socials PS/SP + CVP X 
+ Liberals + PRL/PVV 
Hainaut Socialists + Christian Socials PS + PSC y 
Liege Socialists + Liberals PS + PRL X 
Luxembourg Socialists + Liberals PS + PRL X 
Namur Socialists + Liberals PS + PRL X 
Regional Parliament 
Brussels-Capital Region Socialists + Christian Socials PS/SP + PSC/CVP X 
+ Regionalists +FDF+VU 
Note: National government: Socialists + Christian Socials (PS/SP + PSC/CVP). 
and Greens in a so-called black-green or eco-libertarian coalition. In 
the city-state of Bremen, the Free Democrats left their federal allies, 
the CDU, for an SPD-FDP-Grune "traffic light" coalition in the 1990­
94 senate. The Lander of Hesse and Lower Saxony were included in 
the sample because their respective "red-green" SPD-Grtine govern­
ments could be considered "congruent" coalitions. The Hesse and 
Lower Saxony governments represented unions of parties in opposi­
tion nationally and as such matched the national majority-versus-
opposition alignment. They are worthy of study also because most 
observers regarded them as "experiments." Table 4.2 summarizes the 
German Lander selected for inclusion in the survey. 
The context in which new governments are negotiated in these four 
German states clearly varies, as will be shown in chapter 6. Bremen— 
the historically rooted, small, urban Land—is characterized by an elec­
toral history replete with wide interelection vote swings and significant 
discrepancies between party vote shares at federal and Land elections. 
Lower Saxony—the artificially constructed, large, rural Land—is gen­
erally one of the more electorally stable German states and one in 
which election results for federal and Land legislatures appear re­
markably similar over time. Between these two extremes in the Prot­
estant north are Baden-Wurttemberg and Hesse in the Catholic south. 
Both states are characterized by high levels of interelection volatility. 
However, elections in Baden-Wurttemberg are more often "not fought 
on matters of national policy" (Braunthal 1982, 193), retaining an ele­
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Table 4.2 
Germany: State Parliaments Included in Survey Population, 1992 
Congruence with 
National 
Parliamentary 
State Parliaments Partisan Composition of Government Alliances 
Baden-Wurttemberg Social Democrats + SPD + CDU x 
Christian Democrats 
Bremen Social Democrats + Free SPD + FDP + Griinen x 
Democrats + Greens 
Hesse Social Democrats + Greens SPD + Griinen J 
Lower Saxony Social Democrats + Greens SPD + Griinen J 
Note: National government: Christian Democrats + Free Democrats (CDU/CSU + FDP). 
ment of localism despite the state's size and importance in the Bundes­
rat. Voting patterns for federal and Land elections in Hesse, con­
versely, more closely mimic one another, which may indicate a national 
rather than a "local" electoral dynamic. 
French Regional Councils 
The same process of area selection guided the choice of French re­
gions for inclusion in the survey population. Only months before the 
survey questionnaires were distributed, France held direct elections to 
its 22 metropolitan regional councils. At the time of the regional elec­
tions, which were for the first time uncoupled from national legislative 
elections, the 29-member cabinet of Socialist Prime Minister Edith 
Cresson contained figures not only from the Parti Sodaliste (PS) but 
also from the smaller Mouvement des Radicaux de Gauche (MRG) and 
France Unie (FU).5 This group of parties is considered the national 
majority of the day, while the "Union pour la France" (UPF) electoral 
alliance, incorporating the Rassemblement pour la Republique (RPR) 
and the Union pour la Democratic Fran^aise (UDF), is but one of sev­
eral national oppositions. Other separate parties, including the Parti 
Communiste (PC), the Greens (Les Verts), Generation Ecologie (GE), 
the Front National (FN), and Chasse, Peche, Nature et Traditions 
(CPNT), are classified as unallied national oppositions. Any regional 
coalition that mirrored the PS-MRG-FU national majority or the RPR­
UDF oppositional alliance could be included as "congruent." Any other 
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alliances would be deviations from the national pattern and could be 
included as "incongruent" coalition cases. 
Nine particular regions stood out as representative of the patterns 
of alliance building following the 22 March 1992 elections and the for­
mation of regional governments. In two regional councils (Pays de la 
Loire, Provence-Alpes-Cote d'Azur), the national RPR-UDF alliance 
duplicated itself in electing the regional president and in forming the 
regional cabinet. In Aquitaine, Midi-Pyrenees, and Picardie, the same 
RPR-UDF alliance found itself making postelection deals with the rad­
ical antiecologist CPNT, rewarding the small party with executive posts 
in both Aquitaine and Midi-Pyrenees. Campaign promises to the con­
trary, the center-right RPR-UDF forces in Alsace accepted the sup­
port of right-wing extremists and Front National dissidents, and in 
Languedoc-Roussillon, the parties of Jacques Chirac and Giscard 
d'Estaing rallied a strange mixture of Communists, Greens, and 
"Chasseurs" (CPNT) to elect a UDF regional president. In Bourgogne 
and Lorraine the Socialists joined with the France Unie movement, 
both ecologist parties (Verts, Generation Ecologie), and, in the case of 
Lorraine, the Communists. Charges of collusion with the Front Na­
tional divided the coalition majority in Lorraine, leading to its quick 
collapse and the subsequent formation of an RPR-UDF regional gov­
ernment. The necessity for the Socialists and the conservative parties 
to cope with new, smaller partners holding the balance of power in the 
regions makes these cases particularly valuable. 
Given these substantively interesting outcomes, and given that they 
display variation in an important theoretical phenomenon (national­
subnational congruence), these nine regions were chosen for inclusion 
in the survey. Table 4.3 summarizes the regional councils selected for 
the French sample and their coalition majorities. 
Responses 
A total of 608 completed questionnaires were returned, giving the 
survey a relatively high overall response rate of 38.7%. This rate is 
especially satisfying for U.S.-based cross-national surveys of elected 
representatives in European subnational assemblies. The response 
rate is generally consistent across countries and area units, and the 
respondent pool generally reflects the territorial parliaments' overall 
characteristics in terms of both party affiliation and legislative expe­
Table 4.3 
France: Regional Assemblies Included in Survey Population, 1992 
Congruence with 
National 
Parliamentary 
Regional Councils Partisan Composition of Government Alliances 
Alsace Gaullists + Democratic Union + National Front RPR+UDF + FN X 
Aquitaine Gaullists + Democratic Union + Other Rightists RPR + UDF + CNI + CPNT X 
Bourgogne Socialists + Other Left + Greens + France United PS + MRG + Verts + GE + FU X 
Languedoc-Roussillon Gaullists + Democratic Union + Green Dissidents RPR + UDF + Diss. Verts X 
Lorraine Socialists ­f Communists 4- France United 4- Greens PS + PCF + FU + Verts 4- GE X 
Midi-Pyrenees Gaullists + Democratic Union RPR + UDF 
Pays de la Loire Gaullists + Democratic Union RPR + UDF 
y 
j 
XPicardie Gaullists + Democratic Union + Other Rightists RPR + UDF + CPNT 
Provence-Alpes-Cote d'Azur Gaullists + Democratic Union RPR + UDF J 
Note: National government: Socialists + Left Radicals + France United (PS + MRG + FU). 
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rience (i.e., number of terms served). A complete tally of the survey 
returns, broken down by region and party, is provided in Appendix 2. 
It is instructive to note here some characteristics of the respondent 
pool in each country. Contained within the Belgian sample are 10 of 
27 (35.7%) deputes permanents, the provincial executives analogous to 
national cabinet ministers. In addition, 2 of 5 (40%) provincial council 
presidents responded to the survey questionnaire, as did 4 vice pres­
idents and 15 ordinary members of the executive bureaus. Six provin­
cial party groups leaders (chefs des graupes) returned their surveys, as 
did 2 party federation presidents. The national vice president of one 
Belgian political party, also a provincial councilor, provided answers 
to the questionnaire as well. Among the German respondents are 2 
minister-presidents, 1 Landtag president, and 3 Landtag vice presi­
dents. In addition, 5 Land government ministers and 5 former Land 
government ministers answered the questionnaire. German parlia­
mentary party leaders are also well represented, with 6 Landtag/ra&-
tionsvorsitzenden and 9 deputy fraktionsvorsitzenden responding. 
More impressive is the list of high-ranking politicians in the group 
of French respondents, this being due in large part to the French tra­
dition of cumul des mandats, or the accumulation of elective offices 
across multiple levels of government. On the level of regional govern­
ment itself, all 9 council presidents, 30 vice presidents, and 11 com­
mission permanente members replied. Regional councilors with positions 
in national government answering the questionnaire include 5 cabinet 
ministers and 1 junior minister (secretaire d'etat), 6 senators, 9 Assem­
blee Nationale deputies, and 2 former deputies. In addition, 4 of the 
French respondents are European deputies. Regional councilors hold­
ing elective office below the regional level are also generously repre­
sented, including 30 departmental councilors (conseillers generaux), 36 
municipal councilors, and 48 mayors. There is, then, more of an op­
portunity with the French data to gauge the responses of persons in 
multiple positions of party power and with experience and stature in 
national government. 
Reliability and Validity 
The prevention of any systematic error ranked high among the 
goals during the design of the survey.6 To estimate the reliability of in­
dicators, parallel measures were constructed for key items and placed 
at different points in the questionnaire. Strong correlations between 
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items and generally equal mean values signal that the measures are to 
a large extent reliable. Limitations on the length of the questionnaire 
itself, however, prevented the use of parallel measures tests for all in­
dicators. Beyond reliability, the validity of the measures is of crucial 
importance. Several steps were taken to ensure that indicators for such 
tricky concepts as "influence," "pragmatism," and "deference" would 
be sufficiently valid. First, pretesting the questionnaire with a small 
sample of respondents helped eliminate certain problematic indica­
tors. Second, soliciting the critical assessments of academic observers 
with expertise in the field also improved the validity of the measures 
before administering the survey. One final, and perhaps most impor­
tant, method of determining the validity of selected indicators as 
guidelines to what "really" happens was to check them against the re­
sponses of both party actors and nonparty political observers in open-
ended discussions. This technique, facilitated by 12 months "in the 
field," more than any other technique contributed to reliable and valid 
measures and analysis. 
The Interviews 
To complement and validate the data derived from survey responses, 
a final empirical base is supplied in the form of interviews conducted 
with elected representatives and party leaders at both subnational 
and national levels in Germany, Belgium, and France. Such interviews 
were necessary to produce the qualitative and contextual material 
essential for full interpretation. Moreover, open-ended discussions 
helped ameliorate some of the inherent restrictiveness of closed-ended 
questionnaires. 
The interviews, conducted during the September 1992 to Septem­
ber 1993 period, included discussions with regional and provincial 
councilors and deputies, subnational party leaders, national parlia­
mentarians, central party executives, and extraparliamentary party 
staff officials in each of the three countries. In all, representatives from 
17 political parties, 14 subnational assemblies, and 3 national govern­
ments were interviewed. Interview subjects were selected on the basis 
of several criteria. Participation in coalition negotiations, government 
membership, legislative and party tenure, position in party hierarchy, 
and dual office holding (national and subnational) were among the 
principal concerns. Of primary importance were party group leaders 
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(chefs des groupes, fraktionsvorsitzenden) in selected territorial assemblies. 
These persons occupy key decision-making positions and are involved 
more than others—at least outwardly—in the formulation and nego­
tiation of coalition agreements. They are likely also to be the persons 
who feel the most pressure from national party officials and who, at 
the same time, can exert the most pressure on the national party. 
Using what is generally deemed the "nonschedule-structured inter­
view method" (Nachmias and Nachmias 1987), the strategy of the in­
terviews was to raise specific questions concerning previous decisions 
of coalition participation, the intraparty causes and consequences of 
these decisions, and the prospects for future collaboration with other 
parties. Asking the same question of a simple councilor, a regional 
party group leader, a regional government executive, a national par­
liamentarian, an extraparliamentary national party official, and a 
party president best served the comparative purposes of this analysis. 
Was the interviewee aware of the party's coalition strategy? How did 
the interviewee believe the party's coalition strategy in Region A or 
Region B fit into the party's national coalition strategy? What factors 
did the interviewee believe were most influential in the party's sub-
national coalition decision, and how likely was it that this decision 
would influence future coalition choices in national government? Fre­
quently, the answers from persons in the same party in the same re­
gional parliament were not the same. Together, however, they supplied 
important clues and different pieces of the puzzle that ultimately re­
vealed meaningful empirical patterns.7 
Summary 
This chapter has delineated a three-part research methodology de­
signed to describe, explain, and to some extent "predict" coalition be­
havior and government formation in subnational assemblies. The tools 
of investigation include the analysis of historical events data, attitudi­
nal survey administration, and interviewing of elites. Simple reliance 
on one of these three methods would probably not supply an informed 
account of the coalition game as it plays out in territorial parliaments; 
it has been argued, however, that combining historical, quantitative, 
and qualitative approaches—what Putnam (1993) calls "marinating 
yourself in the data" (190)—allows for useful insights into patterns of 
behavior in Belgium, France, and Germany. 

Part Three 
Empirical Analysis


Chapter Five 
The Province, the Region, 
and the State: 
Rules of the Game 
in Three European Systems 
Rules, structures, and history matter. Any treatment of power pol­itics and coalition behavior in parliamentary assemblies must rec­
ognize substantial elements of each to be plausible. To explain impor­
tant phenomena across countries, we tend to look first for similarities 
and differences in procedural rules, institutional design, and under­
lying processes of change. Only then can we move on to search for 
explanations of behavioral patterns within countries by focusing on 
environmental conditions—for instance, those to be found in electoral 
competition and organizational pressures. To establish the institu­
tional and historical background for our analysis, this chapter is in­
tended to fill some of the gaps in our knowledge about structures, 
functions, actors, government formation processes, and the historical 
evolution of coalition politics in the intermediate-level territorial par­
liaments of Belgium, Germany, and France. 
Our first goal is to find answers to the following questions: Where 
and how do the provinces, regions, and states fit into their respective 
political and administrative systems? Who are the key players in the 
power game? How are new governments formed—in other words, 
what are the "rules of the game"? Are there aspects of the government 
formation process that generate criticism, either for their lack of trans­
parency or for their lack of democratic accountability? In what ways 
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have the dynamics of coalition building at subnational levels mimicked 
or departed from national alliance patterns? The methodology is to ask 
these questions of each country separately and, once this is done, to 
draw together some of the most important comparative characteristics. 
It is this drawing together of history and institutional development that 
leads to the chapter's second goal, namely, the close examination of the 
outcomes of coalition bargaining. Our methodology here represents a 
preliminary exploration of evidence from more than 300 acts of gov­
ernment formation, illustrating the types of governments formed, 
their size in seats and party members, their congruence with national 
coalitions, and their apparent responsiveness to electoral verdicts. 
Belgium 
"L'accord institutionnel de Saint-Michel," an eleventh-hour agreement 
patched together in October 1992 and ratified in April 1993, pushed 
forward Belgium's transformation into a federal state and at least tem­
porarily forestalled the country's anticipated descent into domestic un­
governability. As a federation, Belgium now has greatly strengthened 
regional parliaments, whose deputies were directly elected for the first 
time in the May 1995 general election. In these regional parliaments, 
coalition decisions assume the level of "high politics" as parties in Flan­
ders, Wallonia, and Brussels must choose between subnational gov­
ernments that either complement or complicate the usually shaky 
alliance arrangement in national government. Coexisting with the new 
regions are the provinces, Belgium's traditional meso-level institutions 
of representative government, which "have pursued 'provincial inter­
ests' in a creative way during the past 150 years" (Delmartino 1993, 
52). So urgent is the task of contemporary Belgium to find common 
ground between disparate cultures, parties, and ideologies that any 
lessons concerning cooperation culled from the grass roots should be 
of great practical value. This is the justification for exploring coalition 
behavior in the elected assemblies of both the provinces and the re­
gions. 
In Belgium's oldest political and administrative institutions, the 
provincial councils (conseils provinciaux, provincieraad), political parties 
often coalesce in manners strikingly different from their national 
counterparts. With the centrist Christian Socials and left-of-center So­
cialists allied in national coalition following the 1995 election, for ex­
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ample, parties in only 2 of the 10 provincial councils adopted the 
national center-left formula. The same had been true following the 
previous election in 1991, and in 1987 none of the provincial council 
majorities matched the parliamentary majority constructed in Brus­
sels. "Unnatural" alliances between left-wing Socialists and right-wing 
Liberals, "grand" or all-party coalitions, and the possibility of power 
sharing with regionalist or ecologist parties are all provincial phenom­
ena with indirect and direct system-level implications. While observers 
of Belgian politics frequently refer to such phenomena as "interfer­
ences" in the process of national government formation, little or no 
attempt has been made to determine their magnitude.1 
In Belgium's newest institutions, the regional parliaments (Con­
seil Regional Wallon, Vlaamse Gewest, Conseil Regional Bruxellois/ 
Brusselse Hoofdstedelijk Gewest), legislative parties have much less 
government formation experience than their provincial colleagues. 
Councils for the Flanders and Wallonia regions date from 1980, but 
for 15 years the two bodies consisted exclusively of elected mem­
bers of the national parliament. In 1989 the metropolitan region of 
Brussels became the first region to directly elect its own parliamen­
tary assembly, and in 1995 Flemish and Walloon voters had their 
first opportunity to choose representatives to autonomous regional 
parliaments. What Belgium's regional politicians and parties lack in 
government formation experience they make up for in functional 
competence and potential for profound system impact. When schol­
ars characterize Belgium as "the first Western state to go into volun­
tary semi-liquidation, as it were, without a shot being fired" (Sharpe 
1993, 32), it is upon the regions that the country's future is said 
to rest. 
Subnational Government Structures 
Since its creation in 1831, the modern Belgian state has developed 
from its original "unitary decentralized" form to a fully federalized 
arrangement. The Belgian Constitution after multiple revisions now 
establishes a hereditary monarchy within a parliamentary system, pro­
viding for the territorial organization of the country to include a fed­
eral authority with an executive (prime minister) and two legislative 
houses (Chamber of Representatives, Senate); three linguistic-cultural 
communities; three regions; 10 provinces, each with its own directly 
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UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE 
Figure 5.1 Belgian Political Institutions 
elected deliberative council; and 589 communes (municipalities), each 
with its own council as well. The organization of the Belgian state is 
depicted in figure 5.L 
PROVINCES. The advantage in directing initial attention at the Bel­
gian provinces is that, historically, they are the best and only example 
of intermediate-level territorial government in which politicians and 
parties playing the coalition game are clearly distinguishable from 
their counterparts in national parliament. This is so because before 
1995 the regional and community councils for Flanders and Wallonia 
were chosen indirectly from among sitting national MPs. 
Their status formalized by the Loi Provinciale of 1836 and by Ar­
ticle 108 of the Constitution confirming their power over "all matters 
of provincial interest,"2 the provincial councils have intentionally mim­
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icked, though in much reduced scope, the political structures existing 
in national government.3 Their size depending on population, the pro­
vincial councils currently range from 50 seats (Luxembourg) to 56 
(Walloon Brabant, Namur), 70 (Limburg), 75 (Flemish Brabant), 80 
(Liege), and 84 (Antwerp, East Flanders, West Flanders, Hainaut). 
Each deliberative council is directly elected for six-year terms by man­
datory universal suffrage, according to a proportional representation 
formula in which the basic electoral unit is the arrondissement (district). 
No provincial councilor may concurrently hold a mandate in the na­
tional parliament. Traditionally held on the same day as national par­
liamentary elections, provincial council and national parliamentary 
elections were "decoupled" for the first time with the provincial vote 
in 1994. This decoupling put an end to an important traditional fea­
ture of the life cycle of provincial legislatures, namely, their dissolution 
along with the national parliament. 
At the outset of a new legislative session, each council elects by secret 
ballot a six-member provincial executive, or deputation permanentelbe­
stendige deputatie.4 Party composition of the deputation is "usually the 
result of inter-party negotiations in the days following the elections" 
(Fitzmaurice 1983, 136). Permanent deputies, who receive salaries 
comparable to those of national senators, wield considerable executive 
power, even to the extent that one Luxembourg councilor claims, that 
"these six people can make the rain and sun in this province."5 The 
allure of this prize is made even greater for political parties by the fact 
that provincial executives cannot "fall" or be dismissed by a vote of no 
confidence within the council. Calls for democratization by making the 
provincial executive more directly responsible to the council at large 
do exist and are particularly loud in some quarters.6 
Historically, the work of the provincial assembly and its executive 
has been supervised by a putatively nonpartisan gouverneur, named by 
both the Crown and the minister of the interior and revocable at their 
joint request. This napoleonic holdover has during recent years waned 
in importance, ceding largely to the permanent deputation, and is also 
targeted for democratic reform. By eliminating the provincial gover­
norship or by making it an elective office and thus politicizing the po­
sition, reformists hope to remove this vestige of central government 
tutelle.7 Each provincial council also elects an internal bureau with a 
council president, a varying number of vice presidents, secretaries, and 
questeurs/quaestoren who represent the provincial opposition but whose 
number and influence depend ultimately on the good will of the 
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majority. The bureau is chiefly responsible for preparing and man­
aging council business, for interpreting procedural rules, and for re­
solving disputes that arise during plenary sessions. 
Among the council's formal responsibilities are enforcement of laws 
and general decrees, allocation of expenditures to public works and 
commercial activities, distribution of national government subsidies, 
imposition of provincial taxes, creation of schools, industrial devel­
opment, environmental management, and (historically) the election of 
provincial senators to the Belgian Senate.8 Provincial councils meet at 
least once every two months, but the primary sitting takes place for two 
to eight weeks, beginning every October. Scheduled at that time is the 
"grande session budgetaire provinciale," during which parties debate 
and vote on a budget proposed by the provincial executive and sup­
ported by the provincial majority. 
Budgetary debate is far from a dry, tedious process. The process gives 
opposition parties chances to snipe at the majority and to grandstand for 
the local media.9 The ecologist parties in particular pursue this strategy 
with great effort and fanfare, employing their statutory right to question 
every item in the budget, literally line by line. To illustrate, during the 
October 1992 budgetary debates in Luxembourg province, the four-
member opposition Ecolo party needled the Socialist-Liberal majority 
for "the terrible way they use our money."10 The council chamber turned 
raucous when the Ecolos revealed that from a budget of 1.9 billion Bel­
gian francs (approximately $57 million)11 the majority had proposed 
1.3 million francs ($40,000) for wine and cigars. The ecologists' efforts 
were received derisively by the majority parties in a boisterous ex­
change not unlike those that occur in the British House of Commons. 
For most of Belgium's history, the provincial councils were instru­
mental in determining the political composition of the Belgian Senate. 
Provincial councilors elected approximately 50 of the 184 members of 
the Senate, with each province choosing at least 3 provincial senators.12 
Selection of provincial senators took place soon after an election dur­
ing special council sessions in which parties presented lists either in­
dividually or as cartels. The remaining members of the Belgian Senate 
were then either directly elected (approximately 106) or "co-opted," 
the latter being a complex process in which a final group of senators 
was chosen together by the directly elected senators and the indirectly 
elected provincial senators. The reform of the Senate as realized by 
the latest federalization measures has substantially reduced the prov­
inces' role in this selection process. 
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Belgium's institutional reform projects give cause to question the 
very continuation of the provinces as "political" and not just "admin­
istrative" institutions. For external observers especially, the country 
appears to have a penchant for "overgovernment." Debate over the 
future of the provinces arises periodically, the most serious threat coin­
ciding with the so-called pacte d'Egmont and the Stuyvenberg accords 
in 1977 and 1978. At that time, the government of Prime Minister Leo 
Tindemans (CVP) envisioned putting an end to the provinces as gen­
uine political institutions, and legislation passed in 1980 sharply cur­
tailed the fiscal powers of provincial authorities. When center-left gave 
way to center-right in the coalition shift of 1981, however, the fortunes 
of the provincial institutions reversed. Laws passed in 1982 reestab­
lished the fiscal powers of the provinces, and by 1984 the former min­
ister of the interior, Charles Nothomb, proclaimed: "It is the end of 
the anti-provincial illusions" (Decoster 1987, 31). 
Belgium's provincial politicians jealously guard their institutions, 
and calls for their suppression have only resulted in efforts toward 
their renewal. The creation of a tenth province in 1995 is but one man­
ifestation of this renewal. Both Antwerp and Limburg have reacted to 
criticism of the provincial institutions by recently building ornate and 
expensive council chambers. The new provincial "palace" in Limburg, 
for example, is a 43,000-square-meter edifice, constructed at the cost 
of more than 2 billion Belgian francs ($66 million). Multiparty working 
groups have been formed in most provinces to "dust off and revitalize" 
the functioning of the institutions.13 Recognizing a perceived "demo­
cratic deficit," provincial politicians now take stock of their institutional 
failings: "The provinces have paid the price for their own mistakes. 
Their principal defect is that of never addressing public relations. I 
believe the provinces are indispensable to the smooth functioning of 
the country. Of course, they must adapt to the new situation by estab­
lishing new rules and in defining the means of their administrative 
collaboration with each region."14 The importance of council gov­
ernment in the Belgian provinces, as suggested by the Socialist Party's 
legislative leader in the Limburg Provincial Council, is in the end mea­
sured by popular perception: "The people on the street believe pro­
vincial politicians have the authority to influence their lives, despite 
whatever powers we may or may not actually have."15 
REGIONS. Few observers question the authority and impact of Bel-
gium's regional parliaments, their governments, or their cultural iden­
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tities. Any visitor, indeed any researcher bothering to venture beyond 
the various directorates-general of the EU labyrinth in Brussels, today 
cannot miss the physical evidence of regional identity and enterprise. 
Excepting the tremendous outpouring of unionist sentiment upon the 
sudden death in August 1993 of Belgium's venerable monarch, King 
Baudouin, it is uncommon to find the national flag displayed in out­
lying areas. Instead, either the bright red rooster of Wallonia or the 
black lion of Flanders adorns most town squares, accompanied almost 
without exception by the familiar blue and gold of the European 
Union. One cannot take public transport (De Lijn in Flanders, Trans­
port en Commun in Wallonia, STIB in Brussels) without noticing the 
placards claiming regional directorship. Visitors arriving in Ostende 
from Dover or Calais by ferry are likewise reminded of the inter­
regional cooperation agreements between Kent (UK), Nord-Pas de Ca­
lais (France), Flanders, and Wallonia. Flanders sells itself to investors 
as the region of high-tech, science-based industry, attracting interest 
from numerous multinationals. Wallonia, alternatively, desperately at­
tempts to attract investment in hopes of diversifying its economy and 
reversing its declining heavy industries (steel, textiles, construction). 
Brussels makes its pitch as the "capital region of Europe." The demo­
cratic manifestation of this emergent regional identity—and the agents 
behind much of the regional self-promotion—are the new parliamen­
tary assemblies. 
Flanders (58% of nation's population), Wallonia (32%), and Brus­
sels (10%) inherit most of the competences deemed residual under the 
new constitution, including foreign trade, energy, employment, re­
search and development, agriculture, and physical planning. To leg­
islate and execute within these areas, regional parliaments are directly 
elected by mandatory universal suffrage for five-year terms. Parlia­
mentarians select their own governments, the size of which varies 
across the three regions. The 75 members of the Walloon Parliament 
choose a minister-president and approve a cabinet of six ministers, the 
124 members of the Flemish Parliament (118 of whom are directly 
elected from the Flemish Region and 6 of whom are appointed Dutch 
speakers from the Brussels-Capital Regional Parliament) elect a minister-
president and approve a maximum of 10 cabinet ministers, and the 75 
members of the Brussels Parliament select a minister-president and 
approve a cabinet of 4 ministers (2 francophones and 2 Dutch speak­
ers) along with 3 secretaries of state (to include at least one Dutch 
speaker). None of the 268 regional deputies may now sit simulta­
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neously in the regional assembly and the federal parliament, effectively 
ending a decade and a half of political redundancy at national and 
regional levels. 
Party Participation in Coalition Governments 
While the provinces today appear secondary to the newer regional 
institutions, the power and prestige associated with majority status in 
provincial government is real. This is especially true given the clien­
telism for which Belgian party politics is famous at all levels of the 
polity (Dewachter 1987; Dewachter and Clijsters 1982; Fitzmaurice 
1983; Rudd 1986). The equation is simple: having no members in the 
governing deputation results in a party's having substantially less 
power and influence in provincial politics. Provincial elections, there­
fore, become minibattlegrounds for the parties and for the "second­
tier" politicians who contest them. 
The political parties that contest provincial elections and that are 
represented on the councils are subnational sections of the "national" 
parties. The linguistic parties from each of the three national political 
"families" (Socialist, Christian Social, Liberal) all currently have mem­
bers in the provincial councils: Socialistische Partij (SP)/Parti Socialiste 
(PS), Christelijke Volkspartij (CVP)/Parti Social-Chretien (PSC), Partij 
voor Vrijheid en Vooruitgang (PVV)/Parti Reformateur Liberal (PRL). 
The linguistic parties of the ecologist movement, Anders gaan leven 
(Agalev) in Flanders and Ecolo in Wallonia, have been consistent play­
ers in provincial politics since first gaining representation in 1981. Ad­
ditionally, regionalist or "community" parties have pursued provincial 
office, including the Volksunie (VU) in Flanders and the Front De­
mocratique des Francophones (FDF) in Brabant. Recently, extremist 
parties have gained toeholds in the provincial councils, especially in 
Antwerp province, where in 1991 and again in 1994 the far-right, anti-
immigrant Vlaams Blok (V1B) ranked as the second-largest party in 
the council. In the Walloon provinces the extremist parties do not fare 
as well, but the Front National (FN) and the equally vitriolic Agir have 
been able to gain a handful of seats, respectively, in recent elections 
(Downs, forthcoming). 
In provincial government, single-party majorities are almost as rare 
as at the national level in Belgium. Of 109 postelection acts of govern­
ment formation between 1961 and 1994, only 19 single-party major­
ities altogether have been formed in the Belgian provinces (table 5.1). 
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Hainaut province, where the Socialist Party long stood as the hege­
monic power, boasts the most single-party majorities (6) during the 
period. In two provinces, Brabant and Namur, there have been no 
single-party majorities during the 30-year span. Of the remaining 90 
cases, 73 (81%) have been two-party coalitions and 17 (19%) have com­
prised three or more parties. Quite striking is that 47 (52%) of the 90 
coalition governments represent cases in which provincial parties 
overtly chose not to duplicate the national majority-versus-opposition 
alignment despite the numerical possibility of doing so. 
Table 5.1 provides an important longitudinal picture of alliance be­
havior at one subnational level of the Belgian polity. What is evident 
across three decades is clear variation in terms of patterns of party 
coalition behavior, not only across parties but across provinces and 
across time. Subsequent chapters attempt to identify reasons for such 
variation, but the survey and interview data upon which the expla­
nation is based are cross-sectional rather than longitudinal. It is there­
fore necessary to outline the historical context of evolving subnational 
and national coalition patterns, a task achieved below by highlighting 
key developments in five crucial time periods. 
FROM SINGLE-PARTY GOVERNMENT TO THE POLITICS OF COALI­
TION (1961-73). This initial period is marked, first, by the transition 
from predominantly single-party provincial governments to coalition 
arrangements and, second, by a consistency in national-provincial co­
alition alignments as yet unequaled in subsequent legislative periods. 
Of all the legislatures under consideration, the 1961-to-1965 term wit­
nessed the creation of the greatest number (seven) of single-party pro­
vincial majorities. After the elections of March 1961, the Catholic party 
collected a monopoly of power in all of the Flemish provinces and in 
Luxembourg province as well. Socialists commanded an outright ma­
jority in Hainaut; and in Liege, where they held 43 of the 86 seats, the 
PS received a "free" vote from the Communists to form the majority.16 
The only coalitions were formed in Namur and Brabant, where the 
centrist Christian Socials allied themselves with the Liberals on the 
Right. Both provincial coalitions stood in contrast to the center-left 
Lefevre (PSC-BPS) national government (table 5.2). 
The joint national-provincial elections of May 1965 were the first to 
be truly colored by the regionalization issue and as such saw the entry 
of "federalist" parties onto the political landscape. In the provinces the 
trend away from single-party majorities had begun, their number 
Table 5.1 
Partisan Composition of Belgian Provincial Governments, 1961—1994* 
1961 1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 1978 1981 1985 1987 1991 1994 
National Coalition C+ S C+ S C+S C + S C + L + R C + S + V +  F C + S + F C+ L C + L c+s+v C+S C+S 
Province-
Antwerp 
Brabant 
c 
C+ L 
C + L C + S C+S C+S C+S C + S C + S C + S C + S C + S + L C+S+ L 
C+ L C + L C+ S + L C + S + L C+S + L C + S + V +  F C + S + L C + S + L C+S + L C+S + L** 
Vlaams Brabant C + S + V 
Brabant Wallon S + L 
(0 
CO 
East Flanders C C C+S C+ S C+S C+S C + S C + L C + L C + L C + L C+S + L 
s S + R S S S C+S C + S Hainaut 
Liege 
Limburg 
Luxembourg 
Namur 
s
s
c
c 
C+ L 
C + S s C+ S C+S 
C+ S C + S C + S C + S C + S C + S S + L S + L S + L S+L S + L 
c C+ S C+S C + S c C + L C + S C + S S + L+V S + L+V c
c C + L C+S S + L + R S + L+R C + S + L S + L S + L S + L S + L S+L 
C + L C+S C+S C+S C+S C + S C + S S + L S + L S + L S + L 
West Flanders C C C+S C+S C + S C + S c C+S C + S C + S C + S C+S 
Note: C = Christian Socials, S = Socialists, L = Liberals, V = Volksunie, F = Francophone Democratic Front, R = Walloon Rally. 
*Underlined cases are those in which provincial coalitions congruent with national parliamentary alignments were numerically possible but were 
not formed. 
**The Flemish Christian Democrats (CVP)—but not the francophone Christian Socials (PSC)—-joined the Brabant provincial coalition in 1991. 
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Table 5.2 
National Governments in Belgium since 1961 
Party Composition 
Prime Minister of Government* Duration 
Lefevre PSC-PSB Apr. 1961-May 1965 
Harmel PSC-PSB July 1965-Feb. 1966 
Vanden Boeynants I PSC-PLP Mar. 1966-Feb. 1968 
Eyskens IV CVP-PSC-PSB June 1968-Nov. 1971 
Eyskens V CVP-PSC-PSB Jan. 1972-Nov. 1972 
Leburton CVP-PSC-PSB-PVV-PLP Jan. 1973-Jan. 1974 
Tindemans I CVP-PSC-PVV-PLP Apr. 1974-June 1974 
Tindemans II CVP-PSC-PVV-PLP-RW June 1974-Mar. 1977 
Tindemans III CVP-PSC-PSB-FDF-VU June 1977-Oct 1978 
Vanden Boeynants II CVP-PSC-PS-SP-FDF-VU Oct. 1978-Dec. 1978 
Martens I CVP-PSC-PS-SP-FDF Apr. 1979-Jan. 1980 
Martens II CVP-PSC-PS-SP Jan. 1980-Apr. 1980 
Martens III CVP-PSC-PS-SP-PVV-PRL May 1980-Oct. 1980 
Martens IV CVP-PSC-PS-SP Oct. 1980-Mar. 1981 
Eyskens CVP-PSC-PS-SP Mar. 1981-Sept. 1981 
Martens V CVP-PSC-PVV-PRL Dec. 1981-Oct. 1985 
Martens VI CVP-PSC-PVV-PRL Nov. 1985-Oct. 1987 
Martens VII CVP-PSC-PVV-PRL Oct. 1987-Dec. 1987 
Martens VIII CVP-PSC-PS-SP-VU May 1988-Sept. 1991 
Martens IX CVP-PSC-PS-SP Sept. 1991-Oct. 1991 
Dehaene I CVP-PSC-PS-SP Mar. 1992-May 1995 
Dehaene II CVP-PSC-PS-SP June 1995-
*In 1968 the Social Christian Party (PSC) split into the CVP and PSC; in 1972 the 
Liberal Party (PLP) split into the PVV and PLP; in 1978 the Belgian Socialist Party 
(BSP) split into the PS and SP; in 1979 the PLP became the Liberal Reform Party 
(PRL). 
down to only three in 1965. Of the six coalitions, there were an equal 
number of center-left (Christian Socials-Socialists) and center-right 
(Christian Socials—Liberals) arrangements. The PS lost its majorities 
in both Liege and Hainaut, conceding executive posts to the PSC in 
each province. The PS-PSC coalition in Liege coincided with the con­
clusion of a 12-year provincial accord linking the two parties whenever 
election results would allow.17 These arrangements, as well as a center-
left coalition in East Flanders, mirrored the national coalition under 
Prime Minister Harmel. Budgetary crisis toppled the Harmel govern­
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ment after little more than six months in office, leading to a reversal 
of alliances and a new right-leaning Vanden Boeynants (CVP/PSC-
PLP) cabinet. 
After almost two years of unpopular economic austerity measures 
and mounting "community problems," the government resigned and 
parliament was dissolved. The punctuating event in the crisis had been 
the controversial creation of a French section at the University of Leu-
ven.18 Elections in March 1968 and the negotiations that followed re­
sulted in abandonment of the conservative national coalition and a 
return to the center-left, this time headed by Prime Minister Gaston 
Eyskens. Provincial majorities likewise moved to the left, with five 
Christian Social—Socialist coalitions (three in 1965) and only two Chris­
tian Social-Liberal coalitions (three in 1965). After almost three and 
a half years in office, the Eyskens government fell on 24 September 
1971. Difficulties associated with the revision of the Constitution and 
tensions over the status of certain linguistic and cultural trouble spots19 
made the November elections especially combative; the results, how­
ever, prompted little change in the distribution of power. Refusing to 
consider grand coalition with the Christian Socials and Liberals, the 
Socialists gave the center parties no alternative but a reconstitution of 
the same CVP/PSC-BSP coalition.20 The "new" government had the 
same prime minister and the same vice prime minister and was char­
acterized by a "tres grande continuity avec le gouvernement precedent, 
a un degre rarement attein dans Fhistoire politique de la Belgique" (a 
great continuity with the preceding government, a degree rarely 
achieved in Belgium's political history).21 This continuity was further 
reinforced in the provinces, as eight of the nine new council executives 
were shared by Christian Socials and Socialists. In Brabant, where it 
was impossible to duplicate the national arrangement, the three tra­
ditional party families formed a tripartite coalition, effectively block­
ing the largest party in the council and the election's clear winner— 
the FDF-RW, with 25 seats—out of power. In protest against a majority 
of Flemish preponderance (29 Dutch speakers out of 55), two members 
of the Liberal group broke party ranks and publicly disavowed the new 
alliance.22 Coalition change also took place in Luxembourg province, 
where the PS replaced the liberal PLP in the executive despite an ac­
cord signed on 17 April 1969 between the PSC and the PLP to main­
tain their 1968 coalition through two legislatures. 
The political landscape in Belgium grew considerably more com­
plicated in 1973. To resolve the "immobilisme" of the second Eyskens 
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government with regard to the mounting pressures of regionalization 
and constitutional revision,23 a new tripartite cabinet coalition was formed 
on 26 January 1973, including the Socialists (PSB), both parties of the 
Christian Social family (CVP, PSC), and both parties of the Liberal 
family (PVV, PLP). The Leburton-Tindemans-De Clercq alliance was 
the first postwar Belgian government combining the three traditional 
parties, and it did so clearly to command the two-thirds majority nec­
essary under parliamentary rules for reform of the Constitution. Still, 
the reform process moved nowhere, and the global economic crisis, 
especially the oil crunch and the devaluation of the U.S. dollar, only 
served to agitate the already bitter infighting among the rival govern­
ment parties. The "grand" coalition collapsed after just one year. 
REGIONALIST PARTIES GAIN ENTRY (1974-80). This second pe­
riod is defined principally by the entry of regional linguistic commu­
nity parties into governing arrangements at both national and provin­
cial levels. With the fall of the Leburton government in January 1974, 
King Baudouin charged Leo Tindemans (CVP) with the task of form­
ing a new government. Tindemans's initial failure prompted the dis­
solution of parliament—and the provincial councils—and the calling 
of new elections. After the March elections, Tindemans, again forma­
teur, put together a short-lived minority national government (CVP/ 
PSC-PVV/PLP). This right-leaning national government did not cor­
respond with the coalition preferences of provincial parties. Not one 
of the nine provincial governments formed in March 1974 matched 
the Tindemans coalition. Christian Social parties in seven provinces 
opted for alliances with the Socialists, while the three traditional party 
families renewed their anti-FDF "blocking coalition" in Brabant. In 
Luxembourg province, Socialists, Liberals, and the Walloon Rally 
(RW) constituted a "coalition of minorities" and thrust the PSC out of 
its vocation majoritaire and into opposition. The participation of a fed­
eralist party, the RW, was the first in provincial government, and it 
anticipated the party's June entry into national government. The RW 
persisted longer in the Luxembourg majority than it did in Brussels, 
first refusing to support the government's budget and ultimately with­
drawing its cabinet ministers in March 1977. 
Elections in April 1977 saw gains for the Christian Socials, Socialists, 
and the Francophone Democratic Front in the Chamber of Represen­
tatives. The Liberals maintained their seats, while the Volksunie reg­
istered small losses. The RW's painful experiment as a party of 
The Province, the Region, and the State " 1 0  3 
government hurt it at the polls, where it lost 8 of its 13 seats in parlia­
ment. Tindemans, again in search of a coalition broad enough to deal 
effectively with the linguistic community divisions, succeeded in join­
ing the two major party families in progression (CVP/PSC, BSP/PSB) 
with the two largest federalist parties, FDF and VU. The Socialists had 
vetoed any tripartite formula including the Liberals. The experimental 
arrangement in national government allowed for the two-thirds ma­
jority necessary for constitutional reform, and it comprised the largest 
parties in each of the country's three regions—CVP in Flanders, the 
PSB in Wallonia, and the FDF in Brussels. In provincial government 
there is no clear need for a two-thirds majority; hence, the results of 
coalition bargaining in the provinces were not likely to mirror those at 
the national level. Only in Luxembourg did a federalist party (RW) 
gain a share of the provincial executive. Still, the basic left-leaning na­
ture of Belgian coalitions was upheld in six of the eight provinces. In 
Brabant the three traditional party families retained their anti-FDF 
alliance in spite of that party's arrival in national government. 
Elections in December 1978 saw gains for three of the four existing 
national coalition partners. Only the Volksunie met with electoral de­
feat, losing six deputies and six senators. A 99-day crisis ensued, cul­
minating in the formation of a CVP/PSG-SP/PS-FDF government with 
the necessary two-thirds strength to deal with continuing issues of state 
reform. In the meantime, provincial coalitions exhibited varying de­
grees of continuity with national arrangements. Even in the absence 
of a two-thirds decision rule, parties in Brabant's provincial council 
duplicated the CVP/PSC-SP/PS-VU-FDF coalition that had governed 
Belgium for more than a year. Outside its electoral base in Brabant, 
the FDF did not gain provincial council representation. Therefore, the 
center-left coalitions established in Liege, Namur, Antwerp, and East 
Flanders matched national trends. In Luxembourg province, where 
parties were gaining a reputation for nonconformity with national pat­
terns, the three "great" parties (PSC, PS, PRL) agreed to share power 
after nine days of postelection negotiations.24 In Hainaut province, 
where Socialists in some federation congresses voted by 80% against 
coalition with the PSC, an alliance with the RW was established to best 
express the "progressive will" of the population.25 
Their impotence in government and mounting pressures from the 
CVP forced the FDF to exit the national cabinet coalition in 1980. The 
Christian Social and Socialist government left behind faltered and fell 
in April 1980. Rather than resort to new elections, Prime Minister Wil­
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fried Martens (CVP) negotiated a tripartite arrangement with Social­
ists and Liberals, the third Belgian government to be headed by 
Martens. Martens III survived little more than four months, as pri­
mary issues of budgetary spending, unemployment, and social security 
rendered the alliance untenable. Martens IV, comprising Christian So­
cials and Socialists, endured five months, and yet another "new" gov­
ernment (CVP/PSC-SP/PS) tenuously survived five more months, this 
time led by Mark Eyskens (CVP). 
ALTERNATIVES TO THE CENTER IN PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT 
(1981-86). This third crucial period saw a major rightward shift in 
national alignments and the ouster of the center party in Wallonia in 
favor of coalitions of parties presumably "unconnected" on the left-
right ideological scale. In the November 1981 general elections, the 
parties of the Christian Social family suffered their worst defeat of the 
postwar period, losing a combined 21 deputies and 17 senators. The 
Liberal parties, gaining a combined 15 deputies and 16 senators, reg­
istered the greatest victory. The big losers and the big winners formed 
the Martens V government. In the provinces, only two council major­
ities (East Flanders, Limburg) corresponded directly with the right­
ward shift. In three others (Namur, Antwerp, West Flanders), Chris­
tian Socials and Socialists rejected the national coalition reversal and 
maintained their center-left alliances. In Li&ge and Luxembourg prov­
inces, Socialists and Liberals concluded unprecedented agreements to 
exclude the centrist PSC from provincial government. 
In a break from past practice, the Martens V government invested 
in 1981 lasted its full legislative term. Elections in 1985 produced sig­
nificant gains for the Catholic parties and only modest losses for the 
Liberals, thus allowing the coalition's continuation and the beginning 
of Martens VI. At the same time, the gap between patterns of provin­
cial coalition policy and national coalition policy widened, with only 
one province (East Flanders) choosing to duplicate the national alli­
ance. The three remaining Flemish provinces concluded center-left co­
alitions, and Liberals in three Walloon provinces (Liege, Luxembourg, 
Namur) rejected their national coalition partner (PSC) in favor of the 
national opposition (PS). 
THE LEFTWARD WENDE (1987-93). The fourth period in our time 
line is notable initially for the leftward shift in power at the national 
level but also for the breakdown in previously solid party relations in 
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the periphery. In October 1987 Martens VI temporarily stalled and 
was reconstituted as Martens VII (CVP/PSC-PVV/PRL), which itself 
lasted only until the early elections of December 1987. The elections 
were to produce real change in national coalition policy but none at 
all in the provinces. In each of the nine provinces, the majority formed 
following the 1985 elections was renewed in 1987. This occurred de­
spite the conclusion in 1986 of an eight-year pact between the PSC and 
PRL to form coalitions in all institutions where election results allowed. 
By 1987 the alliance pact had ruptured, and Liberals in Liege, Lux­
embourg, and Namur made new deals with the Socialists (see chapter 
7). The rupture was even more real in national government, as the 
Catholic parties in 1988 engineered a coalition change to include the 
Socialists and the Volksunie. 
Coalition bargaining following the November 1991 elections saw a 
formateur attempt for the first time since 1958 to put together a Belgian 
government without the Catholic parties. In three Walloon provinces 
(Liege, Luxembourg, Namur), where the Christian Socials had first 
been blocked from power in 1981, "une coalition sans les sociaux-
chr£tiens" was realized in the form of PS-PRL governments. In Lim­
burg the Socialist-Liberal-Volksunie coalition reduced the CVP to the 
ranks of the opposition for the first time ever in a Flemish province. 
In Brabant province the council parties reproduced a classic tripartite 
coalition, but with one profound difference—the PRL blocked the 
PSC's entrance to the permanent deputation. For the first time, a tra­
ditional party, the CVP, joined a provincial government without its 
linguistic partner, the PSC. This "accord historique" produced the 
country's first "asymmetrical" coalition. The anti-CVP/PSC coalitions 
in the Belgian provinces reflected public sentiment but were not re­
alized in national government, where a center-left cabinet under Jean-
Luc Dehaene (CVP) ultimately emerged. 
COALITIONS IN THE FEDERAL STATE (1994-95). The postfeder­
alization period in Belgian electoral and alliance politics ushered in 
several important changes: provincial elections detached from na­
tional elections, ten instead of nine provincial councils, and direct elec­
tions to autonomous regional parliaments. The provincial vote in 
October 1994 led to a renewal of the socialist-liberal axis in much of 
francophone Belgium and a continued, albeit marginal, erosion of 
Catholic dominance in the north. These developments took a back seat 
to the 1995 elections (table 5.3) and government formations in Flan­
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ders, Wallonia, and Brussels regions. Although Brussels had elected 
its first legislature and government in 1989, May 1995 signaled the 
democratization of Belgium's regions as a legitimate institutional tier 
of representative government. Following the elections, weeks of in­
tense bargaining at multiple tables revealed the apparent interdepen­
dence of negotiations to form the federal and regional governments. 
In the event, the center-left parties in the Chamber of Representatives, 
the Flanders Parliament, and the Wallonia Parliament orchestrated 
matching coalition governments. Only in the Brussels region, with its 
bilingual legislature, did a more politically and linguistically inclusive 
alternative emerge. 
General Patterns 
It is evident from this broad historical overview that in Belgium 
single-party majorities are scarce at all levels of government. Indeed, 
Belgian parliamentary democracy is coalition politics. There is no 
question that examining coalition behavior in the Belgian provincial 
councils and regional assemblies, instead of simply in the national par­
liament, is an unconventional method of understanding the strategic 
behavior of the country's political parties. This fact, however, gives the 
approach part of its allure and value. 
Repeated rounds of government formation at different levels of the 
polity demonstrate real diversity. Tables 5.1 through 5.3 attest to this 
fact. Parties in subnational legislatures appear, at least at first glance, 
to be responding in varying degrees at varying times to a range of 
motivations, such as concerns of coalition size, ideological connected­
ness, and coalition continuity; national party preferences; national co­
alition arrangements; and even sometimes the verdict of the electorate. 
Explaining this variance is an empirical matter and will be pursued in 
following chapters. The purpose of this initial overview of the Belgian 
case has been to establish the context in which coalitions occur, to con­
firm the existence of variance, and to describe the historical linkages 
between subnational and national coalition systems. 
Germany 
Despite a respectable number of case studies of coalition formation 
and collapse in the German states (see Broughton and Kirchner 1986; 
Table 5.3 
Partisan Composition of Directly Elected Belgian Regional Parliaments and Their Governments 
Brussels-Capital 
Parliament 
Wallonia Parliament Flanders Parliament 
l one 1989 1995 
iyyo 
Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes 
Parties (N = 75) (%) (N = 118) (%) (N = 75) (%) (N = 75) (%) 
French-speaking socialists (PS) 30 35.2 — — 18 22.0 17 21.4 
Flemish socialists (SP) — — 25 19.4 2 2.7 2 2.4 
Flemish Christian Democrats (CVP) — — 35 26.8 4 4.2 3 3.3 
Francophone Christian Democrats (PSC) 16 21.6 — — 9 11.8 7 9.3 
Flemish-speaking liberals (VLD, was PVV) — — 26 20.2 2 2.8 2 2.7 
Federation of French-speaking liberals and 
Francophone Democratic Front (PRL-FDF) 19 23.7 — — — — 28 35.0 
French-speaking liberals (PRL) — — — — 15 16.9 — — 
Francophone Democratic Front (FDF) — — — — 15 16.7 — — 
Volksunie (VU) — — 9 9.0 1 2.1 1 1.4 
AGALEV — — 7 7.1 1 1.1 — 0.9 
ECOLO 8 10.4 — — 8 10.2 7 9.0 
Vlaams Blok (V1B) — — 15 12.3 1 2.1 2 3.0 
National Front (FN-NF) 2 5.2 — — 2 3.3 6 7.5 
French Speakers Union (UF) — — 1 1.2 — — — — 
Others — 3.9 — 4.0 — 4.1 — 4.1 
Government Formed PS + PSC SP + CVP PS/SP + PSC/CVP PS/SP+CVP+ 
FDF + VU PRL-FDF + VU 
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Culver 1966; Gunlicks 1977; Pridham 1973), little systematic attention 
has been devoted to analyzing the broader linkages between Land-
federation coalitions. Nor has much research attempted to look, with 
an eye toward comparison, at the ways in which German state politi­
cians and their parent party organizations cope with coalition envi­
ronments. Do party leaders at the federal level want to impose the 
same coalition at all levels of government where election results permit, 
so as to avoid intraparty conflicts, ensure policy consistency, and en­
gender harmony between federal coalition partners? Or do they ac­
tively encourage the formation of incongruent coalitions, perhaps to 
boost their leverage with federal coalition partners by increasing the 
credibility of the threat of coalition breakup? Or are federal party 
leaders not powerful enough to dictate the choices of recalcitrant state 
parties? 
These questions are as old as the Federal Republic and take on 
added importance with the recent addition of five "new" Lander from 
the former German Democratic Republic (GDR). As in the case of Bel­
gium, the following overview of institutional structures and historical 
development is not intended to supply every detail of every case of 
government formation at either the federal or the Land level. More 
directly, the task at hand is to describe the institutional settings in 
which coalitions form and to summarize basic trends in coalition out­
comes for federal and Land governments. 
Subnational Government Structures 
For a much longer period than in Belgium, federalism has domi­
nated the territorial administration and political division of Germany. 
The German state after 1949 is an amalgam of federal (Bund), regional 
(Land), county (Kreis), and municipal (Gemeinde) institutions. Ger-
many's constitution or "Basic Law" (Grundgesetz) explicitly details the 
country's territorial organization, including deliberative assemblies at 
the national, regional, and local levels, as depicted in figure 5.2. At the 
national level are two parliamentary chambers: the Bundestag (lower 
house), directly elected by the German population, and the Bundesrat 
(upper house), appointed by and representing the interests of the re­
spective Land governments. At the regional level reside separate par­
liaments (Landtage), each with its own executive. Finally, at the local 
and district levels, the German system provides for thousands of coun­
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Federal Assembly Federal 
Council 672 Members 
4 Seats Each: 
chleswig-Holstein 
Appointed randenburg 
by 
Regional Saxony-Anhalt 
Thuringia Governments 6 Seats Each: 
Bavaria 3 Seats Each: 
Lower Saxony Mecklenburg-W. Pom. 
Baden-WUrttemberg Bremen 
North Rhine- Hamburg 
Westphalia Saarland 
State (Land) Parliaments 
16 
District Councils 
Local Councils 
16,160 
UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE 
Figure 5.2 German Political Institutions 
dls (Gemeinderat, Stadtrat, Kreistag) that have the authority to "regulate, 
under their own responsibility, all affairs of the local community, 
within the framework of the law."26 
German "national" government exercises a wide degree of discre­
tion in policy making. The federal chancellor (Bundeskanzler) and fed­
eral ministries {Bundesregierung) have constitutional jurisdiction to act 
exclusively in areas such as foreign affairs and defense, monetary pol­
icy, nationality laws, railways, air traffic administration, customs, postal 
services, and telecommunications. Wary, however, of vesting too much 
power in central authorities, the authors of the Basic Law established 
that "the exercise of state powers and the discharge of state functions 
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rests with the Lander insofar as this Basic Law does not prescribe or 
permit other arrangements" (Article 83). Thus, the Lander hold cer­
tain reserved and residuary competencies—among them, education, 
law and order, cultural and religious affairs, and supervision over local 
government (Gerstenlauer 1995). Generally described by the term co­
operativefederalism, the German model "is characterised by competition, 
sometimes by controversy and confrontation, and eventually by bar­
gaining. Neither element can force its will upon the other, rather the 
component units are forced into a scheme of co-operation" (Hrbek 
1987, 32). Thus, the constitutional structures of German territorial 
division, much as in Belgium, do yield discernibly different national 
and subnational governmental arenas that, as will be described below, 
offer lucrative prizes for political parties.27 
The component regional units of Germany's cooperative federalism 
are the individual Lander. Allied authorities created 11 West German 
Lander by 1949: Hamburg, Bavaria, North Rhine—Westphalia, Lower 
Saxony, Hessen, Rheinland-Palatinate, Bremen, Baden, Wurttemberg-
Hohenzollern, Wiirttemberg-Baden, and Schleswig-Holstein. West 
Berlin became an administrative unit with special status in 1950. By 
1951 the three southwestern states of Baden, Wurttemberg-Hohen-
zollern, and Wiirttemberg-Baden merged into the present Land of 
Baden-Wurttemberg. West Germany regained the Saarland in 1957, 
bringing the total number of Lander back to 11. These principal units 
of subnational government underpinned the West German state from 
its inception to its most recent transformation—the October 1990 re­
unification. With reunification came the incorporation of five Lander 
crafted from the territory of the former GDR: Brandenburg, Meck-
lenburg-West Pomerania, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, and Thuringia. 
LAND GOVERNMENT. At the state or regional level resides "a com­
plex balance of somewhat autonomous centres of power" (Lehmbruch 
1978, 154). Each of the states has its own legislature, its own govern­
ment, and its own constitution. Each government is headed by a chief 
minister (Ministerprdsident), who is accountable to the democratically 
elected parliamentary body. Each state party (Landesverband) has at 
some time asserted its local autonomy in relation to the formation of 
coalitions that differ from the arrangement prevailing in Bonn at the 
same time (Broughton and Kirchner 1986). This is the crucial factor 
that makes multiparty government in Germany's regional parliaments 
worthy of our attention.28 
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The Landtage (Abgeordnetenhaus in Berlin, BiXrgerschaft in Bremen 
and Hamburg) range in size from 60 seats (Saarland) to 237 (North 
Rhine—Westphalia), corresponding to population size and to the stat­
utes of the respective Land constitutions. Individual differences make 
general comparisons across the state parliaments more difficult than 
in the case of the uniformly structured Belgian provinces. Elections to 
the Landtage take place approximately every four or five years, but the 
legislative periods of the respective Landtage do not necessarily corre­
spond with that of the Bundestag nor with those of each other. Moreover, 
the two-ballot electoral system (one vote for a constituency candidate, 
one for a party) that determines federal elections is not uniformly prac­
ticed by the Lander in their parliamentary elections. In North Rhine-
Westphalia Landtag elections, for example, voters directly elect 151 
deputies (MdL) in a "first past the post," single-member constituency 
system. With the same vote, however, the remaining 86 MdL are 
chosen via proportional representation from among those "Land re­
serve lists" gaining at least 5% of the overall vote.29 Land parliament 
deputies may not concurrently hold mandates in the Bundestag. 
Stakes in postelection coalition games are high in the Landtage. The 
minister president (Burgermeister in the city-states of Hamburg, Bre­
men, and Berlin) is chosen by absolute majority from among the Land-
tag deputies in secret balloting. This chief executive then has the 
authority to appoint a cabinet of generally 9 to 15 ministers, each with 
a portfolio in some area such as finance, justice, education, or envi­
ronment. In the absence of a single-party majority in the Landtag, 
multiple parties must negotiate the candidacy of the minister president 
and bargain over the distribution of cabinet ministries. Once invested, 
the minister president and the cabinet may be ousted from office by a 
constructive vote of no confidence. Here is one clear indicator of the 
differences between executives in the German Lander and those in the 
Belgian provinces. 
In addition to the consequences of immediate importance to a par­
ticular Land, coalition outcomes also influence the balance of power 
in federal government. Much as the Belgian provincial and regional 
majorities have been able to determine the composition of the Belgian 
Senate, the majority party or parties in the German Landtage deter­
mine the political composition of the Bundesrat. The second chamber 
in Germany is composed of persons appointed by the individual Land 
governments, voting together as Land blocs and following the instruc­
tions of the Land governments. As most legislation requires passage 
112 • Chapter Five 
in both the Bundestag and the Bundesrat, the Lander thus have a di­
rect impact on federal policy. This becomes especially crucial when the 
majority in the Lander, and hence in the Bundesrat, does not match 
the federal majority in the Bundestag. A single change of coalition 
partners in a single Landtag can thus alter the balance of power in the 
Bundesrat and in the federal system altogether. 
Party Participation in Coalition Governments 
In federal Germany the construction of governments in both Bonn 
and in the Lander is largely a product of coalition politics. At both 
levels, the primary actors are the Christian Democratic Union/Chris-
tian Social Union (Christlich Demokratische Union/Christlich Soziale 
Union), the Social Democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische 
Partei Deutschlands), the Free Democratic Party (Freie Demokratische 
Partei), and the Greens (Die Griinen). In the first decades of the fed­
eration, smaller parties, including the German Party (Deutsche Par­
tei) and the Association of Refugees and Disenfranchised (Gesamt­
deutscher Block/Block der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten), 
also made their way into governing coalitions. A formidable literature 
on German party dynamics generally concurs with Norpoth's (1982) 
observation that the pattern of coalition government in the FRG is one 
of "steady, effective, and at times creative government lacking the con­
stant menace of crisis" (31; see also Broughton and Kirchner 1986; 
Hoffmann-Lange 1986; Johnson 1983; Klingemann 1985; Padgett 
1989; Padgett and Burkett 1986; Pridham 1982; Pulzer 1982; Schmidt 
1983; Smith 1989). 
While there is no intention here to recapitulate the issues and cleav­
ages that characterize politics in Bonn, the general evolutionary pat­
tern of German coalition politics at the federal level does deserve initial 
attention. Table 5.4 provides the party composition and coalition status 
of federal governments since 1949. The immediate postwar period wit­
nessed broad-based inclusive coalitions, followed by various minimum 
winning coalitions between the CDU and FDP, an oversized grand co­
alition from 1966 to 1969, and alternating periods of center-right CDU 
and center-left SPD alliances with the pivotal liberal FDP. To gener­
alize, it may be said that SPD-dominated coalitions have tended to 
be "overloaded" with economic issues, including pro-labor and pro-
welfare state measures, while CDU-dominated coalitions have tended 
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Table 5.4 
Federal Coalitions in Germany since 1949 
Factor Precipitating Change or 
Parties in Government* Period of Office Renewal 
CDU/CSU-FDP-DP Sept. 1949-Sept. 1953 Elections 
CDU/CSU-FDP-DP- Oct. 1953-Oct. 1955 Internal party split and defection 
GB/BHE 
CDU/CSU-FDP-DP Oct. 1955-Feb. 1956 Internal party split and defection 
CDU/CSU-DP Feb. 1956-Sept. 1957 Elections 
CDU/CSU-DP Oct. 1957-July 1960 Internal party split and defection 
CDU/CSU July 1960-Sept. 1961 Elections 
CDU/CSU-FDP Nov. 1961-Oct. 1963 Voluntary resignation 
CDU/CSU-FDP Oct. 1963-Sept. 1965 Elections 
CDU/CSU-FDP Oct. 1965-Oct. 1966 Coalition breakup 
CDU/CSU-SPD Dec. 1966-Sept. 1969 Elections 
SPD-FDP Oct. 1969-Nov. 1972 Elections 
SPD-FDP Dec. 1972-May 1974 Voluntary resignation 
SPD-FDP May 1974-Oct. 1976 Elections 
SPD-FDP Dec. 1976-Oct. 1980 Elections 
SPD-FDP Nov. 1980-Oct. 1982 No-confidence vote 
CDU/CSU-FDP Oct. 1982-Feb. 1983 Elections 
CDU/CSU-FDP Mar. 1983-Jan. 1987 Elections 
CDU/CSU-FDP Jan. 1987-Nov. 1990 Elections 
CDU/CSU-FDP Dec. 1990-Oct. 1994 Elections 
CDU/CSU-FDP Oct. 1994­
Note: CDU = Christian Democratic Union; CSU = Christian Social Union; SPD = Social 
Democratic Party; GRUNE = Greens; FDP = Free Democratic Party; GB/BHE = Refugee 
Party; DP = German Party. 
*Bold type indicates possession of chancellorship. 
to emphasize free-enterprise "social capitalism," religious and citizens' 
rights issues, and conflicts over law and order (Schmidt 1983). 
In Land parliaments the party composition of coalition govern­
ments has demonstrated greater variation. While the CDU has tradi­
tionally dominated governments in such states as Baden-Wiirttemberg, 
Rhineland-Palatinate, Schleswig-Holstein, and the Saarland, it has 
done so by allying on frequent occasions with its liberal partners, the 
FDP, but also at times with its avowed adversaries, the SPD. Only in 
Bavaria, where the CSU has long been hegemonic, has the Christian 
Union largely avoided coalition compromises and enjoyed uninter­
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Table 5.5 
Partisan Composition of German Land Governments since 1961 
Year, North 
Federal Baden- Lower Rhine- Rhineland Schleswig 
Coalition Wttrttemberg Bavaria Berlin Bremen Hamburg Hessen Saxony Westphalia Palatinate Saarland Holstein 
1961 CDU+FDP+ SPD+FDP CDU+FDP 
CDU/CSU GDP CSU+BP/ 
+FDP | SVP SPD+FDP SPD+FDP 
CDU+FDP | 
1965 
CDU/CSU CSU SPD+FDP SPD SPD CDU-•SPD SPD+FDP CDU-
+SPD 
1969 
SPD+FDP SPD+FDP SPD+FDP SPD SPD+FDP 
SPD SPD

1972 
SPD+FDP SPD+FDP SPD+FDP SPD+FDP 
SPD+FDP SPD SPD+FDP CDU CDU CDU

1976 
SPD+FDP SPD SPD+FDP CDU 
SPD+FDP SPD

1980 
SPD+FDP CDU 
CSU

1983 I SPD+ 
CDU/CSU CDU J CD U GRUNE 
+FDP i SPD | 
CSU 
1987 SPD SPD+FDP CDU+FDP 
CDU/CSU I 
+FDP 
I

1990 SPD+FDP SPD SPD+ SPD+ SPD SPD+FDP SPD 
CDU/CSU •SPD +GRUNE GRUNE GRUNE 
+FDP 
I

1994 SPD+ SPD+ SPD SPD+ CDU+FDP SPD 
CSU

CDU/CSU CDU+FDP CDU+SPDCDU+SPD STATT GRUNE GRUNE 
+FDP

Note: CDU = Christian Democratic Union; CSU = Christian Social Union; GDP = German 
Party; SPD = Social Democratic Party; Griine = Greens; STATT = "Instead" Party (Dissident 
CDU); FDP = Free Democratic Party; BP/SVP = Bavarian Party. 
rupted single-party majority government. The Social Democrats have 
controlled Land governments in Bremen, Hamburg, Hessen, and 
North Rhine-Westphalia, coalescing most often with the Free Dem­
ocrats but also engaging in experimental alliances with the emergent 
Greens. Table 5.5 lists Lander governments and coalitions from 1961, 
which marks the beginning of the "stable period" of the party system 
(Roberts 1989). 
As has been shown to be the case in Belgium, in Germany an im­
portant dimension of subnational governments is their frequent in­
congruence with the partisan composition of national governments. 
Unlike the Belgian case, however, such patterns in Germany have at­
tracted a certain degree of scholarly attention. Roberts (1989), for one, 
categorizes state-level coalition governments that differed during some 
period of their term with respect to the inclusion or exclusion of one 
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or more major parties in comparison to the Bonn coalition. The cat­
alog yields three primary periods of national/subnational coalition in­
congruence, including FDP-SPD Lander coalitions while the FDP was 
in coalition with the CDU/CSU in Bonn (1949-56, 1961-66); FDP­
CDU Lander coalitions, or support for CDU minority governments, 
during the Bonn SPD-FDP coalition (1969-82); and inclusive all-party 
Lander governments predating the 1966-69 CDU/CSU-SPD "Grand 
Coalition" in Bonn. Updating Roberts's list, it is useful to add the SPD­
FDP alliances, the so-called traffic light SPD (red)-FDP (yellow)-
Griinen (green) coalitions, the CDU-SPD grand coalitions that have 
emerged at the Land level during the Kohl CDU-FDP federal govern­
ment, and the SPD—Statt Partei government in Hamburg. While not 
incongruent as such, the SPD-Green coalitions in such states as Lower 
Saxony, Hesse, and Hamburg deserve attention for their potential "ex­
perimental" value. 
For purposes of historical background, it is useful to summarize the 
evolution of coalition systems at both the state and federal levels. With­
out breaking the overview into separate federal legislative periods, it 
suffices to adopt the conventional four-part division of German elec­
toral periods, which recognizes an era of center-right domination 
(1961—66), the "grand coalition" interlude (1966-69), an era of center-
left domination (1969-82), and finally the recent span of Christian 
Democratic—Liberal hegemony (1982-). 
CENTER-RIGHT DOMINATION (1961-66). The period of center-
right dominance spans the entire fourth Bundestag legislature and the 
beginning of the fifth legislature, both of which were marked by solid 
CDU/CSU-FDP majorities (309 of 499 seats from 1961 to 1965, 294 of 
496 seats from 1965 to 1966). The Christian-Liberal alliance, headed 
by Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, took shape, strangely enough, fol­
lowing an election campaign in which the FDP and its federal chairman 
Dr. Erich Mende had explicitly promised voters that it would not join 
an Adenauer cabinet (Kloss 1990). Rewarded by the electorate for this 
hardline stance with an impressive 5% gain over its 1957 totals, the 
FDP nonetheless did accept a junior position in a new Adenauer gov­
ernment. Despite this "betrayal of trust" (Culver 1966, 312) and its 
severe electoral consequences in subsequent state elections, in the Lan­
der the Liberals managed to duplicate the Bonn alliance in varying 
forms in 5 of the 11 governments. Parliamentary parties in Rhineland­
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Palatinate and Saarland matched the Bonn alliance perfectly, while in 
Baden-Wurttemberg, Bavaria, and Schleswig-Holstein, the Refugee 
Party (BHE) gained a share of government power as a third partner. 
Elsewhere, FDP coalitions with the Social Democrats in Bremen, 
Hamburg, and Lower Saxony stood in stark contrast to the Bonn gov­
ernment. These coalitions clearly predated the Social-Liberal federal 
alliance that would be built later in the decade. While these state gov­
ernments were thus "incongruent" with the federal coalition, only in a 
few cases had strict "congruence" been a mathematical possibility. This 
was certainly the case in both Bremen and Hamburg, although in both 
states the SPD could have governed alone but chose instead to govern 
with the Free Democrats as junior partners. In Lower Saxony the CDU 
and FDP could have formed a governing majority, indeed a minimum 
winning majority; nevertheless, the Liberals negotiated a coalition with 
the largest party in the Landtag, the SPD. In West Berlin the CDU­
SPD grand coalition that had governed the city-state since 1955 col­
lapsed in 1963, but as in Lower Saxony, the Socialists shared power 
with the FDP despite owning an outright parliamentary majority. 
Although they reneged on their electoral promises at the federal 
level, there is little in the five-year period to suggest that the Free Dem­
ocrats were flagrantly disloyal to their coalition partners in Bonn, ex­
cept that they were easy prey for a Social Democratic Party intent on 
proving itself as a successful party of government and as a reasonable 
alternative to the Christian Democrats. There is also little to support 
the notion of minimum-size coalitions being the most preferable ones 
to parties in state parliaments. In addition, with the case of Berlin, the 
precedent for a national unity government—a CDU-SPD coalition— 
had already been set. 
GRAND COALITION (1966—69). The period of "GroBe Koalition" 
in Bonn had been foreshadowed in the Lander. This formula had been 
attempted not only in Berlin (1955-63) but also in various arrange­
ments in Bavaria (1945-54), Bremen (1951-59), Hamburg (1945-46), 
Hessen (1945-51), Lower Saxony (1946-51, 1957-59, 1965-70), 
North Rhine-Westphalia (1946-50), Rhineland-Palatinate (1946-47, 
1947-51), Saarland (1956-61), and Schleswig-Holstein (1946-47). 
When the FDP left the national Erhard (CDU) government and the 
coalition with CDU/CSU amid the economic recession of 1966, the 
Christian Union parties and the Social Democrats agreed to unite un­
der the chancellorship of Kurt-Georg Kiesinger (CDU), then minister­
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president of Baden-Wiirttemberg. The oversized coalition produced 
a surplus majority of 198 seats in the fifth Bundestag, and it should 
be noted that the FDP could have chosen coalition with the SPD over 
its eventual decision to go into opposition.30 
During the 1966~to-1969 period of CDU/CSU-SPD power sharing, 
there were six Landtag elections resulting in coalition governments, 
five in 1967 and one in 1968. Parties in both Baden-Wiirttemberg and 
Lower Saxony reproduced the coalition policy of the Bonn parties, 
with the SPD abandoning the FDP in Lower Saxony and the CDU 
abandoning the FDP in Baden-Wtirttemberg. Alternatively, the SPD 
in Bremen and West Berlin reconstituted alliances with the Liberals 
in 1967, whereas CDU parties in Rhineland-Palatinate and Schleswig-
Holstein reaffirmed their coalitions with the FDP the same year. Here 
is striking evidence of divergent coalition behavior among the same 
parties at roughly the same time but across different Lander. 
THE LEFT ASCENDANT (1969-82). A series of SPD-FDP coalitions 
in Bonn succeeded the grand coalition, stretching from the sixth to 
almost the end of the ninth Bundestag legislatures, and effectively 
ended 20 years of Christian Democratic dominance. The first Brandt 
(SPD) government (1969—72) secured a slim five-seat majority in par­
liament following the 1969 federal elections. The second Brandt gov­
ernment (1972-74) could seemingly have expanded this margin to 22 
seats, but defections over foreign policy gave the SPD-FDP coalition a 
weak voting majority in the Bundestag. In both of these cases, a CDU/ 
CSU—FDP government had been possible given the distribution of 
Bundestag seats, and in 1969 the SPD-FDP coalition propelled the 
Christian Democrats into opposition despite the latter's plurality of 
parliamentary seats. Schmidt's (SPD) chancellorship from 1974 to 
1982 maintained the Social Democrat-Liberal alliance, although the 
1976 federal election reduced the coalition's Bundestag majority to a 
tenuous four seats. 
During the 13-year period, there were some 38 Landtag elections, 
most of which produced single-party majorities. In 11 instances, how­
ever, two-party governing coalitions were formed in postelection bar­
gaining. Ten of the 11 (Hamburg in 1970 and 1974; Hessen in 1970, 
1974, and 1978; Lower Saxony in 1974; North Rhine-Westphalia in 
1970 and 1975; West Berlin in 1975 and 1979) matched the SPD-FDP 
coalition in Bonn. In two of these cases (Hamburg in 1974, Hessen in 
1970), a CDU-FDP government had been the minimum winning com­
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bination but was chosen in neither case. Moreover, Social Democrats 
in Hamburg following the 1970 election held an absolute majority but 
were still willing to accept the Free Democrats as coalition partners. 
Only in Saarland did an explicitly "incongruent" coalition form fol­
lowing an election. This occurred after the April 1980 Landtag elec­
tion when the FDP joined Werner Zeyer's CDU in coalition, despite the 
feasibility of allying with the SPD.31 Elsewhere, the FDP had tolerated 
CDU minority governments in West Berlin and in Lower Saxony, per­
haps in order to "balance" the federal position of the party (Broughton 
and Kirchner 1986). 
The era of Social Democratic—Liberal dominance in federal gov­
ernment appears to have been mirrored to a large extent in the Lander, 
but not completely. The SPD managed to control five Lander—Bre-
men, Hamburg, Hessen, North Rhine—Westphalia, and Berlin—either 
alone or in coalition with the FDP, yet the CDU remained the strongest 
in five others—Baden-Wtirttemberg, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland, 
Schleswig-Holstein, and Bavaria (CSU). The SPD-FDP combination 
proved to be the preferred power-sharing arrangement and thus ap­
pears to have followed the lead of the federal coalition system. This 
particular observation should not neglect the inverse, namely, that the 
SPD-FDP federal coalition had already been widely tested in the Lan­
der before 1969. Both parties had already been partners in govern­
ment at one time or another since 1946 in 7 of the 11 Lander. 
GREENS AND REUNIFICATION ALTER THE EQUATION (1982—). 
Most accounts of the Social Democrat-Liberal federal government 
agree that the coalition fell apart in 1982 largely on account of mount­
ing economic problems and deteriorating personal relationships be­
tween Chancellor Schmidt and the FDP's Hans-Dietrich Genscher 
(Broughton and Kirchner 1986; Schmidt 1983). With the so-called 
economic liberals of the FDP's right wing gaining sway within the 
party, the Free Democrats resigned from the Schmidt cabinet and by 
October 1982 had formed a workable majority coalition with their old 
partners the Christian Democrats under Helmut Kohl. Center-right 
Kohl governments had by 1996 thus survived more than a decade and 
almost four Bundestag legislatures in power. 
With the emergence of Die Griinen onto the electoral landscape, 
the relatively simple and stable three-party coalition system grew more 
complex. The Greens bargained their way into Land governments in 
Hesse (1985-87, 1991, 1995), Lower Saxony (1990), Bremen (1990), 
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and North Rhine-Westphalia (1995), while in the process usurping 
the FDP's traditional role as the coalition party. In Hesse the first case 
of a coalition involving the Green Party occurred when, from 1985 to 
1987, Holger Borner's SPD chose coalition over minority government 
by concluding an agreement—or "red-green experiment"—with the 
Greens (Padgett 1989). In four other cases—Hesse (1987-91), Lower 
Saxony (1986-90), Rhineland-Palatinate (1987-91), Berlin (1985-
89)—the CDU and FDP matched the Bonn coalition. Incongruent co­
alitions formed in Hamburg (1987) and Rhineland-Palatinate (1991), 
where the Free Democrats joined SPD governments despite their 
supposed allegiance to the CDU in federal government. The SPD­
FDP coalition in Hamburg, beginning in 1987, marked the first case 
of an incongruent coalition after the change of government in Bonn 
in 1982. In addition, in both Berlin (1991) and Baden-Wurttemberg 
(1992), election outcomes led to reconstitutions of the old CDU-SPD 
coalitions, giving voice as well as substance to those calling for a 
new grand coalition in federal government to deal with the prob­
lems of reunification. This most recent period has also seen the first 
"traffic light" (SPD-FDP-Grune) coalition, which occurred in Bre­
men in 1990,32 as well as the first, albeit failed, serious attempt at 
forming a "black-green" CDU-Grune coalition in Baden-Wurttemberg 
(1992). 
East-West reunification has added new players and new possibilities 
to party government in Germany. The first elections to democratic par­
liaments in the eastern Lander in 1990 resulted largely in a duplication 
of traditional alliance patterns in the West (table 5.6). The Christian 
Democrats, benefiting from Chancellor Kohl's success at ending four 
decades of national partition, captured power outright in Saxony and 
imported Kurt Biedenkopf to serve as minister-president. In Meck-
lenburg-West Pomerania, Saxony-Anhalt, and Thuringia, Kohl's party 
managed to forge cabinet coalitions with the Free Democrats. Only in 
Brandenburg did the CDU join the ranks of the opposition, coming 
up short against Manfred Stolpe's SPD-FDP—Bundnis 90 (Greens) co­
alition. Four years later, the FDP was completely banished from the 
ranks of state government in the eastern Lander, falling under the 5% 
threshold owing to the strength of the Party of Democratic Socialism 
(PDS, former Communists). The Free Democrats' demise has hurt the 
CDU, which although retaining its conservative bastion in Saxony was 
forced in 1994 into coalitions with the SPD in Mecklenburg-West Pom­
erania and Thuringia. The Social Democrats, wary of alliance with ex­
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Table 5.6 
Partisan Composition of Governments in "New" German States 
Landtag Government, 1990 Government, 1994 
Brandenburg SPD + FDP + Biindnis90 SPD 
(Griinen) 
Mecklenburg—West Pomerania CDU + FDP CDU + SPD 
Saxony CDU CDU 
Saxony-Anhalt CDU + FDP SPD + Grunen 
Thuringia CDU + FDP CDU + SPD 
Communists and avoiding grand coalition where possible, opted for 
the red-green formula in Saxony-Anhalt to complement their un­
shared rule in Brandenburg. 
General Patterns 
This overview of the historical development of coalition systems at 
both the Land and federal levels provides background and establishes 
variance. State-level coalitional strategy has not invariably followed 
federal-level coalitional strategy. Parties in the Landtage have seem­
ingly followed minimum winning types of rationality on some occa­
sions but on others have chosen to form governments that include 
surplus members (in terms of both parties and seats). These divergent 
patterns suggest that it is worth investigating in the German case the 
broader questions that drive our analysis: Where are the fundamental 
decisions of participation in state government coalitions made—at the 
national or the subnational level? On what bases are these decisions 
reached? And how much influence is brought to bear on state party 
leaders by the federal party leadership? In the German case, just as in 
that of Belgium, simple reference to formal theory does not immedi­
ately provide adequate explanation. Criteria of minimalist rationality 
can account for the formation of only some of Germany's state-level 
coalition governments. 
France 
Regional-level coalition government in France lacks some of the formal 
tradition of Belgium and Germany, given that directly elected assem­
blies at this level date only from the mid-1980s. France is, however, a 
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crucial case. Long one of the most centralized countries in Europe, 
indeed once the "archetype of a centralised country" (Hainsworth and 
Loughlin 1989, 149), recent French governments have sought to "ra­
tionalize and reform the complex structure of centre-periphery rela­
tions" (Mazey 1989, 42). In particular, the Socialist government of 
Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy and President Frangois Mitterrand 
moved in 1982 to establish directly elected regional councils with full 
revenue-raising powers and significant legislative capacity. Because of 
France's divisive party system, the creation of conseils regionaux as 
important decision-making bodies with executive offices beholden to 
the assembly at large has made multiparty coalitions in many regions 
likely if not absolutely necessary. 
In a country where national strategies have traditionally determined 
local tactics and where dissident party members are often expelled, the 
emergence of regional council coalitions has presented party leaders 
and individual representatives with a novel set of circumstances. Vot­
ing results in 1986 left most of the 21 mainland councils without a 
single-party majority.33 The extremist Front National, largely consid­
ered "untouchables" at the national level, found themselves holding 
the balance of power in many regions and were rewarded for their 
support with a share of power alongside mainstream Gaullists and Gis­
cardians. Following the 1992 regional elections, Socialists tried to sal­
vage their presence in regional government by patching together 
alliances with the Communists and the ecologist parties, largely to no 
avail. Coalition politics in the French regional assemblies, in short, is 
like that in the German Landtage and in Belgium's meso-level parlia­
ments: an important political reality showcased repeatedly during the 
act of government formation. 
Subnational Government Structures 
Until the reforms instituted by the Socialist regime in the early 
1980s, the unitary French state of the Fifth Republic concentrated for­
mal political authority in national government institutions—namely, 
the president, the prime minister, and Parliament. This produced the 
characteristic depiction of the French state as a "centralized, struc­
tured, hierarchical system" (Meny 1988, 130). Local administrative 
units in the form of 96 metropolitan departements with departmental 
councils {conseils generaux) and 36,000 communes with communal 
councils {conseils municipaux) largely did the bidding of a government­
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appointed prefect, who has been described as both "a kind of impe­
rialist 'governor'" of true Jacobin heritage and a "mediator" who rep­
resents the central government (Hainsworth and Loughlin 1989, 150). 
Only in 1972 did a French government add regional institutions to 
the territorial division of the state. The 1972 decentralization act 
created a regional prefect and a regional council, neither of which was 
directly elected. National deputies and senators automatically became 
regional representatives. The act also resulted in increased regional 
autonomy, but the 22 regions (including Corsica) had no intervening 
economic power and remained clearly subservient to the preexisting 
levels of government—nation, department, and commune (Schmidt 
1990). Throughout the 1970s, the regions and their councils "were 
widely criticized as being undemocratic, powerless and inadequately 
financed" (Mazey 1986, 297). 
With the arrival of Mitterrand and the Socialists in 1981, the pace 
of decentralization quickened. Prime Minister Mauroy's interior min­
ister in charge of decentralization, Gaston Defferre, placed in motion 
a series of 33 laws and 219 decrees between 1982 and 1985 aimed at 
reforming the system of territorial administration in France. The re­
forms established that departmental and regional executives would be 
elected by their respective elected councils and that the regional coun­
cils would henceforth be elected by direct suffrage. This move would 
eliminate the tutelle of the prefects, who had to give up their positions 
as territorial executives. Further, the reforms provided regions with 
their own budgets and bestowed on them significant powers to inter­
vene in the economic field. The region thus became a distinct, fourth 
level of French government, with its own autonomous deliberative 
council, its own executive, and its own budget. The basic components 
of the post-1982 French state structure are presented in figure 5.3. 
REGIONAL GOVERNMENT. Since independent regional assemblies 
have existed only since the date of their first election in 1986, the exact 
nature and true identity of regional government are still in formation. 
The councils themselves range widely in size from 43 seats (Franche-
Comte) to 209 (Ile-de-France), corresponding to population size in the 
regions. Elections to the regional councils for fixed terms take place 
every six years, the first having occurred in March 1986 and the second 
in March 1992. The 1986 regional elections were held in conjunction 
with the national legislative elections; Mitterrand and the Socialist au­
thorities, however, changed this practice for the 1992 regional elec­
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National Assembly 
577 Members 
Directly-Elected 
Regional Assemblies 
22 1 
General Councils 
96 Metropolitan 
Departments 
Municipal Councils 
36,551 
UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE 
Figure 5.3 French Political Institutions 
tions, which took place a year in advance of the Assemblee Nationale 
elections. A proportional system has been employed in both regional 
elections, and the regional balloting, unlike balloting in national elec­
tions, is limited to one round. 
As in both Belgium and Germany, postelection maneuvering for the 
prizes of regional office is intense. A week following regional elections, 
the new assembly convenes to elect a president who will serve a six-
year term as the region's chief executive. A candidate can be elected 
regional premier in one of three rounds of voting. Where a single 
party holds an absolute majority in the council, its candidate for pres­
ident may easily ascend to the office of regional presidency in the first 
round. In the absence of such a single-party majority, however, the 
politics of coalition ensues. To be successful in forming a majority, a 
candidate in the second round must piece together an alliance with 
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another party, whose candidate would then stand down, or bargain 
with individuals to desert their own party's candidates in secret bal­
loting. If no absolute majority emerges after a second round of voting, 
the candidate able to produce a relative majority in the third and final 
round is elected president. 
The winning majority, whether a single party or a multiparty coa­
lition, must then elect an executive bureau or cabinet. The actual ex­
ecutive cabinet is a group of between 4 and 16 vice presidents, the 
party composition of which usually—but not always—mirrors the 
party composition of the majority that elected the regional president. 
In addition, a body of secretaries (commission permanente) is elected, 
generally representing all other parties on the council. The regional 
president and the vice presidents thus constitute the clear executive 
power in the council and as such are the real prizes for political parties 
participating in the coalition game. 
Party Participation in Coalition Governments 
In large measure, the key players in the regional coalition game are 
the same as those that pursue and participate in French national gov­
ernment. The principal actors at both levels include the Socialist Party 
(Parti Socialiste, PS), the neo-Gaullists (Rassemblement pour la Re­
publique, RPR), the Giscardian French Democratic Union (Union 
pour la Democratic Frangaise, UDF), the Communists (Parti Com­
muniste Frangaise, PCF), the National Front (Front National, FN), and 
the two ecologist parties (Les Verts and Generation Ecologie, GE). The 
Left-Radicals (Mouvement des Radicaux de Gauche, MRG) are closely 
affiliated with the PS and during the 1986-to-1995 period stood under 
the "majorite presidentielle" umbrella. On the Right, the UDF is itself 
a federation of parties, including the Christian Democrats (Centre 
des Democrates Sociaux, CDS), the Social Democrats (Parti Social-
Democrate, PSD), the Republicans (Parti Republicain, PR), and the 
Radicals (Parti Radical, Rad). Another party contesting elections at 
both levels under the label of "diverse droite" is the Centre National 
des Independants et Paysans (CNI). Smaller parties, such as Jean-
Pierre Soisson's France Unie (FU)—representing the non-Socialist 
forces of the presidential majority—and the antiecologist Chasse, 
Peche, Nature et Traditions (CPNT), have also found their way into 
the regional assemblies. 
The sheer number of parties in the French system distinguishes it 
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clearly from the German system and even from the complex Belgian 
party system. However, with a two-ballot electoral system and a much 
smaller degree of proportionality determining parliamentary party 
strengths at the national level in France, the effective number of par­
ties or party "blocs" seeking power in Paris is reduced. This is not the 
case in the outlying regions, where single-party majorities are highly 
exceptional, where two-party coalitions are themselves not especially 
abundant, and where multiparty coalitions are the norm. Thus, we can 
ask of coalition activity in France's regional assemblies: What factors 
motivate and constrain coalition building? What is the nature of na­
tional party policy toward regional alliances? What pressures do na­
tional party leaders bring to bear on their regional colleagues? And to 
what extent do patterns of regional collaboration influence coopera­
tion in Paris? 
In addition to answering these questions, by devoting attention to 
coalition politics in the French regional assemblies it is possible to cor­
rect the unfortunate tendency to view France (more appropriately, the 
French Fifth Republic) as a case unworthy of inclusion in studies of 
coalition government. Because the French president holds formal con­
stitutional powers over the prime minister, "France has continued to 
be a problem case for coalition analysts" (Laver and Schofield 1990, 
225) and is omitted from most cross-national studies of coalition gov­
ernment (see Browne and Franklin 1986; De Swaan 1973; Dodd 1976; 
Luebbert 1986; Taylor and Laver 1973). Most studies of coalition be­
havior tend to lose interest in France after the coalitional frenzy of the 
Fourth Republic and the onset of a supposed bipolarization in the 
Fifth. Granted, the rules of the game at the national level in France 
distinguish it from other systems: Article 8 of the Constitution gives 
the president power to appoint a prime minister and, on the latter's 
advice, to appoint and dismiss the other members of the government; 
Article 9 provides for the president to preside over the Council of Min­
isters; and Article 12 gives the president authority to dissolve the Na­
tional Assembly, after consultation with the prime minister and the 
presidents of the two houses of Parliament. Rules matter. For our pur­
poses, however, what is important is that national-level and regional-
level governments are normally products of bargaining among mul­
tiple parties in the absence of outright parliamentary majorities. 
Table 5.7 lists French national governments since 1959. Three re­
cent periods stand out as particularly illustrative of coalitional activity: 
1981-84, 1986-88, and 1993-95. In 1981 the admission of the Com­
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Table 5.7 
Presidents, Prime Ministers, and National Governments in France since 1959 
President Prime Minister Dates Parties in Government 
De Gaulle Debre (UNR) 1/59-4/62 UNR, MRP, Independents, Radical 
Socialists 
Pompidou (UNR) 4/62-12/62 UNR, MRP, Independents 
Pompidou (UNR-UDT) 12/62-1/66 UNR-UDT, Independent Republicans 
Pompidou (UNR-UDT) 1/66-4/67 UNR-UDT, Independent Republicans 
Pompidou (UNR-UDT) 4/67-5/68 UNR-UDT, Independent Republicans 
Pompidou (UNR-UDT) 5/68-7/68 UNR-UDT, Independent Republicans 
Couve de Murville (UDR) 7/68-6/69 UDR, Independent Republicans 
Pompidou Chaban-Delmas (UDR) 6/69-7/72 UDR, PDM, Independent Republicans 
Messmer (UDR) 7/72-4/73 UDR, CDP, Independent Republicans 
Messmer (UDR) 4/73-3/74 UDR, CDP, Independent Republicans 
Messmer (UDR) 3/74-5/74 UDR, CDP, Independent Republicans 
Giscard d'Estaing Chirac (UDR) 5/74-8/76 UDR, MRG, Independent Republicans 
Barre (UDR) 8/76-3/78 UDR, CDS, Radical Socialists, 
Independent Republicans 
Barre (UDR) 3/78-5/81 UDR, CDS, Radical Socialists, 
Independent Republicans 
Mitterrand Mauroy (PS) 5/81-6/81 PS, MRG 
Mauroy (PS) 6/81-3/83 PS, MRG, PCF 
Mauroy (PS) 3/83-7/84 PS, MRG, PCF 
Fabius (PS) 7/84-3/86 PS, MRG, PSU 
Chirac (RPR) 3/86-5/88 RPR, UDF-PR, UDF-CDS 
Rocard (PS) 5/88-6/88 PS, MRG, UDF, Independents 
Rocard (PS) 6/88-5/91 PS, MRG 
Cresson (PS) 5/91-7/92 PS, MRG, FU 
Beregovoy (PS) 7/92-4/93 PS, MRG, FU 
Balladur (RPR) 4/93-5/95 RPR, UDF 
Chirac Jupp<§ (RPR) 5/95- RPR, UDF 
Note: UNR = Union pour la Nouvelle Republique; UDT = Union De"mocratique du Travail; MRP = 
Mouvement R£publicain Populaire; UDR — Union des D£mocrates pour la Republique; PS = Parti So­
cialiste; CDS — Centre des D6mocrates Sociaux; MRG = Mouvement des Radicaux de Gauche; RPR = 
Rassemblement pour la Republique; UDF ~ Union pour la Democratic Franchise; DU = France Unie; PR 
= Parti Re"publicain; PSU = Parti Socialiste Unified PDM = Progres de Democratic Moderne; CDP = 
Centre Democratic et Progres 
munist Party (PCF) into government, "prepared by negotiations be­
tween the PCF and PS leaders" (Wilson 1989, 69), temporarily bridged 
an ideological gulf between two parties whose campaigns "were almost 
as critical of their allies as of their opponents*' (Machin 1989, 61). In 
1986, the peculiar setting of "cohabitation" freed the government for­
mation process of presidential control, thus forcing Jacques Chirac to 
consult with party leaders of the right-wing coalition over the party 
composition and ministerial assignments for his government. In both 
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cases, "Consultations between the executive and party leaders [took] 
place during the formation of new governments" (Wilson 1989, 69). 
Similarly, with the devastating defeat of the Socialists in the 1993 leg­
islative elections, cohabitation again returned, forcing Chirac, Giscard, 
and new Prime Minister Eduard Balladur to divide the spoils of cabinet 
portfolios among the RPR and UDF victors. 
The important point here is not that the systemic characteristics of 
government formation in France mirror those of Belgium or Germany, 
or of multiparty systems in general. Clearly, the national government 
formation process in France differs in certain respects from that of 
most parliamentary democracies. The bottom line, instead, is that po­
litical parties in France—parties with distinct identities, and parties 
that compete electorally with their partners—combine to form major­
ity governments. 
These combinations, in turn, are not always duplicated in the re­
gions. Table 5.8 lists regional governments in France since 1986. As is 
clear, the regions belong overwhelmingly to the parties of the Right. 
The demise of the French Left, undeniable by the time of the 1993 
legislative elections, is evident as early as the 1986 regional elections. 
Even on the Right, neither the Gaullist RPR nor the Giscardian UDF— 
which in a sizable number of constituencies did have candidates stand­
ing against one another—chose to govern alone. Coalition building has 
been the rule in most regions. Regional coalitions, whether among the 
Communists and Socialists on the Left or among the Gaullists, Gis­
cardians, and lepenists (FN) on the Right, contradict party alliances at 
the national level in France. So, too, do the regional governments that 
include the ecologists (Verts, GE) or the antiecologist reactionary 
CPNT. 
The evolution of coalition patterns in the French regional assem­
blies is easily divided into two periods, the first coinciding with the 
1986-to-1992 regional legislative term and the second coinciding with 
the 1992-to-1998 term. 
THE EXTREME RIGHT AS KINGMAKERS (1986—92). When 27.8 
million French voters went to the ballot boxes on 16 March 1986, they 
possessed an opportunity for the first time to elect representatives to 
autonomous regional councils. Frangois Mitterrand's Socialist govern­
ment was five years into its first septennat, Gaston Defferre's blueprint 
for decentralization was reality, and the bipolar structure that had 
characterized recent party politics was rapidly coming apart. The so­
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Table 5.8 
Partisan Composition of French Regional Governments, 1986 and 1992 
Region 1986* 1992b 
Alsace UDF + RPR + DVD UDF + RPR + DVD + FN* 
Aquitaine UDF + RPR + DVD + FN UDF + RPR + DVD + CPNT* 
Auvergne UDF + RPR + DVD UDF + RPR + DVD 
Bourgogne UDF + RPR + DVD FU + PS+ GE +VERTS* 
Bretagne UDF + RPR + DVD UDF + RPR + DVD* 
Centre UDF + RPR + DVD UDF + RPR + DVD* 
Champagne-Ardenne UDF + RPR + DVD* UDF + RPR + DVD* 
Corse UDF + RPR + DVD + FN* UDF + RPR + DVD 
Franche-Comte UDF + RPR + FN UDF + RPR + DVD 
Ile-de-France UDF + RPR + DVD* UDF + RPR + DVD* 
Languedoc-Roussillon UDF + RPR + DVD + FN UDF + RPR + DVD* 
Limousin PS + PC PS + PC + DVG + GE* 
Lorraine UDF + RPR + DVD* UDF + RPR + DVD 
Midi-Pyrenees UDF + RPR + DVD UDF + RPR + DVD + CPNT 
Basse-Normandie UDF + RPR + DVD UDF + RPR + DVD 
Haute- Normandie UDF + RPR + DVD + FN UDF + RPR + DVD + FN 
Nord-Pas de Calais PS + MRG + PC VERTS + PS* 
Pays de la Loire UDF + RPR + DVD UDF + RPR + DVD 
Picardie UDF + RPR + DVD + FN UDF + RPR + DVD + CPNT* 
Poitou-Charentes UDF + RPR + DVD UDF + RPR + CPNT 
Provence-Cote d'Azur UDF + RPR + DVD + FN UDF + RPR + DVD* 
Rhone-Alpes UDF + RPR + DVD UDF + RPR + DVD + CPNT + 
VERTS + GE* 
Note: UDF = Union pour la democratic franchise; PS = Partie socialiste; GE = Generation 
Ecologie; RPR = Rassemblement pour la Republique; PC = Parti communiste; DVD = 
Diverse Right; MRG = Mouvement des radicaux de gauche; FU = France unie; DVG = 
Diverse Left; CPNT = Chasse, peche, nature et traditions; FN = Front national; VERTS 
— Greens. 
•Indicates minority government. 
aNational parliamentary majority: UDF + RPR + DVD. 
bNational parliamentary majority: PS + MRG + FU. 
called Union of the Left that propelled both the Socialists and the 
Communists into power in 1981 had broken down. Tensions on the 
Right, where the RPR-UDF alliance remained, were only slightly more 
muted. Farther right, Jean-Marie Le Pen's Front National was fresh 
off a solid performance in the 1984 regional assembly elections in Cor­
sica. When the results of the March joint regional/legislative elections 
were tallied, votes for regional party lists so closely paralleled those for 
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parliamentary parties vying for the National Assembly that few observers 
considered the regional elections worthy of independent analysis. 
Immediately following the elections, Jacques Blanc, atop the UDFs 
list in Languedoc-Roussillon, signed a written agreement with eight 
Front National councilors to secure his election as president of the re­
gional council. The UDF, along with its ally the RPR, had gained only 
31% of the popular vote in the Mediterranean region. Without the 
added support of the FN (12%) and the CNI (9%), Blanc could not 
have found the necessary votes from the 65 councilors to gain the re-
gion's top executive prize. In return for the FN's support, the UDF 
rewarded Le Pen's forces with a coveted vice presidency and three seats 
on the executive bureau. In Paris, party leader Jacques Chirac, who 
had for years accused the Socialists of unholy alliances with the Com­
munists, busied himself with the task of publicly denouncing the Front 
National and its "simplistic, anti-immigrant, pro-guillotine stances" 
(Machin 1989, 62), while turning a blind eye to Languedoc-Roussillon, 
Aquitaine, Franche-Comte, Haute-Normandie, and Picardie, where 
similar deals had been cut (Hainsworth and Loughlin 1989; Mazey 
1986; Perrineau 1986, 1987). 
In addition to these developments on the Right, the PS-MRG-PCF 
alliance continued to function, albeit poorly, at the regional level 
despite the collapse of the left-wing coalition at the national level 
(Schmidt 1990). The PCF supported Socialist candidates for regional 
president at the second round in Limousin and in Nord-Pas de Calais, 
these being the only two regions successfully preserved by the Left. In 
the case of Limousin, the regional party had actually been instructed 
by its national central committee not to cooperate (Mazey 1986). Else­
where, the regional Communists took a much harder line against their 
old allies the Socialists, with PCF-PS alliances being "non-existent" 
(Hainsworth and Loughlin 1989, 159). 
The French regional assemblies in 1986 were clearly important 
arenas for coalition bargaining in which partnerships frequently de­
parted from the patterns in Paris. The new national parliamentary 
majority, a RPR-UDF government under Prime Minister Chirac co­
habiting with the Socialist President Mitterrand, excluded the 35 Front 
National deputies. Nevertheless, by entering into explicit or tacit alli­
ances with the mainstream Right in a handful of regions, the FN could 
claim a giant leap forward in its quest for national legitimacy. 
MINORITY GOVERNMENT (1992—). Unlike the 1986 elections, the 
22 March 1992 regional elections took place independent of national 
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legislative elections. As such, the results of France's first election in 
three years had been awaited as a kind of barometer of political opin­
ion at the midway point of Mitterrand's second seven-year presidential 
term. On the Left, the Socialists had tried to mobilize voters by warning 
about the dangers of letting the FN gain a permanent foothold in 
French politics. On the Right, the RPR and UDF, blaming the Socialists 
for economic slowdown, rising unemployment, urban blight, and an 
excess of Third World immigration, had promised to impose a "quar­
antaine republicaine" on the Front National and to reject any alliances 
with the extremists. Voting tallies registered the worst defeat for the 
Socialists since the party's modern inception in 1971, but the Socialists' 
losses did not translate directly into gains for the traditional Right. 
Le Pen's Front National registered impressive gains, as did Antoine 
Waechter's Verts and Brice Lalonde's Generation Ecologie, making all 
three parties powerful arbiters in the ensuing government formation 
process. 
In 1986, 14 regional presidencies had been decided in the first 
round of voting; in 1992, conversely, only 4 presidential majorities 
emerged as easily in the first round. In 1986, only 4 elections of re­
gional presidents had reached the third round; in 1992, conversely, a 
total of 16 contests were decided in the final round. In 1986, parties 
in 17 regional assemblies succeeded in establishing clear postelection 
governing majorities, and in only 3 cases did the failure to do so result 
in relative majorities (i.e., minority governments). Roughly the oppo­
site occurred in 1992: in only seven regional assemblies did the three-
stage bargaining process yield absolute majorities, whereas 14 councils 
wound up with minority governments that would be dependent sub­
sequently upon producing voting coalitions in order to pass a budget 
or generate legislation. The differences between 1986 and 1992 are 
stark, and if coalition had been the order of the day in 1986, it was 
even more so in 1992. 
The conservative parties remained true, in places, to their promise 
not to share power with the FN. In Aquitaine, Languedoc-Roussillon, 
Picardie, Provence-Alpes-Cote d'Azur, and Rhone-Alpes, for example, 
the RPR-UDF forces accepted minority government over the support of 
the Front National, which would have assured clear and safe majorities 
for the Right. Elsewhere, the formation of conservative regional gov­
ernments was clouded by accusations of collusion with the FN, this 
being the case in Alsace, Franche-Comte, and Haute-Normandie. Only 
in Alsace and Haute-Normandie, however, did the FN obtain a re­
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gional vice presidency. In lieu of coalitions with the FN, the conser­
vatives formed coalitions with Andre Goustat's antiecologist reaction­
ary party, CPNT, which had obtained 29 council seats across 13 
regions. The CPNT thus gained a share of power in four regional gov­
ernments. Alternatively, the Right courted even the ecologists, as in 
Rhone-Alpes, where Charles Millon (UDF-PR) attempted to shore up 
his weak "majority" (64 seats out of 157) by awarding vice presidencies 
to the Verts and GE. 
The Socialists* options were more limited, and their success was 
minimal. In the traditional regional bastion of Limousin, Robert Savy 
(PS) managed to put together an alliance of Socialists, Communists, 
and the Generation Ecologie that produced a relative majority and 
gave the presidency to Savy. In Nord-Pas de Calais, an even greater 
Socialist stronghold, the PS national government minister, Michael De­
lebarre, failed to negotiate the support of the PCF and was forced to 
enter an unprecedented coalition with the Verts under the presidency 
of Marie-Christine Blandin, a relatively unknown 38-year-old profes­
sor of natural sciences and member of Greenpeace. 
The events in Lorraine and Bourgogne regions, however, proved 
even more controversial. In each region, a non-Socialist minister in 
Prime Minister Edith Cresson's cabinet government succeeded in gain­
ing the regional presidency; in both cases, however, charges of alliance 
with the FN proved destabilizing. In Lorraine, a coalition of Socialists, 
Communists, and Greens helped elect Jean-Marie Rausch (France 
Unie) regional president in the third round. Subsequent charges that 
Rausch had negotiated the support of the FN broke the coalition and 
forced Rausch to resign his post two days after the election. In Bour­
gogne, a similar coalition elected Jean-Pierre Soisson (France Unie), 
Cresson's civil service minister, and again the supposed support of one 
or more FN councilors spawned charges and countercharges. Soisson, 
protesting suggestions from his own prime minister that he had know­
ingly colluded with the far Right, resigned his national ministerial 
portfolio while keeping the regional presidency in an attempt to con­
struct the foundations of a "laboratoire de Pouverture."34 
Coalition building after the 1992 regional elections proved to be "a 
feverish political journey, full of surprises."35 Among the national-level 
consequences were a shake-up in the cabinet and the subsequent re­
placement of Prime Minister Edith Cresson with Pierre Beregovoy. 
The foundation for Michel Rocard's "big bang," or alliance among So­
cialists, reformed Communists, centrists, and ecologists, had also been 
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laid with regional experiments such as the one in Nord-Pas de Calais. 
For their part, the RPR and UDF could reclaim some but not all of the 
honor lost through their 1986 alliances with the extreme Right. Al­
though excluded from most of the official majorities of which it had 
been a part since 1986, the Front National found that it could still reap 
the benefits of the majority formation process simply by inflicting dis­
order on it. 
General Patterns 
As in both the Belgian and German cases, regional sections of na­
tional political parties in France find themselves bargaining—and re-
warding—their national-level adversaries. There is, as well, variance 
in the behavior of parties across the two time points and across the 
regions. Why did the PCF support the PS in some regions but not in 
others? Why did the Green parties support the Left in some coalition 
situations and the Right in others? Why did the conservative parties 
establish power-sharing arrangements with the extreme Right in 1986 
but back off from the practice in 1992? Similarly, why did the Right's 
quarantine of the FN break down in some cases? These questions sug­
gest that regional-level coalition behavior can provide the impetus to 
reintegrate the French case into coalition studies. 
Cross-Country Comparisons 
Clearly, the intermediate-level legislatures and executives in Belgium, 
Germany, and France are not uniform in their structures. Each, how­
ever, has a distinguishable executive body, a directly elected represen­
tative assembly, and some power to tax, spend, and pass legislation— 
that is, each has meaningful political relevance. In addition, the Bel­
gian provincial/regional assemblies, the German state parliaments, and 
the French regional councils each exhibit interesting coalition dynam­
ics. Of course, some aspects of coalition behavior in the respective in­
stitutions are a function of the basic, static structural environments in 
which they occur. Table 5.9 draws together relevant comparative in­
stitutional and procedural aspects of subnational government in each 
of the three countries. 
It is, for one thing, easier to spot variation at one time point in the 
French regional councils than in the Belgian provinces because there 
Table 5.9 
Institutional and Procedural Dimensions of Subnational Assemblies and Government Life Cycles 
Belgium France Germany 
Provincial Councils Regional Parliaments Regional Councils State Parliaments 
Number 10 3 22 16 
Size range in seats 50-90 75-118 43-209 60-237 
Average number of parties in 5.7 7.3 7.9 3.9 
assembly (1994) 
Length of legislative period 6 years 5 years 6 years 4-5 years 
Dismissed with national No No No No 
parliament (Yes, before 1994) 
Directly elected Yes Yes Yes Yes 
09 Elections concurrent with No Yes—first elections Yes—1986 No 
09 national parliamentary elections (Yes, before 1994) No—subsequent elections No—1992 
Possible to hold concurrent No No Yes No 
mandate in national parliament 
Executive Governor/ Minister-president/ President/ Minister-president/ 
permanent deputation cabinet of ministers bureau of vice cabinet of 
presidents ministers 
Executive elected by formal Governor—no, central Yes Yes Yes 
investiture vote in assembly government appointee 
Permanent deputation—yes 
Executive chosen by secret Yes Yes Yes Yes 
ballot 
Executive revocable by formal No No No Yes 
no-confidence vote in assembly 
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are simply so many more assemblies in France. Conversely, it is more 
difficult to generalize about longitudinal patterns in the French case 
because there have been only two regional elections, whereas change 
can be measured more accurately in Belgium and Germany. Further, 
it should be noted from these basic descriptive data that the universe 
of possible coalition combinations is likely to be larger in the French 
regions, where on average almost eight parties are represented in the 
councils, as compared to just four in the German state parliaments. 
Additionally, these data suggest from the outset that in terms of 
cross-national comparisons, national-subnational linkages should be 
strongest in France, where it is possible to hold concurrent mandates 
as a regional councilor and a national deputy. This fact, however, does 
little to explain within-nation variance. Along similar lines, concerning 
the so-called "nationalization" of local electoral systems, it should be 
kept in mind that provincial elections in Belgium have historically 
taken place on the same day as national legislative elections. A final 
matter to be considered is the termination of subnational coalitions, 
which in the German Lander can take place between elections after a 
formal vote of no confidence. There is no such provision for a midterm 
dismissal of the executive coalition in Belgium, and in France regional 
governments usually change only with elections or the resignation of 
a regional president. This makes the possibility of midterm coalition 
change greatest in Germany. 
Across all cases, it is evident that political parties are powerful in­
termediaries between electorates and governmental authority at sub-
national levels. When provincial, regional, or state elections make it 
possible for any one of a number of different governments to mate­
rialize, each representing a different combination of parties, then the 
choices made by parties during the government formation process are 
clearly important. Outcomes reflect choices. That these choices are 
made largely in secret does not lend much transparency or account­
ability to the process. 
In establishing rules, structures, and history, it has been an impor­
tant aim to confirm the existence of variation in coalition outcomes 
within each country. Since this study is explicitly comparative in pur­
pose and in method, the concluding section of this chapter is a com­
pilation of comparative coalition outcomes, presented in keeping with 
the descriptive intentions of the chapter but also serving as a useful 
segue into the analytical chapters that follow. A series of pie charts 
illustrate coalition behavior across levels of government according to 
the following criteria: type of government formed, coalition size in 
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seats, number of parties in coalition, congruence with national coali­
tions, ideological "connectedness" of coalitions, and responsiveness to 
the verdict of the electorate (inclusion of largest legislative party; in­
clusion of winners/losers). 
Government Types 
Figure 5.4 compares the types of governments formed across na­
tional and subnational assemblies in Belgium, France, and Germany. 
It is clear from these data that in all three countries coalition govern­
ment is a fact of political life. Of the 263 cases of subnational govern­
ment formation examined, 188 (71.5%) resulted in some form of 
power-sharing arrangement between two or more political parties. 
The incidence of multiparty government is even greater at the national 
level in the three countries, where all 62 governments have been multi­
party coalitions. At the subnational level, only in the German Landtage 
does single-party government occur more frequently than coalition 
government. 
Coalition Size in Seats 
Formal theoretical assumptions about coalition formation frequently 
suggest that the most likely outcomes are those that minimize the 
membership size of coalitions, specifically the number of seats or in­
dividual parliamentarians contained within the coalition. While the 
object here is not to apply a stringent test of such assumptions, for 
descriptive purposes it is useful to note that many, if not most, gov­
erning coalitions, at both levels of government in Belgium, France, and 
Germany, do contain excess members (figure 5.5). Post hoc observation 
of these coalition outcomes suggests that simple reliance on certain 
assumptions about coalition size with respect to individuals will not 
yield a powerful or accurate explanation. 
Of 188 coalition governments responsible to territorial assemblies, 
123 (65.6%) contained excess individual members, whereas 65 (34.6%) 
contained the minimum required, of which 27 actually mustered less 
than the required minimum winning threshold (assuming a 50% + 1 
winning rule). Applying size assumptions to Belgian national govern­
ment runs into problems in that the literal winning threshold (50% + 
1) for government formation is not always the de facto winning thresh­
old. Constitutional revision, in which recent Belgian governments have 
been mired, requires a two-thirds parliamentary majority.36 Conse­
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Figure 5.4 National and Subnational Government Types 
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Figure 5.5 Size of Governing Coalition in Parliamentary Seats 
138 • Chapter Five 
quently, an overwhelming 86.4% of Belgian governments since 1961 
have contained "excess" members. Formally, almost all German federal 
governments since 1961 have contained more than the minimum num­
ber of deputies required. However, periodic defections during the 
course of a legislative period have shrunk many postelection coalition 
majorities. While French parties do largely adhere to minimum size 
conditions in regional government, even to the extent of preferring 
minority arrangements over larger, safer majorities, such has not been 
the case in national government, where 64% of the Fifth Republic's 
cabinet governments have contained spare members. 
Number of Parties in Coalition 
Perhaps a better initial gauge of the size characteristics of coalitions 
is the number of political parties agreeing to participate in an eventual 
government (figure 5.6). If parties are disciplined units, then while 
coalitions may contain excess individuals, they may still contain only 
the minimum necessary number of parties. The data indicate that 
most coalitions in all but French national government contain only the 
minimum number of parties needed to form a majority. Approxi­
mately four of every five governing coalitions invested by subnational 
parliaments across all three countries combined do meet formal ex­
pectations about minimum numbers of parties. 
Congruence with National Coalitions 
Data from coalitions in the Belgian provinces and regions, the 
French regions, and the German Land parliaments reveal that parties 
in each subnational assembly do stray from national coalition arrange­
ments (figure 5.7). Apparently in spite of some of the structural and 
procedural differences between subnational government and party 
systems in the three countries, this basic fact characterizes all three 
countries. The propensity to form incongruent coalitions is greatest in 
the Belgian provinces. This tendency is still present but weaker in 
France, where somewhat fewer than half (43.2%) of the power-sharing 
arrangements in regional executives deviated from existing national 
alliances. In the German Lander, two of every five governments since 
1961 have failed to match the majority-versus-opposition alignments 
existing in federal government. This suggests important exceptions to 
the policy of congruence or matching (Gleichschaltung). 
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"Connectedness" of Coalitions 
A fourth dimension that deserves initial comparison is the extent to 
which the parties participating in a governing coalition are "con­
nected" in an ideological or policy sense. Using standard left-right 
placements of parties in each country,37 it is possible to observe that 
connectedness is indeed a characteristic of coalitions at both levels of 
government (figure 5.8). Christian Social parties at the center of the 
Belgian party system have historically formed national governments 
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with Socialists to their immediate left or Liberals to their immediate 
right. In the provinces, however, Socialists and Liberals often bypass 
the center and construct unconnected, nonideological "red-blue" co­
alitions. In French national government, cohesive party blocs on the 
left and right of the political spectrum generally accede to government 
power, although radical socialists have joined conservative cabinets and 
conservatives have participated in Socialist cabinets on several occa­
sions. While postelection "presidential" coalitions in the French re­
gions are frequently unconnected, with right-wing extremists sup­
porting Socialist presidential candidates and ecologists supporting 
conservatives, the actual power-sharing, executive coalitions generally 
do overwhelmingly tend to be connected. The much simpler party sys­
tem in Germany and its more restricted set of coalition alternatives 
make connected coalitions at both levels of government especially 
likely. If we follow Castles and Mair (1984), Inglehart and Klingemann 
(1987), and Sani and Sartori (1983) in considering the FDP to be lo­
cated strategically between the SPD and CDU/CSU, then all but the 
"grand" CDU-SPD coalitions and the SPD's singular experiences gov­
erning Hesse with the German Party (GDP) and Hamburg with the 
Statt Partei may be considered connected. 
Responsiveness to the Verdict of the Electorate 
A more practical concern is the extent to which postelection coali­
tion bargaining actually results in government that reflects the verdict 
of the electorate. Granted, elections that result in no party's holding 
an absolute majority of seats do not send clear messages to the parties 
faced with forming a government. Parties can, presumably, still try to 
interpret the vote. The responsiveness of parties to electoral verdicts 
can be measured indirectly through (1) the presence in government 
of the party holding a plurality of parliamentary seats and (2) the pres­
ence in government of at least one party whose vote share is equal to 
or greater than its vote share at the preceding election. 
The charts in figure 5.9 accordingly compare the inclusion in win­
ning coalitions of the party initially strongest in resources (i.e., votes 
and seats) across national and subnational levels of government. Of 
the 188 subnational governments formed, a substantial 44 (23.4%) 
failed to include the strongest single legislative party. In approximately 
one of every four cases, then, electoral strength paradoxically trans­
lates into governmental weakness. This apparent denial of electoral 
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verdicts occurs also in national government, though to a lesser extent. 
If we exclude midterm coalition changes and focus only on coalitions 
formed in the immediate aftermath of elections, we find that only four 
national governments in our sample denied the largest parliamentary 
party a share of the ministerial portfolios. Such "coalitions of minor­
ities" appear most likely in Germany. Given the data at hand, then, 
parties in subnational legislatures appear more inclined than their na­
tional counterparts to gang up on the party supported by the plurality 
of the voters. This pattern is one not likely to go unnoticed by demo­
cratic theorists or by voters. 
A second outcome of coalition bargaining that can indicate respon­
siveness to electoral verdicts is whether parties in territorial assemblies 
construct governments of "winners" or "losers." Evidence indicates that 
"coalitions of losers" are not unusual at either the subnational or the 
national level (figure 5.10). Better than one in five subnational coali­
tion governments includes only parties that have lost vote shares since 
the previous election. In the Belgian provinces, a substantial 27% of 
coalition governments have contained only election "losers." These are 
the kind of data that tend to give pause to those considering the "dem­
ocratic" merits of coalition government. 
Summary 
This chapter has sought to introduce the actual politics of coalition as 
it has played out in the intermediate-level subnational assemblies of 
three European countries. The chapter, in short, places our study in 
proper historical and institutional context. In doing so, it has also re­
vealed a substantial amount of meaningful political behavior worthy 
of explanation, not the least of which is the apparent propensity of 
parties at provincial and regional levels to form coalition governments 
incongruent with those in existence nationally. The most important 
behavioral patterns revealed by our inventory of subnational govern­
ments are recorded in table 5.10. 
Addressing basic behavioral patterns has revealed several important 
findings. It is evident, first, that the translation of electoral strength 
into governmental power is not automatic at subnational levels. Sec­
ond, it is apparent that minority or relative majority government can 
be a preferred alternative of parties competing in the subnational 
arena. Oversized subnational governments are common as well, fur­
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Table 5.10 
Government Formation in Belgian, French, and German Subnational Assemblies: 
Comparisons of Coalition Outcomes 
Germany 
Belgium France (1960-94) 
(1961-95) (1986-92) West East 
Institution Conseil Provi /ncial  Conseil Regional/ 
Provincieraad Gewestraad Conseil Regional Landtag 
N of units analyzed 9-10 3 22 11 5 
N of governments formed 109 4 44 96 10 
Government types (%) 
Single-party majority 15 0 0 49 30 
Single-party minority 2 0 0 5 0 
Coalition majority 83 100 61 46 10 
Coalition minority 0 0 39 2 60 
% of coalition governments 
excluding party with 
plurality of seats (%) 12 0 52 22 10 
% of coalition governments 
including only election "losers" 27* 0** 23 17 0 
% of coalition governments 
incongruent with national 
governments-vs.-opposition 
alignments 76 50 43 39 43 
% of coalition governments whose 
members are ideologically 
"unconnected" 21 0 0 12 29 
% of all governments including 
more parties than required 
to "win" 16 50 23 19 14 
Cooperative or "grand" coalitions 
including # 1 and #2 parties (%) 60 25 25 9 29 
•Excludes coalitions formed in new provinces of Vlaams Brabant and Brabant Wallon after 1994 elections. 
**Only comparison here is between governments formed after 1989 and 1995 regional assembly elections in Brussels. 
ther indicating that a size principle is not absolute. There is, in short, 
variation in coalition outcomes. Outcomes reflect choices, not necessar­
ily electoral verdicts, obligatory duplications of national arrangements, 
or strict adherence to zero-sum competition. Having established vari­
ation, the task of subsequent chapters is to test the theoretical rela­
tionships posited in chapter 3 in order to impose some analytical order 
on the range of behavior exhibited by parties competing for power in 
territorial parliaments. 
Chapter Six 
Do Electoral Verdicts Matter! 
The Effects of Competition 
on Strategic Choice 
The election: It can mean nothing. In forming a new majority, 
anything goes. 
—Regional Councilor, 
Nord-Pas <Je Calais (France) 
The people speak, then we act. 
—Regional Councilor, 
Lorraine (France) 
Ideally, the act of government formation in territorial parliaments should serve to commission and legitimize the direction of public 
policy in a province, region, or state. In this single act lies any newly 
elected assembly's first and most overt expression of "opinion-policy 
congruence" (Page, 1994). Where election results play little or no role 
in determining the choice of government, however, the veracity of this 
legitimizing function tends to come into question. In such cases, a fun­
damental principle of representative democracy—that the govern­
ment, at whatever level of the polity, should enjoy the support of the 
electorate—may, to some, seem lost. The extent to which this elemental 
linkage between representatives and voters, the "electoral connection," 
actually compels or constrains regional parliamentarians and provin­
cial councilors at the occasion of their first major postelection decision 
is the subject of this chapter. 
Bogdanor (1983) writes that "elections do not choose governments, 
they alter the power relations between the parties. . .  . The formation 
of a government, then, is the process of artificially constructing a ma­
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jority" (272). Characterizing the government formation process as "ar­
tificial" is as accurate at subnational levels as it is at the national level. 
At both levels, political parties, not voters, ultimately decide the com­
position and character of a government. Identifying the factors that 
influence the manufacturing of governing majorities is our task, and 
to that end we focus here on the relative influences of electoral com­
petition, electoral accountability, and electoral change. Following chap­
ter 3's theoretical discussion and drawing upon a mix of historical, 
interview, and survey data, the challenge is to determine whether key 
characteristics of electoral environments (namely, their instability and 
localism) shape the ways in which representatives view the responsi­
bilities of government formation. If electoral context "matters," then 
the opportunities and constraints produced by varying environments 
may help explain why, for example, local sections of the same national 
political party choose different coalition strategies in different prov­
inces, regions, and states. 
Dilemmas of Electoral Accountability, 
Responsiveness* and Transparency 
Indirect or artificial selection of governments highlights a host of nor­
mative dilemmas inherent in most parliamentary systems. The exis­
tence of such dilemmas frames our inquiry. To illustrate the level of 
controversy and the direction of elite thinking about certain aspects of 
government formation and multiparty coalitions, evidence may be 
found first in the responses of sitting provincial and regional coun­
cilors to a set of explicitly normative statements (table 6.1). In personal 
interviews with elected representatives in Belgium, France, and Ger­
many conducted during the September 1992-September 1993 period, 
politicians were asked to react to carefully worded statements regard­
ing electoral accountability, disclosure of coalition intentions, govern­
ment formation by secret ballot, publication of coalition agreements, 
alliances with extremist parties, and the formation of "coalitions of 
losers." 
The responses are presented here purely for descriptive and sug­
gestive purposes. What is important is that the data suggest some clear 
and consistent patterns as well as some tensions among politicians as 
they reflect upon the responsibilities of forming new governments. 
For instance, while a majority of those interviewed in each country 
Table 6.1 
Representatives' Responses to Normative Dilemmas of Coalition Government 
Agre  e Disagre e 
Item 1. Coalition Decisions and "Voters should hold individual politicians and their Belgium (N = 44) 63.6 36.4 
Electoral Accountability parties accountable for the legislative and power- France (N = 31) 67.7 32.3 
sharing alliances they form following an election." Germany (N = 22) 77J* 22,7 
Total 68.0 32.0 
Item 2. Disclosure of Coalition "Parties should be required to reveal their coalition Belgium (JV = 44) 27.3 72.7 
Plans during Campaign preferences during an election campaign in order to France (N = 31) 41.9 58.1 
give voters a better basis upon which to choose." Germany (N = 22) 364 *>3J> 
Tota l 34.0 66.  0 
Item 3. Government Formation "Selection of a governing executive by secret ballot Belgiu  m (JV = 43) 32.6 67.4 
by Secret Ballot should be eliminated, as it makes representatives Franc  e (JV = 30) 13.3 86.7 
accountable to neither the voters nor the party." German  y (JV = 22) 45,  4 54J> 
Tota l 29.  5 70.5 
Item 4. Publication of Coalition "Coalition agreements should be made available to the Belgiu m (JV = 44) 47.7 52.3 
Agreements public in written form." Franc  e (JV = 31) 48.  4 51.6 
German  y (JV = 19) 63J> 36,8 
Tota l 51.1 48.  9 
Item 5. Coalition Building and "It is the responsibility of all democratic parties, no Belgiu m (JV = 44) 70.5 29.5 
"Extreme" Parties matter the differences normally separating them, to Franc e (JV = 31) 32.3 67.7 
govern together against an extreme party, even if the German  y (JV = 19) 73/7 2  O 
extreme party has won a plurality of votes and seats Total 58.5 41.5 
in a fair, democratic election." 
Item 6. Representation and "A governing coalition that contains only parties that Belgiu m (JV = 44) 22.3 77.3 
"Coalitions of Losers" have lost votes and seats since the previous election is Franc e (JV = 31) 19.4 80.6 
a "losers* coalition" and is an evasion of the German  y (JV = 20) 5 0 J  0 5CM) 
electorate's verdict." Tota l 37.9 62.1 
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answered that voters should hold them accountable for decisions of co­
alition participation (item 1), a rather surprising one-third envisioned 
no "electoral connection." Some parties campaign openly on the basis 
of specified coalition intentions, while others campaign on promises 
not to collaborate with a certain other party or parties. But generally 
voters are in the dark about what parties intend to do once the votes 
are counted. Two-thirds of the subnational parliamentarians dis­
agreed with the proposition that parties should divulge coalition pref­
erences and intentions during election campaigns (item 2). This, many 
politicians explained, would tie their hands during negotiations. As for 
postelection issues, several representatives felt that formal investiture 
of new governments by secret ballot (item 3) decreases accountability 
and eliminates transparency; still, the clear majority wanted to pre­
serve this procedural rule because it enhances rather than detracts 
from the "democraticness" of the government formation process. The 
deals upon which investiture votes are won are frequently struck be­
yond the reach of journalists—if not behind closed council chamber 
doors, then literally anywhere, from restaurants to restrooms. The 
question of whether the texts of signed coalition agreements, once suc­
cessfully negotiated by party leaders, should enter the public domain 
(item 4) generates a real split in thinking among provincial and re­
gional politicians. 
One dilemma often faced by parties in regional or local assemblies 
before their colleagues in national parliament is how to deal with ex­
treme, fringe, or new parties that emerge from the grass roots. Should 
the threatening party be isolated, or should it be incorporated into the 
power structure in order to uncloak it as incapable of effective gov­
ernance? This dilemma is especially tricky when the so-called pariah 
party gains a plurality of votes and seats in a democratic election (item 
5). When a question regarding the duty of "democratic" parties to 
form blocking coalitions against "extreme" parties was asked system­
atically of 94 elected subnational assembly members, the responses 
proved indicative of the ways in which mainstream parties in the re­
spective countries approach the dilemma in practice. In both Belgium 
and Germany, the preference has been to isolate insurgent parties per­
ceived as extreme (Vlaams Blok and Front National in Belgium, the 
Republicans and the Party of Democratic Socialism in Germany). Con­
versely, in France there has been considerable collaboration between 
mainstream center-right parties and the Front National of Jean-Marie 
Le Pen. 
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Similarly, there is frequent criticism that parties are insensitive to 
shifts in electoral support and that they use the coalition process to 
evade electoral verdicts. Here the politics of mutual self-preservation 
is said to win out over responsiveness to popular will. When asked 
straightforwardly whether governments composed strictly of parties 
that have lost votes and assembly seats since the previous election are 
"losers' coalitions" and thus rejections of the electorate's wishes (item 
6), almost two-thirds of the 95 politicians interviewed disagreed. What 
matters, many argued, is simply meeting the 50% + 1 threshold for 
winning in the assembly. Others, especially the German Landtag dep­
uties, place higher value on choosing combinations of parties that re­
flect not only the level of public support but the direction as well. 
For our purposes, what matters is the admission from a large num­
ber of key players in the power game that these dilemmas exist. The 
apparent vagaries of the "electoral connection" prompt closer exam­
ination. One method for testing the strength of this connection lies in 
assessing the impact of two variables: electoral volatility and electoral lo­
calization. These two variables represent, as outlined in chapter 3, the 
extent of competitiveness, uncertainty, and instability present in sub-
national electoral environments. Competitiveness, to restate the ar­
gument, should increase the risks of coalition building, heighten the 
pressures of accountability for strategic choices, and restrict the num­
ber of feasible coalition alternatives. Competition, uncertainty, and in­
stability should, in other words, restrict coalition choice. Under con­
ditions of competitive uncertainty, politicians and parties faced with 
strategic dilemmas should recognize the presence of an electoral con­
straint and thus should be expected to behave in ways different than 
they would if they enjoyed the relative security of stable vote shares 
and "nationalized" elections. In short, electoral competition should 
constrain the degree to which parties can make decisions independent 
of the preferences of the local electorate. 
To investigate these possibilities, this chapter first provides mea­
sures of electoral volatility and electoral localization, respectively, in 
the provinces and regions of Germany, Belgium, and France. These 
measures yield distinct groupings of electoral environments within 
each country. Once regions and provinces have been dichotomized ac­
cording to volatility and localization, the chapter proposes combining 
the two measures to produce a typology of electoral environments in 
the three countries. This done, hypotheses are tested linking electoral 
conditions with individual-level attitudes and with actual coalition out­
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comes. The evidence suggests how individuals and groups endowed 
with political responsibility weigh the costs and benefits of alternative 
strategies according to the electoral environments in which they must 
act. From these data, electoral uncertainty and instability emerge as 
powerful constraints on individual representatives' perceptions of stra­
tegic freedom. However, indications that individual perceptions of risk 
and accountability often fail to translate into predictable forms of col­
lective behavior suggest that although electoral verdicts may "matter," it 
may be organizational constraints (i.e., party-legislator links) rather 
than electoral constraints (i.e., voter-legislator links) that matter most. 
Electoral Volatility 
Measuring volatility is a fairly straightforward endeavor. Previous work 
by Denters (1985) and Pedersen (1983) provides rough guides, al­
though Pedersen's indicators examine volatility only in national party 
systems. Electoral volatility is the "average of the absolute inter-election 
differences between the voting shares of particular . . . political par­
ties'* in subnational elections across an established period of time (Den­
ters 1985, 306). In this way, greater volatility is indicated by larger net 
changes in voting shares. A region, state, or province's mean volatility 
is the average change across successive elections for all or a select num­
ber of parties. If the posited relationships between electoral context 
and coalition behavior are to hold, then larger net changes and greater 
volatility should be sufficiently obvious to politicians and party leaders 
to act as a constraint on strategic behavior, including coalition choice. 
The formulas for volatility that we use are: 
Volat i l i ty P a r t  y =[Z\Pa<t) - Pa(t + 1)\ + \Pa(t + 1) - Pa(t + 2)\ + \Pa(i + n) ­
* a(t 4- n. . .)!'£'> 
where Pa(t) = the voting share of party a in subnational election at time 
t, and E = number of elections, and where: 
VolatilitySubnational Unit = [Volatility Parly A + VolatilityParty B... n]IP, 
when P = number of parties. 
Data from provincial and regional assembly elections allow for mea­
surements of volatility in each of the three countries.1 
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Electoral Volatility in the German Lander, Belgian Provinces, 
and French Regions 
Observers of coalition politics in Germany frequently suggest that 
"major trends in electoral change can be observed at state level before 
they occur in the federal party system" (Muller-Rommel 1989, 117). 
The question here, however, is to what extent volatility differs geo­
graphically, and the corresponding expectation is that such differences 
may have consequences for alliance building in the respective Land 
parliaments. Using the indicator proposed above, the average volatility 
of West German state party systems is measured from the early 1960s 
(table 6.2).2 Levels of electoral change are measured for two periods, 
the pre-Greens period (1961-77) and the Greens period (1978-95). For 
the sake of consistency, the measure includes interelection differences 
in vote shares for the CDU, SPD, FDP, and Die Griinen, excluding 
minor parties and others consistently falling under the 5% threshold. 
While the method of computation is somewhat different and the time 
period extended, these findings generally concur with those of Muller-
Rommel (1989) and Padgett (1991). Measuring volatility in the Ger­
man Lander thus produces evidence, at least on the surface, of more 
unstable electoral systems, as in the city-states of Bremen, Hamburg, 
and Berlin, and more static electoral systems, as in Bavaria and North 
Rhine—Westphalia.3 
The same measure can be applied to the Belgian provinces. Table 
6.2 presents the mean volatility of each of the nine pre—federal era 
provinces for the period 1961-91.4 The 30-year span is divided in two 
parts (1961—76, 1977-91), covering elections both before and after the 
first participation of "community" parties in coalition governments. 
The observation that leaps out immediately is that volatility has been 
greatest in the Walloon provinces, whereas it has been more moderate 
in Flanders. Namur, for example, has considerably greater instability 
than East Flanders. In practical terms, this has meant that each of the 
parties (e.g., PS, PSC, PRL, Ecolo) competing for the 285,000 votes in 
Namur on average either gains or loses 12,800 votes between elections. 
If the Socialist Party in Namur had gained 12,800 votes in 1991 over 
its 1987 total, the party would have secured an absolute majority in 
the provincial assembly. Instead, the PS actually lost 13,800 votes and 
four seats, primarily to the Ecolos (+ 15,000), thus necessitating a co­
alition with the liberal PRL. In other words, major and consistent fluc­
tuation in provincial voting patterns has meant that coalitional politics 
Table 6.2 
Electoral Volatility in Germany, Belgium, and France 
Land Number of Muller-Rommel Padgett 
Period I, 1961-77 Period II, 1978-95 Average Election Rank,* Rank,** 
German Lander (%) (%) (%) Periods 1956-83 1975-90 
Bremen 4.5 4.6 4.5 8 1 1 
Hamburg 4.6 4.3 4.4 10 4 2 
Berlin 4.2 3.3*** 3.7 7 — — 
Saarland 3.7 3.5 3.6 7 3 3 
Baden-Wiirttemberg 4.6 2.1 3.4 8 2 8 
Hessen 3.9 2.5 3.0 9 6 5 
Rhineland-Palatinate 2.6 3.1 2.9 7 7 4 
Lower Saxony 2.9 2.4 2.7 8 5 7 
Schleswig-Holstein 2.1 2.9 2.6 8 10 6 
North Rhine-Westphalia 2.5 2.2 2.4 7 9 10 
Bavaria 2.4 1.8 2.0 8 8 9 
German Average 3.4 3.0 3.3 7.9 
*Muller-Rommel (1989), 119. 
**Padgett(1991), 6. 
***Appropriate time period is 1978—89. No meaningful comparison of 1990 Land election in united Berlin can be made to previous Land 
elections. 
Belgian Period I, 1961-76 Period II, 1977-91 Province Average JV of Election Periods 
Provinces (%) (%) (%) 
Namur 5.2 3.6 4.5 10 
Hainaut 4.2 3.0 3.7 10 
Liege 4.3 2.9 3.7 10 
Luxembourg 4.2 3.0 3.7 10 
Limburg 3.5 2.8 3.2 10 
Antwerp 3.3 3.0 3.2 10 
West Flanders 2.8 3.1 2.9 10 
East Flanders 2.5 3.1 2.8 10 
Brabant 3.3 2.1 2.7 10 
Provincial Average 3.7 3.0 3.4 10 
Brussels Region 1.2 (1989-95) 1 
Period 1986-92 Period 1986-92 
French Regions (%) French Regions (%) 
Lorraine 9.6 Ile-de-France 8.0 
Rhone-Alpes 9.4 Pays-de-la Loire 7.8 
Provence-Alpes Cote d'Azur 9.4 Alsace 7.6 
Franche-Comte 9.2 Centre 7.5 
Champagne-Ardenne 9.2 Bretagne 7.3 
Haute-Normandie 8.6 Basse-Normandie 7.2 
Aquitaine 8.5 Corse 6.8 
Picardie 8.3 Nord-Pas de Calais 6.8 
Poitou-Charentes 8.3 Midi-Pyrenees 6.0 
Languedoc-Roussiilon 8.3 Limousin 5.8 
Bourgogne 8.0 Auvergne 4.9 
French Average 7.8 
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has taken place in the midst of a changing environment. Much less 
fluctuation has characterized voting for the Brussels Regional Parlia­
ment, for which a measure of volatility across the span of its two elec­
tions is provided. 
Changes in vote shares among the parties in the new French regions 
are on the whole significantly greater than in both Belgium and Ger­
many. Average net volatility across two time points (1986 and 1992), 
as presented in table 6.2, suggests that instability is pronounced in 
many of the regions but markedly less pronounced in others. Lorraine 
and Rhone-Alpes, for example, are characterized by much greater vol­
atility than Limousin and Auvergne. Here in France, as in Germany 
and Belgium, we find clear evidence of relative differences in electoral 
environments across regions. 
Electoral Localization 
The degree of electoral localization is considered to be the extent to 
which average absolute interelection mutations in party vote shares in 
a subnational arena deviate from average absolute interelection mu­
tations for the same parties in the national arena. In this way, greater 
localization is indicated by greater subnational-national differences in 
the mutations. Greater nationalization is indicated when changes in 
subnational election results mirror those occurring across successive 
national elections. If changes in partisan support differ across levels, 
this is likely to be a clue that voters are basing their decisions on dif­
ferent criteria (i.e., local and national). Conversely, if changes in par­
tisan support across levels mirror one another, then local factors are 
likely to be playing less of a role. The measurement of localization used 
here is: 
Localization^ = &\(Sat - Sat _ ,) - (Nat - Nat _ ,)| + \(Sat. n ­
where Sat — Sat „ 2 = change in voting share of party a between sub-
national elections at times t and t — 1; Nat — Nat _ 7 = change in voting 
share of party a between national elections at times t and t — 1; E = 
number of elections; and where: 
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LocalizationSubnationalUnit =[LocalizationPartyv4 + LocalizationParlyB... n]IPf 
when P = number of parties. 
The measure should equal 0 when changes in subnational election 
results mirror perfectly those for parties in the national arena. The 
larger the localization measure, conversely, the more important are 
subnational deviations from national patterns. 
Electoral Localization in the German Lander, 
Belgian Provinces, and French Regions 
Changes in party vote shares in the Land elections between 1961 
and 1995 are neither perfect reflections nor complete distortions of 
changes in party vote shares in federal elections. There is instead vari­
ation, "a marked heterogeneity from one Land to another" that "may 
be taken as an indication of the impact of local factors in Land elec­
tions" (Padgett 1991, 4). The calculations presented in table 6.3 indi­
cate that voting patterns across the states do deviate from federal 
averages to markedly greater and lesser degrees. The small city-states 
of Bremen, Hamburg, and Berlin are among those Lander whose elec­
tion results are less attributable statistically to federal trends and thus 
appear to have idiosyncratic patterns of voting behavior. Conversely, 
changes in election results in North Rhine-Westphalia, Lower Saxony, 
and Rhineland-Palatinate more closely mimic global German trends. 
Illustrative of these patterns on a small scale are the fates of the CDU 
in "localized" Bremen and "nationalized" North Rhine—Westphalia. 
With a net change for the CDU between the 1987 and 1990 Bundestag 
elections at 0.1%, change in support for the North Rhine-Westphalia 
CDU followed directly at 0.2%; however, the Bremen CDU over the 
same period weathered a massive 10% change. It may further be noted 
that the average percent vote for independent candidates and purely 
"local" parties in the state elections of Bremen, Hamburg, and Baden-
Wiirttemberg (i.e., the "localized" states) is more than three times 
greater than that for Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia, and 
Rhineland-Palatinate (i.e., the "nationalized" states). That Baden-
Wlirttemberg is among the more localized electoral systems seems in­
itially surprising, given its size and presumed national importance, but 
it is a fact confirmed by previous studies: "Baden-Wiirttemberg falls 
into the same category of states with a distinctive political culture, and 
idiosyncratic patterns of voting behaviour" (Padgett and Burkett 1986, 
00 
Table 6.3 
Electoral Localization in Germany, Belgium, and France 
Average % Vote 
Period I, 1961-77 Period II, 1978-95 Land Average Number of for "Local" Lists, 
German Lander (%) (%) (%) Election Periods 1961-95 
Bremen 3.0 3.7 3.4 8 3.4 
Hamburg 3.0 2.9 3.0 10 4.1 
Baden-Wiirttemberg 2.7 2.3 2.5 8 4.7 
Berlin 2.6 2.3* 2.4 7 3.3 
Saarland 3.1 1.8 2.4 7 1.8 
Hessen 2.8 2.0 2.4 9 4.5 
Schles wig- Holstein 2.3 2.3 2.3 8 2.3 
Bavaria 2.1 1.1 1.6 8 2.4 
Lower Saxony 1.2 1.7 1.5 8 2.7 
North Rhine-Westphalia 1.8 1.3 1.5 7 0.3 
Rhineland-Palatinate 1.0 2.2 1.5 7 1.8 
German Average 2.3 2.1 2.2 7.9 2.8 
* Appropriate time period is 1978—89. No meaningful comparison of 1990 Land election in united Berlin can be made to previous Land elections. 
Belgian Period I, 1961-76 Period II, 1977-91 Province Average Number of Average % Vote for 
Provinces Election Periods "Local" Lists 
Namur 3.6 3.2 10 3.5 
Luxembourg 2.8 3.1 3.0 10 2.9 
Antwerp 1.9 1.8 1.8 10 2.8 
Hainaut 1.8 1.9 1.8 10 3.0 
Limburg 2.2 1.6 1.8 10 1.4 
West Flanders 2.0 1.4 1.7 10 1.4 
Liege 1.6 1.5 1.6 10 2.3 
Brabant 2.0 1.1 1.5 10 2.1 
East Flanders 1.5 1.3 1.4 10 0.9 
Provincial Average 2.2 1.8 2.0 10 2.3 
Brussels Region 0.9 1 (1989-95) 1.4 
<£> 
Period 1986-92 Average % Vote Period 1986-92 Average % Vote 
French Regions for "Local" Lists French Regions for "Local" Lists 
Alsace 5.4 4.3 Nord-Pas de Calais 3.3 10.1 
Basse-Normandie 4.9 3.6 Picardie 3.3 6.7 
Lorraine 4.7 1.6 Languedoc-Roussillon 3.3 5.2 
Champagne-Ardenne 4.5 5.2 Ile-de-France 2.9 0.5 
Rhone-Alpes 4.5 2.2 Bourgogne 2.9 4.3 
Provence-Alpes Cote d'Azur 4.4 12.7 Pays-de-la-Loire 2.8 2.1 
Limousin 4.4 2.6 Bretagne 2.6 0.6 
Franche-Comte 4.3 1.5 Corse 2.6 15.1 
Haute-Normandie 4.0 5.4 Centre 2.5 0.8 
Poitou-Charentes 3.7 3.3 Auvergne 1.6 3.3 
Aquitaine 3.5 12.2 Mid-Pyrenees 1.5 4.4 
French Average 3.5 4.9 
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276). For present purposes, then, this statistical procedure lends cre­
dence to the assumption of differentiation in regional voting traditions 
in Germany.5 
The provincialization of election results in Belgium is somewhat 
more difficult to discern. This is due in significant part to the simul­
taneous occurrence of provincial and national elections. Nevertheless, 
changes in provincial voting results do not vary strictly according to 
national patterns (table 6.3). The francophone province of Namur 
stands out as the most distinctive province, followed by Luxembourg, 
the province physically and historically most distant from the Belgian 
capital. Although most things in Belgium resist the label nationalized, 
the province of East Flanders should still qualify given the degree to 
which elections there consistently follow larger Flemish and Belgian 
trends. So, too, should the Brussels region, where voting patterns have 
demonstrated little local distinctiveness. 
It is possible to offer a limited measure of localization (i.e., region­
alization) in the election results of France's 20 regions. This calculation 
measures interelection changes in party vote shares between the 1986 
and 1992 regional elections. These results are then compared with 
interelection changes in party vote shares for the two closest national 
parliamentary elections, those having occurred in 1986 and 1993. As 
the data in table 6.3 reveal, election results in many of the French re­
gions have a distinctive localflavor, with regional-level party gains and 
losses being detached from national-level party changes to a far 
greater extent than in Belgium and Germany. The degree of locali­
zation in small and historically contested Alsace in the northeastern 
periphery of the French hexagon, for example, is more than three 
times that of Auvergne, located at the country's center. 
A Typology of Subnational Electoral Systems 
in Germany, Belgium, and France 
Our statistical measures of objective conditions—such as instability 
and idiosyncrasy of voting behavior—may have tapped into a pool of 
influences (physical size, historical identity, distance from center, oc­
cupational structure, economic conditions) that can combine to create 
different regional voting patterns. For our purposes, it suffices to note 
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Figure 6.1 Volatility and Localization in German Lander, 1961—1995 
the actual presence of variation, variation that may condition several 
strategic behaviors, of which coalition building is but one. 
Given these two measures, each country's subnational units may be 
classified by cross-comparing a state, province, or region's cumulative 
scores for both volatility and localization (figures 6.1 through 6.3). 
Doing so reveals clear variation and the existence of separate clusters 
of subnational electoral arenas. Within their respective systems, Bre­
men, Namur, and Lorraine are characterized by consistently high lev­
els of electoral instability; conversely, voting patterns in Lower Saxony, 
Brabant, and Midi-Pyren6es are comparatively and consistently more 
stable. Likewise, voting shifts in Hamburg, Luxembourg, and Alsace 
demonstrate greater independence from national shifts than do those 
in Rhineland-Palatinate, Liege, and Auvergne. 
These measures provide solid empirical evidence of differential 
electoral conditions across the territorial divisions of Germany, Bel­
gium, and France. As such, they should facilitate investigation into 
"conditional" coalition behavior. The empirical classification scheme 
also enables us to characterize the relative constraints under which our 
survey respondents find themselves, since the territorial assemblies 
constituting the sample represent different combinations of electoral 
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Figure 6.2 Volatility and Localization in Belgian Provinces, 1961— 
1991, and Brussels Region, 1989-1995 
volatility and localization. Given that the survey instrument was cross-
sectional and the classification scheme longitudinal, however, effort 
was made to ensure that the same relative disparities in volatility and 
localization held true for the most recent election period in the locality. 
Controls for electoral environment were also corroborated by survey 
items tapping respondents' own perceptions of volatility and localiza­
tion; provincial and regional means for these items correlated strongly 
and positively with our objective, cumulative measures of high/low vol­
atility and localization/nationalization.6 
In a very basic way, the typology of electoral environments thus 
achieves an important goal: it establishes a contextual framework that 
allows for the specification of certain likely electoral constraints on the 
strategic behavior of subnational parliamentarians. This is a necessary 
precondition for testing whether the electoral milieu in which parties 
find themselves actually influences the development of strategic policy 
and the making of coalition choices. These measures obtained, the 
question that must be addressed is whether the two variables of elec­
toral volatility and electoral localization, either separately or in com­
bination, intervene to condition the ways in which politicians and 
parties approach coalition situations. 
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Do Volatility and Localization 
Have an Impact on Coalitions? 
When politicians and parties believe that what they do in the hours, 
days, and weeks following an election has a direct impact on future 
election outcomes, then their strategic choices are constrained by the 
necessity of appearing reliable and credible to the local electorate. In 
less competitive situations, however, politicians can, without serious 
worry about damaging their election result, pursue a more unre­
stricted set of coalition possibilities. This section tests the influence of 
volatility and localization on individual-level strategic assessments as 
well as on aggregate-level coalition outcomes. 
Hypothesis: Volatility Heightens Risk and Accountability 
If electoral conditions (e.g., proximate and unstable competition) 
really do influence and constrain what rational politicians may be 
expected to do, then some relationship between volatility and actor 
appreciation of coalition accountability and decision-making respon­
sibility should exist. Basic tenets of democratic theory anticipate that 
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electoral competition increases the need for "responsible," reelection-
minded representatives and parties to appear consistent and reliable 
to their electorates. In other words, increased competition for electoral 
support presumably heightens the risks of strategic choices, elevates 
the stakes of coalition games, and magnifies the accountability that 
political actors (individually and/or collectively) feel for their actions. 
This should be true especially for coalition preferences and decisions, 
as they are among the most outward signals of governing intent and 
political motivation. Whether such sensitivity to electoral pressures ex­
erts any influence in the realm of coalition politics is the initial empir­
ical matter to be addressed here. 
To test for contextual influence, initially on micro-level rationality, 
we can compare subnational legislators' perceptions of coalition ac­
countability, concern for local public opinion, and consideration of the 
electoral consequences of strategic decisions under different electoral 
conditions. Combining the objective measures of volatility presented 
above with responses to select items in the survey questionnaire sent 
to Belgian, German, and French representatives, we can instructively 
put to the test the null hypothesis that has heretofore guided general 
theories of coalition formation, namely, that context does not matter. 
The questionnaire asked representatives: 
"Will voters at the next election hold you and your party accountable 
for a coalition you may have sought with another party or parties 
to influence the distribution of government posts or to promote a 
policy?" 
The resulting frequencies reveal that a majority (59.8%) of the sub-
national deputies sampled do anticipate electoral consequences to fol­
low from their coalitional activity. French (67% or 164), German (61% 
or 104), and Belgian (51% or 87) respondents indicated that they be­
lieve that the voters in their respective regions, states, and provinces 
hold them accountable for power-sharing arrangements or other forms 
of cross-party collaboration. However, these majorities are by no 
means absolute, revealing that substantial numbers of representatives 
(40.2%) actually perceive no accountability to voters for their decisions 
of government formation and interparty cooperation. These percent­
ages remain consistent when controlling for party participation in an 
actual governing coalition. 
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Table 6.4 
Level of Coalition Accountability, by Volatility 
of Electoral Environment (%) 
Volatility of 
Level of Coalition Electoral Environment 
Accountability High Low N 
High 68.8 43.3 355 
Low 31.2 56.7 239 
N 384 210 
X2 =4.71, df= l,p< 0.030. 
Kendall's Tau-b = 0.10,/? < 0.05. 
The primary purpose here, however, is to learn if concern over co­
alition accountability may vary according to different electoral envi­
ronments. Table 6.4 presents respondents' answers to the question on 
coalition accountability, dichotomized by respondent location in en­
vironments of either high or low electoral volatility. The evidence pro­
vides an important first clue supporting the "context matters" thesis. 
A substantial two-thirds of the councilors and deputies competing in 
electoral environments that objectively and consistently demonstrate 
high levels of electoral change acknowledged the connection between 
coalition behavior and electoral success. Conversely, fewer than half of 
the representatives whose electoral milieu may be deemed "low vola­
tility" sensed the presence of such an accountability dynamic. This in­
itial discrepancy in responses is statistically significant, supports the 
underlying logic of the hypothesis, and thus warrants further inves­
tigation. 
If politicians operating in unstable environments perceive greater 
strategic risk than do those operating in stable environments, then to 
what extent do they allow environmental pressures to influence their 
choices? Free in theory to maximize individual and collective goals by 
cutting deals with any number of potential partners once elected, play­
ers in the coalition game are formally bound by few rules except that 
of "winning." Some have revealed their coalition intentions during a 
campaign and in party conferences, but many have not. In the post­
election trading and bickering over personalities, portfolios, and pol­
icies, most of which transpires outside council chambers and beyond 
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Table 6.5 
Concern for Public Opinion in 
Decisions of Coalition Composition, 
by Volatility of Electoral Environment (%) 
Influence of Land/ 
Volatility of Electoral Environment 
Public Opinion High Low 
Very influential 20.1 8.2 
Somewhat influential 59.6 55.6 
Not at all influential 20.3 36.2 
N 334 207 
X2 = 7.19, d/ = %p < 0.104. 
Kendall's Tau-c = 0.11,/? < 0.12. 
the reach of journalists, it is unclear how interpretations of the "verdict 
of the electorate" figure into decisions of government participation, 
choices of partners, and the direction of joint public policy. 
Table 6.5 presents responses to the following survey question: 
"In the process leading to the formation of a new coalition, you and 
your party are likely influenced by many considerations in your ap­
proach to negotiations. How influential is [provincial/regional/Land] 
public opinion in determining your party's strategy?" 
The councilors and deputies answered by indicating "very influential," 
"somewhat influential," or "not at all influential." Even given a tendency 
of elected officials to inflate the extent to which popular will drives 
their behavior, the response pattern fits theoretical expectations re­
garding the intervening influence of electoral context. Of the 334 sub-
national representatives competing under conditions of high volatility, 
20.1% indicated that public opinion is very influential in formulating 
coalition strategy, whereas only 8.2% of the 207 respondents in low-
volatility arenas so indicated. At the same time, 36.2% from low-
volatility environments responded that public opinion was not at all 
important, compared with a smaller 20.3% from the high-volatility 
category. In both cases, the majority of respondents indicated public 
opinion to be "somewhat influential" in strategic choice. That the cli­
mate of provincial, regional, or state public opinion influences coalition 
behavior to a greater extent in more competitive, unstable electoral 
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Table 6.6 
Perceived Importance of Vote-Maximizing 
Capacity of Coalition Strategy, 
by Volatility of Electoral Environment (%) 
Importance of 
Volatility of Electoral Environment 
with Coalition High Low 
Great 12.2 5.8 
Moderate 50.3 48.1 
Little or none 37.5 46.1 
N 328 208 
X2 = 7.05, df = 2, p < 0.029. 
Kendall's Tau-c = 0.08, p< 0.13. 
environments is apparent. What should not be overlooked, especially 
for its substantive, if not normative, implications, is that in both types 
of electoral environments, there are more representatives answering 
that public opinion is "not at all influential" than there are those an­
swering that it is "very influential." 
Addressing the influence of public opinion taps into political sen­
sitivity to popular will. A more direct measure of motivation can be 
achieved by asking representatives about the vote-maximizing inten­
tions of certain approaches to coalition situations. Table 6.6 reports 
findings for the following survey item: 
"Please characterize the following as a motivation for your party 
when seeking a coalition with another party or parties: Gaining votes 
at the next election." 
The gap here is not huge, but it is consistent with theoretical expec­
tations. Forward-looking vote maximization is twice as important a mo­
tivation among competitors in high-volatility situations as among their 
colleagues in more stable electoral contexts. Indeed, close to half of 
the respondents in the latter category answered that a coalition's ca­
pacity to win votes at the next election was of little or no importance 
in either its selection or its rejection. 
Individually, the data presented in tables 6.4 through 6.6 are im­
portant, if initially unspectacular. Taken together, the patterns appar­
ent from the data suggest a positive relationship between electoral 
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context and individual-level perceptions of strategic risk and coalition 
accountability. Consistent with the hypothesis, these findings success­
fully link environment with important motivational concerns. Accord­
ing to these individual-level attitudinal data, then, it seems justifiable 
to proceed under the assumption that volatility may in fact increase 
the perception among politicians that electoral fortunes are linked to 
coalition choices. Recognizing this makes it possible to regard electoral 
context as a potential constraint on behavior. 
Hypothesis: Localization Heightens Risk and Accountability 
When changes in election results at the subnational level are con­
sistently tied to those at the national level, politicians developing strat­
egy at the lower levels should be freed somewhat from the pressures 
to appear consistent and reliable to the local electorate. Conversely, the 
more fluctuations in party vote shares in the subnational arena distin­
guish themselves from those at the national level, the greater such 
pressure is likely to be. Under conditions of "localized" (or "provin­
cialized," "regionalized") rather than "nationalized" election environ­
ments, politicians are more likely to collectively recognize competition 
as a threat to the attainment of office and thus are less likely to remain 
indifferent to local preferences in developing strategy. 
As with the examination of our first hypothesis, the prime concern 
here is to test whether objective electoral conditions—in this case, con­
textual traditions of localization—condition actor perceptions of the 
coalition game, its stakes, and especially its electoral consequences. At 
issue are whether officeholders' recognition of coalition accountability, 
their reliance on public opinion as a guide to strategic alternatives, and 
their vote-seeking motivations increase as the resemblance of subna­
tional elections to those at the national level decreases. Using the same 
survey items as were employed in the analysis of the previous hypoth­
esis, it is possible to take one further step toward establishing that con­
text "matters" when otherwise self-interested politicians are faced with 
collective action problems. 
Table 6.7 presents responses to the "accountability," "public opin­
ion," and "vote-seeking" survey questions, this time dichotomized by 
respondent location in electoral environments that may be deemed 
either "localized" or "nationalized." Consistent with expectations, a 
greater proportion of respondents competing in localized environ­
ments feel that voters will ultimately hold them and their parties ac­
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Table 6.7 
Concern for Preferences of Local Electorate 
in Decisions of Coalition Composition, 
by Localization of Electoral Environment (%) 
Localization of Electoral Environment 
High Low 
Level of Coalition 
Accountability* 
High 63.9 57.2 
Low 36.1 42.8 
AT 208 386 
Influence of Land/ 
Regional/Provincial 
Public Opinion** 
Very influential 13.5 10.2 
Somewhat influential 58.9 48.8 
Not at all influential 27.6 41.0 
N 207 334 
Importance of 
Winning Votes with 
Coalition*** 
Great 11.5 
Moderate 58.6 43.2 
Little or none 29.9 48.9 
N 208 328 
*X2 = 1.18, df= \,p< 0.28; Kendall's Tau-b = 0.09, p < 0.07. 
**X2 = 5.80, df = 2, p < 0.21; Kendall's Tau-b = 0.08, p < 0.05. 
***X2 = 11.9, df=2,p< 0.01; Kendall's Tau-b = 0.11; p < 0.05. 
countable for coalitional activity in the subnational assembly. Also 
matching theoretical expectations is the pattern revealed by responses 
to the question on public opinion. While only 27.6% of the respondents 
representing localized electoral systems relegated provincial/regional/ 
Land public opinion to the "not at all influential" category, 41% of the 
respondents from more nationalized electoral systems did so. Finally, 
the motivation of securing votes via coalition choices also appears to 
7.9 
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Table 6.8 
Perception of Coalition Accountability, 
by Dominant Themes of Subnational Electoral Politics (%) 
Determining Forces of Subnational Electoral Politics 
Provincial/ National Administrative 
Level of Coalition Regional Issues Issues and Concerns; Not 
Accountability and Personalities Personalities Party Politics 
High 62.2 39.4 21.1 
Low 37.8 60.6 78.9 
N 275 198 19 
X2 = 21.85, d/ = 2,/?<0.000. 
Kendall's Tau-c = 0.21, p < 0.04. 
vary according to electoral localization. Similar percentages of respon­
dents labeled "gaining votes at future elections" as a very important 
motivation; however, substantially more respondents in nationalized 
electoral milieus (48.9%) indicated that vote getting was a marginal if 
nonexistent motivation for them, compared with 29.9% in localized 
environments. Together, these results suggest that, like volatility, lo­
calization creates pressures of which representatives do seem to be 
aware. In raising the risks and stakes of the coalition game, the onus 
of making "responsible" choices intervenes in the politician's and the 
party's pursuit of goals and rewards. 
An additional questionnaire item serves to corroborate these find­
ings as well as the validity of the aggregate measure of localization. 
Respondents were first asked to characterize the determining forces of 
elections in their respective province, region, or state. They were given 
the opportunity to answer that elections are decided "more by national 
themes, personalities, and parties," "more by [provincial/regional/Land] 
themes, personalities, and parties," or "more by administrative concerns 
and not party politics." As the results in table 6.8 demonstrate con­
vincingly, only among those indicating that "local" issues, personalities, 
and parties ultimately decide elections did a majority of respondents 
perceive any real accountability links in the coalition process. Here, 
again, is more evidence of differential constraints. 
One final method of establishing the relationship between locali­
zation and constraints on coalitional activity is presented in figure 6.4. 
Here objective measures of average electoral localization of provinces, 
regions, and Lander included in the survey population are plotted 
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against area response means for the question addressing the influence 
of public opinion in determining party strategy in coalition situations. 
The results clearly indicate a positive relationship between the con­
textual condition of electoral localization and respondent affirmation 
of a role for public opinion in the formulation of coalition strategy. 
These data, too, provide tangible evidence that localization can be an 
important intervening variable between preferences and choices. The 
findings make it possible to contend that localization, like volatility, can 
be a constraint on behavior. The weight of the evidence suggests that 
context does matter, and that it does so in systematic ways. 
The question remains, however, whether attitudes, perceptions, and 
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recognition of strategic risk and democratic responsibility, once in­
creased by unstable and localized electoral conditions, necessarily 
translate into recognizably different patterns of behavior. If they do, 
then there will be reason to believe that an electoral explanation of 
subnational coalition politics is appropriate and useful. If they do not, 
then a weak link in popular representation at the subnational level will 
be highlighted. If, further, the influence of elections on coalition pat­
terns is especially ambiguous, then there will be cause to explore sep­
arate organizational and motivational factors in search of a more 
suitable explanation. In any event, tests of individual-level attitudes 
cannot be used in isolation to generalize about coalition behavior. The 
survey data cannot by themselves discern whether representatives, in­
dividually and collectively, will actually act in accordance with their 
recognition of coalition accountability. It is therefore necessary to go 
beyond the individual level of analysis to examine the connections be­
tween electoral conditions and coalition outcomes. Aggregate-level data 
will allow some indication of whether higher levels of electoral volatility 
and/or localization are associated with certain types of coalition outcomes. 
Behavioral Companions to Micro-Level Rationality 
The most direct means of addressing the behavioral companions to 
the micro-level rationality thus far exposed is to examine actual out­
comes of government formation in subnational assemblies. An ample 
amount of such behavioral data can be put to use from a set of 176 
subnational governments formed in the aftermath of elections in Bel­
gium (N = 82), Germany (N = 50), and France (N = 44). Each out­
come was coded according to the type of coalition formed, along with 
the volatility and localization measures for each election. Each coalition 
was assigned a series of binary codes (0, 1), corresponding to its com­
position: minimum number of parties, ideological "connectedness," 
party with the most seats included, inclusion of one or more "winning" 
parties, whether the winning coalition represented a change from the 
previous arrangement, congruence with the national coalition, and 
whether the coalition was "cooperative" (i.e., whether it allied the two 
initially strongest parties). 
If volatility and localization do have an impact on coalition behavior, 
either separately or in conjunction, these variables should be associated 
in some clear and meaningful fashion with certain types of coalition 
outcomes. With increased volatility and localization, we might expect 
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to find, for example, that parties more often pursue and form power-
sharing coalitions that minimize ideological heterogeneity, thus re­
ducing the amount of postelection compromising that could damage 
a party's image with voters. Along these lines, heightened risk should 
reduce the likelihood of coalition experimentation. As competition in­
creases, moreover, parties should be more likely to seek governing co­
alitions that contain only the minimum number of partners necessary 
to "win." With the rewards and resources of government status in 
greater demand and their possession more uncertain, parties as ratio­
nal agents should be less likely to engage in any unnecessary acts of 
cooperation with their competitors. They may also have greater in­
centives to react to electoral change and instability with short-term ad­
versarial strategies, such as seizing power from the initially strongest 
party. Such strategy would, however, run the risk of retaliation and 
exclusion from coalitions at future iterations of the government for­
mation process. Vote-maximizing coalition behavior under conditions 
of high volatility and localization may also manifest itself in coalitions 
that include at least one "winner." Where, further, forming coalitions 
congruent with national alliance patterns would represent rejection of 
local electoral cues and local balances of power, incongruent coalitions 
should be more likely to form. All told, the hypothesized picture is one 
of parties pursuing goals through coalitions in unstable environments, 
full of strategic risk, by adopting adversarial strategies that minimize 
the electorally deleterious risks of compromise and domination by co­
alition partners. 
Conversely, where electoral environments are relatively stable and 
the driving forces behind partisan change are national rather than lo­
cal, we should expect to find a wider assortment of coalition outcomes. 
Here parties not only are free simply to duplicate previous arrange­
ments (i.e., strategic inertia) or to replicate the national balance of 
power but also are less constrained in attempts to form ideologically 
unconnected coalitions, to experiment with untried alliances, or to en­
gage in more long-term cooperative strategies, primarily those that 
link the two strongest parties in a kind of "grand coalition." 
A useful test of these basic propositions is to compare the frequency 
of certain outcomes according to varying levels and combinations of 
electoral volatility and electoral localization. Table 6.9 presents the re­
sults of this comparison, highlighting patterns of coalition outcomes 
in opposing electoral systems, namely, those in high volatility/local-
ized environments and those in stable/nationalized environments. The 
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percentages of provincial, regional, or Land government coalitions 
meeting each of the seven criteria are listed, along with correlation 
coefficients measuring strength and direction of association between 
each criterion and each outcome's electoral context (i.e., level of vol­
atility, level of localization, and a multiplicative measure of the inter­
active effects of the two variables combined). 
Results of this analysis provide some evidence that context matters. 
As electoral constraints increase, parties seem to pursue adversarial 
strategies (e.g., coalitions that minimize cooperation between the 
strongest rivals or that exclude the dominant party). Electoral con­
straints also appear to restrict the incentives for parties to engage in 
political inertia by maintaining the coalition status quo; this finding is 
important, for it indicates responsiveness to electoral cues. There is 
also useful evidence to the effect that congruence with national align­
ments, like coalition inertia, is more difficult to maintain under the 
pressures of electoral constraints. In addition, there is some behavioral 
support for the notion that context intervenes to influence the for­
mation of ideologically homogeneous governing partnerships. Con­
trary to the expected direction of this relationship, however, it appears 
that in these three countries, parties competing under electoral con­
straints are more likely to react with "unconnected" coalitions than are 
their counterparts in unconstrained environments. This may mean 
that parties prefer "strange bedfellows" over opposition status in vol­
atile electoral markets or that ideological cleavages and distances be­
tween parties as they are perceived in national politics do not apply 
directly in the provincial or regional context. Most likely, what these 
data suggest is that parties in contentious, risky electoral environ­
ments, faced with dilemmas of short-term survival rather than of long-
term partnership, behave more as office seekers than as ideological or 
policy purists. 
In terms of statistical robustness, these data are rather a mixed bag. 
By themselves they are not definitive. However, together with the survey 
evidence presented earlier, they are suggestive of the existence of linkages 
and intervening contextual mechanisms that work to constrain and in­
fluence the choices rational actors make in coalition situations. 
Application and Discussion 
Cross-national evidence presented in this chapter suggests the exis­
tence of relationships among electoral conditions, coalition outcomes, 
Table 6.9 
Coalition Outcomes, by Condition of Subnational Electoral Environment 
% Coalitions Exhibiting Characteristics 
Exclude Include Contain Excess Incongruent Include #1 
Strongest Only Excess Ideological with National Coalition and #2 
Party Losers Parties Distance Alignments Change Parties 
Belgium 
Volatile/localized 3 0 3 1 15 4  5 75 33 40 
Stable/nationalized 6 22 17 6 59 23 74 
Vol*Loc r 0.05 0,27*** - 0.12 0.11 0.23*** 0.27*** - 0.23** 
Volr 0.04 0.30*** - 0.10 0.13 0.23*** 0.32*** - 0.32*** 
Loc r 0.01 0.19** - 0.10 0.02 0.27** 0.26** - 0.19* 
Germany 
Volatile/localized 14 16 45 21 36 57 16 
Stable/nationalized 9 29 7 7 33 57 7 
Vol*Loc r 0.25* - 0.16 0.14 0.25* 0.07 - 0.04 0.05 
Volr 0.22* - 0.16 0.01 0.04 0.16 0.08 0.07 
Loc r 0.30** - 0.06 0.14 0.26* - 0.08 0.01 - 0.05 
France 
Volatile/localized 57 29 14 43 43 57 0 
Stable/nationalized 42 33 0 17 17 50 0 
Vol*Loc r 0.34* - 0.10 0.05 0.27* 0.02 0.03 — 
Volr 0.07 - 0.22 0.14 0.17* 0.10 0.22 — 
Loc r 0.41* 0.01 0.22 0.22* 0.10 0.14 — 
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***/> < 0.01. 
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and representatives' strategic assessments. To some degree, the rela­
tionships measured on the individual level are stronger than those 
measured at the aggregate, behavioral level. This is in some small part 
probably an inherent artifact of the survey measurement instrument 
itself. It is, however, also likely that in large part the perceptions, as­
sessments, and attitudes of individual officeholders are constrained by 
more than just electoral cues. The set of variables that most probably 
play an equally important intervening role are those regarding the or­
ganizational context of coalition building. These variables will be ad­
dressed in the following chapter. At present, it remains to venture a 
final assessment of the utility of explaining coalitional dynamics based 
upon electoral cues. Such an assessment ultimately rests on just how 
much of the story of actual coalition behavior we can tell on the basis 
of the apparent responsiveness of parties in subnational assemblies to 
variable electoral markets. Practical applications of the electoral model 
can be pursued by making paired comparisons of coalition behavior 
in provinces, regions, or states of contrasting electoral contexts. 
Coalition Outcomes in Contrasting Belgian Provinces 
Two provincial polar opposites in Belgium are Namur and West 
Flanders. From the beginning of the 1960s through the early 1990s, 
electoral competition in Namur has been intense compared to that in 
West Flanders. In Namur, the average change per election in party vote 
shares during this period is 4.5%, higher than the 2.9% average vol­
atility for West Flanders across the same 11 provincial elections. More­
over, differences in national-provincial mutations in party vote shares 
across elections are comparatively greater in Namur (3.2%) than in 
West Flanders (1.7%). Figure 6.5 demonstrates differences between the 
two provinces caused by the joint presence of volatility and localization. 
Have these different conditions in any way manifested themselves in 
different patterns of provincial government coalition formation? 
In Namur, 11 provincial elections have produced 11 provincial co­
alitions. During the 30-year period, there have been three different 
types of provincial majority and two coalition alternations. Christian 
Socials (PSC) and Liberals (PRL) shared power from 1961 to 1968, and 
in 1968 the PSC switched partners and allied with the Socialists (PS) 
until 1985. Subsequently, the PS and PRL constituted provincial gov­
ernments after the 1985, 1987, and 1991 elections. In West Flanders, 
11 provincial elections have produced eight coalition governments. 
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During the period, there has been but one coalition formula: Christian 
Democrats (CVP) and Socialists (SP). These two parties alone divided 
provincial power from 1968 to 1978, and one term of CVP single-party 
government (1978-81) gave way again to a center-left alliance during 
the period since 1981. 
Every West Flanders coalition has linked the first- and second-ranking 
parties in the council in a provincial version of the "grand" coalition 
model. Conversely, in Namur, coalitions have joined the strongest and 
the weakest parties (1961), the first- and third-strongest parties (1965, 
1968, 1985-91), the two strongest parties (1971-81), and two of three 
equally powerful parties (1968). Each West Flanders provincial coali­
tion has included the center party (CVP) and a party immediately ad­
jacent to it on an ordinal policy/ideology scale (SP). Alternatively, in 
Namur, the 1985, 1987, and 1991 majorities may be said to be ideo­
logically "unconnected" in that they pair Left (PS) with Right (PRL) 
but skip over the center (PSC). 
To a discernable degree, then, patterns of coalition behavior in Na­
mur and West Flanders do vary. Inertia is the strongest single expla­
nation for the consistency of the center-left arrangement in West 
Flanders, and the relative freedom from electoral pressures there has 
allowed Christian Democrats and Socialists to develop a long-term, co­
operative arrangement that serves their mutual power interests but de­
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nies Liberals, ecologists (Agalev), or nationalists (Volksunie, Vlaams 
Blok) any hope of gaining entry. As in West Flanders, in Namur, Chris­
tian Socials and Socialists have also been the two strongest parties in 
provincial parliaments after every election since 1961. Contrary to 
what has occurred in West Flanders, however, these two parties have 
agreed to share power on only 5 of 11 occasions. Instead of a long-
term cooperative strategy, coalitions have been built on the basis of 
more short-term competitive strategies. The differences in electoral 
environments between the two political arenas have to be considered 
important factors influencing the discrepancy in behavior. 
Coalition Outcomes in Contrasting German Lander 
Statistical analysis of coalition outcomes in the German Land par­
liaments supplied some limited support for assuming that certain 
types of state governments will form given the presence or absence 
of certain variable electoral conditions. That these findings are not 
stronger seems to support Cerny's (1990) characterization of the "rare 
occasions in the FRG that an election outcome remove[s] an incumbent 
government" (219-20). 
It remains instructive to compare coalition governments chosen by 
Land parliaments in states marked by substantially different levels of 
electoral stability and localism. One useful comparison may be made 
between Hamburg, a small state with a tradition of erratic and local­
ized voting, and Lower Saxony, the second-largest state and one with 
relatively stable and "nationalized" voting patterns. The electoral con­
ditions under which parties in the respective states compete are con­
spicuously different (figure 6.6), and coalition outcomes in the two 
Lander differ accordingly. 
Hamburg has experienced some of the greatest electoral "earth­
quakes" in postwar German state politics. Volatile voting patterns have 
been a familiar feature of elections in the city-state, especially since 
1974. In losing the absolute majority it had held since 1957, the SPD 
in March 1974 surrendered 14 seats and a full 10% of its 1970 par­
liamentary strength. Filling the gap, the CDU increased its vote share 
by a substantial 8% and gained 10 new seats in the Burgerschaft. Votes 
for the perennial "buffer" party, the FDP, increased by almost 4%, 
giving the Liberals four additional deputies. Although a CDU-FDP co­
alition would have secured a safe majority, the election's undisputed 
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loser—the SPD—managed to maneuver around the electorate's ver­
dict and secured a partnership with the FDP in the senate. 
Similarly, in 1982 the SPD once again relinquished 10% of its vote, 
with the CDU gaining 6% and with the Green Alternative List (GAL) 
bursting onto the scene with 8% of the vote and nine seats. Holding 
the plurality for the first time in Hamburg, the CDU nevertheless could 
bring itself neither to form a Grand Coalition with the Social Demo­
crats nor to contemplate any sort of alliance with the new Greens. The 
SPD, itself not prepared to venture into a full-fledged red-green ex­
periment, attempted to break the stalemate with a minority govern­
ment to be "tolerated" by the GAL—a government that ultimately 
lasted less than six months and that had been marked by more acri­
mony than tolerance (Kitschelt 1989b). Hamburg's voters, forced by 
the unwillingness and inability of the parties to establish any system 
for cooperation, were summoned back to the polls and asked to aban­
don their original verdict. 
Rendering the SPD a safe majority in December 1982, Hamburg's 
mercurial voters nevertheless once again turned against the Social 
Democrats in dramatic fashion at the November 1986 election. This 
election handed the plurality back to the CDU and increased the GAL's 
strength to an unprecedented 10.4%. Maintaining their uncompro­
mising strategies, the parties yet again failed to construct a viable 
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majority government. Another short-lived SPD minority government 
fell, and new elections in May 1987 passed judgment on five years of 
chaos by returning the FDP to the Blirgershaft and to government for 
the first time since the 1974-78 legislature. That the SPD chose the 
Liberals as partners rather than the GAL, which held the same number 
of seats, is indicative of an adversarial strategy vis-a-vis both the GAL 
and the CDU (by breaking the "Bonn model").7 
The tradition of adversarial strategies in Hamburg can be seen 
as a function of electoral conditions,8 especially when the pattern of 
coalition behavior in this small, volatile arena is compared with that 
in a much larger, more stable, and relatively more "nationalized" 
arena. In Lower Saxony, for example, state elections are more often 
than not fought and won on national issues rather than the local con­
cerns of a smaller state such as Hamburg (Braunthal 1983; Culver 
1966; Kloss 1990; Pridham 1973). Moreover, in Lower Saxony the 
electoral peaks and valleys of competing parties are noticeably less 
pronounced. 
While the SPD in Hamburg weathered on average a ± 7% change 
in support at every Land election since 1961, the Social Democrats in 
Lower Saxony experienced fluctuations of only ±3% . Similarly, the 
CDU and FDP in Hamburg have oscillated with ±4% and ±2.5% 
swings, respectively, while in Lower Saxony these figures are reduced 
to ±3  % and ±1.5%. At the same time, interelection vote shifts in 
Lower Saxony have proven more likely to follow patterns for the parties 
at Bundestag elections. For example, the average difference in changes 
in support for the SPD at Lower Saxony Land elections and changes 
in support for the SPD at national elections is only 0.76%, while in 
Hamburg the gap is substantially greater at 4.1%. In comparison to 
Hamburg, then, Lower Saxony is a low-volatility, nationalized electoral 
market. 
Examination of coalition outcomes in Lower Saxony accordingly re­
veals cases of "cooperative" coalition building to an extent unmatched 
in Hamburg. Whereas grand coalition in Hamburg never proved to 
be a feasible option (even when the alternative was minority govern­
ment), in Lower Saxony the CDU-SPD formula came to fruition in 
1965 even before its introduction at the federal level. Similarly, Greens 
and Social Democrats in Lower Saxony succeeded in concluding a gov­
erning alliance in 1990, a feat their more contentious colleagues in 
Hamburg could not pull off three years earlier. If electoral success 
really "reinforces noncooperative strategies" (Kitschelt 1989b, 255), 
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then the modest volatility in Lower Saxony has to be seen as one factor 
facilitating cooperation where none occurred in the more explosive 
Hamburg electoral system. 
Coalition Outcomes in Contrasting French Regions 
Understanding the electoral context in which coalition players develop 
strategy in the French regions can likewise shed some light on the forces 
that condition government formation and alliance politics in that coun­
try. One substantively interesting set of decisions that may be explained 
in part by recognizing the electoral environments in which coalition bar­
gaining took place concerns the PCF-PS "union de la gauche." Choices 
between adversarial and cooperative strategies were not uniform across 
the regions after the elections in either 1986 or 1992. In this regard, 
it is useful to compare the fate of the Communist-Socialist axis in 
Limousin, Nord-Pas de Calais, and Provence-Alpes-Cote d'Azur. 
In both 1986 and 1992, the Communist Party's delegation to the 
Limousin regional council chose to support the Socialist Party and its 
candidate for regional premier, Robert Savy. True to the once-strong 
tradition of "desistement republicain," the PCF in 1986 withdrew from 
the presidential contest after the first round of voting and combined 
its eight-strong group with the 15 PS councilors, securing a three-seat 
majority for the Left at the second round. Similarly, in 1992, with the 
PCF-PS union in disarray throughout the country and the central com­
mittee of the Communist Party instructing its regional representatives 
not to cooperate with the Socialists, the Communists nonetheless re­
newed their support for Savy and so allowed the PS to retain one of 
its last regional bastions.9 
Cooperation on the Left in Limousin contrasted sharply with the 
confrontational strategies adopted elsewhere, such as in Nord-Pas de 
Calais and in Provence-Alpes—Cote d'Azur. Having contributed to the 
creation of a regional government headed by the PS in 1986, the PCF 
in 1992 stunned and embarrassed the Socialists in Nord-Pas de Calais 
by refusing to support a majority ruled by the national government 
minister Michel Delebarre. This decision facilitated a virtual seizure 
of power by the Verts, a party of just 8 persons in a council of 113. 
In Provence-Alpes—Cote d'Azur, a coalition of Left parties (Socialists 
and Communists) and ecologists—a veritable "majorite de progres"— 
would have forced the Right in 1992 to either ally with the FN or lose 
its grip on power in the important southern region. In the event, no 
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such majority emerged. Instead, the Communist group led by Guy 
Hermier rejected the overtures of another minister in the Socialist gov­
ernment, Bernard Tapie, and so handed regional power back to the 
Right and to its candidate for regional president, Jean-Claude Gaudin 
(UDF-PR). 
One means of explaining the variation in PCF-PS strategies between 
Limousin, on the one hand, and Nord-Pas de Calais and Provence-
Alpes—Cote d'Azur, on the other, is offered by the electoral conditions 
under which the respective party groups found themselves. In all three 
regions, the PCF and PS had each held especially strong positions in 
1986. In 1992, however, the parties' fortunes altered dramatically (fig­
ure 6.7). In Limousin, the Communists lost 9.5% of their 1986 vote, 
the largest setback for the party in any region. The Limousin Socialists, 
although squandering 5% of their previous electoral support, never­
theless weathered the smallest net 1986-92 change for the PS in all the 
regions. Indeed, excluding the fortunes of the PCF, Limousin's voters 
altered their 1986 preferences very little in 1992. If electoral failure 
reinforces a party's propensity to pursue survivalist strategies—that is, 
cooperation—then the PCF's stinging defeat in Limousin probably 
proved to be a key influence in the party's decision to maintain its 
union with the PS. 
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The PCF's losses in Nord-Pas de Calais (NPdC) and Provence-
Alpes-Cote d'Azur (PACA) were the reverse of Limousin: the Com­
munists gave up just 2.8% of their preexisting support in NPdC and 
only 2.5% in PACA. At the same time voters in NPdC denied the PS 
9.3% of its 1986 total, and in PACA the Socialist Party's 1986 total 
(25%) was almost entirely wiped out and replaced in 1992 by Tapie's 
Energie Sud list at 21%. The fortunes of the parties in the regions were 
reversed, and so too were the strategies of the Communists. The PCF's 
bargaining power had clearly been stronger in NPdC and PACA than 
in Limousin. Thus, it proved easier for Alain Bocquet's Communists 
in NPdC and Guy Hermier's group in PACA to play the role of an 
"opposition de gauche" and to keep their distance from a Socialist 
Party whose popularity had just absorbed crushing blows in the two 
respective regions. According to Hermier, "The Communists are not 
for sale," and Bocquet proclaimed, "We will not participate in the 
shady deals. We reject coalitions of circumstance for majorities of cir-
cumstance."10 In Limousin, however, it was Raymond Labrousse's PCF 
and not Savy's PS that suffered the staggering setback. There the risks 
of noncooperation proved greater, and given his party's position as the 
loser among otherwise stable parties, Labrousse resigned himself and 
his party to the position that in Limousin a continuation of the Union 
of the Left and a Left majority in the regional assembly was justifiable 
to "compensate for the possible negative effects of national politics."11 
There are, then, some useful insights into actual coalition outcomes 
gained through understanding the constraints placed on decision 
makers by electoral conditions. The German and French cases also 
raise the important caveat that the relative electoral success or failure 
of individual parties—not just the objective, aggregate condition of 
electoral volatility—can explain why subnational branches of the same 
political party choose different coalition strategies in different prov­
inces, regions, or states. This caveat prompts the final hypothesis of 
the chapter. 
Hypothesis: Electoral Success Reinforces 
Noncooperative Strategies, while Electoral 
Failure Reinforces Cooperative Strategies 
Documented strategies of Social Democrats and Greens in Ham­
burg and Lower Saxony, or Communists and Socialists in Limousin 
and Nord-Pas de Calais, provide ready and clear empirical support for 
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this hypothesis. A more limited test of these propositions using the 
available survey data is presented in table 6.10. The questionnaire 
asked all respondents to indicate frequency of personal participation 
in a variety of cooperative coalition-building acts with members of 
other political parties, including various acts of government formation, 
passage of budgets, and passage of legislation. Responses to these 
questions were added, and the cumulative pattern was coded as either 
"cooperative" or "noncooperative." All respondents were coded as 
either "winners" or "losers," according to whether their party had 
either won or lost percentage shares of the vote at the most recent elec­
tion. If electoral success really "reinforces noncooperative strategies" 
(Kitschelt 1989b, 255), then it was expected that "winners" would re­
port less cooperation than "losers," who must salvage their influence 
on the political process via coalition tactics. 
The Belgian respondents fit the expected relationship convincingly, 
both in strength and in direction. If winning strengthens bargaining 
positions and thus reduces incentives to cooperate, then logical sense 
can be made of these data. Two-thirds (64.2%) of the Belgian coun­
cilors belonging to electorally successful parties reported noncooper­
ative approaches to postelection government formation and postfor­
mation legislative activity. This compares with the much smaller 26.7% 
of electoral winners who reported similar adversarial behavior. This 
pattern, clear and statistically powerful in the Belgian case, does, how­
ever, wash out in the German and French cases. The French data are 
informative, nonetheless, as majorities of both winners and losers re­
port noncooperative approaches to regional politics. Given that French 
regional volatility is on the whole more intense than in Belgium and 
Germany, this finding matches expectations that competition will pro­
duce adversarial strategies. That Belgium appears to stand apart on 
this measure also complements earlier findings that linked electoral 
cues with coalition behavior to a greater extent in Belgium than in 
Germany or France. This might lead us to believe that in subsequent 
analysis intervening organizational factors play a greater role in the 
latter two countries than in Belgium. 
Summary 
Returning to the question with which this chapter began—"Do elec­
toral verdicts matter?"—it is possible to venture a qualified "yes." Vol­
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Table 6.10 
Reported Cooperation with Other Parties, 
by Change in Party Bargaining Strength (%) 
Membership in Winning or Losing Parties 
Cooperation Winners Losers 
Belgium* 
Noncooperative 
strategies and behavior 64.2 26.8 
Cooperative 
strategies and behavior 35.8 73.2 
N 67 71 
Germany* 
Noncooperative 
strategies and behavior 46.5 48 
Cooperative 
strategies and behavior 53.5 52 
N 86 50 
France* 
Noncooperative 
strategies and behavior 56.8 60.7 
Cooperative 
strategies and behavior 43.2 29.3 
N 95 84 
*X2 = 12.83, df= \yp< 0.000; Kendall's Tau-b = 0.36,/? < 0.093. 
**X2 = 1.26, df = 1, p < 0.265; Kendall's Tau-b = 0.05, p < 0.078. 
***X2 = 0.98, df = 1, p < 0.389; Kendall's Tau-b = 0.05, p < 0.095. 
atility and localization both increase the tendency of politicians to view 
coalition decisions as acts that may influence their chances for election 
and reelection. For voters, this finding can bolster faith that even in 
coalition systems, imposing change at the ballot box can heighten the 
accountability politicians feel for their party's coalition decisions and 
thus can influence the allocation of subnational power. Holding poli­
ticians accountable for their coalition decisions is a key aspect of de­
mocracy in/multiparty systems. Whether politicians act on their dem­
ocratic responsibilities is a different matter, however. 
The immediate implications of these findings should be apparent. 
Coalition behavior is not so simple that it can be reduced to expecta­
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tions of unconstrained decision making. Electoral environment appears 
to influence behavior. The modest strength and patchy consistency of 
the findings for the behavioral companions to individual-level percep­
tions nevertheless hints that forces outside the immediate electoral 
context may also play an influential role. It could be argued, for in­
stance, that political inertia is a powerful influence in some provinces, 
regions, or states, leading parties to simply continue remaking old al­
liances as a means of mutual self-preservation. A more instructive ex­
planation, however, may lie in the organizational or internal party 
dimension of coalition behavior. Recognizing that coalition govern­
ments at subnational levels are not completely detached from those in 
national government means recognizing that party strategies in both 
arenas may also be linked. Accordingly, chapter 7 examines the ques­
tion of organizational constraints. 
Chapter Seven 
Loyalists and Radicals: Coalitions 
and Intraparty Politics 
In matters of major importance for the party, we must usually 
do as we are told by Bonn. A party leader can expect that his 
instructions will be followed at all levels of political power. 
—Free Democrat Landtag Deputy, 
Rhineland-Palatinate 
The Rheinland-Pfalz statement refers to the practice which is 
naturally followed, and that is to consult. I do think that after 
analyzing a situation there is hardly ever a conflict between 
the national leadership and the Lander leadership over what 
kind of government, what kind of coalition, should be formed. 
—Officer, 
FDP Federal Headquarters 
kO parties in subnational parliaments choose solutions to ques­
tions of coalition participation according to local preferences or 
according to the wishes of their national party leaders? If by them­
selves electoral conditions can explain only some of the variation in 
strategic attitudes and coalition behavior, how compelling is an al­
ternative explanation based on internal party conditions? One variant 
of the democratic ideal maintains that the act of majority formation 
in the territorial parliaments of liberal democracies should be decided 
by those persons and those groups elected by, and responsible to, 
the citizenry. When, however, the decisions allocating provincial or 
regional power are made outside the immediate bargaining arena— 
that is, at the center—then the democratic ideal presumably lan­
guishes. In such cases, subnational party groups take on the guise 
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of passive trustees of national party policy rather than that of re­
sponsible delegates serving their constituents. 
Of the linkages between territorial deputies and their parent party 
organizations, Duverger (1954) writes: "The problem of their recip­
rocal relations is of great importance: democracy requires that parlia­
mentary representatives should take precedence over party leaders 
and the members of the electorate over the members of the party. . . . 
In practice the opposite often takes place: in many parties there can 
be seen a tendency of party leaders to give orders to the parliamentary 
representatives. . . . The domination of the party over its elected rep­
resentatives constitutes a form of oligarchy" (182). The particular con­
cern of this chapter is the extent to which organizational oligarchy 
conditions and constrains parties' choices at the occasion of their first 
important postelection decision: government formation. 
Investigating coalition behavior in subnational legislatures requires 
that we peer into the "black box" of vertical intraparty decision-making 
processes. To not do so would be to accept on faith the premise that 
parties are unconstrained unitary actors as regards coalitions and to 
risk overlooking significant variation in attitudes and strategic behav­
ior. Focusing on the relationship between intraparty decision making 
and coalition choices at the subnational level thus raises a variety of 
pertinent questions that can be studied in a systematic and compara­
tive way: At what organizational level of the party are decisions of 
coalition strategy formulated? What is the nature of national party 
involvement and influence in subnational coalition bargaining? Can 
national leaders assume the deference and adherence of party groups 
in subnational assemblies with regard to coalition strategy, or can the 
process of coalition building in subnational institutions be a source of 
internal party conflict? Finally, does the competitiveness of the sub-
national electoral environment influence the degree to which organi­
zational constraints condition coalition bargaining? Recounting some 
finer details of one specific case of government formation, such as that 
presented below, illustrates how important questions about vertical 
party relations are for the politics of coalition. 
Case Testing Coalition Loyalty and Party Discipline: 
Belgium's "Pacte de Huit Ans" 
On the last day of January 1986, Gerard Deprez, president of Bel-
gium's Parti Social-Chretien (PSC), and Louis Michel, president of the 
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Parti Reformateur Liberal (PRL), signed an eight-year accord linking 
their two parties in coalition at all levels of power where the two to­
gether could make up a majority and where there were no other pre­
existing agreements to the contrary. The contract translated into a 
pledge that the two parties would stand together, either in power or in 
opposition, in the French Community Council, the Walloon Regional 
Council, and the provincial councils of Brabant, Hainaut, Liege, Lux­
embourg, and Namur. This arrangement, announced amidst great pomp 
and dubbed the "pacte d'amour" by Belgium's media,1 corresponded 
directly with the national government of the day, a center-Right (CVP/ 
PSC-PVV/PRL) cabinet under CVP Prime Minister Wilfred Martens. 
In establishing coalition uniformity across all levels of government, 
Deprez and Michel hoped to solidify their hold on power and by doing 
so to relegate Wallonia's Socialists to a position of unprecedented po­
litical weakness. 
General elections in December 1987 would provide the first test of 
this explicit attempt at linking national and subnational coalitions. The 
Christian parties suffered the biggest electoral setback, together losing 
seven seats in the national parliament. Their Liberal coalition part­
ners, on the other hand, succeeded in maintaining all 48 of their seats 
in the Chamber of Representatives. Together, the existing parties of 
government could still command an eight-seat parliamentary majority 
if the Deprez-Michel accord were honored and the then six-year-old 
coalition reconstituted. The PSC and PRL could also faithfully imple­
ment their pact in the French Community Council and the Walloon 
Regional Council, although in the latter the two parties could not by 
themselves form a majority but could do so with help from smaller 
parties such as Ecolo and the Francophone Democratic Front. 
Extending the pact to certain of the provinces would be possible as 
well. Election results immediately indicated that this would be espe­
cially easy in Luxembourg province, where the PSC and PRL together 
held 35 of the 50 council seats, and where the Deprez-Michel pact 
could finally put an end to the PSC's decade-long absence from power.2 
In Brabant, the Christian and Liberal parties enjoyed a one-seat ma­
jority, although the bilingual status of the province would encourage 
a continuation of traditional Socialist/Christian/Liberal tripartism. In 
"red" Hainaut, however, voters ensured yet another absolute majority 
for the Socialists. In Liege, the election results also made a coalition 
without the Socialists mathematically impossible. In Namur, where the 
PSC and PRL could feasibly constitute a one-seat majority, a well-
publicized PS-PRL accord dating from 1985 precluded extension of 
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the multilevel PSC-PRL pact to the province. The first real test of the 
global PSC-PRL accord, then, would be in Luxembourg province. 
Only a day after the election, news breaking out of the provincial 
capital of Arlon stunned and embarrassed PSC and PRL leaders in 
Brussels. The Luxembourg PRL, meeting late into the night, had de­
cided to reject the eight-year pact orchestrated by its own party president and 
instead to construct a power-sharing alliance with the Parti Socialiste 
(PS). Scrambling to remedy and reverse the situation, national PRL 
leaders, including party chief Michel and Vice Prime Minister Jean 
Gol, immediately issued a demarche to their colleagues in Luxem­
bourg insisting that they renege on their agreement with the Socialists. 
In refusing, the Luxembourg Liberals explained that they were obli­
gated by a secret accord, dated 14 October 1985, to maintain the 
PS-PRL provincial coalition and that this accord predated the 1986 
PRL-PSC "pacte de huit ans." The PS-PRL coalition, the defiant Lux­
embourg Liberals decided, would stand.3 
Despite Louis Michel's protestations that the Luxembourg accord 
had been secret even to him, the ramifications of the provincial deci­
sion were not lost on PSC chief Deprez. Deprez judged that the accord 
between PRL and PS in Luxembourg was an intentional rupture of the 
PSC-PRL pact signed in 1986: "The PRL negotiators affirmed at the 
time that the pact would be applied to the province of Luxembourg. 
I state that the Luxembourg PRL have dishonored the signature of the 
national leaders of the PRL and have put an end unilaterally to the 
PSC-PRL pact."4 The alliance that was to last for eight years did not 
last for two. Subsequent to the events in Luxembourg province, the 
PSC abandoned the PRL and joined forces with the PS to share ex­
ecutive power in both the French Community Council and the Walloon 
Regional Council. Ultimately, indeed six months after the general elec­
tions, the Christian parties succeeded in engineering a major coalition 
reversal in national government by wooing the Socialists and Flemish 
Volksunie into a cabinet headed yet again by Wilfred Martens. The 
Liberals in Wallonia were thus rudely and completely banished from 
all but provincial power. Provincial infidelity bore high costs. 
The PSC-PRL pact of 1986 had been an overt attempt by national 
party leaders to impose the same coalition formula at all levels of gov­
ernment. For PSC president Deprez, one of the principals, the effort 
was in retrospect ill conceived: "The eight-year pact was stupidity. It 
was an idea of Jean Gol and Louis Michel. At the time my first preoc­
cupation was to make a coalition without the Socialists at the regional 
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level. I wanted to demonstrate that it was possible to rule Wallonia 
without the Socialists. Jean Gol, however, was afraid that if we excluded 
the Socialists they would later seek revenge and retaliation against one 
or another party. Gol said he would accept a coalition without the So­
cialists at the regional level, but that he would have to ask for a pact 
for eight years. In my party the provincial lobby made sure the agree­
ment was extended to the provincial level."5 
For Deprez and the PSC, a strategy of global coalition with the Lib­
erals would therefore have served to show that the PS did not have a 
monopoly on power in Wallonia. For the PRL, this demonstration may 
not have been as important as the apparent security given by the pact 
to a weary center-Right national coalition. Nevertheless, by agreeing 
to an eight-year deal, both parties assumed loyalty and compliance on 
each other's part and on the part of their own constituent party groups 
in the respective subnational assemblies. Deprez states: "I know that 
Jean Gol and Louis Michel and the staff of the PRL were not informed 
of the agreement in Luxembourg. I know that they were totally sur­
prised when they received evidence of the PS-PRL coalition. But given 
that the PRL could not then satisfy what was in the pact, I decided the 
pact was broken. This single act gave me the free hand to enter ne­
gotiations for the composition of the national government and to begin 
speaking of ending an increasingly unpopular coalition. It was a con­
venient political crisis." 
Here, then, is a useful example of the coalition choices of subna­
tional party groups confounding the overt desires of national party 
leaders. These choices, made by provincial assembly members under 
pressure from national party figures at the highest level, ultimately 
proved responsible for the subsequent termination of the center-Right 
national coalition and the dramatic leftward Wende of 1987, even if only 
as a pretext for the PSC's ending of an increasingly untenable coalition. 
The Luxembourg case is also suggestive of several important pat­
terns in national-subnational coalition behavior. It first suggests that 
national political party leaders do on occasion attempt to concoct 
multilevel coalition strategies, imposing the same coalition partnership 
on constituent party groups across levels of government. The case also 
illustrates that even in matters of such extreme strategic importance, 
party leaders cannot count on the compliance and loyalty of subna­
tional groups. Finally, the aftermath of the Luxembourg rupture of 
the PSC-PRL pact demonstrates that spoiled relations between parties 
in subnational assemblies can spill over into the relations between the 
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same parties at superior levels. These are pieces of the coalition puzzle 
that are lost when analysis focuses narrowly on the comings and goings 
offormateurs and national party presidents. 
Analyzing Organizational Constraints 
The internal battle that took place in Belgium's Luxembourg province 
prompts us to look more systematically and more comparatively at co­
alitions and intraparty politics. Of interest are a range of factors po­
tentially responsible for variation in the reciprocal relations between 
territorial deputies and their national party leaders. These factors may 
be grouped into three categories: party properties, actor properties, 
and contextual properties. Party properties are those attributes most 
often considered to be determinative in matters of internal decision 
making and conflict resolution. Chief among these properties are party 
rules and statutes, centralization, and modes of vertical communica­
tion. Actor properties are individual-level characteristics or attitudinal pre­
dispositions, the balance of which should influence collective choices 
within party groups and determine organizational deference and dis­
sent. This set of factors includes organizational discontent, levels of 
participation, and career ambitions. A third and final set of variables, 
contextual properties, links the electoral conditions discussed in chapters 
3 and 6 with the organizational pressures under review here. 
To analyze organizational constraints, our first goal is to identify 
the basic parameters of cross-national and cross-party variation. This 
is accomplished through presentation of survey responses that mea­
sure four key indicators: national-subnational coalition congruence, 
national-subnational motivational disparities, locus of decision mak­
ing, and influence of national party leadership. The evidence will re­
veal variation across the three countries, across the parties within each 
country, and within individual parties. Such variation justifies treating 
the four concerns as dependent phenomena deserving of explanation. 
Seeking out empirical relations and meaningful explanations, the 
chapter proceeds by testing the relative importance of party and actor 
properties as independent variables. The analysis also raises the pos­
sibility that coalition situations in different electoral markets render 
different probabilities for organizational conflict. 
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Behavioral and Attitudinal Indicators of Organizational Linkages 
NATIONAL-SUBNATIONAL COALITION CONGRUENCE. It migh  t logi­
cally be assumed that alliance behavior in the periphery is a direct re­
flection of party relations at the center. Were this true, we should ex­
pect to find parties forming provincial and regional-level governments 
that match national government-versus-opposition alignments. This 
would reveal either the periphery's endorsement of decisions made at 
the center or the center's ability to gain adherence to its strategies 
among the various party organs in the periphery. As demonstrated in 
previous chapters, however, the practice of matching subnational and 
national coalitions where possible is by no means universal. Parties 
elected to territorial assemblies in Belgium, Germany, and France have 
chosen power-sharing partnerships that deviate from existing national 
arrangements even where duplication was a winning option. 
How strong an incentive, then, is "matching"? Provincial and re­
gional deputies in each country were asked to characterize the impor­
tance of forming subnational governments that duplicate alliances 
existing among the national parliamentary parties: 
"In forming a new [provincial/regional/Land] government, how im­
portant is it for your party to duplicate—i.e., have the same part­
ner^) as—your national party's alliance strategy wherever possible?" 
Several key points arise immediately from the responses (Figure 7.1). 
First, there is clear variation across parties. Two distinct groupings 
exist, one in which party members generally believe that matching is 
of little or no importance and one in which the balance of party 
members clearly responds that duplication is indeed an important or 
a very important strategic consideration. Representatives of the Ger­
man FDP, a quintessential "party of government," profess a far greater 
flexibility than the French Left Radicals (MRG), whose lot is intimately 
tied to a national alliance with the Socialist Party (PSF). This finding 
corroborates the comments of one FDP official who admitted that "co­
alition decisions, both before and after elections, are for us not really 
a matter of preferences, but of electoral strategy."6 Second, as a 
country-level generalization, the data suggest that French parties see 
greater value in global alliance strategies than do their German and 
Belgian counterparts. This finding may be explained in part as a man­
ifestation of the institutional osmosis afforded French politicians by the 
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Figure 7.1 Importance of Duplicating National Coalition, by Party 
cumul des mandate practice. Third, excepting the French MRG, there 
are conflicting opinions within in each party concerning the impor­
tance of coalition gleichshaltung or egalite. From these data, it would be 
difficult, therefore, to accept the generalization that forming exact 
replicas of national party partnerships is the governing principle of 
coalition formation in the periphery. 
LOCUS OF COALITION DECISION. Where do parties determine co­
alition strategy for provincial and regional government, at the sub-
national level or at the level of the national party leadership? This is 
an important question and one whose answer should provide initial 
clues as to the variability between national control and local autonomy 
in matters of strategic choice. If the notion of unified, oligarchic par­
ties holds, we should expect strong national-level determination of sub-
national coalition strategies across countries and across parties. If, 
however, the reverse is true and parties in territorial assemblies con­
sistently determine their own coalition strategies, then this should 
suggest either weaker national-level control or greater decentralized 
decision making, and perhaps less rather than more deferential be­
havior. 
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All respondents were asked to identify the locus of decision making: 
"Are the coalition strategies of your [provincial/regional/Land] party, 
particularly its tactics during and after elections, determined more 
by [provincial/regional/Land] party members or more by national 
party leaders?" 
German Landtag deputies provide the clearest response, with an over­
whelming 94% naming Land-level party figures as the key decision 
makers in their coalition politics (Figure 7.2). Alternatively, 56% of the 
provincial councilors in Belgium responded that national-level party 
leaders determine coalition tactics during and after elections to pro­
vincial assemblies. This finding is especially pronounced for the PRL, 
a "presidentocracy" according to one party veteran and three-term as­
semblyman in Hainaut province: "The real decisions are made by only 
a few people at the national level. These decisions do not always faith­
fully reflect the wishes and desires of provincial party members. Eighty 
percent of the power is in the hands of the president, and the rest is 
in the hands of the petite bureau. There is some party democracy, but 
it is democracy 'descendant.'"7 Responses from francophone deputies 
to the Brussels Regional Council (not included in Figure 7.2) were like­
wise split, with slightly more than half (53.3%) reporting decisions 
being made by national party officials. And well over half (60.0%) of 
French respondents indicated that regional level elus and party lead-
ers—not the party bureaus in Paris—ultimately determine regional 
alliance behavior. 
Country specialists should find the German results predictable; yet 
questions about Belgium and France emerge. Why have there been so 
many "deviant" provincial coalitions in Belgium if national party lead­
ers are themselves calling the shots? Here may be a clue that the as­
sumption that national party leaders always oppose the formation of 
incongruent coalitions is itself suspect. What, moreover, should we 
make of the strategic autonomy boasted by many of the respondents 
in France, a country where national strategies have traditionally de­
termined local tactics? Do national leaders allow party factions in their 
regional strongholds this indulgence to keep them within the party 
fold and to avoid internal party disputes? 
NATIONAL PARTY INTERVENTION. Measuring the ultimate locus 
of decision making is not, of course, the same as measuring influence 
or pressure. Are we to conclude from the German data, for instance, 
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Figure 7.2 Locus of Party Coalition Decision 
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that coalition strategies in the Lander are strictly the domain of in­
dependent, unitary state parties making decisions without pressure 
from Bonn? Having identified the actual locus of coalition decisions, 
it is equally important to measure the extent of national party influence 
and intervention in subnational coalition bargaining. To measure na­
tional party influence in the coalition process, the questionnaire asked: 
"How would you characterize the influence of your party's national 
leadership in the government formation process in the [conseil pro-
vincial/conseil regional/Landtag] and in your party group's decisions 
to form a coalition with another party or parties?" 
The majority of respondents in all three countries answered that their 
national party leadership holds "strong influence" over the party's co­
alition decisions in subnational assemblies (Figure 7.3). Thus, while 
German Landtag deputies indicated a clear belief that they ultimately 
determine their own fate, they nevertheless acknowledged here a sub­
stantial degree of involvement and influence coming from Bonn. This 
provides new empirical support for Culver's (1966) early assessment 
that "once negotiations on the formation of Land governments get un­
der way, considerable pressure is exerted on the local parties by their 
national counterparts to influence the party composition of the min­
istries" (306). Responses from the Greens should be highlighted, as 
they represent an interesting exception to the overall German pattern. 
Similarly in France, where regional councilors claimed a considerable 
degree of credit for crafting their own coalition strategies, there is wide 
recognition here of strong national party influence in the power game. 
As in Germany, the pattern in France is broken by an ecologist party, 
the Verts, the majority of whose respondents perceive weak or no in­
fluence from national leaders in their regional coalition decisions. In­
deed, one of the Verts' regional council vice presidents in Nord-Pas de 
Calais illustrated the lack of involvement by Antoine Waechter, the 
party's de facto leader, by saying, "He did not learn of our coalition 
victory until one day after the fact, when he heard about it on the 
radio!"8 
The Belgian data largely mirror the findings of the earlier "locus 
of decision" questionnaire item, indicating a significant degree of 
national influence but also the greatest within-party variance regard­
ing the strength of such influence. They also complement responses 
to another survey question that asked representatives the extent to 
which their party organization at the national level had advised the 
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Figure 7.3 Influence of National Party 
Leadership in Provincial and Regional 
Coalition Bargaining 
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subnational party, when composing its most recent election manifesto, 
"to follow the intentions and policies of the national party." Of the Bel­
gian councilors answering this question, 82% indicated some degree 
of national involvement in the election manifesto; of the German 
Landtag deputies, 65%; and of the French regional councilors, 62%. 
Together, these data further enhance the picture of regional and pro­
vincial coalition building as a process involving not only interparty ex­
changes but also intraparty exchanges. 
MOTIVATIONAL DISPARITY. Do disparities exist between subna­
tional parliamentarians and their national party leadership regarding 
the motivations for government participation? If the chief concerns 
and preference orderings of party members are the same across sub-
national and national levels, organizational constraints on coalition de­
cision making are likely to be averted. However, if the objectives of 
party groups at different levels vary, then the probability of intraparty 
conflict over strategy increases. Survey questions allow a partial test for 
mixed motives in the coalition process. 
As the respondent pool is made up largely of persons holding office 
exclusively at the subnational level, measuring national motivations per 
se is not possible with this survey instrument. Instead, the object here 
is to gauge motivations at the subnational level and to determine if 
representatives at this level themselves believe that they are pursuing 
government office for the same reasons as or for different reasons than 
their colleagues in national parliament. Here "perception" is an im­
portant intermediate variable between objective facts and the reactions 
of political actors. Regardless of actual intentions, if a regional deputy 
or provincial councilor perceives that his or her national party's moti­
vations for seeking office and for formulating coalition strategy are 
fundamentally different from those that motivate the regional party 
group, then the councilor is more likely to find unattractive any pres­
sure to adopt central party policy in the subnational setting. 
Assembly members in all three countries were asked: 
"From the list below, please rank the importance given by your [pro-
vincial/regional/Land] party group to the following considerations 
when forming a governing coalition with another party or parties: 
a. The need to be part of the majority in the council 
b. Maintaining party and ideological identity 
c. Agreement on a specific policy issue 
d. The electoral advantages of an alliance 
e. Following instructions from national party leaders" 
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This question was followed immediately by a similar item that asked 
respondents to characterize the motives of the national parliamentary 
party and its extraparliamentary leadership in strategic coalition sit­
uations: 
"To your knowledge, how important are the following consider­
ations for your national party when it forms a coalition with one or 
more parties in the [Chambre des Representants/Assembl6e Natio-
nale/Bundestag] ? 
a. The need to be part of the parliamentary majority 
b. Maintaining party and ideological identity 
c. Agreement on a specific policy issue 
d. The electoral advantages of an alliance 
e. Instructions from [provincial/regional/Land] party leaders" 
Table 7.1 provides the results, broken down by party from among 
those parties that have actually participated at one time or another in 
governing coalitions at both the national and subnational levels. The 
percentage of respondents reporting identical preference orderings 
for both subnational and national levels is presented, as are the most 
important and least important criteria (scaled according to the mean 
response for each item). 
Only in the German CDU, just one of the 12 parties included in the 
table, did respondents signify clear agreement that their party's stra­
tegic behavior at the subnational level is motivated by precisely the 
same preference ordering (for all five criteria) as that which compels 
behavior at the national level. In nine parties (Belgian PS, PSC, PRL, 
FDF; German CDU, SPD; French PC, PS, UDF), respondents identi­
fied cross-party agreement on specific policy issues as their party's pri­
mary consideration in forming provincial or regional governments. In 
two of these nine (French PS and UDF), respondents answered that 
the party's national elite are more concerned with vote seeking than 
with the policy affinities of potential partners in government, and re­
spondents from the Belgian PSC indicated that their national parlia­
mentary party is more concerned with its place in the majority (i.e., its 
"governing vocation") than with the policy or ideological compatibility 
of its prospective partners. 
In one case (German FDP), respondents identified the need to be 
part of the governing majority as their party's overriding concern at 
both regional and national levels. Responses also indicate that for 
some parties (French MRG; also Belgian PRL and French PCF, where 
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Table 7.1 
Motivational Concerns in Subnational and National Government Formation, 
as Ranked by Subnational Assembly Members 
% Reporting Most Important (MI) and 
Identical Least Important (LI) 
Preference Criteria for Party in 
Party Orderings Subnational Assembly 
Socialist Party (PS) 
Christian-Social Party 
(PSC) 
Liberal Party (PRL) 
Francophone Democratic 
Front (FDF) 
Christian Democratic 
Union (CDU) 
Social Democratic Party 
(SPD) 
Free Democratic Party 
(FDP) 
Communist Party (PCF) 
Left Radical Movement 
(MRG) 
Socialist Party (PS) 
Union for French 
Democracy (UDF) 
Rally for the Republic 
(RPR) 
Belgium 
44.0 MI: Policy agreement 
LI: Top-down instructions 
35.3 MI: Policy agreement 
LI: Ideological identity 
46.5 MI: Policy agreement 
LI: Electoral advantages 
64.3 MI: Policy agreement 
LI: Top-down instructions 
Germany 
70.8 MI: Policy agreement 
LI: Top-down instructions 
68.6 MI: Policy agreement 
LI: Top-down instructions 
42.9 MI: Majority status 
LI: Electoral advantages 
France 
23.5 MI: Policy agreement 
LI: Majority status 
33.3 MI: Top-down instructions 
LI: Electoral advantages 
52.9 MI: Policy agreement 
LI: Top-down instructions 
46.3 MI: Policy agreement 
LI: Top-down instructions 
43.8 MI: Ideological identity 
LI: Top-down instructions 
Most Important (MI) and 
Least Important (LI) 
Criteria for Party in 
National Parliament 
MI Policy agreement 
LI: Bottom-up instructions 
MI: Majority status 
LI: Ideological identity 
MI: Policy agreement 
LI: Bottom-up instructions 
MI: Policy agreement 
LI: Majority status 
MI: Policy agreement 
LI: Bottom-up instructions 
MI: Policy agreement 
LI: Electoral advantages 
MI: Majority status 
LI: Bottom-up instructions 
MI: Ideological identity 
LI: Majority status 
MI: Ideological identity 
LI: Majority status 
MI: Electoral advantages 
LI: Bottom-up instructions 
MI: Electoral advantages 
LI: Bottom-up instructions 
MI: Electoral advantages 
LI: Bottom-up instructions 
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"instructions" ranked second), the need to follow instructions and to 
stay in line with national strategy is an important factor in developing 
regional strategy. It should not go unmentioned that of the 12 parties 
included in the table, responses from representatives of the French 
Communist Party (PCF) and the French Left Radicals (MRG) indicate 
not only the greatest role for strategic deference but also the greatest 
subnational/national discrepancies in preference orderings. This find­
ing perhaps taps into some of the tension experienced by the Limousin 
Communists in their decision not to toe the national party line in 1992, 
an exemplary case detailed in the previous chapter. 
Given these data, it appears that motives can be mixed across layers 
of the same party, or at least that members of subnational party groups 
believe them to be so mixed. This is a powerful finding in that it sug­
gests that groups within parties are not uniformly motivated by office 
seeking, vote seeking, or ideology advocacy. Together, the data from 
these survey questions indicate that unlike parties in the oversimplified 
models of unitary and oligarchic parties, political parties in territorial 
parliaments may be neither independent bargaining entities nor sim­
ple executers of decisions made at superior organizational levels. In­
stead, evidence suggests that decisions of party coalition strategy are 
made at multiple organizational levels, that national party influence in 
matters of strategic decision making varies, and that motivations differ 
across organizational and institutional layers. There is, in short, suf­
ficient "noise" within the data to suggest that government formation 
at the regional or provincial level is not a simple or clear-cut process 
for parties. Variance suggests that strategic decision making involves 
intraparty exchange relationships—that is, politics within parties. 
Explaining Organizational Influences 
on Coalition Formation 
National party involvement and influence in coalition decision making 
at subnational levels vary, but why, and with what consequences? A 
knee-jerk analytical response would be that formally centralized parties 
invariably control subnational strategy, while formally decentralized 
parties invariably allow local autonomy in strategic decision making. 
Yet even the most centralized of parties, the French Communist Party, 
suffers internal conflict over alliance strategy and bears witness to the 
coalitional deviance of maverick party groups in the periphery (Mazey 
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1986; Perrineau 1986; Schain 1991; Weber 1990). On the other side, 
even the most fervent advocates of "basis democracy/' such as ecologist 
parties, are subject to the oligarchic tendencies of their leaders and 
national governing bodies. The well-documented turmoils of the Ger­
man Greens in their debates over participation in state government 
are easy examples (Frankland 1989; Kitschelt 1988, 1989b), as is the 
more obscure case of an Agalev politician's expulsion by the party or­
ganization for negotiating a local coalition after 10:00 p.m., too late 
according to party rules (Deschouwer 1989)! Formal organizational 
centralization is probably a necessary but insufficient explanation of 
party coalition behavior in the regional or provincial arena. 
It might also be a logical first assumption that in a federal system, 
such as Germany, state parties are structurally free to pursue strategies 
independent of their respective national party organizations. Given 
the tendency "to view state elections as stages in the bitter contest for 
national power" (Pridham 1973, 461) and the important federal-level 
ramifications of coalition decisions in the Lander, however, key Bun­
desprominenz do actively intervene in coalition negotiations. Moreover, 
parties in the federal system may be organizationally federalized yet 
functionally "autocratic," as the German Free Democrats are fre­
quently described (Laver and Schofield 1990). Assuming, alternatively, 
that more unitary political systems inevitably favor tightly controlled 
parties with top-down decision-making regimes is not satisfactory, 
either. Excluding the PCF and the Gaullists, French parties have not de­
veloped tight bureaucratic organizations (Knapp and Le Gales 1993). 
The point here is that simple reference to formal statutes and struc­
tures neglects what can be very telling organizational struggles over 
strategy. 
A more useful explanation should include measures of organiza­
tional centralization and authority structures but must also take into 
account the attributes and aspirations of subnational politicians and 
the electoral context in which they find themselves. In asking whether 
and how organizational oligarchy acts as a determinant of strategic 
choice in subnational legislatures, we must learn when national party 
leaders are drawn into local coalition bargaining, what impact that in­
tervention has on bargaining outcomes, and what broader conse­
quences external interference might have for local democracy. One 
approach is to posit that the electoral conditions addressed in chapter 
6 define the organizational hazards of postelection coalition bargaining. 
Party-level considerations, namely, the openness of internal decision­
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making regimes, should, in turn, influence the ways in which deputies 
in subnational parliaments react individually and collectively to or­
ganizational risk. Finally, individual-level factors, such as levels of par­
ticipation and career ambitions, should mitigate the tendency of sub-
national parliamentarians to risk conflict by breaking from "the party 
line" in pursuit of local goals. These variables, largely underspecified 
or neglected outright in previous coalition studies, can further inform 
our understanding of the political struggles that occur when parties 
have to decide upon strategies in multiple institutional arenas. 
Linking Electoral and Organizational Constraints 
The competitiveness and uncertainty of electoral environments 
should structure the incentives for national party leaders to intervene 
in the coalitional affairs of their subnational colleagues. Given that 
central party officials are more likely to be concerned with coalition 
outcomes where the power and standing of the party are most at stake, 
national party involvement in local coalition bargaining is likely to be 
greatest under conditions of electoral instability. When government 
formation becomes a two-table bargaining process, as parties negotiate 
horizontally with potential partners in the subnational assembly while 
also negotiating vertically with party superiors, then the likelihood of 
intraparty conflict should likewise increase. All else being equal, the 
potential for intraparty conflict is greatest in high-volatility, localized 
electoral environments. Under such conditions, the national party has 
a clear vested interest in intervening, but at the same time subnational 
parliamentarians recognize that they cannot succeed electorally by get­
ting a free ride from their respective national parties. In localized elec­
toral markets, voters judge regional and provincial parties on their 
own merits, making it more difficult for those parties to automatically 
toe the party line without regard for local conditions. Therefore, if 
coalition preferences differ between national and subnational party 
organs, then the probability of conflict is high. In sum, coalition sit­
uations in different electoral arenas render different probabilities for 
organizational oligarchy and conflict. 
Attitudes and behavior under conditions of electoral uncertainty 
should differ perceptibly from those under conditions of greater elec­
toral stability. Static considerations such as party centralization should 
give way to actor properties and contextual properties as more mean­
ingful explanatory factors. When the choice of coalition strategy in 
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a competitive—that is, volatile and localized—environment induces 
national-subnational disagreement, politicians will respond to orga­
nizational demands in different ways depending in part on their "or­
ganizational radicalism." In the absence of both electoral constraints 
and pressure from national elites, debate over the power of party layers 
is inconsequential. Politicians can pursue unrestricted the coalitions 
that maximize their basic preferences. Under the weight of both elec­
toral and organizational constraints, however, organizational "radi­
cals" are more likely than "loyalists" to pursue their own strategy and 
to risk sanction rather than defer to the strategy of their superiors. 
Tests of these propositions are possible using the data available from 
survey responses as well as from both primary and secondary accounts 
of coalition politics at the subnational level. 
Hypothesis: Volatility and Nationalization 
Increase Incentives for National Party Leaders 
to Participate in Decisions 
of Subnational Government Formation 
All else being equal, national party intervention and influence in 
local coalition bargaining will be greatest where electoral security is 
most uncertain (i.e., high volatility) and where elections more often 
take on the guise of mininational contests (i.e., nationalization). Bi­
variate correlations between reported levels of national party influence 
in the bargaining process and both the volatility and localization of 
respondents' electoral systems are included in Table 7.2. The expected 
direction and magnitude of the relationship between external influ­
ence and volatility is met in 13 of the 16 parties. This finding reinforces 
our understanding that party leaders calculate the costs and benefits 
of decentralized decision making according to situation. Under con­
ditions of high volatility, "the troops must obey the orders of their gen­
erals; internal decision-making costs are comparative disadvantages in 
the game" (Heidar 1984, 3). The anticipated inverse relationship be­
tween national party influence and localization is also met in 12 of the 
16 parties. Under these conditions, party leaders have less information 
about the local electorate and its preferences: "Thus the national pol­
iticians must, as a rule, proceed in co-operation with the provincial 
colleagues rather than attempt to assert the prerogatives of the central 
party organisations and the pre-eminence of what they discern as de­
cisive party interests seen from the national level" (Johnson 1983, 160). 
206 • Chapter Seven 
Table 7.2 
Reported Influence of National Party in Subnational Coalition Choice, 
by Patterns of Electoral Competition (Pearson r values) 
Influence Reported by 
Party Representatives Volatility Localization N 
Belgium 
PS 0.53* -0.55 * 41 
PSC 0.13 -0.29 33 
PRL 0.36 -0.52 * 37 
ECOLO 0.20 -0.11 20 
Germany 
CDU -0.19 * -0 .11  * 72 
SPD -0.10* -0.15 * 70 
FDP 0.48* 0.44 14 
Griine 0.37 -0.37 15 
France 
PCF 0.34* -0.13 17 
MRG 0.87** -0.87** 6 
PS -0.30 * -0.32 * 51 
Verts 0.26 0.18 22 
Generation Ecologie 0.28 0.37* 21 
UDF 0.13* -0 .21  * 41 
RPR 0.11* -0.10* 48 
FN 0.19 0.12* 42 
*p< 0.15. **/>< 0.10. 
Note: Volatility and Localization are of respondent's regional or provincial electoral 
market, as measured over previous two elections. 
That this occurs in practice is confirmed by Gerard Deprez, presi­
dent of the Belgian PSC: "In some provinces it is very difficult to in­
terfere with the coalitions. There it's a very specific situation, and 
relations between persons at the local level are essential to make a co­
alition. As president of the party I do not have enough information 
. . . enough sensitivity . .  . to the relations between the persons . .  . to 
the local problems they have to solve and the capacity they have to work 
together. In some cases people at the provincial level refuse to receive 
instructions from the national level. They just refuse. 'That's our job,' 
they say. 'You have no power, and we decide what we have to do,' and 
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Table 7.3 
Consequences of National Party Intervention 
Bargaining Success Vertical Conflict Deference 
(%) (%) (%) 
Intercept 71.72 29.14 8.16 
(1.518) (1.723) (1.451) 
National presence at — 31.365 20.675 16.38 
bargaining table (1.859) (2.110) (1.778) 
R* 0.322 0.261 0.124 
SignifF 0.001 0.001 0.001 
N 601 601 601 
Note: Standard error in parentheses. 
Bargaining Success = % of original demands met; Vertical Conflict = incidence 
as % of all observed government formations; Deference = % of time local positions 
conceded. 
they refuse."9 Deprez's remarks complement our statistical findings 
and supply important evidence of the linkages between coalition bar­
gaining, electoral competition, and organizational control. In doing so, 
they ultimately support the broader theoretical contention that sys­
temic conditions and patterns of party competition, and not just some 
putative "inexorable law of oligarchy that governs all voluntary asso­
ciations" (Kitschelt 1989a, 400), can help explain cross-sectional and 
intertemporal variation in party strategy. 
If electoral uncertainty prompts external intervention in coalition 
bargaining, then what consequences does such intervention ultimately 
have on bargaining outcomes? Table 7.3 provides evidence that the 
effects are profound. Using only the presence or absence of one or 
more national party officials (parliamentary deputies and/or extra-
parliamentary figures) at the subnational bargaining table as a di­
chotomous independent variable, OLS regressions were run on three 
dependent variables. The data first indicate that where subnational 
parliamentarians reported a national presence at the most recent post­
election coalition negotiations, the regional or provincial party's suc­
cess at securing its original bargaining demands vis-a-vis the other 
parties in the assembly is cut almost in half. National party interven­
tion appears, therefore, to have deleterious consequences for horizon­
tal bargaining. The data also confirm our suspicion that by sending 
emissaries out into the periphery to help negotiate new governments, 
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national parties risk instigating internal divisions over policy and 
strategy. Indeed, the reported incidence of vertical conflict over coa­
lition strategy almost doubles when there is a national agent at the 
bargaining table. Finally, the survey data suggest that a national 
presence markedly increases the tendency of subnational party groups 
to concede local policy priorities in favor of national strategic pri­
orities. National party intervention thus induces deference, but by 
reducing the importance of local issues, two-table bargaining in gov­
ernment formation calls local democracy into question. Clearly, rec­
ognizing that parties deviate from the image of "unitary actors" can 
significantly improve our understanding of the coalition process and 
its outcomes. 
Hypothesis: Volatility and Localization 
Increase the Potential for National-subnational 
Conflict aver Coalition Strategy 
Survey data have empirically established the existence of national­
subnational conflict over coalition strategy. As presented in Table 7.3, 
however, there is no indication about the variation across parties in 
conflict or what we might call "strategic factionalism." Figure 7.4 com­
pares measures of strategic factionalism for parties whose subnational 
branches compete amidst varying levels of electoral volatility and lo­
calization. Strategic factionalism is an indexed variable, constructed 
from a combination of scores on four survey measures: (1) ideological 
distance between subnational and national parties, (2) indifference to 
matching national coalition strategy, (3) aversion to following national 
instructions, and (4) resistance to party leadership.10 Higher values on 
these measures indicate independent identity for the subnational party 
group and its greater propensity to pursue independent courses of 
action. The mean index value for each party has then been plotted 
against the summed value of mean volatility and mean localization for 
each party in the provinces, regions, and Lander included in the sur­
vey sample.11 
This process provides some support for the notion that electoral 
constraints induce organizational pressures and reinforce strategic 
factionalism. Trend lines indicate that, in both Belgium and France, 
deference, or the likelihood that party subgroups will, "despite their 
more polarized opinions, submit to the authorities of the party lead­
ership and subscribe to the proposals put forward by it" (Pierre 1986, 
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472), is a characteristic of those parties whose competitive positions 
are comparatively stable and linked to the fortunes of the national 
party. Where party fortunes at the subnational level are erratic and 
decoupled from national trends, there is likewise some indication that 
electoral exigencies create incentives to pursue independent courses of 
action. This dynamic, however, appears to add little to the understand­
ing of intraparty relations among the German parties. There are, 
moreover, some unexpected findings for individual parties. That Ecolo 
scores the lowest of all Belgian parties in terms of strategic factionalism 
is surprising, as is the comparatively high factionalism reported by the 
French PCF, a party traditionally held together by democratic cen­
tralism. On the whole, there is reason to believe that environment con­
ditions organizational approaches to coalitions, but it is also clear at 
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this point that a richer interpretation requires that party-level and 
individual-level considerations be addressed as well. 
Toeing the Party Line 
If decisions of government participation and power sharing at provin­
cial or regional levels can instigate organizational conflict, then it be­
comes important to understand the likelihood that party representa­
tives in the periphery will behave independently of pressure from their 
national leadership. Do open lines of vertical communication and in­
formal channels of access reinforce a consensual approach to party 
strategy in the periphery (Brearey 1989)? Do the ideological orienta­
tions and participation levels of the middle-level elites who pursue pro­
vincial and regional office, particularly their fundamentalism and 
activism, exacerbate or diminish intraparty conflict (Kitschelt 1989a; 
Orbell and Fougere 1973; Pierre 1986)? Are,finally, career aspirations 
within the party and the tendency to view subnational office as a step-
ping-stone to national elective office real constraints on local strategic 
autonomy (Laver 1989)? Like the conditions discussed above and in 
the previous chapter, these factors are generally left untested in studies 
of strategic party behavior in territorial parliaments. 
Hypothesis: Organizational Radicalism 
Reinforces Strategic Factionalism 
Chapter 3 posited that political struggles over party strategy in the 
periphery are likely to depend as much on the goal-related tendencies 
of intraparty groups as on more static organizational rules and struc­
tures. In this vein, provincial and regional party groups can be seen 
as mixtures of "loyalists" and "radicals," each subset with its own views 
of party conflict and consensus, each with its own set of values, and 
each with different beliefs about the legitimacy of compromise in ex­
change for government status. Organizational radicalism, it has been 
suggested, should reinforce the extent to which strategic decisions de­
viate from the wishes of national party leaders and from the models 
set by parties in national parliament. In short, organizational radical­
ism should reinforce strategic factionalism. 
Using survey data, a composite index measuring organizational 
radicalism was constructed and employed to test this proposition. The 
Loyalists and Radicals " 2 1  1 
index of organizational radicalism incorporates measures of four vari­
ables: (1) ideological self-placement on a Left-Right scale, (2) self-
placement on a pragmatism/fundamentalism scale, (3) respect for 
party authority, and (4) fidelity to individual party leaders.12 Party 
scores on this composite measure are presented in Table 7.4. 
These data clearly display the kind of internal party heterogeneity 
anticipated and outlined in chapter 3. With the lone exception of the 
French Front National, all parties scoring high on the radicalism mea­
sure are leftists or ecologists. The empirical question is whether the 
attitude-related and belief-related radicalism associated with these 
parties translates into more divisive approaches (i.e., vertical strategic 
factionalism) to party strategy. Of the seven parties having previously 
scored high on the factionalism measure (Belgian PSC, PRL; German 
FDP, Greens; French PCF, PS, Verts), just three score high on the 
radicalism measure (Greens, PCF, Verts). This suggests that while 
attitude-related factionalism over coalition strategy in the periphery is 
greatest on the ideological Left and along the postmaterialism axis, it 
also characterizes catch-all parties at the center (PSC), parties on the 
ideological Right (PRL), and parties that are internally polarized along 
ideological lines (FDP). 
Hypothesis: Informal Party Organization 
Increases Subnational Autonomy and Deviance 
The two remaining concerns of this chapter link, first, the "internal 
workings of parties to their choice of strategy in a competitive envi­
ronment" (Kitschelt 1989a, 403), and, second, the patterns of political 
participation within subnational party groups to their strategic inde­
pendence. Decentralized party organization, it has been suggested 
elsewhere, reinforces strategic factionalism (Panebianco 1988). How­
ever, given that "the degree of correspondence between a party's stat­
utory norms and its actual power structure" is not always perfect (Maor 
1992, 6), a simple categorization of centralized/decentralized parties 
may mask significant variation. After all, the "formal structures of par­
ties no more than the constitutional arrangements of states will give 
us the final story on influence and power in the system" (Heidar 1984, 
8). While structures cannot be ignored, it may be more meaningful 
to view organization as a "communication system" (Sjoblom 1968) 
connecting subnational officeholders and national party leaders. As 
Brearey (1989) found in her study of local coalitions in North Rhine— 
Table 7.4 
Summary Index of Organizational Radicalism (%) 
Belgium Germany France 
PSB PSC PRL Eco FDF CDU SPD FDP GRN PCF PSF VRT GE UDF RPR FN 
Most radical 
orientation 
(9-13) 30 24 24 70 20 6 39 17 62 100 35 57 7 3 17 52 
NO Intermediate 
orientations 
(6-8) 30 14 20 10 40 31 15 8 22 0 32 14 21 47 44 39 
Most moderate 
and loyal 
orientation 
(0-5) 40 63 56 20 40 63 46 75 16 0 33 29 72 50 39 9 
Average value 6.5 5.5 5.5 9.1 6.0 4.9 5.7 4.0 9.3 10.8 6.4 8.5 4.1 5.1 5.5 7.7 
N 36 21 26 17 6 71 70 14 12 7 36 23 16 36 33 26 
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Westphalia, councilors who enjoyed "easy, regular, and informal ac­
cess" to party officials at the federal level (e.g., as personal acquain­
tances) as opposed to "formal access" (e.g., as delegates) achieved 
superior levels of local autonomy in decisions pertaining to coalition 
strategy. We can therefore hypothesize that informal party organiza­
tion increases subnational autonomy and deviance. 
An important qualifier must be attached: participation in the or­
gans of party decision making outside the region or province is in­
versely related to organizational risk taking. If those regional or 
provincial representatives who enjoy informal access to national party 
leaders also hold elective office at the national level (as in France) or 
regularly participate in executive leadership committees at the na­
tional level, then we may expect to find greater "pressure on the coun­
cillors to conform to party line and conventions" (Brearey 1989, 295). 
In the same vein, where subnational representatives aspire to higher 
elective office or positions within the party hierarchy, organizational 
constraints on risk taking in coalition formation are likely to be high. 
These situational variables—overlapping membership, level of partic­
ipation, candidate status—all have to be considered as possible orga­
nizational determinants of strategic choice. Table 7.5 presents bivariate 
correlation coefficients for survey measures of vertical authority struc­
ture and levels of participation, revealing significant associations be­
tween these factors and deferential behavior. 
VERTICAL AUTHORITY STRUCTURE. Do open lines of vertical com­
munication and informal channels of access reinforce a consensual ap­
proach to party strategy in the periphery? Members of territorial 
subgroups in tightly organized political parties are likely to be at a 
structural disadvantage when it comes to pursuing their own strategic 
preferences. They are apt to be the group least likely to have their 
views considered by party superiors, least likely to win internal party 
disagreements, and most likely to submit to party leadership under 
threat of sanction or promise of support. Therefore, the measures of 
organizational centralization presented in Table 7.5 are based on rep­
resentatives' assessments of national-subnational relations within the 
party and on the capacity of the national party to punish maverick 
party behavior in the periphery. 
On a five-point scale, politicians could indicate whether communi­
cation between subnational and national party tiers is regular and in­
formal, regular and formal, limited and informal, limited and formal, 
Table 7.5 
Strategic Deference and Influence, by Authority Dynamics and Levels of Participation 
(Pearson r Values) 
Deference to Coalition Importance Attached to Leadership Receptivity to 
Choices of National Duplicating National Respondent's Coalition 
Leadership Coalition Preferences 
Vertical authority structure 
Informality of communication -0.16**** -0.21**** 0.10 
Openness of access 0.15**** 0.07 — 0 27**** 
Subnational success in intraparty conflict 0.05 0.07 0.32**** 
Capacity to punish subnational deviance 0.22**** 0.20**** -0.23**** 
Level of participation 
Localists (N = 159) -0.08 * -0.09 * -0.19*** 
"Meso"ists (N = 359) -0.13*** -0.14* 0.12** 
Party leaders (N = 42) 0.39**** 0.24*** 0.22*** 
Candidates (N = 160) 0.10** 0.10** 0.06 
*p < 0.10. **/> < 0.05. ***/? < 0.01. ****/> < 0.001. 
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or nonexistent. Subnational representatives who perceive communi­
cation to be "limited and formal" are likely to be those belonging to 
more centralized organizations, where formalized mechanisms of ver­
tical communication translate into reduced scope for subnational in­
fluence. Those indicating vertical communication to be either "regular 
and informal" or "nonexistent" are indicating that relations, when they 
occur, are less rigid and more personal, and that when they apparently 
do not occur, their absence is indicative of greater local autonomy. A 
corresponding question challenged respondents to indicate the open­
ness of their group leaders' access to the party's national leadership. 
"No access" or "limited access" indicates a closed vertical party system, 
whereas "open access" or "very open access" signifies the opposite. In 
apparent confirmation of Brearey's earlier findings, the results suggest 
that the informality of vertical communication and the openness of 
access to central party leaders are inversely related to deferential at­
titudes vis-&-vis the party leadership and to the importance ascribed 
to duplicating national models in subnational assemblies. Moreover, 
they both are positively associated with respondents' beliefs that their 
own views and preferences regarding coalition strategy are actually 
considered by the party leadership. 
Two additional measures of vertical authority structure are pro­
vided in Table 7.5. "Subnational success in intraparty conflict" reports 
respondent observation of the frequency of provincial or regional 
party group success in resolving disputes with the party leadership 
(100%, >50%, 50%, <50, 0%). Assuming that subnational success is 
inversely related to central leadership power, this variable has been 
tested for association with indicators of strategic deference and lead­
ership receptivity to individual coalition preferences. The strong find­
ing that emerges is that with a track record of success in internal party 
disputes, subnational party groups gain—or at least perceive that they 
gain—added stature in the formulation of coalition strategy by na­
tional party leaders (r = 0.32). The final measure of vertical authority 
structure, "capacity to punish subnational deviance," presents some of 
the clearest relationships of all the authority variables. Where provin­
cial councilors, regional councilors, and Landtag deputies believe that 
the leading figures and bodies of the party at the national level can 
punish them for dissident behavior, deference follows, and the impor­
tance of duplicating national party strategy increases. At the same 
time, the capacity to punish also translates into much weaker "collec­
tive" strategic decision making. This finding goes far in explaining dis­
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crepancies in earlier measures: for example, why a party such as the 
French Front National scored high on radicalism but low on faction­
alism. It may also shed some light on why French parties, almost all of 
which have active "discipline committees" that warn, censure, and ex­
pel maverick members, scored surprisingly low on measures of fac­
tionalism. 
LEVELS OF PARTICIPATION. The second half of Table 7.5 exam­
ines patterns of party participation and attitudes toward party au­
thority. The expectation here is that participation, when low or when 
restricted to local party sections, is likely to reinforce the pressures of 
vote maximizing, local public opinion, and local concerns over and 
above those of submitting to the authority of the party leadership. Lo­
calism and "mesoism," like the systemic electoral localization discussed 
in earlier chapters, should therefore reduce the larger organizational 
constraints on forming strategy at the subnational level. Respondents 
have been coded as either "localists," "mesoists," or "party leaders." 
Localists have indicated greater participation in communal and mu­
nicipal party sections than in provincial, regional, or national party 
organs. "Mesoists" have likewise indicated greater participation in 
party affairs at the middle or supralocal (i.e., provincial, regional, or 
Land) level than at both the local and national levels. Party leaders are 
those subnational representatives participating regularly in the na­
tional governing bodies (i.e., bureaus, permanent committees) of their 
respective parties. To gauge the risk-inhibiting pressures of national 
office seeking (e.g., selection processes, financial support, campaign 
backing), respondents were also coded as "candidates" if they an­
swered affirmatively to a direct question regarding their future inten­
tions to stand for election to a seat in national parliament. 
If these data do tell a story, then it clearly is that situation within a 
party influences the degree to which members accept a top-down ap­
proach to coalition strategy in the periphery. While party leaders and 
those active at the party's highest tiers strongly support a "leader­
follower" approach to authoritative decision making, localists and me­
soists are more apt to disagree with such a conception of deference 
and imitation. The inverse association between localism and leadership 
receptivity to coalition preferences should be noted here, as it contrasts 
with the positive coefficients recorded for mesoists and party leaders. 
Although somewhat weaker than anticipated, the correlations between 
future candidacy for national elective office and measures of strategic 
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dependence are positive and statistically significant. All told, there is 
definite empirical evidence pointing to situational party variables as 
important considerations in the coalition game. 
Discussion 
This chapter opened by raising the issue of whether and how orga­
nizational considerations condition coalition behavior in the subna­
tional parliamentary institutions to which parties aspire to gain power. 
This issue, it was proposed, is an important research concern for both 
practical and theoretical reasons. As a matter of practical politics, it is 
of real interest to know whether individuals and groups chosen by the 
electorate to determine the allocation of power and the direction of 
public policy in their respective provinces, regions, or states are func­
tionally independent of party bosses and party strategies at the center. 
The extent to which party groups in the periphery pursue strategies— 
of which coalition building and power sharing are crucial elements— 
independent of their national parties is an indication of the democ­
ratization of decision making within political parties. The extent to 
which local preferences override national circumstances and pressures 
also reflects directly on the health of representative democracy at sub-
national levels of governance. These are important concerns, even in 
the "mature" democracies of Belgium, France, and Germany. 
At the same time, the analysis has addressed important theoretical 
issues, using the coalition process as a lens with which to examine as­
sumptions about organizational oligarchy, parties as "unitary actors," 
and electoral sources of party conflict. Such issues have long been 
staples in works by political scientists in the tradition of Duverger, 
Michels, and Downs. They have also long been oversimplified by the­
orists attempting to understand party behavior in coalition situations 
such as government formation, leading to an unproductive polariza­
tion of ambitious game theorists on one side and empiricists of the 
"European politics tradition" on the other. Certainly, little effort has 
heretofore been devoted to testing many of these assumptions against 
the evidence offered by coalition politics in subnational institutions. 
Hence, it has been a major goal of this chapter to gauge the existence 
and magnitude of a range of possible relationships linking strategic 
behavior with systemic, party, and individual variables. 
Evidence presented in this chapter contributes to both these sets of 
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practical and theoretical concerns. Across three countries with varying 
state structures, it is clear that subnational power is valuable enough 
to merit the active pursuit and intervention of party players external 
to the immediate bargaining environment. Yet party behavior in the 
periphery can deviate substantially from politics and cross-party co­
operation as it is practiced in the capital. This is manifested most 
overtly in coalitions that fail to match national partisan alignments, as 
well as in those that experiment with alternative coalition formulas. 
Party attitudes and approaches to coalition situations and collective 
action problems can likewise bear little resemblance to party strategy 
at superior levels. Motivational disparities and ideological discrepan­
cies such as those measured empirically in the previous sections pro­
vide tangible evidence that parties are not single-minded bargaining 
entities with a single set of preferences regarding the range of potential 
coalitions. Furthermore, where local preferences and national strate­
gies collide, it is apparent from these data that party leaders cannot 
feel entirely comfortable in expecting deference from the lower ech­
elons of their organizations. 
The picture painted by the data is ultimately one in which patterns 
of electoral competition, ideological extremism, organizational mili­
tancy, authority structures, and activism all intervene to condition what 
otherwise rational actors should be expected to do in collective bar­
gaining situations. In other words, there is far more to bargaining and 
strategy than the legislative "weights" of the parties elected to subna­
tional parliaments. Systemic conditions, namely volatility and localiza­
tion, appear to increase both the electoral stakes and the organizational 
risks of coalition strategy. Party conditions, primarily the openness of 
vertical communication and access, appear to increase the likelihood 
that subnational groups will enjoy strategic autonomy in their own 
arena. Individual considerations, such as career aspirations and high 
levels of participation in party bodies above the provincial or regional 
level, appear to increase the incentives for representatives to trade elec­
toral risks for organizational unity. Recognizing these relationships 
allows a more informed and a more theoretically meaningful under­
standing of an important political process and of complex political be­
havior in an overlooked institutional setting. 
Part Four 
Application and Conclusions


Chapter Eight 
Coalition "Proving Grounds": 
A Functional Role 
for Subnational Parliaments 
in Multiparty Systems 
In his classic study, Coalitions in Parliamentary Government, Dodd (1976) proposes that "provincial or state parliaments could provide an 
experimental setting in which party coalitions could be attempted be­
tween long-term adversaries, with the intermediate provincial expe­
rience making national-level coalitions more possible than they would 
be without the provincial experience" (217). Given this proposition 
that subnational parliaments "could" serve a functional purpose as 
proving grounds for future national coalition arrangements, the lit­
eratures on coalition behavior and multiparty government have never­
theless failed to systematically explore whether they really do. 
This chapter investigates Dodd's suggestion of subnational-national 
coalition linkage, and in doing so it evaluates subnational institutions 
as suppliers of the information that national party leaders need when 
they sit down at the bargaining table to negotiate a new government. 
In demonstrating the (in)compatibility of parties, their (in)efficacy in 
governing, and the electoral (un)popularity of a partnership, coalitions 
in regional and provincial parliaments should be valuable sources of 
feedback. To establish this linkage empirically, three questions are 
posed: Do subnational coalitions alter the number of coalitions avail­
able to parties in national government? Do subnational politicians 
themselves perceive any direct or indirect influence on national coa­
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lition patterns, and if so, are they motivated by the prospect of such 
influence when they negotiate the party composition of their own ex­
ecutives? Finally, do national party leaders actually make use of the 
knowledge gained through coalition experiences in the periphery 
when weighing alternative coalition strategies in the national arena? 
Conceptualizing the Feedback Role 
The recent rise of ecologist or "Left-libertarian" parties and the re­
surgence of regionalist, populist, and extreme right-wing nationalist 
parties have resulted in the introduction of new parties into the rep­
resentative assemblies of most European countries. This has been most 
pronounced at local and regional levels, where parties such as the 
Front National in France, Die Grunen in Germany, and Ecolo and the 
Vlaams Blok in Belgium have gained entry and consequently compli­
cated the once predictable coalition calculus. The theoretical and em­
pirical literatures on parliamentary politics and coalition government 
generally neglect the wider implications and subnational-national link­
ages inherent in these developments. This deficiency could be re­
dressed if two parallel research trends would only merge. First, there 
is nascent interest among scholars of multiparty government in the 
coalition politics of subnational assemblies. Second, there is increasing 
recognition that national government formation and coalition building 
are not one-shot events but instead parts of an iterative bargaining 
process. The problem is that these two research lines have yet to in­
tersect. The possibility that subnational coalitions offer both experi­
ence and information to parties in the national bargaining arena is 
underexplored. 
The periodic formation of coalitions in subnational institutions is 
the most overt manifestation of coalition behavior outside of national 
parliaments. These are events that may be full of national connota­
tions, and they should be included in a dynamic explanation of coali­
tion formation. Detailed in chapter 3, the essential tenets of such a 
dynamic model are depicted in figure 8.1. Here coalition choices are 
driven by the rational pursuit of certain preferred goods (e.g., spoils 
of office) but are constrained by pressures external to a pure utility 
calculation. These constraints include the necessity of adapting to the 
immediate electoral environment (chapter 6) and to the preferences of 
party superiors (chapter 7). Government formation and party alliances 
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Figure 8.1 Linking National and Subnational Government Formation 
are interdependent across levels of the political system. Visualizing the 
determinants of coalition choice in this fashion adds spatial and tem­
poral dimensions to our understanding of an important political pro­
cess. Coalition politics in subnational assemblies may take place within 
the larger context of national coalitions, transforming government for­
mation from a discrete event into a dynamic process "nested" within 
the national coalition game. Coalitions at one level of government can, 
moreover, have an impact on coalitions at other levels, with a feed­
back loop connecting past, current, and future iterations of coalition 
bargaining. 
The model essentially posits a process of "coalitional learning." A 
baseline for thinking about coalitional learning first envisions a set of 
relatively exclusive coalitional strategies (i.e., alternative combinations 
of governing parties) that dominate the parliamentary game until en­
vironmental shifts and policy problems emerge that require new co­
alitional strategies (i.e., new combinations of parties) in order for the 
government to govern effectively as a policy-making entity. As long as 
the environment remains relatively constant, coalition actors engage 
in iterative maneuvers within the existing set of coalitional strategies 
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that define the game, leaving the permissible combinations within the 
game unchanged. However, when governing crises or electoral up­
heavals emerge, the national parliament must learn which new party 
combinations are politically viable and effective as governing solutions. 
One way to learn is to assess coalitional experiments at the regional or 
provincial level. When subnational assemblies have created viable and 
effective coalitions among new parties, that experience becomes strong 
evidence that such coalitions may work for the national parliament. 
When a national parliament faces a governing crisis and sees new coa­
litions at subnational levels that appear viable and capable of address­
ing the crisis, then the national parliament may embrace a coalitional 
strategy or set of strategies that previously seemed impossible to con-
sider—thereby transforming the strategic structure of the coalitional 
game within the national parliament. We can justifiably call this a pro­
cess of coalitional learning (figure 8.2). 
Inherent in such a process are two key dimensions: influence and 
experimentation. Regarding influence, we are concerned with whether 
and how much subnational coalition activity affects the behavior of 
parties at superior levels of government. Regarding experimentation, 
we recognize that coalition change itself implies different and often 
untried forms of multiparty power sharing. To test for influence, it is 
necessary to establish a temporal connection and direction of coalition 
change using historical events data. To discern if influence is conscious, 
real, and not merely apparent, it is necessary to reconstruct decision-
making processes and experiences through survey and interview data. 
Beyond this, it is necessary to determine whether politicians at sub-
national levels consciously experiment with novel coalition models for 
the express purposes of gauging voter response, testing cross-party 
loyalty, or determining the within-party consequences of a new gov­
erning partnership. Experimentation presupposes a certain amount 
of openness in the coalition system. If subnational assemblies are to be 
considered as experimental laboratories for national coalitions, then 
such experimentation must assume willingness on the part of subna­
tional parliamentarians and party leaders to form alliances with un­
conventional partners. Survey and interview data prove useful in 
testing for how "open" councilors are to the entire range of coalitions 
available following an election. 
To explore each of these possibilities empirically, the following 
propositions are offered: First, bottom-up strategic influence and 
learning exists when coalition innovations—that is, new power-sharing 
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Figure 8.2 Coalition Learning 
arrangements—first appear at the subnational level and are subse­
quently introduced at the national level following a brief "lag" period. 
Second, the functional utility of subnational parliaments as coalition 
proving grounds is enhanced when regional and provincial councilors 
(a) perceive a "spillover" or "trickle-up" influence and (b) are moti­
vated to pursue alternative coalitions by the prospect of such influence. 
Third, the "feedback" or test value of subnational coalition experience 
increases with the active intervention of national party leaders in the 
local bargaining process. 
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Evidence: Direction off Temporal Change 
It is possible to compare, country by country, the major changes in 
national coalition arrangements against coalition developments in sub-
national government. The temporal dimension of change—whether a 
new coalition model is adopted first at the national or subnational level, 
and if once inaugurated at one level is duplicated elsewhere—is a nec­
essary initial indicator of national-subnational coalition linkages. 
Belgium 
In Belgium, there have been four important innovations, or "firsts," 
in government coalitions since 196L1 
FIRST "TRIPARTITE" COALITION. In the face of mounting chal­
lenges from new parties' pressing demands for regional devolution, 
the Socialist, Christian Social, and Liberal parties formed their first 
grand coalition since a string of all-party governments in the imme­
diate postwar period. The institutional setting was Brabant's provincial 
assembly following general elections in November 1971. Twelve months 
after this model's inauguration at provincial level, a tripartite coalition 
linking the same parties took shape in national government under So­
cialist Prime Minister Leburton. 
FIRST COALITION TO INCLUDE A "COMMUNITY" OR FEDERALIST 
PARTY. The earliest power-sharing arrangement based on territorial 
rather than socioeconomic cleavages formed in Luxembourg province 
following the March 1974 general election. Instead of responding to 
the crisis of an electoral breakthrough by a regionalist party by closing 
ranks against it (the strategy followed in Brabant three years earlier), 
in Luxembourg province Socialists and Liberals allied with the fran­
cophone Rassemblement Wallon (RW). Three months later, the RW 
negotiated its way into national government. The RW's elevation to 
government status, first at the provincial level and then at the national 
level, signified a recognition by Belgium's traditional parties that they 
could not hope to recoup mounting electoral losses without addressing 
the grassroots demands for territorial and cultural integrity champi­
oned by the RW. 
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FIRST POWER-SHARING COALITION IN THE FLEMISH HALF OF BEL­
GIUM TO EXCLUDE THE CHRISTIAN PEOPLE'S PARTY (CVP). Flemish 
Socialists, Liberals, and the Volksunie ousted the CVP from govern­
ment for the first time in 161 years by coalescing in Limburg's provin­
cial assembly after the November 1991 general election. Fifteen days 
later, the Belgian monarch for the first time since 1958 charged a "for­
mateur" with the task of forming a non-Catholic national government. 
Although his mission ultimately proved unsuccessful, the attempt was 
rife with political symbolism and exemplified the country's search for 
new alternatives to an increasingly inert leadership. 
FIRST "ASYMMETRICAL" COALITION. The first coalition govern­
ment chosen by a bilingual assembly to include one but not both halves 
of a traditional political "family" arose in Brabant province following 
the November 1991 election. In Brabant, the Flemish CVP joined a 
governing coalition with the Socialists and Liberals, but without its 
Walloon counterpart, the PSC. No such asymmetrical coalition sub­
sequently formed in national government, although the respective 
memberships of the CVP and PSC split dramatically in their desire to 
join the new government.2 Four years later, the Flemish Christian 
Democrats in the Brussels Regional Council repeated this act of frat­
ricide by joining an asymmetrical government without their franco­
phone counterparts. 
Of the four cases of major coalition change in Belgium, therefore, 
all clearly originated at provincial level. As a consequence of these 
provincial-level coalition innovations, two were ultimately adopted in 
national government after a short lag period, one was duplicated in 
regional government, and a fourth profoundly altered the calculus of 
national party bargaining. 
Germany 
There have been six important instances of coalition innovation and 
change since 1960 in Germany, each with possible federal-state link­
ages. 
FIRST "GRAND" COALITION. The Christian Union and Social Dem­
ocrat parties adopted a "grand" coalition model for the first time in 
federal government in 1966, prompted by the outgoing FDP's dis­
agreement with the CDU over economic policy. Harbingers of the 
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grand coalition, however, had been set repeatedly in the state parlia­
ments, especially in the immediate postwar period: Bavaria (1945-54), 
Bremen (1951-59), Hamburg (1945-46), Hessen (1945-51), Lower 
Saxony (1946-51, 1957-59), North Rhine-Westphalia (1946-50), 
Rhineland-Palatinate (1946-47, 1947-51), and Schleswig-Holstein 
(1946—47). More contemporary with the Bonn change was the shift 
from SPD-FDP to CDU-SPD in Lower Saxony in 1965, as well as the 
CDU-SPD coalition arrangements in Berlin (1955—63) and in Saarland 
(1956—61). Subsequent to the change in Bonn, only one Land govern­
ment (Baden-Wiirttemberg 1966-72) adopted the grand coalition 
formula. 
FIRST SOCIAL-LIBERAL (SPD-FDP) COALITION. After tWO full de­
cades of Christian Democratic presence in the young democracy's 
federal government and amidst growing fears of a "CDU-staat," the 
first SPD-FDP federal government assumed power in 1969. Social 
Democrat—Free Democrat governments in the Lander clearly predated 
Bonn's new left-leaning alliance: the SPD and FDP had already been 
coalition partners in 7 of the 11 Lander since 1946. Additionally, in 
the immediate prelude to the Bonn change, SPD-FDP coalitions con­
stituted the governments of Hamburg, Hessen, North Rhine—West-
phalia, and West Berlin. In the aftermath of the Bonn change, the 
social-liberal coalition reproduced itself in Hamburg, Hessen, and 
North Rhine-Westphalia, but of these there were no actual alterna­
tions of coalition partners. 
WENDE. The 1982 SPD-FDP to CDU/CSU-FDP coalition change 
in Bonn represents an alternation but not an innovation in the German 
coalition system. The FDP had already betrayed the Social Democrats 
in Saarland (1977-84) and Lower Saxony (1977-78), and the FDP's 
willingness to play junior partner to the Christian Democrats rather 
than the SPD in Hessen in 1982 heralded impending change at the 
federal level. No major coalition alternations occurred in the Lander 
following the Bonn change, and only five years later did the FDP stray 
to the SPD (e.g., in Hamburg in 1987). 
FIRST "RED-GREEN" COALITION. In Hessen, the SPD chose coa­
lition with Die Grtinen over minority government in November 1985. 
The radical new model spawned similar arrangements in other Lander, 
usurping the FDP's traditional role as the coalition partner and intro­
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ducing "new politics" policy issues into state government. However, 
heading into the 1994 Bundestag elections, Social Democrats and 
Greens failed to reach any formal cooperative agreement to share fed­
eral power if the opportunity arose, as in the event it did not. 
FIRST "TRAFFIC LIGHT " COALITION. The earliest government to 
include the SPD (red), FDP (yellow), and Die Griinen (green) parties 
formed in the eastern state of Brandenburg in 1990 and in Bremen in 
1991. This unlikely new type of coalition, as yet untried at the federal 
level, nevertheless sets the precedent for such a creative configuration 
in national-level politics. The SPD-FDP-Griine coalitions thus further 
expand the set of coalition alternatives in a system that was, before the 
emergence of the Greens in the late 1970s, relatively closed. 
FIRST ATTEMPTED "BLACK-GREEN" COALITION. Negotiations to 
form an unprecedented CDU-Grune coalition took place in Baden-
Wiirttemberg following the 1992 state election. The coalition ulti­
mately failed to form; however, the Baden-Wiirttemberg attempt in­
troduces the "eco-libertarian" model as still another new alternative in 
the universe of coalition possibilities. 
It is clear from these six cases that no coalition change in German 
federal government has occurred without precedent in Land govern­
ment. No combination of parties has governed in Bonn without pre­
vious power-sharing experience at regional level. The historical se­
quencing of coalition change in Germany is a necessary first indicator 
of a bottom-up process of coalition learning and diffusion. 
France 
Principal alliance shifts and coalition innovations in France since the 
first election of autonomous regional assemblies in 1986 are limited to 
three particular developments. 
FIRST COLLABORATION WITH FRONT NATIONAL. Aside from a 
city-level coalition with the Gaullist RPR in Dreux in 1983, the first 
power-sharing coalitions between the extremist Front National and the 
orthodox center Right emerged following regional council elections in 
1986. In such key regions as Aquitaine, Languedoc-Roussillon, Haute-
Normandie, and Picardie, moderate conservatives made pacts with the 
FN to secure power and to allocate important executive posts. Despite 
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this extensive network of regional collaboration, the UDF and RPR, 
upon gaining the majority in the Assemblee Nationale, rejected formal 
cooperation with the Front National's 35 deputies. By 1988, nonethe­
less, the UDF and RPR were making second-ballot deals with the FN 
to save national parliamentary seats and coopting key FN policy 
themes, such as immigration reform, in an effort to reunite the right-
wing electorate. 
SOCIALIST-COMMUNIST RUPTURE. The Socialist Party's (PS) coa­
lition "ouverture" in 1988 to the Center marked a clear shift away from 
the old "Union of the Left" socialist-communist axis. Stopping short 
of a formal alliance with the centrist parties in parliament, Michel Ro­
card wooed several centrist and right-wing figures into his govern­
ment, including Jean-Pierre Soisson (ex—UDF-PR), Jean-Marie Rausch 
(CDS), Olivier Stirn (ex-UDF-Rad), and Lionel Stoleru (ex~UDF-PR). 
By 1990, the non-Socialist members of the "majorite presidentielle" 
had formed the France Unie (FU) movement, a "party" with which the 
PS did not sign a global accord but with which the Socialists attempted 
regional coalitions in Lorraine and Bourgogne in 1992.3 The price for 
the national-level shift, however, could be seen in the widespread re­
fusal by PCF councilors to support PS presidential candidates in the 
regions. 
FIRST "ROSE-VERTE" COALITION. Socialists and ecologists for the 
first time agreed to share power following the 1992 regional council 
election in Nord-Pas de Calais. Just days later, a national spokesman 
for the PS declared, "An alliance with the ecologists is today indis­
pensable. Not only would this permit us to maybe win the legislative 
elections, but it would represent a first phase of enlarging the political 
space."4 Another leading party official stated that "it is now the so­
cialists, the communists, and the Verts who must emerge as a new ma-
jority."5 By February 1993, former PS Prime Minister Michel Rocard 
had launched his campaign for a political "big bang" on the Left to 
constitute a vast new movement including socialists, centrists, ecolo­
gists, and reform communists that would be based on the Nord-Pas de 
Calais model. 
In France, therefore, two of the three primary coalition innovations 
since the mid-1980s have involved mainstream parties attempting al­
ternative regional-level coalition models with ecologists and national­
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ists. In both cases, developments at regional level generated a political 
dynamic that influenced national-level cooperation. 
Summary 
Table 8.1 summarizes the nature and direction of major coalition 
innovations in the three countries. In these innovations and in their 
consequences is initial evidence of the primary locus of coalition ex­
perimentation and of apparent bottom-up coalition learning. On the 
surface at least, national coalitions do seem to be reacting to devel­
opments at subnational levels, and by setting precedents for alternative 
types of cooperation, parties appear to have enlarged the number of 
permissible coalition options in national parliament available to them. 
Is there some systematic reason that may indicate why "learning" a new 
coalition might be easier first at the subnational level than at the na­
tional level, as well as vice versa? One possibility is that coalitional 
learning is easiest first at the subnational level when policy problems 
are driven primarily by domestic regional-economic concerns, whereas 
coalitional learning is more viable first at the national level when policy 
problems are driven primarily by constitutional or international con­
cerns. Thus, in Belgium, the one clear example of a national-level 
coalition innovation coming first is that prompted by the issue of con­
stitutional reform of the state's structures. Similarly, the example of 
the breakdown of the "Union of the Left" in France comes in 1988 
amid the general breakup of communist dominance in the Soviet 
Union and throughout Europe. By contrast, the remaining examples 
of subnational influence revolve more around domestic and regional 
issues and events rather than shifting international developments or 
those dealing with the core identity of the nation-state. 
It might also be tempting to assume that because a country has mul­
tiple subnational units but only one national parliament, the proba­
bility of a new coalition's emergence at the subnational level is simply 
by definition higher, assuming a random distribution of outcomes. 
This might then be consistent with an argument that coalition building 
is a discrete event and that any connection between national and sub-
national levels is spurious. This assumption, more likely, is a moot 
point since the important concern is ultimately not with estimating the 
likelihood of where new coalitions will emerge but with if and how a 
coalition strategy that previously seemed impossible to consider can, 
once adopted somewhere in the system, transform the coalition game 
Table 8.1 
Origins and Directions of Coalition Change 
Direction 
of 
Coalition Innovation Site Consequence Time Lag Influence 
Belgium 
First "tripartite" coalition Brabant Province, 1971 Tripartite national government formed 12 months t 
K9 
First coalition with Luxembourg Province, 1974 Community Party (RW) enters national 3 months t 
09 
"Community" Party government 
First coalition with regional­ National Government, 1977 Federalist parties join Brabant 12 months i 
nationalist parties provincial coalition 
First non-Catholic (non-CVP) Limburg Province, 1991 First formateur since 1958 with mission 2 weeks t 
government in Flanders to form national government without 
Catholic parties 
First "asymmetrical" coalition Brabant Province, 1991 Split between CVP and PSC over 5 months t 
joining new national government 
Asymmetrical coalition established in 4 years t 
Brussels Region 
Germany 
"Grand" coalition Lower Saxony, 1965; Berlin, CDU/CSU-SPD grand federal coalition Years 
1955; Saarland, 1955; and from 1966 to 1969 
most immediate postwar 
Land governments 
Social-Liberal government 7 of 11 Lander from 1946 SPD-FDP government from 1969 Years 
to 1969 to 1982 
First "red-green" coalition Hessen, 1985 SPD-Green government in Lower Years 
Saxony, 1990 
{2 First "traffic light" coalition Brandenburg, 1990 SPD-FDP-Green coalition in Bremen, 11 months 
1991 
France 
First coalitions with National 
Front 
Socialist collaboration with 
Dreux, 1983; multiple 
regions, 1986 
National government, Rocard 
2nd-ballot deals in 1988 national 
election 
Alliances with France Unie in Lorraine 
Years 
Years 
t 
i 
center (France Unie) cabinet, 1988 and Bourgogne in 1992 
First "rose-verte" coalition Nord-Pas de Calais, 1992 PS announces "big bang" strategy to 
reorient Left 
10 months t 
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throughout the system. Moreover, it may be dubious to assume a priori 
a random distribution of coalition outcomes, given Laver's theoretical 
contentions that "local coalitions are negotiated in the context of a par­
ticular coalition government at national level," that subnational politi­
cians "attempt as a first recourse to form an equivalent local coalition," 
and thus that there may be "very heavy constraints that national pol­
itics can conceivably impose upon local coalitional behaviour" (Laver 
1989, 24-27). 
Councilors9 Perceptions of Strategic Influence 
Prima facie evidence that coalition precedents are set in subnational 
assemblies with a subsequent impact on national alliances is a powerful 
and necessary first indicator of linkage. It is not sufficient, however, 
and we must look deeper to determine if such linkages are conscious 
or merely coincidental. Do subnational politicians themselves perceive 
any direct or indirect influence on national coalition patterns? Are sub-
national politicians motivated by the expectation that the coalitions they 
choose may affect coalition decisions at the national level? How open 
(a precondition for experimentation) are subnational legislators to al­
liances with "alternative" partners? Do national politicians actually 
seek out evidence from coalitional experiments at the subnational 
level? These are crucial questions that are explored with survey data 
and with interview probing. 
Recognizing Interdependence 
Councilors responding to the survey questionnaire were asked the 
following two complementary questions: 
"Can successful coalitional cooperation in your [subnational govern­
ment] lead to a coalition between the same parties in the [national 
government]?" 
"Can successful coalition cooperation in [national government] lead 
to a coalition between the same parties in your [subnational govern­
ment]?" 
Both questions sought only to measure local legislators' perceptions of 
(a) bottom-up and (b) top-down coalition influence. If government for­
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mations are discrete events, as conventional coalition theories often 
assume, then we should anticipate the null hypothesis—namely, that 
respondents perceive no real connection between coalitions in separate 
institutional arenas.6 Alternatively, if either distinct bottom-up or top-
down coalition influence does exist, then response patterns should re­
veal clear discrepancies in one direction or another. 
The story as told by elected councilors (table 8.2) is that alliances 
formed in territorial assemblies can serve a functional purpose by in­
fluencing future coalition arrangements at the national level. Even 
though federalism emerges here as a potentially important variable, 
this pattern is consistent across structurally different countries. While 
it is not especially surprising that the null hypothesis of no perceived 
linkage does not hold at the individual level, the magnitude of per­
ceived bottom-up influence is striking, particularly in France and Bel­
gium, with their strong traditions of elite control and centralization. 
Such evidence suggests that the temporal sequence of coalition inno­
vation in the three countries, as discussed in the previous section, is 
more than coincidental. Actors in the system perceive not only that 
national coalitions assume the position of the status quo in local coa­
lition bargaining but also that exchanges in the Lander are antecedents 
of coalition innovation at the federal level in Germany. Provincial and 
regional experiments in Belgium likewise herald national coalition 
changes. Regional coalitions as testing grounds ("banes d'essai") in 
France have yet to produce the major changes in national government 
of the magnitude found in the other two countries; nevertheless, their 
consequences in terms of cabinet shake-ups, electoral deal making, and 
policy shifts are seen as real by individuals immersed in the process. 
Numerous factors may account for differences in attitudes about the 
relationship between subnational and national coalition politics: the 
structure of party organization (level of central control), party ideology 
(extreme or moderate), a party's past history of government partici­
pation, past electoral history, fractionalization of the party system, in­
centives in the electoral law, and the visibility and importance of 
subnational governments, to name a few. The informational value of 
subnational parliaments as coalition "proving grounds" should, for ex­
ample, increase with the active intervention of national party leaders 
and other prominent national political figures in the local bargaining 
process. This "nationalization" of local coalition bargaining strips the 
postelection government formation of its purely parochial character, 
heightens the stakes, and subjects the strength of national inter party 
relations to well-publicized tests. In such cases, learning is enhanced, 
Table 8.2 
Perceptions of Coalition Influence across Institutional Tiers 
Bottom-Up Top-Down Primary Direction of Change 
% Reporting % Reporting % Reporting % Reporting 
Weak or No Some or Strong Weak or No Some or Strong % Indicating *Yo Indicating % Indicating 
Vertical Vertical Vertical Vertical Top-Down Bottom-Up Bi-Directional 
Influence Influence Influence Influence 
Germany 6.5 93.5 9.5 90.5 20.5 12.6 66.9 
Belgium 41.3 58.7 31.8 68.2 16.2 23.7 60.1 
France 50.8 49.2 22.6 77.4 5.9 10.3 83.8 
N 222 358 119 460 69 75 405 
AT as % 
of survey 
sample 38.3% 61.7% 20.6% 79.4% 12.5% 13.7% 73.8% 
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and subnational coalition experiences become more accurate providers 
of the information required by parties in the national bargaining 
arena—for example, the compatibility of parties, their loyalty to one 
another, and the coalition's electoral popularity. When such interven­
tion manifests itself as control, however, restrictions on local experi­
mentation inhibit coalitional learning. Similarly, barriers to effective 
organizational communication across subnational-national levels (char­
acteristic especially of extremist parties led by strong, charismatic lead­
ers) can reduce the capacity for bottom-up influence. 
These propositions are largely supported by consistent patterns in 
the survey data (table 8.3). Despite the deleterious consequences for 
local issue priorities and success in horizontal bargaining as revealed 
in chapter 7, national party intervention in regional or provincial co­
alition negotiations appears to have an additional but more construc­
tive side effect of increasing bottom-up influence on party strategy. 
Similarly, where party discipline is relaxed and channels of commu­
nication linking parties' peripheries to their respective cores are open 
and informal, the evidence shows higher levels of reported vertical in­
fluence. Finally, influence is greatest in parties located at the political 
center and weakest on the extreme Right. Given the natural advantage 
that centrist parties enjoy in being able to look in two directions for 
potential partners, this reported receptivity to influence from the pe­
riphery makes logical sense. 
Together, these data on vertical influence make it clear that a mean­
ingful understanding of strategy and cooperation among national 
parliamentary parties should not neglect models attempted in the pe­
riphery. In so doing, they indicate a functional role for meso-level pol­
iticians, most of whom do recognize an interdependence of coalitions 
across different levels of government. Here, then, is tangible evidence 
supporting the theoretical assertion that "coalition behavior in one sit­
uation both affects and is affected by behavior in other situations" 
(Hinckley 1981, 81). The survey data do not, however, adequately 
gauge the extent to which subnational legislators are themselves mo­
tivated to action by the expectation that their coalition choices in the 
subnational arena can influence coalition choices in the national arena. 
This was a matter for systematic probing in elite interviews. 
Motivation 
Responding to questions in face-to-face interviews, politicians tell 
stories of previous experiences negotiating new governing alliances in 
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Table 8.3 
Perceptions of Coalition Learning, 
by Party and Individual Variables 
Bottom-Up 
% Reporting % Reporting 
"Weak" or "No" "Some" or "Strong" 
Vertical Influence Vertical Influence 
Party Variables 
Intervention by National Party 
Extensive 22.7 77.3 
Limited or none 45.6 54.4 
Level of Central Control 
Local dissidence allowed 17.8 82.2 
Local dissidence punished 32.9 67.1 
Vertical Communication 
Free and open 20.6 79.4 
Limited or none 40.8 59.2 
Party Ideology 
Left 19.8 80.2 
Center 13.3 86.7 
Right 31.0 69.0 
Extreme* 47.1 52.9 
Left-libertarian (e.g., Green) 26.5 73.5 
Party variables: x2 = 2.563, df = 1, sig. = 0.103 
Level of central control: x2 = 2.933, df = 1, sig. = 0.087 
Vertical communication: x2 = 4.534, df = 1, sig. = 0.049 
Party ideology: x2 = 6,790, df = 4, sig. = 0.049 
includes FN (France and Belgium), DVU, REPs, CPNT. 
regional and provincial parliaments that inform theoretical expecta­
tions about the motivation and direction of "flow." Particularly relevant 
are councilors' replies to the following question: 
"How important is it for you and your party group to influence na­
tional coalition strategy through the coalition decisions you make in 
[regional/Land/provincial] parliaments?" 
The interview subjects, selected according to past participation in co­
alition negotiations, were asked whether bottom-up influence had been 
a "primary motivating influence," an "important factor," "something 
Coalition "Proving Grounds" • 239 
considered, but only secondarily" during negotiations, or an element 
that "did not enter into the decision-making process." 
All 22 German Landtag deputies interviewed, representing five par­
ties and with more than half holding some leadership position within 
their respective parliamentary groups, answered that federal-level im­
plications are an "important factor" considered in forming a Land gov­
ernment, although none answered that causing a change in the Bonn 
coalition had been the "primary motivating influence" behind the for­
mation of a Land coalition. Christian Democrats and Social Democrats 
in Baden-Wiirttemberg and Berlin, for example, were pressed on the 
extent to which influencing the creation of a new "GroBe Koalition" in 
federal government had motivated the formation of CDU-SPD gov­
ernments in the two Lander. Members of both parties generally echoed 
the thoughts of a senior CDU member of Berlin's governing executive: 
"A great coalition following federal elections is only possible if it is 
necessary. If voters suggest no other alternative, then a great coalition 
is acceptable. That is what happened here in Berlin. Yes, our coalition 
sends a signal to Bonn as we knew it would. But I do not anticipate a great 
coalition unless there is no other choice."7 For a former SPD Fraktion­
vorsitzender and 16-year veteran of the Berlin parliament: "I would al­
ways fight a grand coalition if there is a sensible alternative to it. . .  . 
It can only be justified to have a grand coalition if you have dramatic 
problems that call for something like a 'national union.' If you think 
of jobs, housing, reunification, and moving the seat of government 
from Bonn to Berlin, then right now I think that we are at the stage 
that everyone agrees that there are big problems. In the SPD we had 
two choices: a minority cabinet with outside support from the PDS, or 
a grand coalition with the CDU. Mathematics forced the two big parties 
together, but in doing this we knew at the time that the eyes of those who 
desire a new national union government would be on us."8 
For the CDU fraktion leader in Baden-Wiirttemberg's Landtag, the 
federal-level implications of forming a CDU-SPD government in Stutt­
gart had been deliberated after the 1992 state election: "The majority 
in the CDU desired the SPD because the issues demanded a large ma­
jority. This, you may say, is also true in Bonn with the issues of asylum 
seekers and rebuilding the eastern Lands. And some here in our party 
wanted to make the comparison. To duplicate the grand coalition is pos­
sible, sure, in Bonn. It is not a wish of mine. If election results dic­
tate that it must be done, it would be done. It is a question of necessity 
more than anything else."9 The SPD's parliamentary leader in Baden­
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Wixrttemberg concurred that electoral necessity usually overrides choice 
and motivation: "There was no realistic alternative to a CDU-SPD gov­
ernment in 1992." However, the SPD placed strategic value on the op­
portunity once it had been presented: "Being in opposition at the 
federal level, it is important for the SPD to show the ability to form coalitions 
with many parties. Perhaps this is a motivation for vs. We can show that 
CDU-SPD government works effectively. We have already solved a lot 
of problems in our state: we have the biggest program to build houses 
in all states in Germany; the increase of deficit spending is stopped; 
we combat the Neo-Nazis; we will hire much more policemen and 
teachers. We give our party at federal level all this information."10 
These well-placed participants in Germany's state-level coalition pro­
cess all point to the messages that Landtag coalitions send to federal 
government, and all admit that the anticipated consequences of these 
messages entered the parties' precoalition calculations. 
In recounting the motivations for entering into provincial and 
regional-level coalitions, almost half of the 44 Belgian politicians ques­
tioned responded that influencing national coalitions had for them 
been an "important factor." The only representatives to respond that 
causing a change in national government had been the "primary mo­
tivating influence" behind subnational coalition strategy were mem­
bers of the francophone ecologist party, Ecolo, despite the fact that the 
party has never participated in anything but a handful of municipal 
coalitions. The Ecolos stated that gaining a place in an intermediate-
level government would be a step toward real participation in national 
government. For one party leader in Luxembourg province, "It is our 
ultimate wish to be able to influence political decisions at the national 
level. We are getting there slowly. You see this in [Prime Minister] De­
haene asking for Ecolo's support to pass the federalization reforms. In 
this province we do not want to stay in the opposition for a long time 
because it is not very pleasant. If we want our ideas to be concrete, we 
must go into the majority. We want this because we know it will bring 
us closer to greater influence in Wallonia and in Belgium."11 A step up 
the institutional ladder at the Brussels-Capital Regional Council, Eco-
lo's leader predicted, "We expect to be in the next majority in the re­
gional council. Brussels will likely be the first council in which Ecolo 
will be in the majority. In the future the same coalition all over Wal­
lonia should be expected, and that coalition should determine the na­
tional parliament."12 
For assembly members from other Belgian parties, the expectation 
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that subnational coalitions can influence national coalitions does not 
rank as a primary motivating factor. It is worth comparing the re­
sponses of two Liberal Party (PRL) provincial councilors, the first of 
whom lamented: "In Hainaut, Socialists can choose their allies, and 
they usually just choose the weakest party or the party they can best 
manipulate. We tried to put together a non-PS majority with three 
parties. We wanted to do that for Hainaut, not because we thought we 
could change politics in the nation. If it had worked and we had elim­
inated the Socialists in their strongest province, then of course there 
would have been some people thinking about how this might change 
things in Brussels."13 A second PRL councilor suggests that pure office-
seeking motivations outweigh hopes of influencing national coalition 
configurations: "Liberals and Socialists have been in the provincial ma­
jority since 1981, but Liberals and Socialists have not been together, 
alone, in national government once during that time. That should tell 
you something. It is important for us to be in the deputation in Liege; 
after that, then we worry about national government."14 While only the 
Ecolo councilors admit to deriving primary motivation from the pros­
pect of influencing national alliances in the pursuit of subnational co­
alition strategies, most suggest that national-level implications of a 
subnational coalition do become apparent subsequent to its formation. 
All 31 French interviewees, including regional council executives 
and party leaders, responded that the national-level implications of a 
regional coalition had at least been "considered" during the majority 
formation process. Only the interviewees from the extreme-right Front 
National, however, went further to express a belief that these impli­
cations had for them been the "primary motivating influence." Most 
of the subjects suggested that the expectation of influencing national 
party alliances had been "considered, but only secondarily" in pur­
suing a particular coalition strategy. Characteristic of most regional 
councilors are the comments of one Socialist in Picardie: "The state of 
relations between the parties across France can be very much the same 
state of relations in this region. That means that certain things are not 
possible here because they are not possible elsewhere in France. It also 
means that if something new happens here it may then be possible somewhere 
else in the country. Everyone knows this, but it is not the only thing we 
think about. Our goal is to put together a majority that can work to­
gether. We make a strategy so that we can pass a budget, not because 
we want to make a coalition with this party or that in Paris."15 
If the ecologists in Belgium are those who place the most concern 
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on influencing national patterns through subnational coalition build­
ing, in France it is the right-wing nationalists. According to one leading 
FN party figure in Nord-Pas de Calais, "It is at the top of our priorities 
that the Front National be in regional government. We now have mem­
bers in all regional councils, more than 230 in all. The party has been 
represented in the executives of many regions. These are the facts. 
You cannot deny them. We expect that our success in the regions will 
help us succeed later as a party of government. Part of our strategy in 
the regions is to help the Right save itself from itself, but our larger 
strategy is to prepare for national government!716 
Among most mainstream parties in France, there is strong senti­
ment in the regions that coalition decisions can set a "tone" for future 
party relations at the national level and that some prominent figures 
are motivated by this prospect. While agreeing that these linkages are 
growing stronger, some regional councilors nevertheless reject for the 
moment the conclusion that France's regions have yet become the co­
alition "proving grounds" that the Lander appear to be in Germany. 
A typical response is that of a Languedoc-Roussillon regional councilor 
and local Socialist Party secretary: "In the South of France political 
discussions rest much more on the quality of human relations between 
elected representatives than on national political engagements."17 Oth­
ers, such as a regional councilor in Alsace and party spokesperson for 
Les Verts, argue that the French national electoral system ("scrutin 
majoritaire") simply keeps regional coalitions from being "pertinent" 
at the national level. The variety of responses from French politicians 
suggests a wider range of motivational concerns and a greater uncer­
tainty about the strategic import of the new regional assemblies than 
is to be found among members of the well-established subnational in­
stitutions in Germany and Belgium. 
Together, these assessments from key actors in each of the three 
countries provide evidence that politicians in subnational assemblies 
are to a large degree aware of the possible national-level implications 
of their decisions and that some even perceive these implications to be 
important motivational considerations in the decision-making process. 
But there is not sufficient evidence to suggest that the overriding con­
cern in government formation and coalition bargaining is the expec­
tation of changing national coalition patterns. This appears to be for 
many a secondary concern, but still one to be worried over once the 
dust has cleared from the more immediate and proximate issue of 
forming the subnational majority. 
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The View from Above 
National politicians corroborate the stories told by their colleagues in 
regional and provincial assemblies about the presence and direction 
of coalitional influence and learning. Like most subnational represen­
tatives, party leaders in the capital agree that an existing national par­
liamentary alliance generally defines the initial negotiating positions of 
parties in local coalition bargaining. More important, strategists in na­
tional party headquarters admit to carefully studying the policy ca­
pacities and popular approval of subnational coalition governments. 
Such scrutiny informs the party leadership as to whether it can afford 
to continue the coalition realignment and whether the new coalition 
pattern at the subnational level might be regarded as a model for ac­
tivities at the national level. 
Indicative are comments from national-level representatives of 
three center parties, each of which normally occupies a position in 
national government: 
Federal Party Spokesman, German FDP: We never had the situation 
from the Lander where there was pressure on us to join this or that 
coalition. This is of course different than the question of whether we 
can learn from successes and failures of experience in the Lander. 
This we do. We must to survive.18 
Secretary General, French UDF-CDS: When one is a small party in the 
center—small in numbers—but indispensable to all governmental 
coalitions, one is forcibly solicited by persons on the Left and persons 
on the Right. The ecologists in the regions have tried to charm us. 
Because of their offers there, we decided to see them here in Paris, 
to receive them, and to listen to them. So far we have only told them, 
"You are very nice, but no thank you." We have been tempted by 
alliance with the Right—for example, with the Front National in Al­
sace. We are extremely opposed to the Front National, and we are 
faced with a political reality that we profoundly regret. But the in­
troduction of the extreme Right in the regions at least allows us to 
test a new manner of alliance and to see if the duties of governing 
might tame the party of Le Pen.19 
Senator, Belgian CVP: It is a realistic possibility now in Belgium to 
govern without the CVP. Being the party of government for so many 
years has made us weaker and weaker, because people are always 
looking for a scapegoat. You can compare it to a domestic situation: 
If you have some brothers fighting, the father takes the oldest one 
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aside and punishes him even though the oldest may have been trying 
to find a solution. The oldest should have known better—that's his 
responsibility. Because the CVP is being punished election after elec­
tion, we have to search more creatively for new coalition partners. 
We look seriously at our relations with other parties in the regions, 
the communes, and the provinces. Unfortunately, past experience 
has taught us that the Volksunie cannot be trusted and that it has 
no future, that the ecologists have many slogans but no concrete so­
lutions for implementation, and that the Vlaams Blok is too paro­
chial and egoistic in its approach to policy.20 
Each of these parties faces a crisis. The FDP flirts with disaster each 
time it misses or comes near to missing the 5% threshold for entering 
parliament at federal and state levels. The Christian Democrats and 
the UDF in France watch the FN on the extreme Right scale to levels 
of 15% in electoral support. The CVP in Belgium bears the brunt of 
anti-incumbency sentiment. In each case, knowledgeable actors at the 
national level report that they look to subnational experience for at 
least some of the information they need to devise strategy. This fact 
goes far toward supporting Dodd's proposition and our expectations 
about coalitional learning. 
Experimentation 
Players in the coalition game report important national-subnational 
linkages and the existence of learning across time and parliamentary 
levels in all three countries. Learning entails experimentation. In turn, 
experimentation presupposes a certain amount of openness in the co­
alition system. Openness is a "learning condition." If subnational as­
semblies are to be considered laboratories for national coalitions, then 
such experimentation must assume the willingness of subnational 
councilors and party leaders to form alliances with nontraditional part­
ners. Unconventional coalitions, perhaps concocted by national elites, 
may however be resisted from the grass roots and by the very persons 
whose task it will be to govern with the nontraditional parties. Lower-
or middle-level politicians "who may have little chance of holding ma­
jor office may distrust those who tell them, often from the back seat 
of a chauffeur-driven Mercedes, that policy compromises are neces­
sary so that the party can get into office" (Laver and Schofield 1990, 
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57). How "open"21 politicians in subnational parliaments are to the en­
tire range of coalitions following an election is therefore an important 
empirical question. While formal theoretical expectations hold that the 
set of all mathematically possible combinations of political parties con­
stitutes the actual universe of coalition possibilities, such expectations 
should be tested and not merely assumed. 
Survey data allow a limited test of the "openness" hypothesis. The 
questionnaire presented respondents with a list of the parties com­
peting for seats in each respective territorial parliament. Respondents 
were then asked: "Which party or parties from the following list could 
you never envision forming a coalition?" A binary code (0, 1) was as­
signed to a respondent's reply for each party listed, (0) if the respon­
dent indicated that he or she could never collaborate with the party 
and (1) if the respondent indicated otherwise. Summing the total and 
averaging by the total number of parties listed provides a general in­
dicator of the respondent's openness to the range of parties in the co­
alition system. If a respondent checked no parties, then the openness 
measure would equal 1. Alternatively, if a respondent checked all the 
parties listed, the openness measure would equal 0.22 
The a priori expectation of traditional theory is one of perfect open­
ness. Hence, we can hypothesize that the closer the mean score for a 
given unit is to 1.0 the greater the openness, the more facilitative the 
conditions for coalition experimentation and the more appropriate 
the assumption of "allgemeine Koalitionsfahigkeit." Table 8.4 pro­
vides the mean openness values by country and party.23 In no single 
case is openness absolute. Of the three countries, Belgium's subna­
tional legislators suggest the greatest openness (0.76), while the mean 
response of German state parliamentarians is lowest (0.62). Variance 
across parties is greatest in France, with coalition openness ranging 
from 0.87 (France Unie) to 0.37 (FN). 
Which are the offending parties that lead respondents to restrict 
the set of permissible coalitions? In most contemporary liberal de­
mocracies, the "new politics" ecologist parties and the "old politics" 
nationalist parties are those attempting to use territorial parliaments 
as forums for legitimation and as stepping-stones for their national 
ambitions. In the absence of a major breakthrough election that would 
give one of these parties an absolute majority, however, each must 
search for at least one coalition partner willing to engage in political 
experimentation. How open, though, are the mainstream parties in 
each country to governing coalitions with the Green parties as well as 
Table 8.4 
Openness to All Possible Coalition Partners (respondent means) 
Belgium Germany France 
(N = 145) (N = 182) (N = 254) 
Francophone Democratic 0.83 German People's 0.66 France Unie (FU) 0.87 
Front (FDF) Union (DVU) Radical Leftists (MRG) 0.80 
Socialists (PS) 0.82 Christian Democratic 0.64 Socialists (PS) 0.77 
Ecologists (ECOLO) 0.80 Union (CDU) Ecologists (GE) 0.77 
Christian Socials (PSC) 0.75 Free Democrats (FDP) 0.62 French Democratic 0.73 
Liberals (PRL) 0.69 Republicans (REP) 0.60 Union (UDF) 
Social Democrats (SPD) 0.60 Rally for the Republic (RPR) 0.69 
Greens (Griinen) 0.56 Ecologists (Verts) 0.64 
Communists (PC) 0.39 
National Front (FN) 0.37 
Mean 0.76 0.62 0.65 
Note: Complete openness = 1.0; complete closure = 0.0. 
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with the emergent parties on the far right? Official pronouncements 
from national party elites aside, it is clearly worth examining the at­
titudes of subnational officeholders. 
Figure 8.3 provides an indication of the willingness of traditional 
parties not to exclude ecologist parties from their set of potential co­
alition partners. For all but the French Front National, representatives 
of the major parties in each country refuse to rule out the possibility 
of coalition with the ecologists. This is true even of the German CDU, 
although no such "black-green" coalition has ever formed successfully 
at the Land level. French regional councilors, faced with two Green 
alternatives (Verts and Generation Ecologie), appear more open to 
partnership with Brice Lalonde's GE, the less "fundamentalist" of the 
two parties. One notable exception to the French pattern is the Com­
munist Party, whose respondents suggest a much stronger preference 
for Antoine Waechter's Verts. 
The right-hand side of figure 8.3 details the coalition openness re­
ported by respondents from the respective ecologist parties in Bel­
gium, Germany, and France. Although most Greens ("ni gauche, ni 
droite") reject placement of their parties on a single-dimension Left-
Right ideological scale, these councilors suggest much greater open­
ness toward left-of-center socialist and social democratic parties than 
toward right-of-center conservative parties. Belgian Ecolos suggest 
overwhelming acceptance of coalition with both the PS and the PSC, 
but their enthusiasm is more muted for the Liberal PRL. The German 
Greens register strong approval of the SPD as possible and actual part­
ners, and many refuse to discard the Christian Democrats or even the 
Liberals as potential coalition allies. Of the French Greens, it is worth 
noting the complete closure with regard to the FN, the hesitancy with 
respect to the PCF, and the almost equivalent openness to coalitions 
with very different political forces: the PS and the UDF. 
Coalition openness with regard to ecologist parties stands in stark 
contrast to the reported openness of subnational councilors toward 
possible power-sharing arrangements with parties of the far right. Fig­
ure 8.4 indicates widespread aversion among traditional parties to the 
idea of participating in coalition with right-wing nationalist parties. In 
Belgium, the Front National had by 1991 gained entry into the Hai­
naut and Namur provincial councils, the Council of the French Com­
munity, and the national parliament. A clear majority of respondents 
from the mainstream Walloon parties do, however, rule out a future 
coalition that might include the FN, but in the three "traditional" par­
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Figure 8,3 Coalition Experimentation with Green Parties 
ties even this attitude is not absolute. Apparently much stronger is the 
resolve of the French Left and the French ecologists to avoid collabo­
ration with Le Pen's FN. In Germany, whispers about sympathies 
within the CDU toward the Republikaner party and the Deutsche 
Volksunion appear to be not without at least some substance. For ex­
ample, of the 19 CDU respondents from Baden-Wiirttemberg, where 
the Republicans gained 15 seats in the 1992 Landtag election, 9 re­
fused to reject the possibility of working with the far-right party. 
Evidence also shows that far-right parties, although generally la­
beled untouchables by mainstream parties, are themselves quite open 
to coalitions with "the establishment." This openness, however, is con­
fined to coalitions with parties of the Right or center Right. Thus, co­
alitions with socialists, communists, and ecologists are both unlikely 
and off limits. It is worth pointing out here how well responses from 
regional representatives of the French Front National graphically 
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Figure 8.4 Coalition Experimentation with Far-Right Parties 
match expectations about coalition preferences based upon ideological 
proximity and minimum "distance": openness toward the right-wing 
RPR reduces almost evenly as one moves leftward across the ideolog­
ical spectrum to the PCF.24 
It is apparent from these data that the universe of politically pos­
sible coalitions—while perhaps not as large as the universe of math­
ematically possible coalitions—is still significantly larger than what 
might be deduced from the set of coalitions that have in fact already 
formed. There is no absolute "openness" in any of the three countries 
nor among any of the parties. This formal assumption falls apart upon 
inspection of attitudes and behavior at the micro-level. However, there 
is enough evidence to argue that at subnational levels we should con­
tinue to assume that all mathematically possible combinations of par­
ties constitute the universe of possible governing coalitions. This is not 
to say that all coalitions are equal in the eyes of those who must par­
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ticipate in them. The point is that given the right conditions, almost 
no coalition can be ruled out at the subnational level. Hence, the pos­
sibility of experimentation is real. 
"Perfect Information": Cases of Experimentation 
The example discussed in chapter 7 of Luxembourg province and the 
deleterious effects that its rupture of the PSC-PRL "pacte de huit ans" 
had on Belgian government in 1987 is but one case of party policy at 
one governmental tier having an impact on relations at another. There 
are numerous others, most of which have been ignored in the com­
parative literature. The following three cases address instances of sub-
national political engineering and their potential as proving grounds 
for new coalitional strategies. In these cases, parties pursue new and 
unique forms of political cooperation for a variety of reasons: electoral 
necessity, displeasure with previous partners, instructions from party 
leaders, issue-based affinity, unity in the face of challenge from ex­
tremists, and signal sending to national counterparts. Whatever the 
root motivation, experimentation involves risks and compromises. Ex­
ploring how parties weigh the costs and benefits of experimentation 
and determine strategy should tell us something about political moti­
vations at the subnational level, should highlight the influential role of 
contextual conditions on government formation, and should indicate 
the opportunities to use subnational institutions as laboratories for cre­
ative policy making and as a learning process for political cooperation. 
Case L Experimenting with "Asymmetry": Brabant Province 
and the Five-Party Coalition of 1991 
Observers of Belgian politics traditionally regarded the problems of 
Brabant province as being like those of the entire country, but in min­
iature. Before its scission in 1995, the province of 2.2 million inhabi­
tants straddled the country's linguistic dividing line to include bilingual 
Brussels within its borders. Here the Dutch-speaking and French-
speaking communities meet and compete. Here issues of economic de­
velopment, jobs creation, education, culture, and health care have de­
manded Brabantine solutions, not Flemish or Walloon ones. Before the 
1995 division of the province into Walloon Brabant and Flemish Bra­
bant, Brabant's provincial council had been the only subnational as­
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sembly in Belgium to include political parties from both linguistic 
regions. Predictably, this enlarged the universe of coalition possibilities 
available following elections, although the singular characteristic of 
provincial governments in Brabant since the early 1970s has been one 
of "tripartism" among the six parties of the Socialist, Catholic, and 
Liberal families. The "pentapartite" coalition of 1991, however, chal­
lenged this pattern. 
In Belgian terms, the provincial coalition established in November 
1991 can be regarded as historic, though again in miniature. Through­
out the country, voters registered their displeasure with mainstream 
politics by turning their backs on traditional parties at the polls, allow­
ing ecologists and right-wing extremists to record significant gains. In 
Brabant, elections to the provincial assembly largely followed national 
patterns, with four of the six majority parties (PS, SP, CVP, PRL) losing 
seats in the 90-member council (table 8.5). The remaining two parties 
of provincial government, the PSC and PVV, maintained their 1987 
levels of representation. Still, as the previous majority had been an 
oversized coalition boasting 71 of the 90 seats, the losses in 1991 had 
only reduced a potential traditional tripartite majority to a healthy 63. 
As the results were tallied on election night, Francis De Hondt, re­
elected to the provincial council on the PSC list, analyzed: "The current 
majority has lost eight seats, but it is still a comfortable majority. All 
other possibilities seem to me to be quite improbable."25 Similarly, Jan 
Anthoons, a CVP member of the outgoing provincial executive, pre­
dicted: "A majority of only two [party families] is impossible in view 
of the results. Therefore we will very probably continue with the same 
partners."26 
What neither De Hondt nor Anthoons anticipated were the events 
that would occur the week following the election. In what the Brussels 
daily Le Soir proclaimed to be "un accord historique" that would "in­
augure l'asymetrie,"27 five parties—PS, SP, PRL, PVV, CVP—formally 
agreed to share provincial power and to divide the Brabant executive. 
Noticeably absent from this arrangement were the francophone Chris­
tian Socials (PSC), a party that had been part of the provincial majority 
without interruption for the previous 30 years. For the first time ever 
in Belgium, one linguistic wing of a party family had entered a gov­
erning coalition without its partner: in this case, the Flemish CVP had 
accepted a coalition without the French-speaking PSC. 
Reactions to the coalition decision ranged from dismay to resigna­
tion. Jean Courtin, president of the PSC federation in Brabant, la­
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Table 8.5 
Brabant Provincial Assembly, November 1991 
Votes Executive 
Party Seats (%) Portfolios 
Francophone Socialist Party (PS) 10 (-5 ) 10.29 (-4.22) 1 ( = ) 
Flemish Socialist Party (SP) 9 (-D 9.36 (-1.47) 1 ( = ) 
Christian Social Party (PSC) 6 ( = ) 6.90 (-0.07) ( - 1  ) 
Christian People's Party (CVP) 13 (-D 13.02 (-2.34) 1 ( = ) 
Liberal Reform Party (PRL) 15 (-D 14.10 (-2.06) 2 (+1 ) 
Flemish Liberal Party (PVV) 10 ( = ) 10.49 ( + 0.06) 1 ( = ) 
Francophone Democratic Front (FDF) 7 ( = ) 7.06 ( + 0.34) 
Flemish People's Union (VU) 5 (-2) 5.43 (-1.55) 
Ecolo 7 ( + 3) 7.71 ( + 3.49) 
Agalev 4 ( + 2) 4.72 (+1.26) 
Vlaams Blok 4 ( + 4) 6.24 ( + 4.55) 
Total 90 95.32 6 
mented, "I am outraged by the attitude of the CVP. In fact I am 
astonished at the attitude of the CVP that it did not defend its small 
francophone brother." Jean-Paul Dumon, spokesman for the PSC 
group in the provincial council, declared that he was "surprised and 
scandalized'* by the coalition outcome. The PSC's national office 
judged "scandalous" the attitude of the PRL, which "pleads for a place 
in a tripartite national government," as well as that of the PS, which 
"would like to govern with the PSC at all levels of power."28 In respond­
ing, the CVP said only that "we did not really have a choice; it was 
either us in the coalition, or the alternative: Volksunie or the FDF."29 
At issue, at least on the surface, had been personality conflicts over 
the PSC's proposal to designate one Andre Antoine as depute per­
manent for the new legislative period, an initiative at which both 
Socialists and Liberals balked. More important were fresh political 
memories. Still smarting from the PSC's abandonment after the de­
mise of the PSC-PRL "pacte de huit ans" in 1987, the national PRL 
leadership saw in the Brabant coalition situation an opportunity to in­
flict retribution: "We feel that in 1987 we were betrayed by the Chris­
tian Socials with the so-called pacte de huit ans. Three years later we 
betrayed the PSC. At that time the president of the party was Louis 
Michel, and in 1991 he said, 'We want to make coalitions with every­
body in the provinces but the PS C It was some kind of revenge."30 
The Brabant CVFs willingness to enter government without the 
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PSC is a clue that office seeking may outweigh any intrafamily loyalty 
or unity. This adds important insight to what is a familiar topic of spec­
ulation in Belgium, namely, whether familial party unity has eroded 
to such an extent that a Flemish or Walloon party might enter a na­
tional coalition cabinet without its counterpart. Dewachter and Clijsters 
have written that "the former linguistic wings operate as autonomous 
parties, maintaining only loose ties on the national level, but strong 
enough to prevent the other wing from joining a coalition without its 
linguistic counterpart" (1982, 198). In their own review, Laver and 
Schofield conclude that "most authors, while noting that members of 
the same family have thus far always acted in concert over coalition 
formation, do not rule out the possibility of independent action" (1990, 
221). The CVP's behavior in Brabant in 1991 thus sets an interesting 
precedent. To be sure, the stakes in Brabant province are not com­
mensurate with those of national government formation. Nevertheless, 
the taboo of an "asymmetrical" coalition has been broken. 
The context in which the Brabant "experiment" developed gives 
some indication as to its higher-level implications. Provincial politics in 
Brabant are characterized by both electoral stability and nationalized 
election results. In 1991, for example, the net seat change per party 
on the provincial council was only 1.8%, and the net vote change per 
party was a mere 1.7%. These minor changes closely mirrored party 
change in national legislative elections, with the net difference between 
changes in provincial and national vote shares between 1987 and 1991 
being just 0.79%. Clearly, the electoral risks for the CVP in committing 
what amounted to political fratricide were low in Brabant province. 
Moreover, despite sharing the same party headquarters building with 
the PSC in Brussels, the top CVP leadership endorsed the scission. For 
the provincial CVP, then, the organizational risks of venturing into an 
asymmetrical alliance were also low. 
Our theoretical assumptions would thus lead us to anticipate that 
the Brabant coalition is of relatively high experimental value. No clear 
electoral constraints pressured the provincial politicians to try the five-
party formula. The effort to evict the PSC had been purposive on the 
part of both the PRL and the PS, and it could not have been accom­
plished without the knowledge and complicity of the CVP. No over­
riding organizational constraints compelled the CVP councilors to 
reject coalition participation without the PSC. Although both are 
members of one supposed political "family," it is now clear that the 
CVP and the PSC can have very different preferences about coalition 
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participation. In this respect, it is worth comparing how party votes in 
March 1992 on whether to join the eventual Dehaene national govern­
ment diverged: 94.5% of the PSC voted in favor of the proposed gov­
ernment, but only 61.8% of the 3,000-strong CVP Party congress voted 
in favor. It is also evident that the loyalty of the two parties to one 
another as indispensable coalition partners cannot simply be assumed. 
It is worth noting that among all Belgian provincial councilors re­
sponding to the survey employed in this study, those from Brabant 
province indicated the greatest acceptance of the proposition that sub-
national coalitions can lead to national coalitions. As a group, they also 
score highest on the measure of coalition openness. Learning condi­
tions in Brabant are facilitative. This is not to say that an asymmetrical 
coalition of the type formed in 1991 can or will be reproduced in na­
tional government. The risks of forming such a coalition, as well as the 
impediments, are much greater in national government, especially 
now in the federal state. Reactions from voters in future elections will, 
however, suggest to the participating parties whether the new coalition 
model should continue, as will the instructions of national elites. Sig­
nificantly, the postscript to Brabant's coalition experiment finds the 
CVP joining another asymmetrical government after elections in 1995 
to the Brussels regional parliament. Clearly, actors can assess coali­
tional experiments and thereby learn new strategies previously seen as 
impossible and thus beyond the realm of strategic foresight. 
Case II. A Rose-Verte Experiment in France: 
The 1992 "Little Bang" in Nord-Pas de Calais 
Like Brabant in Belgium, Nord-Pas de Calais in France is a region 
traditionally characterized by a comparatively high degree of electoral 
stability and by voting patterns that generally follow national trends. 
Thus the red-green or "rose-verte" coalition that emerged following 
the 1992 regional election deserves investigation. What are the factors 
that led to the formation of this novel coalition, and what experimental 
value can be assigned to it? Answers to these questions suggest that as 
with Brabant in Belgium, the ability to view Nord-Pas de Calais as 
French politics in miniature places a high value on the region as a 
proving ground for future cooperation. 
Nord-Pas de Calais is one of the great prizes in French regional 
politics, especially for the Left. The third-most populous region in 
France, this northern region—the "maison de Leon Blum"—is also 
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one of the two strongest in the country for both the socialists and the 
communists (the other being Limousin). This strength is especially evi­
dent in the department of Nord, where the socialists have monopolized 
power since the early 1930s. At the first regional elections in 1986, 
cooperation between the PS and the PCF "survived the collapse of the 
left wing alliance at the national level" (Mazey 1986, 299), allowing 
Noel Joseph (PS) to capture the top executive post in the second round 
with 58 of 113 votes. In 1992 the PS, PCF, and UPF (RPR-UDF) all 
lost seats in the regional council, although for the PS and PCF the 
losses were less severe than the national average. The big winners in 
1992 were the ecologists and the Front National. A renewal of the 1986 
majority would yield only 42 seats, a weak relative majority at best if 
no stronger coalition could emerge. 
In the postelection government formation process, Michel Dele-
barre, PS regional leader and national government minister, promised 
to put together a "majorite de progres."31 His challenge on the Right 
came from Jacques Legendre, National Secretary of the RPR, sup­
ported by the 27 members of the UDF-RPR alliance, and from Carl 
Lang, General Secretary of the FN, with 15 councilors. Thus, a hy­
pothetical PS/PCF bloc with 42 votes stood evenly matched against a 
hypothetical right-wing bloc, also with 42 potential votes. The ecolo­
gists (Verts with 8 seats, GE with 6), the CPNT contingent (2 seats), 
and the group of independent followers of Jean-Louis Borloo, mayor 
of Valenciennes (13 seats), all waited in the wings ready to play the role 
of arbiter. 
Meeting in Lille on March 30, the Nord-Pas de Calais regional coun­
cilors fought their battle for control of executive power. In the first 
round of voting for regional president, seven candidates representing 
each of the parties in the assembly—with the two Green parties form­
ing one group—gained only the votes of their respective groups, thus 
forcing a second round (table 8.6). After some hours of negotiations 
and bargaining, the second round proceeded without the candidacy 
of Carl Lang (FN), whose supporters then divided their votes between 
Legendre (RPR, 39 votes) and the independent Borloo (22 votes). De­
lebarre, failing to win the support of either the obstinate communists 
or the upstart ecologists, mustered only the same 27 PS and MRG 
votes. With no majority evident, a "majorite de coalition" would have 
to emerge in the decisive third round. 
During protracted negotiations leading to the third round, the PS 
implored the communists to abandon their "opposition de gauche" 
Table 8.6 
Nord-Pas de Calais Regional Council, March 1992 
Party Seats 1st Round 2nd Round 3rd Round 
Socialist Party (PS) 25 (-11) Delebarre (PS) 27 Delebarre 27 
Communist Party (PCF) 15 (-4 ) Renar (PCF) 15 Renar 15 
National Front (FN) 15 ( + 3) Lang (FN) 15 
Union for French Democracy (UDF) 14 ( = ) 
Rally for the Republic (RPR) 13 (-8) Legendre (RPR) 27 Legendre 39 Legendre 42 
"Borloo 59-62" (Independent) 13 (+13) Borloo (Ind.) 13 Borloo 22 
Verts 8 ( + 8) Blandin (Verts) 14 Blandin 8 Blandin 52 
G£n£ration Ecologie (GE) 6 ( + 6) 
Left Radicals (MRG) 2 (-1) 
Anti-Ecologists (CPNT) 2 ( + 2) Fremaux (CPNT) 2 Fremaux 2 Fremaux 2 
Total 113 No majority No majority Relative 
majority 
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strategy and rally "without illusion" to Delebarre's candidacy in order 
to "block the Right and the extreme Right." Sensing the opportunity 
to topple the Left in its own backyard, the conservatives changed tac­
tics, as Jacques Legendre announced he would retire his candidacy in 
favor of Jean-Louis Borloo so that a "new regional majority of change" 
could emerge. Borloo, now with 46 votes, including 6 from GE, held 
a potential relative majority over Delebarre's still uncertain 42 votes. 
To have any hope of retaining Nord-Pas de Calais for the Left, Dele-
barre would need the 8 remaining votes of the Verts, barring the pos­
sible acceptance by Borloo of FN votes. Finding themselves in a 
extremely strong bargaining position, however, the Verts would not 
retire their nominee. At half past midnight, Michel Delebarre, the 
Minister of State and mayor of Dunkerque, conceded his candidacy 
and agreed to coalition terms with the eight-member group of Verts.32 
At three o'clock in the morning, Marie-Christine Blandin, a 38-
year-old professor of natural sciences and member of Greenpeace, 
gained 52 votes (from the PS, PCF, Verts, and GE) and the presidency 
of Nord-Pas de Calais. The first red-green coalition in the French re­
gions had formed successfully, if not intentionally. Subsequent to the 
election of the regional president, the region's executive posts were 
divided among the Verts (three vice presidencies) and the PS (seven 
vice presidencies). The PCF, which had distanced itself from Delebarre 
throughout the government formation process under orders from the 
party's central committee, did not join the regional executive, nor did 
Generation Ecologie, which had supported the Borloo cause in the 
second round. Blandin's Verts, therefore, could reap the rewards of a 
major bargaining breakthrough, while Delebarre's PS avoided losing 
entirely the party's historical bastion and in fact maintained a signifi­
cant presence in the regional government itself. 
Delebarre's own analysis is that the coalition was inevitable: "Math­
ematically, we were beaten. If the Right took power, it would have 
rolled over us for two years and then it would be the end of the Left 
in Nord for 20 years."33 One negotiator for the Verts, however, confirms 
an important element of choice in the coalition decision: "Our strategy 
was based upon autonomy, therefore refusing classical forms of mixing 
and coalitions. Therefore, the strategy was for Marie-Christine Blan­
din to maintain her candidacy at all three rounds, which she did. Mon­
sieur Delebarre chose to step down in favor of the Green candidate, 
but of course he did not have to. We chose to accept a government with 
the Socialist Party, but we did not have to. This decision will be an 
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internal problem for us in that most of the Verts' party members come 
from associations which are not especially fond of politics."34 This 
choice made by Socialists and Greens in Lille confirms the openness 
reported by survey respondents of both parties to such an arrange­
ment. Despite the element of choice, it is evident that unlike Brabant 
in Belgium, the Nord-Pas de Calais coalition is at least partly a mar­
riage of circumstance. Given an alternative distribution of seats in the 
council, it is unlikely that Delebarre and the PS would have chosen to 
invite Blandin and the other Verts into regional government. 
Thus, unlike the Brabant case, the "rose-verte" coalition in Nord-
Pas de Calais took on the dimensions of an experiment only after its 
formation. With the fortunes of the PS dwindling on the national level, 
the possibility of reconstructing a "majority of progress" beyond the 
Nord-Pas de Calais region gained wide currency. Michel Rocard's cru­
sade for a "big bang" on the Left to regroup socialists, ecologists, re­
form communists, and centrists followed the "little bang" in Nord-Pas 
de Calais. Indeed, only days after the news of the coalition in Lille 
reached Paris, Laurent Fabius announced: "The Socialist Party needs 
to affirm its identity and, at the same time, to be open to others, to see 
if we can strike up new alliances."35 For many at the national level, then, 
the success or failure of the regional experience would to some degree 
be a test of the parties' ability to overcome mutual suspicions and a 
chance for the Verts to overcome their amateur status as a party of 
government. 
The theoretical expectations advanced earlier in this study indicate 
that since Nord-Pas de Calais region is less electorally volatile and more 
nationalized (when compared to others in France), the coalition's ex­
perimental value should be high. Here the PS in 1992 lost nine seats 
and 9.3% of its 1986 regional vote share, but elsewhere the losses were 
much higher: 14 seats in Lorraine (  - 58.3%), 29 seats in Ile-de-France 
( - 52.4%), 22 seats in Rhone-Alpes (-51.1%). Here the net difference 
between changes in regional and national vote shares for all parties 
combined between 1986 and 1993 is little more than 3%, while in Al­
sace it is 5.4%, in Basse-Normandie 4.9%, in Lorraine 4.7%, and in 
Rhone-Alpes 4.5%. For the Left in Nord-Pas de Calais, the situation 
in 1992 may have been bad, but elsewhere it was quite worse. 
Unlike other red-green collaborations and supposed "laboratoires 
de I'ouverture"36 in Lorraine or Bourgogne, where electoral volatility 
is much higher and where changes in voting patterns have more 
unique regional characteristics, the Nord-Pas de Calais coalition is by 
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most accounts more durable and more efficient. Relative electoral sta­
bility enhances parties' investments in new modes of political coop­
eration, just as stability reassures investment in any other marketplace. 
The "Projet d'Accord" between the Socialist Party and the Verts, ham­
mered out by October 1992, testifies to the two parties' ability to devise 
and agree upon detailed common plans in the areas of economic de­
velopment, environment, transportation, and infrastructure.37 Accord­
ing to a Verts' spokesman: "In Nord-Pas de Calais the experiment is 
one in the politicians' sense of the word. But the experiment is also 
that for the first time in France we are trying to implement, to put 
forward through the planification, a sustainable development strategy. 
And the Socialist Party has agreed to join the Greens on that basis. As 
for Rocard's suggestion of melting the Green parties, the socialists, the 
social democrats, and the centrists all together, it is of course possible, 
but for many there would be a loss in the message if these groups were 
to melt at this point."38 
The red-green mix thus has the opportunity to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of an alternative political approach to some basic eco­
nomic and social issues. Based on what the PS-Verts policy declaration 
calls "eco-development, respectful of the human person as well as of 
natural resources,"39 the regional government has since 1992 set out 
to combat unemployment in the region's key economic sectors and lo­
calities: iron works and industry (Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing) and port 
commerce (Dunkerque, Calais, Boulogne). True to "new politics" doc­
trines, the Verts have also used their new-found government status to 
"combat the crisis of representative democracy" and "reinvent regional 
government" by increasing citizen participation in a "more transpar­
ent, concertative process of decision making."40 
In the short term, no heed was taken of the message of successful 
partisan collaboration coming out of Lille. Socialists, ecologists, and 
communists failed to work out second-ballot deals that may have im­
proved the Left's score as well as that of the ecologists in the disastrous 
1993 legislative elections. Nor did Mitterrand or his government in­
troduce a degree of proportionality into the national elections and thus 
make them more like those at the regional level. In the wake of the 
1992 regional elections, a SOFRES study projected the 1993 legislative 
results based on a proportional system: the 138 projected PS deputies, 
plus those of the ecologists (Verts, 19; Generation Ecologie, 18) and 
those of the PCF (28) would have still been insufficient for a majority 
but would have forced the conservative parties to ally with the Front 
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National to gain a majority.41 Without the more proportional system, 
the conservatives secured 485 Assemblee Nationale seats, overwhelm­
ing the PS (67) and PCF (25). Despite garnering significant numbers 
of votes in the first round of the legislative vote, the new regional-level 
coalition players (FN 12.4%, Verts 4.1%, GE 3.6%) were shut out of 
parliament. Rules do matter. Clearly, any future reform of the electoral 
system will increase the experimental value of regional coalitions. 
To conclude, it may be said that French regional coalitions, to a 
much greater degree than those in Belgium or Germany, are mini­
mum winning arrangements, exhibiting overt power aggrandizement 
and office-seeking behavior of the first order. Greater fractionalization 
and the possibility of relative majorities contribute to this fact. It is 
much more difficult, therefore, to argue that a coalition such as that 
formed in Nord-Pas de Calais had from the outset been premeditated 
and created as a test model for future use elsewhere, perhaps in na­
tional government. More appropriately, innovative regional coalitions 
in France become conscious experiments. This has clearly been the case 
in Nord-Pas de Calais. 
Case III. An Alternative Shade of Coalition: 
The Unsuccessful "Black-Grem" Experiment in Baden-Wiirttemberg 
Unlike the coalition experiments illustrated by Nord-Pas de Calais 
and Brabant, the experiment in the southwestern German state of 
Baden-Wiirttemberg never actually came to fruition. Although the 
1992 Landtag election did result in a CDU-SPD coalition incongruent 
with party alignments in federal government, the postelection govern­
ment formation process is more interesting for the novelty of the CDU-
Green coalition that was attempted but that ultimately failed to form. 
Baden-Wiirttemberg is a traditional Christian Democratic strong­
hold. There the CDU has enjoyed an uninterrupted presence in gov­
ernment since 1953, alone during the 1972-92 period and before that 
in coalitions with the SPD (1966-72) and FDP (1964-66), and in var­
ious other "all-party" governments. Despite the CDU dominance, elec­
tions in Baden-Wiirttemberg have historically proven more volatile 
than those in most other Lander (Miiller-Rommel 1989), with the av­
erage interelection changes in vote shares for the CDU, SPD, FDP, and 
Greens approaching 4%. Additionally, interelection changes in party 
vote shares are generally more localized, with the average difference 
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vote shares are generally more localized, with the average difference 
between changes in state and federal party vote shares between 1960 
and 1992 exceeding the national mean. 
The April 1992 election in Baden-Wurttemberg reinforced this pat­
tern of volatility (table 8.7). The CDU lost 8% and the SPD 3% of their 
respective 1988 vote shares, while the FDP only lost 0.6% and the 
Greens gained almost 2%. The real jolt came from the far right, where 
the Republicans broke into the state parliament with 15 seats and 11% 
of the vote. The 1992 election thus deprived the CDU of its absolute 
majority and handed the SPD its worst score since 1968. Several post­
election coalition possibilities presented themselves to party leaders in 
Stuttgart. Needing 74 seats to form a winning majority, some combi­
nation would have to emerge from among the CDU, SPD, FDP, 
Greens, and Republicans. A CDU-FDP coalition would fall just short 
of a majority, and a "traffic light" SPD-FDP-Green government would 
also prove insufficient. The winning combinations appeared to in­
clude an oversized CDU-SPD government, which would leave the par­
liament with a feeble opposition of only 36 members (of which only 
21 had clear democratic credentials); an unprecedented CDU-Green 
or "black-green" coalition; an unprecedented conservative-far-right 
(CDU-Republican) alliance; or an equally unique "coalition of minor­
ities" that would form only to eject the CDU from its bastion. 
The government formation process, which lingered for several 
weeks, commenced with an offer by Rolf Schlierer's Republicans to 
support a CDU-FDP minority government. The Christian Democrats 
rejected the proposal, according to Schlierer, because "the CDU has 
internal problems and they are too scared to have to depend in the 
future on the votes of the Republican Party. For us it would have been 
a natural combination. The Republican Party is a conservative party, 
a normal right-wing party that is successful because the CDU cannot 
keep a right wing. We are not a nationalist or extremist party like the 
DVU. . .  . It could have been possible for us to support a CDU-FDP 
government."42 This possibility brushed aside, negotiations turned to 
the possibility of a CDU-Green coalition government. Such an alliance 
had occurred occasionally at the municipal level but had never been 
attempted in earnest at Land level. 
The Greens had campaigned on a theme of placing the CDU into 
opposition and of forming another of the increasingly familiar SPD-
Green Land governments. Unable to pursue this preferred course of 
action, the Greens chose to enter into negotiations with the CDU, well 
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Table 8.7 
Baden-Wurttemberg Landtag, April 1992 
Votes 
Party Seats <%) 
Christian Democrats (CDU) 64 (-2) 39.6 (-9.4) 
Social Democrats (SPD) 46 ( + 4) 29.4 (-2.6) 
Republikaner (REP) 15 (+15) 10.9 ( + 9.9) 
Greens (Griine) 13 ( + 3) 9.5 (+1.6) 
Free Democrats (FDP) 8 (+D 5.9 ( = ) 
Total 146 95.3 
aware of the "dangers this posed because at least half of Green voters 
do not understand this and would criticize and probably not vote Green 
in future times."43 Armed with a list of demands that a preelection 
Green Party congress had adopted as conditions for participation in 
government with the SPD, the Green delegation, headed by Fritz 
Kuhn, challenged CDU leader Erwin Teufel to accept the same de­
mands and to share a "new vision" of Baden-Wurttemberg. According 
to Kuhn: "Our parliamentary experience here has shown it to be easier 
to speak on a personal level with the CDU than with the Social Dem­
ocrats. It's a psychological phenomenon, because many Social Demo­
crats in Germany see the Greens as their illegitimate children. So for 
the Greens the talk with the CDU was serious. My vision of the coalition 
was to make a new ecological policy for industry and the economy of 
Baden-Wurttemberg, especially to transform the old industries like the 
automobile industry."44 
The right wing of the CDU, led by Finance Minister Gerhard 
Mayer-Vorfelder, fought the possibility of a CDU-Green coalition from 
the very beginning. Mayer-Vorfelder issued Teufel a public warning 
that there might be a split in the party ranks if he went too far in 
negotiating with the Greens. Others in the party were more sympa­
thetic to the idea, recognizing it as a "really interesting experiment" 
that could give the CDU a "political blood transfusion." "There was a 
federal interest in negotiating with the Greens not so much for the pur­
pose of forming a coalition but for the purpose of having done it. This 
is mainly because the federal CDU is in a strategically weak position. 
The CDU can form coalitions with the SPD, but might not be able to 
form coalitions in the future with the Liberals because both together 
may not be a majority. The CDU cannot as of now form a coalition 
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with the Greens, or with the FDP and the Greens, because there is no 
past political basis for doing so. So, it was part of the strategic interest 
to sound out if it might become an additional coalition possibility for 
the future to integrate the Greens into the coalition system."45 
Ultimately, those in the CDU sharing Kuhn's "new vision" proved 
to be too weak. A part of the CDU had believed that the Greens with 
their strong contingent of eco-libertarians ("Okolibertaren") would of­
fer a cheaper price for coalition than the Social Democrats, but the 
Greens made clear from the beginning that their price would not be 
cheap and would in fact be higher than that of the SPD: "There was 
part of the CDU that expected the Greens to be a more handy partner, 
but they found out this was not to be the case. The Social Democrats 
did not defend demands that the Greens made and that the SPD also 
made during the election campaign, but they dropped them in their 
talks just to get into government."46 
Claiming that a majority with the Greens would have been "too 
small and too difficult to maintain for four years,"47 the CDU ulti­
mately opted for coalition with the SPD. In retrospect, many in the 
Baden-Wiirttemberg Landtag believe that the Christian Democrats 
failed to commit to the black-green adventure because they were sim­
ply caught off guard by the possibility: "In the first round of negoti­
ations it was clear that the CDU was not really prepared to consider 
our demands. Not more than one or two people in the CDU delegation 
had even read our program by that point. Minister President Teufel 
had ordered up copies of the program only two days in advance. So, 
they had never figured on this possibility beforehand."48 Persons in 
both parties thus believe that if the opportunity arose again in the 
future, the CDU would be better prepared and would "know better 
what they were embarking upon."49 
The CDU's lack of preparation is one explanation for the failure of 
the CDU-Green experiment. Organizational pressures and risks may 
also account for the hesitation. The CDU's parliamentary leader ad­
mits that "Kohl's strategy was to keep the SPD out of coalition in 
Baden-Wiirttemberg. Some other coalition would have increased his 
power against the SPD. But he was not excited about the black-green 
coalition." This in addition to warnings from Teufel's own right wing 
in Baden-Wiirttemberg could have figured largely in the decision. 
Teufel, generally characterized as "faithful to the Chancellor and with 
only regional horizons,"50 was not inclined to risk an organizational 
crisis for an uncertain future with the Greens. Several Landtag dep­
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uties speculated, however, that Lothar Spath, Teufel's predecessor as 
minister-president and rival to Helmut Kohl, would have been more 
likely to have ventured into the black-green arrangement because of, 
not in spite of, the organizational pressures from Bonn. This sugges­
tion is interesting, for it provides an alternative understanding of the 
role played by career ambitions to that outlined in chapters 3 and 7. 
It is important also to recognize the electoral context and constraints 
at play in this case. Our theoretical expectation that in localized, high-
volatility arenas, coalitions that minimize policy distance between par­
ties are most likely to form is in this case met. Although wide in its own 
right, the gap between CDU and SPD is perceptibly narrower than 
between CDU and Greens, despite protestations from the latter that 
they are neither "Left" nor "Right." Volatility and localization clearly 
increased the perception among decision makers that the coalition 
chosen following the April 1992 election would directly affect their 
future electoral fortunes. The electoral shock provided by the Repub­
licans raised the stakes even higher. If high stakes reinforce short-term 
strategies, then Baden-Wiirttemberg is a classic example: "The funny 
thing about a grand coalition is that it joins forces in order to fight each 
other as soon as possible. As you know, you do not want to continue it 
after the next election. That is a real strange situation. You work with 
these people, and when we want to introduce a bill we have a rule that 
we always discuss it with the CDU first. And really these are friendly 
people and I try to be friendly to them. And we know full well that at 
the next campaign we are going to go out and hit each other over the 
head."51 
There was, for the CDU especially, not enough electoral stability to 
justify the serious risk that a radical coalition of the kind a black-green 
government would bring. Therefore, it seems reasonable to suggest 
that given the openness of certain elements in the CDU and Green 
camps to formal cooperation, if the situation had arisen under differ­
ent conditions and especially without the uncertainty injected by the 
Republican breakthrough, the chances for a different outcome would 
have been greater. 
Can any experimental value be attached to the short-lived CDU-
Green test in Baden-Wiirttemberg? Because the coalition did not ac­
tually form, it is difficult to compare the experimental value of a 
Baden-Wiirttemberg with that of a Nord-Pas de Calais or a Brabant. 
Our theoretical expectation, nonetheless, is that if the coalition had 
indeed formed, its value as a laboratory for future coalitions would 
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have been comparatively low. The continuous presence of electoral 
constraints and localized electoral patterns would decrease the long-
term incentives for cooperation. In contrast, the value of a black-green 
experiment in North Rhine-Westphalia, for example, would be much 
higher given that state's tradition of low electoral volatility and nation­
alized electoral patterns. In the parlance of game theory, a CDU-Green 
coalition in a low-volatility, nationalized arena like North Rhine-
Westphalia would require fewer "iterations" than in a high-volatility, 
localized arena in Baden-Wurttemberg before the coalition could be 
ready for consideration in federal government. Nevertheless, a black-
green Landtag government, once considered unimaginable, is now le­
gitimately within the set of potential coalition alternatives. 
Summary 
The overarching goals of this chapter have been to address, first, 
whether coalitions formed in subnational parliaments alter the number 
of coalition options available to parties in national government; sec­
ond, whether negotiators at subnational levels are themselves moti­
vated in their local strategic choices by the prospect of influencing 
party relations beyond the locality; third, whether the transmission of 
knowledge gained through coalition experience at subnational levels 
has an impact on party leaders at the national level and conditions their 
behavior in the "supergame" of national government formation; and 
fourth, whether the conditions under which an experimental coalition 
develops influence its value as a model for future coalitions elsewhere 
in the system. Given the evidence presented, it seems a justifiable con­
clusion to suggest affirmative, though qualified, answers to all four 
questions. 
In the three countries examined, national-level coalition behavior 
does react to developments in the subnational coalition system, and on 
most occasions coalition innovation in national government occurs 
only after a cooperative arrangement has been tested in subnational 
government. This linkage is substantial enough to warrant dismissal 
of the formal theoretical assumption that coalition formation is a dis­
crete event; party leaders negotiating coalition arrangements, it would 
seem, suffer from neither amnesia nor myopia. Councilors at sub-
national levels themselves appear to be quite conscious of the influence 
that their coalition decisions have on party relations at superior levels 
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of government, and for some the expectation of this influence is a mo­
tivating factor. Additionally, provincial and regional representatives 
appear to be generally open to the universe of coalition partners avail­
able to them; hence, the presence of a crucial precondition for exper­
imentation. Openness is not absolute, however, and for some, the 
prospect of cooperating with certain parties is uninviting and thus a 
potential source of contention. There is, moreover, evidence to suggest 
that coalition experience in the periphery does supply part of the in­
formational feedback needed by party leaders forming governing al­
liances in the national arena. 
Coalition innovation occurs in a variety of contexts. This has been 
demonstrated by the cases of government formation in Brabant, Nord-
Pas de Calais, and Baden-Wurttemberg. The electoral environment in 
which a coalition emerges can condition its value as an experimental 
model. Of the three case examples, it may be suggested that the Bra­
bant "asymmetrical" coalition is most significant for its particular sys­
tem because a relative absence of electoral constraints allowed the 
coalition to form primarily as a choice of the actors involved. Con­
versely, electoral and organizational constraints raised the costs of a 
black-green coalition in Baden-Wurttemberg to a prohibitive level. 
Nevertheless, all coalition innovations at subnational levels, in success 
and in failure, can provide some of the "perfect information" and 
"feedback" needed by party leaders forming coalitions in the national 
arena. It is necessary as a future step to pursue survey and interview 
analysis of national-level decision makers to better gauge the nature 
of this intent. 
By expanding the study of government formation to include sub-
national assemblies, we have emphasized that authoritative decisions 
about coalition strategy can flow upward as well as downward. Parties 
and their leaders are influenced by past experiences as well as by the 
prospect of future iterations of the bargaining process. In this respect, 
cooperative arrangements at one level of government are affected by, 
and may themselves affect, those forming at another level of govern­
ment. Beyond labeling regional elections as simply "barometers" of 
support for the national government, therefore, more serious consid­
eration should be given to the impact that postelection coalition change 
in the periphery has on party relations at the center. 
Chapter Nine 
Dividing Power in the Periphery: 
Some Comparative Conclusions 
This book has been presented with three purposes in mind. First, the study has attempted to depict a fundamental political process 
as it occurs in an underresearched set of institutions in three European 
democracies. In doing so, it has focused on the building of power-
sharing coalitions as an outward and well-defined manifestation of po­
litical motivation, governing intent, and democratic representation. 
Second, the research has endeavored to collect and assemble attitudes 
and observations from middle-level politicians, elected representatives 
whose obligations, experiences, and ambitions are largely overlooked 
by comparativists. Their stories are frequently left untold by research­
ers more concerned with the "cleaner" and more celebrated process 
of national government formation. Third and finally, the analysis has 
sought to identify and isolate theoretically meaningful relationships 
between electoral risk, organizational pressure, and strategic choice. 
Exposing the process of collective decision making in mixed-motive 
situations reveals the limited utility of some existing theoretical con­
structs, but more importantly it suggests how individuals and groups 
endowed with political responsibility weigh the costs and benefits of 
alternative strategies according to the environments in which they 
must act. This concluding chapter summarizes the main findings of 
the study and ties this particular line of research back into the com­
parative politics literature. 
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A Deeper Understanding of Coalition Politics 
in Belgium, Germany, and France 
At its most basic level, this book contributes to a deeper and richer 
understanding of coalition politics as practiced in Belgium, Germany, 
and France. In systems that obstruct the monopolization of political 
resources by any one party, the necessity for competitors and adver­
saries to cooperate so that they may each share a portion of those re­
sources is a fact of political life. Where elections fail to award one party 
with an absolute majority of seats in a representative assembly, nego­
tiation, bargaining, and compromise ensue. Political parties become 
intermediaries between voters and governmental authority, immedi­
ately faced with the tasks of interpreting the electorate's verdict and of 
establishing a workable and durable partnership that will hopefully 
have some success at formulating, legislating, and implementing public 
policy—all with an eye toward reelection. Despite differences in their 
institutional structures and in their electoral and party systems, Bel­
gium, Germany, and France have each created political systems that 
encourage the formation of coalitions. While coalition building as it 
regards national parliamentary institutions has long been a source of 
curiosity for political scientists familiar with European democracies, 
much less is known about how the same necessity for majority for­
mation plays out in regional or local institutions of representative 
government. 
Evidence presented throughout the preceding chapters conclusively 
demonstrates that the struggles for government status at subnational 
levels are profoundly important to both parties and voters. Outcomes 
of these struggles can, moreover, result in a variety of governments of 
varying political complexion, each illustrating the relative capacity of 
competitors to cooperate, each indicating the relative openness of the 
political system to rule by a diversity of parties, and each exhibiting 
the relative responsiveness of parties to electoral verdicts. Parties com­
peting in the Belgian provinces and regions, the French regions, and 
the German Lander have created coalition dynamics that in some ways 
are distinct from those generated by the same constellation of parties 
competing for national government status. Nonideological coopera­
tion, participation of ecologists and extremists, minority government, 
and all-party government are subnational phenomena that cannot al­
ways be predicted by simple reference to partisan alignments in Bonn, 
Paris, or Brussels. Even where possible, subnational branches of na­
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tional political parties do not invariably follow the lead of their col­
leagues at superior levels of the polity. This is most evident in the 
propensity of parties in all three countries to form partnerships in­
congruent with those in national parliament. 
While coalition systems at the subnational level manifest their own 
distinctive elements, it is possible to answer in the affirmative the ques­
tions of whether government formation and alliance behavior in the 
periphery "enter the strategic considerations of national party lead­
ers," whether they "complicate the coalition environment across the 
country," and whether in fact they may also "act as some determinant 
of actual coalition behavior" in the capital (Pridham 1984, 240). Na­
tional elites do make conscious attempts to communicate instructions 
and influence strategy in the subnational institutions to which their 
respective parties gain entry. Directly elected representatives charged 
with serving their regional or provincial constituencies are therefore 
subject to pressures, constraints, and inducements from leaders of the 
voluntary organizations to which they belong. Although officials in­
volved in national-level politics often possess the inclination to demand 
loyalty and obedience from their putatively subordinate followers, evi­
dence presented in this study suggests that neither deference nor the 
ability to compel behavior from the top down can be assumed. Au­
thoritative decisions about coalition strategy can flow upward as well 
as downward, and the success of party strategy at the subnational level 
can even function to supply some of the information necessary to na­
tional party leaders faced with gauging the reliability of certain parties 
as potential cabinet partners. 
Restricting the findings to single countries highlights important fea­
tures of individual political systems. If we are concerned only with, say, 
Germany, then the discussion of subnational coalition politics must 
recognize the very strong pressures on parties to form governments 
that match at the federal and state levels. This has been, after all, the 
stated preference of powerful leaders such as Adenauer, Brandt, 
Schmidt, and to a certain extent Kohl as well. A country-sensitive anal­
ysis must also acknowledge the small number of parties competing in 
the German system and thus the comparatively decisive elections that 
occur there. That Land elections frequently occur at the midpoint in 
the life of a Bundestag legislative period, and thus can take on the 
character of a plebiscite on the federal government of the day, must 
also be taken as an important aspect of the German system. Equally 
critical to the understanding of the German case are the baseline mo­
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tivations of the pivotal Free Democratic Party, namely, government 
participation at all costs. An analysis of recent trends in state-level co­
alition politics must, finally, recognize the emergence of the Greens, 
the PDS, the Republikaners, and the DVU as complicating what had 
previously been a relatively stable and closed coalition system. Simple 
reference to Germany's federal status certainly accounts for some of 
the importance attached to outcomes at the state level as well as some 
of the dejure independence that state parties are supposed to enjoy, 
but it risks overlooking the de facto antagonisms that develop when 
Land parties have to respond to both local electoral imperatives and 
the intervention of federal authorities who have their own vested in­
terests in the outcomes of strategic choice. 
If we are to restrict the findings to the singular case of Belgium, 
then a host of country-specific factors likewise has to be emphasized. 
That Belgium is a culturally artificial country with different political, 
social, and economic cleavages dividing peoples and parties across a 
north-south line—complicated by Brussels as a francophone enclave 
within Dutch-speaking Flanders—cannot be ignored. Since all the ma­
jor parties competing for political power have since the 1960s had their 
own semiindependent Flemish and Walloon branches, the number of 
coalition possibilities is much greater than in a country such as Ger­
many. It must also be remembered that with provincial elections tra­
ditionally taking place on the same day as national parliamentary 
elections, the importance of purely provincial concerns tends to be 
more diminished than in a system in which elections for territorial and 
national parliaments occur on separate occasions. To fall back—as 
some might wish to do—on conventional assumptions about Belgium 
as a consociational democracy and as a traditionally unitary state with 
napoleonic structures would, however, neglect the political battles 
fought in the country's oldest representative assemblies, overlook the 
adversarial relations between political elites in the periphery, disregard 
the leverage that local party groups can have over their superiors, and 
ignore the bottom-up system change that has transpired in what was 
supposed to be a top-down country. The importance of such battles 
only increases with Belgium's federalization, with the new regional 
parliaments as battlegrounds. 
If, finally, the analysis were to address only the French case, then 
key aspects particular to that country would have to be remembered. 
Chief among these considerations is the immaturity of the French re­
gional government system itself. That directly elected regional insti­
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tutions have existed only since 1986, though increasing the necessity 
and possibilities of original research, nevertheless cuts down on the 
ability to generalize about behavior at this level. An analysis of French 
regional coalition behavior must likewise recognize the large number 
of parties competing for regional power (an average of eight per re­
gion), the wider variety of alliances available, and the strong presence 
of national personalities (through the holding of multiple elective 
mandates). That France has a mixed presidential-parliamentary sys­
tem at the national level as well as a two-ballot electoral mechanism 
(thus reducing the representation of smaller parties) of course inhibits 
the degree to which regional coalition dynamics may be reproduced 
in Paris. Still, to simply assume that these factors automatically relegate 
regional political patterns to marginal importance naively ignores the 
impact that developments in the regions have on national cabinet sta­
bility, party image, legitimation of previously excluded political forces, 
and alternative policy approaches. 
Explanations of events in these countries individually have to take 
all of these factors into consideration. Doing so also contributes rich 
descriptive images of the peculiarities of political structures, processes, 
and historical developments at the subnational level. Such a contri­
bution was the primary concern of chapter 5. Since this study has been 
concerned with elevating the analysis of subnational coalition politics 
to a broader level of generalization, effort has also been devoted to 
identifying how politicians and parties at the meso level in all three 
countries respond to different opportunities and constraints offered 
by coalition situations. In this way, it has been possible to recognize 
that different subnational branches of the same political party can re­
spond to collective action problems—such as government formation— 
with different strategies. The competitive positions of parties vary 
across the respective regions of all three countries, as does the very 
competitiveness of the regional political "markets*' themselves. More­
over, the extent to which peripheral electoral systems have either suc­
cumbed to or evaded the process of political nationalization, in which 
elections and parties' fortunes depend on the general political climate 
and politics at the national level, is an important variable common to 
all three countries. These two factors, it has been demonstrated, in­
tervene to influence, condition, and constrain the choices parties make. 
Recognizing that coalitions are built, to borrow the phrase, in a "con­
strained real world" (Laver and Schofield 1990) informs our under­
standing of why coalitions in the Belgian province of Namur have been 
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far more unstable and unpredictable than in a much more politically 
inert West Flanders. Awareness of electoral context and risk clarifies 
discrepancies between party behavior in Hamburg, where short-term 
adversarial strategies and short-lived governments have been the rule, 
and party behavior in Lower Saxony, where comparative stability has 
reinforced the durability of cooperative arrangements such as the cur­
rent red-green experiment. Acknowledging the variable competitive­
ness of French regional environments, and not just the legislative 
weights of the parties elected to the councils, adds to an understanding 
of why the PCF-PS "Union of the Left" met with such different for­
tunes in regions such as Limousin, Nord-Pas de Calais, and Provence-
Alpes—Cote d'Azur. Recognizing electoral risk and the organizational 
pressures exacerbated by such risk thus allows us to better comprehend 
the issues of accountability and intraparty conflict normally avoided in 
studies of government formation. 
Views from Below: Telling Some Untold Stories 
One of the strengths of the analysis has been the collection and assem­
bly of heretofore unavailable comparative survey data regarding the 
coalition experiences of representatives elected to subnational assem­
blies. There is something inherently appealing in learning about the 
democratic process, its ideals and its realities, from individuals acting 
outside the more familiar boundaries of national politics. The insights 
provided by actors at subnational levels supply important clues about 
strategic choice as it occurs in their milieu. Patterns in the survey data 
pointed to the surprisingly weak influence of local public opinion in 
matters of strategic choice, revealed varying levels of national inter­
vention in the government formation process, suggested motivational 
disparities between subnational-level and national-level decision mak­
ers, and indicated the general openness of individuals and groups to 
coalition experimentation. Controlling for the effects of electoral en­
vironment produced legitimate evidence to suggest that the coalition 
game does mean different things to different players, and elicits dif­
ferent reactions from them, depending upon where the game itself is 
being played. 
Interview data, which have been used to help corroborate patterns 
discerned in the survey data, have allowed some substantively inter­
esting political stories to be told that otherwise would be left out of 
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accounts of multiparty government in the three countries. The cases 
of Limburg and Brabant served to show how parties use the coalition 
process to overturn long-established models of political cooperation 
and to send messages to wider audiences that alternatives to the status 
quo exist. The cases of Luxembourg and Limousin clearly illustrated 
how subnational party groups, even those that represent tightly con­
trolled organizations, can challenge the direct authority and advice of 
national party leaders in order to pursue strategies that optimize more 
"local", benefits. The case of Baden-Wiirttemberg, and to a similar ex­
tent that of Berlin, demonstrated difficulties that parties have in ac­
cepting coalition—indeed "grand" coalition—with their chief rival. 
The Baden-Wiirttemberg case also shows how even in the failure to 
establish a formal coalition, parties attempting to experiment with un­
tried alliances can enlarge the universe of political possibilities and 
thus set the stage for future iterations of the government formation 
process. Devoting some attention to these cases puts "politics" back into 
the discussion of coalition formation. 
Alone, attitudinal data cannot be relied upon to automatically pre­
dict behavior. Nor can the professed observations and subjective im­
pressions of political actors be used exclusively to produce a precise 
image of motivation, power, and influence in the decision-making pro­
cess. Together, and along with historical evidence from more than 260 
cases of subnational government formation, the data collected for this 
study do, however, provide a comprehensive accounting of outcomes 
and beliefs—the totality of which allows us to confidently link our ex­
isting understanding of multiparty coalition government with the re­
ality of party behavior in the subnational institutions of Belgium, 
France, and Germany. 
Theoretical Advances and Prospects 
for Future Research 
This work has also sought to contribute to the literature linking or­
ganizational and systemic aspects of strategic party behavior. This 
literature contends that many assumptions fundamental to most ex­
isting coalition theories seriously neglect contextual constraints and 
attitudinal considerations that may intervene to influence coalition 
choices and the pursuit of political self-interest. Deploying the as­
sumptions of a "conditional model of coalition behavior," it has been 
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possible to examine the relationship between electoral subsystems 
and strategic choice within party organizations. 
The account of strategic choice offered by this study is not consistent 
with the generalizations made by conventional coalition theories that 
anticipate discrete outcomes determined by unified and unconstrained 
parties. Instead, from an expanded examination of government for­
mation that includes intermediate-level subnational assemblies, it is 
evident that parties rarely act as unitary actors, monolithically pur­
suing office benefits according to an agreed-upon set of preferences 
and by command of an oligarchic chain of command. Moreover, it is 
clear that government formation is a dynamic process and not a static, 
discrete event. Party groups and their leaders are, borrowing from 
Strom, "neither amnesiac nor myopic" (1990b, 569). Cooperative ar­
rangements at one level of government may be affected by, and may 
themselves affect, those forming at a different level of government. 
Similarly, past iterations of the government formation process as well 
as the anticipation of future iterations condition what rational actors 
might do otherwise than might be expected if the contest were "single 
shot." The latter point is important not just for coalition studies but 
for theory building in political science more generally. Its importance 
lies in the impetus that it gives us to look beyond preexisting prefer­
ence orderings and iterative strategies and to envision a real world, 
illustrated nicely by parliamentary coalition building, in which political 
actors may truly have to let go of preexisting expectations and exper­
iment with new governing strategies. 
To build upon these advances, future research into multiparty sub-
national government must continue to attract the attention of main­
stream coalition theorists and comparativists. The still largely un­
tapped reservoir of empirical evidence offered by party behavior in 
territorial parliaments can be used to further refine our notions of 
parties as oligarchies or stratarchies, unitary actors or coalitions of 
factions. Beyond the labeling of regional-level elections as simply "ba­
rometers" of support for the national government, more serious con­
sideration should be given to the relative localization/nationalization of 
subnational electoral systems and to the impact of alliance change in 
the periphery on partisan relations at the center. These kinds of issues 
should, of course, continue to receive scholarly attention within the 
particular contexts of the Belgian, German, and French systems. 
In Belgium, the provinces are likely to continue to be minibattle­
grounds for political parties; however, future studies will have the abil­
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ity to examine how parties cope with the task of jointly composing 
governments in the new regional parliaments. It will also be necessary 
in the future to watch closely the kinds of coalition patterns developing 
in the five new Lander of eastern Germany. Will the eastern parties 
duplicate, where possible, the Bonn (or by that time, Berlin) alliances? 
The so-called traffic light coalition in Brandenburg is evidence that 
they may not. Finally, it will be important to follow the maturation of 
the regionalization process in France, as it may increase the authority 
and thus the stakes of regional power. Of special interest will be the 
fortunes of the two parties on opposite sides of the political spectrum 
in France that have each gained a share of regional power and re­
sponsibility. The Verts, on the one hand, and the Front National, on 
the other, have each skillfully manipulated their pivotal position as ar­
biters of power. To what extent they are able to transform their re­
gional experiments into greater payoffs—legitimacy, acceptability as 
coalition partners, stepping stones to national power—should concern 
observers of that country. 
Perhaps most important, the broader comparative politics litera­
ture, especially the part that deals with politics in liberal democracies, 
must use the government formation process as a lens through which 
to assess the "democraticness" of decentralization. If "decentralization 
is one of the elements of political institution-building through which 
acceptance of the political order can be improved" (Kaase and Gi­
bowski 1988, 8), then comparativists must not restrict their analyses of 
regional institutions to measures of economic development and ad­
ministrative efficiency. These are no doubt important concerns, but so 
too are basic issues of representation, accountability, transparency, cit­
izen participation, and political cooperation. In this regard, future re­
search must come to some assessment of the effectiveness of Green 
models of regional governance, since they most closely embrace the 
ideals that reformers have long touted as the merits of decentralization. 
Similarly, future research should work to expand the number of cases 
compared; recent events suggest Spain and Italy as particularly fruit­
ful areas for empirical exploration. Ultimately, for all parliamentary 
democracies, the study of multiparty, subnational government should 
be linked with the broader issue of effective and durable government. 
Nations that create conditions that aid coalitional learning in response 
to new environmental conditions may improve the capacity for dur­
able, resilient, and effective government across time. 
In contributing to our understanding of how the power game is 
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played at subnational levels, this book has taken what previously may 
have seemed an insignificant political process and shown it for what it 
is: a valuable link in the democratic system. This has been done in 
something of a pioneering spirit, intentionally working to open an area 
of inquiry to comparative empirical study. Hopefully, it has provided 
compelling illustrations that such study could prove rewarding. 
Appendix One 
The Survey Questionnaire 
Cover Letter 
Dear , [MdL, Conseiller] 
We are conducting a survey sponsored by the Department of Political Science at Emory University 
(Atlanta, USA). Our purpose is to learn more about the nature of coalition politics as practiced by 
political parties in the German Landtage, French Conseils Regionaux, and Belgian Conseils 
Provinciaux and Conseils R6gionaux. We are especially concerned that we should understand how 
individual Deputies like yourself feel about cooperating and sharing power with the members of 
other political parties. 
Attached please find a copy of our questionnaire. The questions concern you, your Land [regional, 
provincial] party, and particularly your parliamentary group's strategies in forming new governing 
majorities following elections. Also included are questions about the impact of national party 
politics on Land [regional, provincial] party politics, as well as the impact of Land [regional, 
provincial] policies on national strategies. 
We hope that you will take the time to complete the questionnaire and return it to us in the enclosed 
self-addressed stamped envelope. The information you provide will contribute to an important study 
and be of significant interest and value to observers in both Europe and America. 
Your responses will, of course, be completely confidential. Your name will not be revealed or 
associated with your responses in any way. 
We appreciate your willingness to help us in our research effort. We believe that you will find the 
questionnaire both interesting and provocative, and we look forward to receiving your reply. 
Thank you for your cooperation! 
Sincerely yours, 
William M. Downs 
Department of Political Science 
Emory University 
Atlanta, Georgia 30322 
USA 
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QUESTIONNAIRE (Sample) 
1:1 Are the coalition strategies of your state party group, particularly its tactics during and after elections, 
determined more by state party members or more by national party leaders? 
L-J State Politicians '-' National Party Leaders 
1:2 In forming a new Land government, how important is it for your party to duplicate-i.e., have the same 
partner(s)--your federal party's alliance strategy wherever possible? 
( ) a. Very Important ( ) c. Not Very Important (  ) e. Uncertain 
( ) b. Important ( ) d. Not at all Important 
1:3-4 Do you agree with the following statements? (Please circle your responses.) 
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
No 
Opinion 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (0) 
1:3 "Successful " 
coalitional cooperation 
in the Landerparlamenten 
can promote an interest 
in cooperation between 
the same parties at the 
federal level."  1 2 3 4 0 
1:4 "Successful 
coalitional cooperation 
in the Bundestag can 
promote an interest in 
cooperation between the 
same parties at the Land 
level."  1 2 3 4 0 
1:5 Within most political parties tensions exist between "pragmatists" and "ideologues." Pragmatists seek 
government participation, even if the party's goals have to be modified in compromises with alliance partners. 
Ideologues seek government participation, but not if the party's goals have to be modified in compromises with 
alliance partners. Where would you place yourself, closer to the pragmatists or the ideologues? 
(  ) a. Clearly among the pragmatists 
(  ) b. Among the pragmatists 
( ) c. Closer to the pragmatists 
(  ) d. Between the pragmatists and the ideologues 
(  ) e. Closer to the ideologues 
( ) f. Among the ideologues 
( ) g. Clearly among the ideologues 
1:6 Are there any parties with whose members you would not even consider working with in a coalition? (Please 
check from list below.) 
()a.CDU Oc.SPD ( ) e.Die Griinen ( ) g.DSU ( ) i.ODP ( ) k. NPD 
Ob.CSU ()d.FDP Of.PDS ( ) h.REP Oj.DKP 
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1:7 If you have answered "yes" to question 1:6, please specify why you could not cooperate with the members of 
such other party groups. 
For reasons of: 
( ) a. Ideological Differences 
(  ) b. My party follows a policy of parliamentary opposition 
( ) c. Previous disappointing experience of cooperation with party 
( ) d. Advice or Directions from state party leaders 
(  ) e. Advice or Directions from party group at federal level 
2:1 Please indicate to what extent you believe your personal views are considered by your party leaders prior to the 
party's decision to share power with another party. 
(  ) a. My views are always considered in matters of coalition strategy 
(  ) b. My views are frequently considered in matters of coalition strategy 
( ) c. My views are sometimes considered in matters of coalition strategy 
(  ) d. My views are rarely considered in matters of coalition strategy 
(  ) e. My views are never considered in matters of coalition strategy 
2:2 How frequent is cooperation among the parties in the Landtag in the following situations? 
a. Election of Ministerprasident 
Rare 
1 
Occasional 
2 
Frequent 
3 
b. Selection of Cabinet Members 1 2 3 
c. Approval of Budget 1 2 3 
d. Passage of Legislation 1 2 3 
2:3 What types of coalitional activity occur in the Landtag? (Check all relevant responses.) 
(  ) a. Written agreements between party groups 
(  ) b. Verbal agreements between party groups 
(  ) c. Frequent voting support in plenary sessions 
(  ) d. Frequent voting support in committee meetings 
(  ) e. Agreements between party groups not to hinder one another 
(  ) f. Agreements between party groups to disadvantage other group(s) 
2:4 In the process leading to the formation of a new coalition you and your party are likely influenced by many 
considerations in your approach to negotiations. From the list below, please circle the number that best represents 
your party's concerns. 
Not at All Somewhat Very 
Influential Influential Influential 
a. The need for a majority in Landtag 1 2 3 
b. The need for a majority on primary committees 1 2 3 
c. The securing of committee chairs for your fraktion 1 2 3 
d. Obtaining concessions on policy 1 2 3 
e. The ideology of other parties 1 2 3 
f. The climate of local public opinion 1 2 3 
g. The climate of national public opinion 1 2 3 
h. Federal party policy on coalitions 1 2 3 
2:5 Thinking about all of the new Land governments you have seen negotiated, in what percentage of those cases 
would you say there has been some conflict between the Land party and the Bund party over partners, policies, or 
concessions? 
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2:6 Please rank from 1-3 the importance given by state party to the following considerations when negotiating a 
coalition with another party or parties. 
Not Somewhat Very 
Important Important Important 
a. Agreement on a specific policy issue 1 2 3 
b. Need to be part of majority in council 1 2 3 
c. Maintaining party and ideological identity 1 2 3 
d. Electoral advantages of an alliance 1 2 3 
e. Instructions from federal party 1 2 3 
2:7 To your knowledge, how important are the following considerations for your federal party when it negotiates a 
coalition with another party or parties at the federal level. 
Not Somewhat Very 
Important Important Important 
a. Agreement on a specific policy issue 1 2 3 
b. Need to be in parliamentary majority 1 2 3 
c. Maintaining party and ideological identity 1 2 3 
d. Electoral advantages of an alliance 1 2 3 
e. Instructions from state parties 1 2 3 
2:8 Will voters at the next election hold you and your party accountable for a coalition you may have sought with 
another party or parties to influence the distribution of government posts or to promote a policy? 
D Yes D No 
3:1-5 Do you agree with the following statements? (Please circle your responses.) 
Strongly Strongly No 
Disagree Disagree Agree Agree Opinion 
3:1 "The national party 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (0) 
has a legitimate right, 
considering its position, 
to expect that its 
suggestions will be 
carried out at all levels 
of government." 1 2 3 4 0 
3:2 "State party members 
respect the national party's 
competence and good 
judgment about things with 
which it is more 
experienced than they." 1 2 3 4 0 
3:3 "State party members 
admire national party 
leaders for their personal 
qualities, and want to act 
in ways that merit the 
respect and admiration of 
their national leaders." 1 2 3 4 0 
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3:4 "The national party can 
give special help and 
benefits to those who 
cooperate with it."  1 2 3 4 0 
3:5 "The national party can 
apply pressure or penalize 
those who do not cooperate 
with it."  1 2 3 4 0 
3:6 How would you characterize the influence of your party's national leadership in the government formation 
process in the Landtag and in your party group's decisions to form a coalition with another party or parties? 
(  ) a. Very Influential (  ) c. Not Very Influential () e. Uncertain 
(  ) b. Influential (  ) d. Not at all Influential 
3:7 Does your federal party organization advise you, when composing the state manifesto, to follow the intentions 
and policies of the federal party? 
•—' Yes, in everything LJ Yes, in some respects '-J No 
3:8 In politics, one often talks about "Left" and."Right". Where would you place your state party, ideologically, in 
relation to your federal party? (Please place an "L" on the scale for your state party and a "B" on the scale for your 
federal party.) 
Far Left Center Center Center Right Far 
Left Left Right Right 
3:9 After the most recent election, were any members of the national parliament or of the national party leadership 
physically present during any part of the negotiations to form a new regional government? 
yes • 
-PLEASE ANSWER QUESTIONS 4:1-4:2 ONLY IF YOUR PARTY IS PRESENTLY PART OF THE 
GOVERNING COALITION. IF YOUR PARTY IS NOT CURRENTLY A PART OF THE STATE 
GOVERNMENT, PLEASE GO TO QUESTION 5:1. 
4:1 In order that a governing coalition could be formed following the most recent Landtagswahl, please indicate 
whether your party made or obtained concessions with respect to another party or parties in the following policy 
areas. 
CONCESSIONS MADE CONCESSIONS GAINED 
MAJOR MINOR NONE MAJOR MINOR NONE 
Finance 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Education 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Transport 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Health 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Environment 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Labor 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Agriculture 2 3 4 5 6 
Justice 1 2 3 4 5 6 
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4:2 Which of the following aspects of coalitions do you think contributes most to your state party's electoral appeal? 
(Please circle your responses.) 
Least Somewhat Most 
Important Important Important 
a. Publicity gained from being in the government 
b. Psychological boost gained by being part of the 
government 
c. Opportunity to distribute patronage 
d. Opportunity to implement a program 
5:1 Would you say that elections in your Land are determined more by national issues and personalities, more by 
Land issues and personalities, or more by issues of local public administration? (Please only check one.) 
(  ) a. More by national themes, personalities, and parties 
(  ) b. More by Land themes, personalities, and parties 
(  ) c. More by administrative concerns and not party politics 
5:2 How would you characterize the intensity of the most recent Landtag election campaign compared with others 
around the country? 
(  ) a. More competitive (  ) b. Less Competitive (  ) c. Equal in Intensity 
5:3 Given the current electoral system in your Land, is it more politically prudent for you as an incumbent official to 
assure your position vis-a-vis the electors in your Wahlkreis or the party leaders who will determine your place on 
the election list? 
(  ) a. Electors in my Wahlkreis 
(  ) b. Party leaders who will determine my place on an election list 
6:1 What in your view is the actual influence of the following individuals or groups in determining the course of 
Landtag policy? (Please circle your responses.) 
Very 
Quite Great Great 
Little or No Some a Bit of Deal of Deal of 
Influence Influence Influence Influence Influence 
a. Individual Deputies 1 2 3 4 
b. Prasidium 1 2 
c. Council of Elders 
d. Parliamentary Committees 
e. Minister-prasident 
f. Staatsminister 
g. Parliamentary Parties 
h. Landesverbande 
i. Kreisverbande 
j . Bezirksverbande 
k. Bundesvorstand 
1. Bundesgeschaftsstelle 
6:2 Following the most recent election, what percentage of your party's original demands as a price for membership 
in a coalition were ultimately met? 
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6:3 Please check the response that best describes your personal access to the members of the Bundestag. 
(  ) a. Easy and regular formal access to members of Bundestag 
( ) b. Easy and regular informal access to members of Bundestag 
( ) c. Limited, formal access 
(  ) d. Limited, informal access 
(  ) e. No access 
6:4 Please check the response that best describes communication between your state party and the party organization 
at the federal level. 
( ) a. Regular but formal communication 
(  ) b. Regular and informal communication 
(  ) c. Limited and formal communication 
(  ) d. Limited and informal communication 
(  ) e. Nonexistent 
6:5 In your opinion, which of the following best describes the access of your state party group to the chief officers of 
the party at the federal level? (Please check one.) 
(  ) a. Very Open (  ) c. Limited 
(  ) b. Open (  ) d. No access 
7:1 In resolving disagreements with your federal party organization, how often does your state party group emerge 
successful? 
(  ) a. Always () d. Less than half of the time 
(  ) b. More than half of the time ( ) e. Never 
( )c  . Half of the time 
7:2 Where would you place yourself on the following scale? (Please put an "X" at the appropriate point.) 
Far Left Center Center Center Right Far 
Left Left Right Right 
7:3 Do you participate in or attend the meetings of the following bodies? (Please check the appropriate boxes.) 
Most 
From Time of the 
Never to Time Regularly Time Always 
a. Bundesvorstand 1 2 3 4 5 
b. Bundesausschuss 1 2 3 4 5 
c. Landesverbande 1 2 3 4 5 
d. Kreisverbande 1 2 3 4 5 
e. Bezirksverbande 1 2 3 4 5 
7:4 How active do you consider yourself to be in affairs of your party at the local, state, and federal levels? 
Local Level State Level Federal Level 
(  ) a. Very Active () a. Very Active ( ) a. Very Active 
(  ) b. Fairly Active () b. Fairly Active ( ) b. Fairly Active 
(  ) c. Rarely Active () c. Rarely Active () c. Rarely Active 
( ) d. Not Active ( ) d. Not Active () d. Not Active 
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7:5 Do you plan to stand for election to the Landtag at the next election? 
D Yes D No 
7:6 Would you consider standing for election to the Bundestag? 
Q Yes 0 No 
Thank you for your cooperation 1 
Appendix Two 
Survey Responses by Country, Subnational Assembly, and Party 
Country, Subnational Assemblies Parties Totals 
Belgium PS PSC FDF PRL FN AGIR ECOLO N % 
Brabant Conseii Provincial 8/10 4/6 7/7 5/15 — 4/7 28/45 62.2 
Hainaut Conseil Provincial 13/42 8/20 — 7/14 1/1 4/13 33/90 36.7 
Liege Conseil Provincial 12/36 12/18 __ 7/19 — 0/1 6/12 37/86 43.0 
Luxembourg Conseil Provincial 5/13 6/18 — 7/15 — — 3/4 21/50 42.0 
Namus Conseil Provincial 3/26 3/17 _ i i /  H _ — 3/3 20/60 33.3 
Brussels-Capital Conseil Regional 9/18 4/9 7/15 6/15 1/2 
— 
3/8 30/67 44.8 
Totals N 50/145 34/88 14/22 43/92 2/3 0/1 23/47 169/398 
% 34.5 38.6 63.6 46.7 66.7 00.0 48.9 42.5 
Germany SPD CDU FDP REP DVU Griine N % 
Baden-Wiirttemberg Landtag 16/46 19/64 3/8 5/15 _ 4/13 49/146 33.6 
Bremen Biirgerschaft 11/41 13/32 4/10 — 4/5 4/11 28/99 28.3 
Hesse Landtag 17/45 18/47 3/8 — _ 4/12 42/112 37.5 
Lower Saxony Landtag 26/71 22/67 4/9 — 
— 
3/8 61/155 39.4 
Totals N 70/203 72/210 14/35 5/15 4/5 15/44 180/512 
% 34.5 34.3 40.0 33.3 80.0 34.1 35.2 
France PC MRG PS FU UDF RPR CPNT FN Verts GE N % 
Alsace Conseil Regional 2/6 — 4/11 3/8 6/9 4/6 2/3 21/43 48.8 
Aquitaine Conseil Regional 3/6 4/20 — 7/15 4/14 4/8 1/2 3/7 26/72 36.1 
Bourgogne Conseil Regional 2/3 6/9 2/3 3/11 5/12 0/1 4/8 1/5 2/2 25/54 46.3 
Languedoc-Roussillon Conseil 
Regional 2/8 4/14 — 2/11 3/11 5/13 2/3 2/4 21/65 32.3 
Lorraine Conseil Regional 1/3 3/10 2/6 5/11 7/21 4/10 2/5 1/6 25/72 34.7 
Midi-Pyrenees Conseil Regional 2/5 3/5 8/23 — 4/16 5/18 2/9 4/6 2/5 2/2 32/89 36.0 
Picardie Conseil Regional 2/6 4/9 — 4/11 6/11 1/3 3/8 2/5 3/4 25/57 43.8 
Pays de la Loire Conseil Regional 1/3 3/4 6/16 3/6 7/20 6/20 5/8 5/6 4/6 40/89 44.9 
Provence-Alpes C6te d'Azur 
Conseil Regional 4/10 — 14/30 — 5/24 9/17 — 7/34 3/3 2/3 44/121 36.4 
Totals AT 17/44 6/9 51/137 7/15 41/130 48/132 4/14 42/104 22/40 21/37 259/662 
38.6 66.7 37.2 46.7 31.5 36.4 28.6 40.4 55.0 56.8 39.1 
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NOTES

Chapter One 
1. After the 1992 French regional council elections, Les Verts (Greens) out­
maneuvered the Socialists to gain control of the Nord-Pas de Calais region. 
2. The Parti Social-Chretien (PSC) "won" Luxembourg's five provincial 
elections between 1981 and 1994, yet lost provincial power to an alliance of 
Socialists (PS) and Liberals (PRL). 
3. The Republikaner Party caused an electoral "earthquake" in Baden-
Wixrttemberg at the 1992 Landtag election when it gained 15 seats and became 
the third-largest party in the parliament, surpassing both the Greens and the 
Free Democrats. 
Chapter Two 
1. Quotations are from interviews with provincial councilors conducted on 
12 June 1993 in Brugge and 10 July 1993 in Namur. 
2. Bogdanor's (1983) introduction to Coalition Government in Western Europe 
provides a useful summary of these different types of coalitions. 
3. For an excellent discussion of "coalition avoidance,'* see Strom and Lei-
part (1993, 870-87). 
4. Controversy over Fourons played a large role in bringing down the Esy­
kens CVP/PSC-PSB government in 1972 and more recently the Martens CVP/ 
PSC-PRL/PVV coalition in 1987. The issue stems from a 1962 drawing of lin­
guistic borders, a move that transferred six villages of the Fourons district 
from the French-speaking province of Liege to the Flemish province of Lim­
burg. A summary of this complex issue is provided in "Les Fourons: Alsace-
Lorraine des Wallons," Le Monde (13-14 June 1993). 
5. The unlikelihood of a SP-PVV-VU coalition was suggested by the CVP 
spokesman in Limburg in a 12 November 1992 interview with the author. 
However, the specter of such an outcome was raised by the CVP itself during 
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the last days of the campaign when it asked voters: "L'electeur ne compte-t-il 
plus? Une alliance monstreuse contre le CVP?" (Le Soir, 26 November 1991). 
6. "Le CVP dans Topposition," La Libre Belgiqite, 30 November 1991. 
7. "Overeenkomst SP-PVV-VU met betrekking op het bestuur van Pro­
vincie Limburg" (Document obtained by the author). 
8. For more on the choice of a center-left "losers coalition" and its apparent 
rejection of the electorate's verdict, see Fitzmaurice (1992). 
9. Interview with CVP senator (Brussels, 8 December 1992). 
Chapter Three 
1. On "nested" behavior, see Tsebelis (1990). 
2. Figure 3.6 builds upon the graphical framework suggested by Kitschelt 
(1989b, 253). 
Chapter Four 
1. Three questionnaires were produced in order to make sense in the par­
ticular lexicons of the German, Belgian, and French political systems. Natu­
rally, the questionnaires sent to Belgium and France were written in French, 
and those sent to Germany were composed in German. Translations of the 
questionnaires from English to French and from English to German were fa­
cilitated by independent language experts as well as political scientists familiar 
with the precise terminology of the individual political systems. A cover letter 
explained to potential respondents the questionnaire's emphasis on govern­
ment formation and alliance politics. Anonymity and confidentiality were as­
sured to all respondents, although ultimately a large number voluntarily 
identified themselves. A pilot questionnaire was first administered to a small 
sample of subnational representatives from one party in each of the three 
country cases. Questionnaires were sent in May 1992 to preselected individuals 
in the German CDU, the Belgian Parti Socialiste, and the French Parti So­
cialiste with the request that they be completed and with an added solicitation 
to comment further on specific questions where necessary. A sufficient number 
of returns bearing both substantive and stylistic remarks served the process 
of refining the survey instrument, helping to eliminate several inappropriate 
questions as well as those that seemed to add little information and could have 
diluted response rates. Such an initial test also helped minimize the possibility 
of introducing systematic errors that could bias the results. 
2. For their assistance in this regard, the following persons deserve men­
tion: Jos Vandeputte (Brabant), Leon De Winne (East Flanders), Gisele Keer­
sebilck (West Flanders), Omer Coenen (Antwerp), Marc Martens (Limburg), 
Andre Cornet (Luxembourg), Philippe Huge (Namur), Charles Simon (Hai­
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naut), and Jean Claude Piret (Liege). Additional assistance was provided by 
Ernest Staes, Consul General of Belgium in Atlanta. 
3. Following Pijnenburg (1987), local coalitions are congruent when they 
match the national majority versus opposition pattern, either directly or in 
reverse. In a five-party (A, B, C, D, E) national parliament where parties A 
and C constitute the government, "direct congruency" in a five-party (A', B  \ 
C  , D', E') regional assembly is the situation in which parties A' and C share 
executive power, and parties B', D', and E' do not. Reversed congruency is the 
situation in which B', D', and E' share regional power and A' and C do not. 
"For each cluster of parties, whether it finds itself on the majority or the op­
position side is not really important here (direct vs. reversed congruency), as 
long as there is an identical (i.e. between the same partners) 'alliance' or inter­
party bond at the national and local level" (Pijnenburg 1987, 58). Coalitions are 
incongruent when they do not match the national majority-versus-opposition 
pattern. However, I expand Pijnenburg's operationalization of incongruent 
coalitions to include those coalitions in which parties that share parliamentary 
opposition status but that also have expiict policies of noncooperation choose 
to cooperate locally. In this regard, when the mainstream center-right oppo­
sition parties in France adopt "hands-off" policies toward opposition National 
Front legislators in the Assemblee Nationale but then collaborate in regional 
majorities, such alliance patterns are deemed incongruent because there is no 
identical alliance or inter party bond at national and subnationai levels. This 
we may deem the "pariah rule." 
4. All the provinces chosen for inclusion in the survey population lie in the 
francophone Walloon half of Belgium except for bilingual Brabant, whose 
provincial assembly is composed of equal representations from the province's 
Wallon and Flemish districts. The decision to exclude the Flemish provinces 
and the Dutch-speaking councilors in Brabant province and in the Brussels-
Capital Region was a deliberate choice to control for linguistic divisions within 
the party "families," a potentially confounding variable. 
5. France Unie formed in 1990 to regroup the nonsocialist or "ouverture" 
members of the "majority presidentielle," frequently referred to in the French 
press as "gaullists de gauche." 
6. Unfortunately, "the goal of error-free measurement—while laudable— 
is never attained in any area of scientific investigation" (Carmines and Zeller 
1979, 11). Chance or random error is always a possibility. Like any other 
method, moreover, the survey questionnaire technique is subject to these 
chances and to the criticism that its results can blur "reality." If, for example, 
repeated measurements of the same phenomenon do not yield the same results 
(i.e., if they are not reliable), then results and analysis may both be skewed. 
Similarly, if some conceptual indicator does not actually measure what the re­
searcher intends, then the results and subsequent analysis may be invalid. Con­
cerns about reliability and validity raise the possibility of nonrandom error; 
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however, nonrandom error is, to a certain extent, within the power of the re­
searcher to control. 
7. Interviews lasted between 30 minutes and three hours in length. In all 
cases, notes were made during the interview; in others, the interview was 
tape recorded and subsequently transcribed. Recording the responses, which 
clearly improves subsequent evaluation, had no perceptible impact on the re­
spondents' candor. Anonymity proved to be a concern for only some of the 
interviewees, but I generally refrain from attaching names to quotations in the 
text. 
Chapter Five 
1. A useful example of this treatment of subnational coalitions as "inter­
ferences" can be found in Mabille and Lentzen (1988, 49—50). 
2. A comprehensive discussion of Belgium's constitutional development 
is provided by Alen (1990). See also chapters 3 and 4 on central, regional, and 
local government in John Fitzmaurice (1983). 
3. "L'institution provinciale, organised par la Loi provinciale du 30 avril 
1836, present bien des analogies avec Torganisation de TEtat beige" (CRISP 
1972, 2). 
4. The Permanent Deputation predates the Belgian state itself, with the 
first reference to such an institution being in 1664. A useful discussion of these 
origins may be found in Le Soir, 12 April 1992. 
5. Interview with Ecolo party group leader in Luxembourg Provincial 
Council (Arlon, 21 October 1992). 
6. This is especially true among provincial councilors in the Parti Social-
Chretien. See "PSC: le baroud des provincialistes," Le Soir, 19 January 1993. 
7. Ibid. 
8. Provincial councils' election of members of the Belgian Senate dates 
from 1893, a practice that ended with the reform of the Senate in 1993. 
9. See for example "Conseil Provincial: Le budget 93 est accepte majorite 
contre opposition; Les Ecolos voient une taxe-sante" inegale et les PSC rejettent 
une fiscalite allant crescendo," La Meuse—Luxembourg, 5 November 1992. 
10. Interview with Ecolo councilor in Luxembourg Province, (Arlon, 21 
October 1992). 
11. Province de Luxembourg, Projet de Budget: Des Recettes et Depenses Pro­
vinciales Pour VAnnie 1993, Arlon, 1992. 
12. For every 200,000 inhabitants each province received one senator; for 
any remaining 125,000 the province obtained an additional senator. 
13. "Depoussierer la Province," La Meuse—Lihge, 4 November 1992. 
14. "Scission de la province du Brabant: De troublantes questions pour 
l'avenir de Bruxelles," Vlan, 4 April 1993. 
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15. Interview with Socialist provincial group leader (Hasselt, 19 November 
1992). 
16. The Communists did not receive a seat or a portfolio in the provincial 
executive (CRISP, 1972). 
17. CRISP (1972, 24). 
18. A valuable account of the demise of Vanden Boeynants's government 
and the Leuven/Louvain controversy is found in Chapter 1 of Lemaitre (1982). 
19. Namely the town of Fourons/Voeren, trapped as it is between the prov­
inces of Limburg and Liege, and the object of a certain amount of gerryman­
dering. 
20. Lemaitre (1982, 7). 
21. CRISP (1974, 4). 
22. LeSoir, 13 November 1971. 
23. Het Volk, 14 November 1972. 
24. La Libre Belgique, 26 December 1978. 
25. LaPeuple, 19 December 1978. 
26. Article 28 of the Basic Law. 
27. Useful overviews of the German federal system can be found in Kloss 
(1990) and in Johnson (1983). 
28. Enough time has not yet elapsed since reunification to allow for mean­
ingful longitudinal comparisons between party behavior in the five eastern 
Lander and party behavior at the federal level. This analysis thus limits itself 
in large part to a discussion of the traditional 11 Landtage of the former West 
Germany. 
29. The one-vote system is described in Zinnkann (1991). For a comparison 
with the federal two-ballot system see Electoral Law (1986). 
30. A SPD-FDP coalition would have produced a six-seat parliamentary 
majority. 
31. The FDP had already been in coalition with the Saarland CDU since 
1977, although this had occurred between elections. 
32. A similar "traffic light" coalition emerged the same year in the eastern 
state of Brandenburg, where the SPD, FDP, and Biindnis 90 agreed to share 
power. 
33. Regional elections in Corsica had already taken place in 1984. 
34. Le Monde, 16 April 1992. 
35. Le Monde, 24 March 1992. 
36. The two-thirds criterion is not always the deciding factor in national 
government formation even during periods of constitutional revision. The 
government formed in 1991, although charged with legislating Belgium's fed­
eral status, did not command such a majority. The Catholic-Socialist govern­
ment had to build legislative coalitions with the ecologists and the Volksunie 
to secure the necessary two-thirds support in parliament. 
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37. These are conveniently arranged in Appendix B of Laver and Schofield 
(1990). 
Chapter 6 
1. One drawback in the area of temporal comparability exists with France: 
there have been only two sets of regional elections, and thus there is only one 
measurement point of volatility. Whereas a significantly broader historical 
span of comparable evidence is available for Belgium and Germany, it simply 
does not yet exist for France. This fact is a liability only in that changes in net 
volatility for the French regions are not available for comparison with the other 
two countries. 
2. Most observers agree that the start of the 1960s also marked a consol­
idation of the party systems in the Federal Republic. This, then, is a sufficient 
point of departure for the measurement. See Roberts (1989) and Mliller-
Rommel (1989). 
3. Following Pedersen (1983), it is necessary to note that an "average may 
not be typical for the diachronic pattern, but may, for example, reflect the 
occurrence of one or a few highly atypical elections" (37). Therefore, it was 
useful to examine the dispersion of volatility measures around their respective 
Land, province, and regional means. In the German case, for example, plot­
ting the mean volatility of the Lander for the period from 1961 to 1995 against 
the standard deviation for each Land reinforces the conclusion that groups of 
states may be characterized by different levels of electoral uncertainty. Bavaria, 
Rhineland-Palatinate, Lower Saxony, Schleswig-Hoistein, and North Rhine-
Westphalia stand out as states with stable and comparatively low levels of elec­
toral volatility. Alternatively, the state party systems in Bremen, Hamburg, 
Hessen, Baden-Wiirttemberg, and Saarland appear similar in that each has a 
high mean volatility and a high degree of fluctuation around that mean. Ap­
plying the same procedures to the Belgian provinces also yields two apparent 
clusters. Three of the Walloon provinces (Luxembourg, Liege, and Namur) 
score high on both the volatility and fluctuation measures, whereas all four of 
the Flemish provinces and Brabant score comparatively low on both. In Flan­
ders more than in Wallonia, the relative electoral fortunes of parties hardly 
change from one election to the next. The anomoly is Hainaut, which dem­
onstrates moderate to high average net gains/losses but which is not included 
in the same cluster as the other southern provinces. This finding is partially 
explained by a 1965 Hainaut election that was highly atypical in terms of 
average volatility. Plotting regional volatility averages against their standard 
deviations for France is not as useful as in the other two countries, given that 
there is no purpose in trying to identify the effects of "atypical" elections with 
only two time points available. 
4. For the sake of comparability, data from the 1994 provincial election are 
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excluded. In the 1994 election, unlike the previous 10 elections under consid­
eration, the vote was held separate from national parliamentary elections. 
Moreover, the division of Brabant Province into two separate provinces makes 
comparison with earlier elections impossible. 
5. The existence of two distinctive subgroups of nationalized (i.e., "fed­
eralized") and localized (i.e., "regionalized") state electoral systems in Germany 
is reinforced by plotting mean localization values against the respective stan­
dard deviations. Plotting the localization measure for the Belgian provinces 
against the standard deviations around their respective means likewise pro­
vides supporting evidence to classify Namur and Luxembourg as the more 
"localized" electoral systems in comparison to the more "nationalized" electoral 
systems in Liege, Brabant, East Flanders, and West Flanders. For the same 
reasons outlined in note 3, it would be inappropriate in the French case to 
attempt a plotting of localization and interelection standard deviations around 
regional means. 
6. One questionnaire item, for example, asked assembly members to com­
pare the importance of local versus national issues and personalities to the 
outcome of the most recent election in the province or region. The correlation 
between area means for this item and area scores on the aggregate localization 
measure was r = 0.92 (p < .10). 
7. As Paterson (1989) reports, talk of grand coalition in Germany at this 
time was serious, and implementation of such an arrangement in one or more 
of the Lander was not an unrealistic option. A survey taken before the 1987 
federal election found 43% of SPD supporters in favor of a coalition with the 
Christian Democrats (360). 
8. It should be noted that electoral volatility in Hamburg before the 1974 
watershed election had been comparatively mild. The average interelection 
change in party vote shares before 1974 was 2.9%, whereas after 1974 the 
average volatility per election was 4.6%. This may in part explain the coop­
erative stance of the SPD in including the FDP in governments where the SPD 
already had a majority by itself (1961-66, 1970-74). 
9. "M. Robert Savy (PS) perpetue l'union de la gauche," Le Monde, 30 
March 1992. 
10. Le Point, 30 March 1992. 
11. Le Monde, 30 March 1992. 
Chapter 7 
1. LeSoir, 16 December 1987. 
2. Although absent from the provincial majority since the 1978—81 leg­
islative period, the PSC has consistently been the largest single party in the 
Luxembourg provincial council. 
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3. See "Luxembourg PRL-PS: O.K." (LeSoir, 16 December 1987); and "Le 
Pacte est mort au Luxembourg" (Le Peuple, 16 December 1987). 
4. Le Soir, 16 December 1987. 
5. Interview with Gerard Deprez, president of the Parti Social-Chretien 
(Brussels, 24 February 1993). 
6. Interview with International Relations Officer, FDP Bundesgeschafts­
stelle (Bonn, 5 May 1993). 
7. Interview with PRL provincial councilor in Hainaut (Mons, 6 Novem­
ber 1992). 
8. Interview with Verts regional assembly member and vice president in 
Nord-Pas de Calais regional government (Lille, 29 April 1993). 
9. Deprez interview (Brussels, 24 February 1993). 
10. The strategic factionalism index is derived from four variables. The 
DISTANCE variable captures respondent placement of subnational party on 
a 10-point Left-Right ideological scale in comparison to placement of national 
party. DISTANCE is an absolute value. The IMPORT variable measures the 
importance for the subnational group to replicate the party's coalition strategy 
at the national level (very important, important, little importance, not at all 
important). The INSTRUCT variable measures the importance of following 
the instructions of national party leaders in coalition situations (very impor­
tant, important, little or no importance). The DEFER variable gauges respon­
dents* agreement with the statement that "the national party has a legitimate 
right to expect that its instructions will be accepted at all levels of the party" 
(strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree). 
11. Cumulative measures of volatility and localization are used here. 
Again, it should be noted that the relative differences of these cumulative mea­
sures are corroborated by measures of volatility and localization limited to the 
two most recent elections. 
12. The IDEOLOGY variable measures respondent placement on a Left-
Right ideological scale, with values -5 through +5 . The PRAGMAT survey 
item asked respondents to place themselves on a seven-point scale, ranging 
from "clearly among the pragmatists" to "clearly among the ideologues." The 
third component of the organizational radicalism composite measure is the 
RESPECT variable, with respondents indicating the extent to which they re­
spect the judgment and authority of national party leaders (strongly agree, 
agree, disagree, strongly disagree). The fourth variable, ADMIRE, asked re­
spondents to indicate their level of agreement with the statement: "Subnational 
party members admire their party's national leaders for their personal qual­
ities and would like to act in a manner that will merit the respect of their lead­
ers" (strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree). 
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Chapter 8 
1. This discussion omits coalitions formed in municipal councils, al­
though evidence suggests that many coalition experiments originate in local 
government. 
2. For more on this split, see Mabille and Brassinne (1992, 27). 
3. The PS did not make a formal alliance with the France Unie movement, 
largely on the objections of the MRG. See Le Monde, 12-13 January 1992. 
4. Liberation, 18-19 April 1992. 
5. Le Monde, 11 April 1992. 
6. Despite some advances in this area, the standing indictment against 
coalition theory remains valid. Not only are spatial influences on coalition 
building generally neglected, but so too are temporal influences. Laver (1989), 
for example, indicates that "one of the great weaknesses of coalition theories 
as they apply to national governments is they do not take a long-term view of 
party competition" (27). 
7. Interview with senior CDU executive in Berlin Senate (Berlin, 29 
March 1993). Emphasis added. 
8. Interview with Social Democrat Landtag deputy (Berlin, 1 April 1993). 
Emphasis added. 
9. Interview with CDU Fraktionvorsitzender in Baden-Wurttemberg Land-
tag (Stuttgart, 27janaury 1993). 
10. Interview with SPD Fraktionvorsitzender in Baden-Wurttemberg Land-
tag (Stuttgart, 27 January 1993). 
11. Interview with Ecolo councilor in Luxembourg provincial assembly 
(Arlon, 21 October 1992). 
12. Interview with Ecolo chefde group in Brussels Regional Council (Brus­
sels, 5 November 1992). 
13. Interview with PRL councilor in Hainaut provincial assembly (Mons, 6 
November 1992). 
14. Interview with PRL chef de group in Liege provincial assembly (Brussels, 
2 December 1992). 
15. Interview with PS official in Picardie regional council (Amiens, 7 De­
cember 1992). Emphasis added. 
16. Interview with FN regional councilor in Nord-Pas de Calais (Lille, 14 
June 1993). Emphasis added. 
17. Letter to author (1 July 1992). 
18. Interview with FDP spokesman (Bonn, 5 May 1993). 
19. Interview with CDS secretaire general (Paris, 21 April 1993). 
20. Interview with CVP Senator (Brussels, 8 December 1992). 
21. Kitschelt (1989a) considers that the "generalized ability of all parties 
to coalesce with each other is a sign of the regime's openness" (411). 
22. The latter would not be likely to occur, of course, given that respon­
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dents should generally not indicate an unwillingness to participate in coop­
eration with their own party! 
23. Belgian respondents were asked to indicate their openness to the fol­
lowing set of parties: PS, SP, PSC, CVP, PRL, PVV, Ecolo, FDF, Volksunie, 
FN, Agalev, Vlaams Blok. For German respondents the list included: CDU, 
CSU, SPD, FDP, Grunen, PDS, DVU, Republikaner. French regional counci­
lors responded to the following list of parties: PC, PS, MRG, Verts, GE, UDF­
CDS, UDF-Rad., UDF-PR, UDF-PDS, RPR, France Unie, FN. 
24. These data are restricted in that they are limited to a very small pool 
of available respondents. The responses of the Belgian FN are limited to those 
of one of the party's only two provincial councilors. Those of the German Re­
publicans come from 5 of the 15 Baden-Wiirttemberg parliamentarians, and 
the DVU's responses are provided by four of the five party members in the 
Bremen Biirgerschaft. As the French FN has councilors in all of the regions, 
there is less concern about generalizing from the 42 (40.4%) respondents from 
the nine regions surveyed. 
25. Le Soir, 26 November 1991. 
26. Ibid. 
27. Le Soir, 29 November 1991. 
28. "Brabant: Le PSC sur la touche," La Libre Belgique, 29 November 1991. 
29. Jan Anthoons, quoted in Le Soir, 29 November 1991. 
30. Interview with PRL spokesman in national party headquarters (Brus­
sels, 14 December 1992). 
31. Le Monde, 29-30 March 1992. 
32. Calling the process a "mascarade," Borloo retired his candidacy and 
announced that his group would not participate in the third round of voting. 
This done, Legendre felt it his obligation to present his own candidacy once 
again. Details of the three rounds of presidential voting may be found in Le 
Monde, 30 March-1 April 1992. 
33. Le Monde, 1 April 1992. 
34. Interview with Verts regional councilor and regional vice president 
(Lille, 29 April 1993). 
35. Le Monde, 2 April 1992. 
36. Jean-Pierre Soisson, quoted in Le Monde, 8 April 1992. 
37. Projet d*Accord Entre Le Parti Socialiste et Les Verts: Faire du Nord-Pas de 
Calais la Premiere Region de Developpement Durable (Lille, 9 October 1992). 
38. Projet dAccord, 3. 
39. Ibid., 4. 
40. Le Soir, 24 March 1992. 
41. Interview with Republican Party Fraktionvorsitzender in Baden-Wiirt-
temberg Landtag (Stuttgart, 27 January 1993). 
42. Interview with Green Landtag deputy (Green "A,'* Stuttgart, 27 Jan­
uary 1993). 
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43. Interview with Green Party Fraktionvorsitzender (Stuttgart, 27 January 
1993). 
44. Interview with Green Landtag deputy (Green "B," Stuttgart, 27 Jan­
uary 1993). 
45. Interview with Green Landtag deputy (Green "B," Stuttgart, 27 Jan­
uary 1993). 
46. Interview with CDU Fraktionvorsitzender (Stuttgart, 27 January 1993). 
47. Interview with Green Landtag deputy (Green "C," Stuttgart, 27 Jan­
uary 1993). 
48. Interview with Green Landtag deputy (Green "A," Stuttgart, 27 Jan­
uary 1993). 
49. Le Monde, 7 April 1992. 
50. Interview with SPD Landtag deputy, (Berlin, 1 April 1993). 
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